--- title: "Algeria (DZ) — Financial-Integrity Intelligence · Sentinel" canonical: https://sentinel.gi/jurisdictions/algeria/ source_html: /jurisdictions/algeria/index.html description: "Financial integrity intelligence for Algeria (DZ): sanctions, beneficial ownership, enabler jurisdictions, conflict finance, digital assets and compliance technology — with sourced findings." generated_at: 2026-11-08T04:46:02Z content_sha256: 1426dcfed298b82eb9e32743f251b513a468146905ba75da3a6e9affb998bd54 generator: "fe-fleet/md-twin@1.0" --- # Algeria (DZ) — Financial-Integrity Intelligence · Sentinel Not every instrument is backed by its official text yet. At least one law or rulebook covered here has no official source (tier 1) retrieved for it yet. No finding on this page is shown with confidence above “Probable” until stronger sources are retrieved. Financial Integrity Monitor # Algeria DZ Domains covered 8 of 8 Sources 116 Role actions 8 Horizon <90d 1 Jurisdiction profile FATF status: Clean Tier: B Risk direction: Decreasing Enablement vs enforcement: Mixed Algeria's AML/CFT regime rests on the 2005 Anti-Money-Laundering/CFT Act and 2006 Anti-Corruption Act, with the CTRF financial intelligence unit at the Ministry of Finance and Bank of Algeria customer due-diligence regulations. More FATF grey-listed Algeria in October 2024; following reforms to BO sanctions, targeted financial sanctions for TF, and NPO oversight, FATF removed Algeria from increased monitoring on 19 June 2026. Key deficiencies - Beneficial ownership information framework remains under development despite a new sanctions-for-breach legal basis - Risk-based supervision of higher-risk DNFBP sectors still maturing - Private-sector understanding of ML/TF risk assessed as moderate-to-weak in the 2023 MER, particularly among banks on TF risk - Outright criminalisation of virtual assets (Law 25-10) displaces rather than eliminates crypto activity, undermining visibility into flows - Historic extractive-sector corruption (Sonatrach/Saipem) prosecutions have proceeded slowly relative to the scale of alleged laundering Recent developments (18m) - FATF placed Algeria under increased monitoring in October 2024 alongside Angola, Côte d'Ivoire and Lebanon - EU Delegated Regulation (EU) 2025/1184 (10 June 2025) added Algeria to the EU high-risk third country list - May 2025 FATF follow-up re-rated five Recommendations (16, 10, 11, 18 upgraded to largely compliant; 19 to partially compliant) - Algeria enacted Law No. 25-10 (24 July 2025) criminalising all cryptocurrency ownership, trading, mining and promotion - OFAC designated a Hamas/PFLP charity-financing network on 10 June 2025 including an Algerian national and an Algeria-based charity - February 2026 FATF Plenary made an initial determination that Algeria substantially completed its action plan, warranting an on-site verification visit - FATF removed Algeria from the grey list on 19 June 2026 following a successful on-site assessment - OFAC removed a cluster of long-standing Algeria-linked AQIM/GSPC figures from the SDN list on 28 May 2026 Brief ## Lead signal #### Lead Signal A police unit in Bejaia Province, acting through the judicial police brigade at Akbou, dismantled a network accused of laundering proceeds from unlicensed online betting through crypto-asset conversion. Reporting places the number of individuals arrested at eleven to twelve, with roughly DZD 9,000,000 and EUR 2,510 seized. The mechanism described is consistent and specific: funds deposited by bettors on the 1xBet platform were recharged and then converted into crypto and routed onward through RedotPay, Binance, PayPal and Mobcash, giving the proceeds an exit path out of the domestic financial system before they could be traced through conventional banking rails. Read full brief #### Lead Signal A police unit in Bejaia Province, acting through the judicial police brigade at Akbou, dismantled a network accused of laundering proceeds from unlicensed online betting through crypto-asset conversion. Reporting places the number of individuals arrested at eleven to twelve, with roughly DZD 9,000,000 and EUR 2,510 seized. The mechanism described is consistent and specific: funds deposited by bettors on the 1xBet platform were recharged and then converted into crypto and routed onward through RedotPay, Binance, PayPal and Mobcash, giving the proceeds an exit path out of the domestic financial system before they could be traced through conventional banking rails. The significance here is architectural rather than incidental. Algeria already treats both unlicensed online betting and virtual-asset activity as prohibited under parallel legal tracks, so the Akbou case is best read as an illustration of a recurring laundering pattern, not a one-off case. The same shape, proceeds from an illegal betting operation pushed through crypto rails for cross-border movement, was seen in an earlier gendarmerie case in May 2026. What the current reporting adds is confirmation that the pattern persists under enforcement pressure, and that the exit points used (global crypto exchanges and payment applications) are available to operators notwithstanding the domestic prohibition. #### Other Developments No other developments met the threshold for inclusion this cycle. The domain tracker otherwise shows a stable baseline, and nothing beyond the Akbou matter produced material signal within the scope of this update. #### Cross-Monitor Connections The laundering pathway surfaced at Akbou, proceeds of illegal gambling converted into crypto and dispersed through payment intermediaries with cross-border reach, has a natural connection to work tracking payment-system and platform-level financial flows, since the intermediaries named (RedotPay, Binance, PayPal, Mobcash) sit squarely in that domain even though their own regulatory posture is outside the scope of this brief. No sanctions, conflict-finance or state-capture nexus is indicated by the evidence reviewed this cycle, and no cross-reference beyond the general observation that crypto-conversion remains the preferred layering technique for illegal betting proceeds in this jurisdiction is supported by the record. #### Outlook The near-term picture for Algeria on this front is one of continuity rather than change. Enforcement activity against unlicensed betting and crypto-enabled laundering has recurred across at least two cases within the year, and the legal architecture criminalising both the predicate activity and the virtual-asset conversion step is already in force. Absent a new structural development, the expectation is further episodic enforcement of the same pattern rather than a shift in the underlying regulatory posture. A fuller account would benefit from a government or prosecutorial document rather than press reporting alone, since the only materials available to this update originate from news outlets relaying a police communication rather than a primary judicial or regulatory record. Earlier periodic briefs (4) 3 Nov 2026 · fim-2026-11-03 #### Lead Signal A police unit in Bejaia Province, acting through the judicial police brigade at Akbou, dismantled a network accused of laundering proceeds from unlicensed online betting through crypto-asset conversion. Reporting places the number of individuals arrested at eleven to twelve, with roughly DZD 9,000,000 and EUR 2,510 seized. The mechanism described is consistent and specific: funds deposited by bettors on the 1xBet platform were recharged and then converted into crypto and routed onward through RedotPay, Binance, PayPal and Mobcash, giving the proceeds an exit path out of the domestic financial system before they could be traced through conventional banking rails. The significance here is architectural rather than incidental. Algeria already treats both unlicensed online betting and virtual-asset activity as prohibited under parallel legal tracks, so the Akbou case is best read as an illustration of a recurring laundering pattern, not a one-off case. The same shape, proceeds from an illegal betting operation pushed through crypto rails for cross-border movement, was seen in an earlier gendarmerie case in May 2026. What the current reporting adds is confirmation that the pattern persists under enforcement pressure, and that the exit points used (global crypto exchanges and payment applications) are available to operators notwithstanding the domestic prohibition. #### Other Developments No other developments met the threshold for inclusion. The domain tracker otherwise shows a stable baseline, and nothing beyond the Akbou matter produced material signal within the scope of this update. #### Cross-Monitor Connections The laundering pathway surfaced at Akbou, proceeds of illegal gambling converted into crypto and dispersed through payment intermediaries with cross-border reach, has a natural connection to work tracking payment-system and platform-level financial flows, since the intermediaries named (RedotPay, Binance, PayPal, Mobcash) sit squarely in that domain even though their own regulatory posture is outside the scope of this brief. No sanctions, conflict-finance or state-capture nexus is indicated by the evidence reviewed, and no cross-reference beyond the general observation that crypto-conversion remains the preferred layering technique for illegal betting proceeds in this jurisdiction is supported by the record. #### Outlook The near-term picture for Algeria on this front is one of continuity rather than change. Enforcement activity against unlicensed betting and crypto-enabled laundering has recurred across at least two cases within the year, and the legal architecture criminalising both the predicate activity and the virtual-asset conversion step is already in force. Absent a new structural development, the expectation is further episodic enforcement of the same pattern rather than a shift in the underlying regulatory posture. A fuller account would benefit from a government or prosecutorial document rather than press reporting alone, since the only materials available to this update originate from news outlets relaying a police communication rather than a primary judicial or regulatory record. 25 Oct 2026 · fim-2026-10-25 #### Lead Signal Algeria's standing in the architecture of global financial-integrity oversight shifted structurally. The Financial Action Task Force removed Algeria from its list of jurisdictions under increased monitoring at the Plenary of 19 June 2026, closing a period that began with grey-listing in October 2024 over weaknesses in risk-based supervision and beneficial-ownership transparency. The removal followed a third enhanced follow-up report from the Middle East and North Africa Financial Action Task Force dated 24 May 2026 and an on-site assessment that the regional body's own trajectory notes had flagged as warranted as early as its February 2026 determination. Running alongside this sanctions-architecture development is a parallel structural move on beneficial ownership: Executive Decree No. 26-163 of 20 April 2026 repeals and replaces the 2023 framework and extends Algeria's public beneficial-ownership register, held by the national commercial-registry body, to cover legal arrangements including foreign-established trusts. The decree introduces an annual confirmation duty falling due by 31 December each year and requires obliged entities to maintain a continuously updated internal register rather than a point-in-time filing. Taken together, the delisting and the beneficial-ownership overhaul read as a single structural narrative: a jurisdiction whose international standing on transparency was explicitly in question has now revised its domestic register architecture in the same direction the international review process was pushing it. The pairing matters because it is architecture, not incident. Neither development is an enforcement action against a named entity; both are reconfigurations of the rules obliged entities and legal arrangements must operate under going forward. That distinction is the correct lens for reading: Algeria has not merely closed a file with the Task Force, it has also changed what its own register requires of the arrangements most often associated with opacity in ownership structures internationally. #### Other Developments Continued criminal enforcement under the virtual-asset prohibition shows that Algeria's total ban on virtual assets, enacted through Law No. 25-10 and operationalised through Bank of Algeria Règlement No. 24-03 of 24 July 2024, is not a dormant prohibition. Article 48 of that regulation requires obliged institutions to implement a mechanism capable of blocking any operation involving virtual assets and to report it immediately to the national financial-intelligence unit, the Cellule de Traitement du Renseignement Financier. Against that standing architecture, a Gendarmerie Nationale operation between 26 and 28 May 2026 dismantled a network that used ordinary trade-register company fronts as cover for a logistics chain converting online betting winnings into cryptocurrency and moving the proceeds abroad, a pattern that reporting describes as having openly circumvented the country's financial legislation. The enforcement activity illustrates that the blocking-and-reporting duty is being operated through conventional channels against a backdrop of continuing demand for crypto off-ramps, notwithstanding the comprehensive prohibition in place since 2025. A first-ever payment-service-provider authorisation was issued on 23 September 2026 when Algeria's Conseil Monétaire et Bancaire authorised Djezzy Payment Services, a subsidiary of Optimum Telecom Algérie, to incorporate as a Prestataire de Services de Paiement under the monetary and banking law of June 2023, Law No. 23-09. This is the first authorisation granted under the payment-service-provider category since that law created it, and the authorised entity now has twelve months from notification to file for the operating licence that would allow it to actually commence payment services. As a commercial-architecture development, this is less a financial-integrity finding in itself than a marker that a new category of obliged entity is about to enter Algeria's financial system for the first time, with the attendant AML/CFT onboarding, customer due-diligence and reporting obligations that attach to any newly licensed payment-service-provider once operational. #### Cross-Monitor Connections The payment-service-provider authorisation connects directly to the payments-regulation tracking maintained on the market-structure side of our coverage, where the same authorisation is read as a market-access and product-innovation development rather than a compliance one; the two readings are complementary rather than duplicative, since the entry of a telecom-affiliated nonbank entity into licensed payments activity is simultaneously a commercial-structure event and a future AML/CFT-obliged-entity event once the operating licence is granted. The dismantled crypto cash-out network, structured around the misuse of ordinary trade-register company registrations as cover, is a pattern of interest to coverage of corporate-vehicle misuse more broadly, since it demonstrates how legitimate-looking registered entities can be used as logistics cover for layering proceeds through cryptocurrency conversion notwithstanding a comprehensive statutory prohibition on virtual-asset activity. #### Outlook The near-term marker to watch is whether Algeria's post-delisting engagement with the regional Task Force body sustains the reforms that produced the June 2026 removal; jurisdictions recently taken off increased-monitoring lists typically remain subject to a period of continued bilateral engagement, and Algeria's own commitments point toward continued monitoring into 2027. On the commercial side, the twelve-month clock now running on Djezzy Payment Services' operating-licence application means the next material checkpoint falls around September 2027, when it will become clear whether Algeria's first authorised payment-service-provider has converted its incorporation authorisation into an operating licence, and with it, formal entry into the population of AML/CFT-obliged payment entities. The beneficial-ownership decree's annual confirmation cycle, falling due by 31 December each year, will provide the first real test of whether the extended register for legal arrangements, including foreign-established trusts, is being populated and maintained rather than merely legislated. 4 Oct 2026 · fim-2026-10-04 #### Lead Signal Algeria's AML/CTF regime is on an improving procedural trajectory this cycle. At its February 2026 Plenary, the FATF made the initial determination that Algeria has substantially completed its action plan, a confirmed development that now warrants an on-site assessment before Algeria can exit the FATF list of jurisdictions under increased monitoring. This procedural movement is corroborated by MENAFATF's third Enhanced Follow-up Report of June 2026, which re-rates Algeria's technical compliance against the deficiencies identified in its 2023 mutual evaluation report. Together these two primary-source publications constitute the dominant financial-integrity development for Algeria this cycle: a jurisdiction moving from action-plan implementation toward the on-site verification stage that precedes formal delisting. Under the amended UK regime effective from 30 June 2026, Regulation 33(1)(b) and (3)(a) of the Money Laundering Regulations 2017, as amended, now applies mandatory enhanced due diligence only to a FATF call for action country; Algeria's FATF grey-list status under increased monitoring is a risk factor under that regime rather than an automatic UK EDD trigger, since there is no longer a separate UK high-risk third countries list. #### Other Developments Beneficial-ownership register overhaul. A new executive decree, Decree 26-163, is reported to replace Algeria's 2023 beneficial-ownership framework, extending coverage to foreign trusts and legal arrangements and mandating continuous, rather than one-off, verification against a 20 percent capital or voting-rights threshold, or effective control failing that. This is reported at Probable confidence: secondary law-firm reporting corroborates the decree's substance, but its text was not directly retrieved this pass, and whether a public-search UBO interface is operative under the new decree remains unconfirmed. Virtual-asset activity criminalised as an AML/CFT matter. Law No. 25-10 of 24 July 2025 amends AML/CFT Law 05-01 to insert Article 6 bis, a total prohibition of virtual assets, and Article 31 bis, criminal penalties of two months to one year imprisonment and fines of 200,000 to 1,000,000 dinars. This folds all virtual-asset activity into Algeria's AML/CFT criminal perimeter, a development reported at Probable confidence pending direct retrieval of the Journal Officiel text. No active sanctions-regime finding. No international sanctions regime currently applies to Algeria, and no divergence signal was identified this cycle; this finding rests on a single T3 aggregator source and is held at Uncertain confidence. #### Cross-Monitor Connections The virtual-asset criminalisation under Law 25-10 is directly relevant to the crypto monitor, which tracks the same statute as a total prohibition on crypto licensing, on-chain activity, and cross-border transfer, foreclosing any near-term VASP licensing or CBDC-adjacent development for Algeria. It is also relevant to world-payments, where the same statute's payment-rail implications intersect with the non-bank PSP authorisation activity reported separately this cycle. The beneficial-ownership decree overhaul is relevant to advennt's gambling-sector monitoring only insofar as corporate transparency requirements could bear on operator ownership structures, though no such connection was evidenced this cycle. #### Outlook The item to watch is the scheduled FATF on-site verification assessment of Algeria's AML/CFT reforms, expected in the first quarter of 2027, which would determine whether Algeria proceeds to removal from the list of jurisdictions under increased monitoring. On beneficial ownership, whether Decree 26-163's public-search UBO function becomes independently verifiable as operative is the key open item. On virtual assets, whether any confirmed prosecution under Article 31 bis has occurred beyond the single enforcement report referenced in adjacent monitoring remains an open question for the next cycle. 22 Sep 2026 · fim-2026-08-21 #### Lead Signal Algeria's crypto-asset framework tightened decisively this cycle with Law No. 25-10 of 24 July 2025, which criminalises the issuance, purchase, sale, possession, use, mining and promotion of crypto-assets and explicitly amends and supplements the core AML/CFT statute, Law No. 05-01. Secondary reporting frames the measure as an FATF-alignment step on virtual-asset risk, though no Tier-1 primary source (Official Journal or Bank of Algeria) was reached this cycle, capping confidence at Assessed on convergent Tier-3 sourcing. This is an architecture-level development, not an incident: it restructures the entire legal treatment of a financial-innovation category rather than resolving a single enforcement matter, and it does so through the AML/CFT statute itself rather than a separate crypto-specific instrument. #### Other Developments FATF grey-list exit. The Financial Action Task Force removed Algeria, alongside Namibia, from its increased-monitoring list at the June 2026 Plenary, following on-site verification of sustained AML/CFT reform implementation. The governing instrument for Algeria's AML/CFT regime remains Law No. 05-01 as amended by Law No. 25-10, with the Bank of Algeria and the Financial Intelligence Processing Unit (CTRF) as designated authorities. Algeria continues structured follow-up with MENAFATF, its FATF-Style Regional Body, to sustain the improvements that supported delisting — a standing-position update rather than a one-off event, and a High-confidence, Tier-1-sourced finding. Enforcement echo in the crypto-gambling nexus. A network of local agents in Béjaïa was reportedly dismantled by police for organising illegal online gambling and processing cryptocurrency payments on its behalf. This finding is held at Low confidence: it rests on a single Tier-3 source with no established date, and it is recorded here as an incident-level data point rather than a structural finding. It nonetheless illustrates, at the margins, the practical mechanism the new crypto prohibition is aimed at closing. #### Cross-Monitor Connections The Béjaïa enforcement action sits directly at the intersection of this monitor's D5 crypto-integrity finding and the gambling-regulatory domain tracked elsewhere in this fleet: a crypto-payment facilitation network was reportedly used specifically to process funds for illegal online gambling, meaning the same Law No. 25-10 prohibition that this monitor tracks as an AML/CFT-architecture development also removes the payment rail that the gambling-side reporting identifies as the principal access mechanism for offshore betting. Algeria sits outside the EEA, so the EU AML Package (AMLR, 6AMLD, AMLA) is not a directly applicable instrument for this jurisdiction; DZ's standing AML/CFT record is instead anchored to the FATF/MENAFATF track, which is the operative cross-reference this cycle. #### Outlook The FATF delisting is expected to prompt correspondent banks and virtual-asset service providers to re-rate Algeria's country risk downward, though general industry practice will likely lag the formal June 2026 delisting by one to two risk-review cycles as enhanced-due-diligence treatment unwinds gradually. MENAFATF follow-up on Algeria's action plan continues through at least the fourth quarter of 2026. The crypto prohibition under Law No. 25-10 is a structural, not transitional, feature of the regime going forward; watch for whether enforcement activity beyond the single Béjaïa data point emerges as evidence that the ban is being operationalised rather than existing only on the books. Domain intelligence (D1–D8) #### Sanctions Algeria's sanctions-architecture posture turned structurally more favourable this cycle with confirmation that the Financial Action Task Force removed the country from its list of jurisdictions under increased monitoring at the Plenary held on 19 June 2026. Algeria had been placed on that list in October 2024 over weaknesses identified in risk-based supervision and beneficial-ownership transparency, two deficiencies that sit squarely within the architecture this domain tracks rather than at the level of any single enforcement incident. The path to removal ran through the Middle East and North Africa Financial Action Task Force, the regional body responsible for mutual evaluation and follow-up in this geography, which issued a third enhanced follow-up report on 24 May 2026 documenting Algeria's progress against its action plan. That report built on an earlier determination at the Task Force's February 2026 Plenary that Algeria had substantially completed its action plan and warranted an on-site assessment, a procedural step the global standard-setter reserves for jurisdictions whose claimed remediation requires independent verification before removal can be finalised. Continue reading The distinction between the different designation categories matters for how this development should be read. Grey-list status of the kind Algeria has now exited is properly understood as a call for increased monitoring rather than a call for countermeasures; it never carried the weight of a comprehensive sanctions regime, a sectoral restriction, or an enhanced-due-diligence trigger of the kind attached to a call-for-action listing. Its removal accordingly closes a chapter of heightened international scrutiny rather than lifting any formal restriction on financial-sector access, and counterparties who had been applying elevated diligence to Algerian relationships on the strength of the grey-list designation now have a formal basis, as of 19 June 2026, to recalibrate that posture. No separate European Union high-risk-third-country listing action or autonomous sanctions designation targeting Algeria was identified this cycle, and the standing tracker covering Russian sanctions-evasion architecture similarly surfaced no Algeria-specific linkage. What gives this development more than ordinary procedural significance is its coincidence, in the same cycle, with a substantive domestic reform of Algeria's beneficial-ownership register through Executive Decree No. 26-163. Grey-listing processes are frequently criticised for producing remediation that is calibrated to satisfy the reviewing body without altering underlying domestic practice; the fact that Algeria's beneficial-ownership architecture was substantively reworked in the same window as its delisting, extending coverage to legal arrangements including foreign-established trusts and introducing a continuously maintained internal register alongside an annual confirmation duty, is at minimum consistent with the reform being more than cosmetic. Confirming whether the extended register is actually populated, however, is a matter for the beneficial-ownership domain and for subsequent cycles, not something the delisting itself establishes. No primary Task Force Plenary communique for the June 2026 session was directly retrieved this cycle; the delisting itself rests on secondary reporting corroborating the trajectory established by the Task Force's own February 2026 page and the regional body's own follow-up report. That gap is noted rather than allowed to soften the underlying confidence in the direction of travel, which is well supported by the primary trajectory documents that were retrieved. #### Outlook The standard pattern for jurisdictions recently removed from increased monitoring is a period of continued bilateral engagement with the regional evaluative body to confirm that reforms are bedding in rather than merely having been enacted for the purpose of exiting the list; Algeria's own continuing-engagement posture with the Middle East and North Africa Financial Action Task Force points in that direction, with further monitoring activity plausible into 2027. The principal forward marker specific to Algeria is whether a primary Task Force statement on the June 2026 removal becomes available, which would allow this finding to move from secondary corroboration to direct primary-source confirmation, and whether the beneficial-ownership reforms that accompanied the delisting continue to be implemented in substance as the first annual confirmation cycle under Decree 26-163 approaches its December deadline. Judgment: No DZ-specific sanctions-architecture signal found this cycle. Uncertain #### Beneficial Ownership and Corporate Transparency Algeria's beneficial-ownership architecture was substantively rebuilt this cycle through Executive Decree No. 26-163 of 20 April 2026, which repeals and replaces the prior Executive Decree No. 23-429 of November 2023 and was published in the Official Gazette of the Republic of Algeria, edition number 32 of 4 May 2026. The new decree extends the public beneficial-ownership register administered by the national commercial-registry body to cover legal arrangements, including foreign-established trusts, a category of structure that the 2023 framework did not reach with the same clarity. Two obligations anchor the reform: an annual confirmation duty, under which covered entities and arrangements must confirm their beneficial-ownership data by 31 December each year, and a continuously updated internal register requirement, meaning covered entities must maintain current beneficial-ownership records on an ongoing basis rather than refreshing them only at the point of an annual filing. Taken together, these are architecture-level changes to how ownership transparency is verified and maintained in Algeria, not a single disclosure event or enforcement action. Continue reading As a durable structural backdrop against which this kind of national reform is properly read, the European Union's own beneficial-ownership and corporate-transparency architecture rests on three distinct instruments operating at different levels: the Anti-Money Laundering Regulation, directly applicable across Member States without national transposition; the sixth Anti-Money Laundering Directive, which each Member State transposes into its own domestic law; and the Anti-Money Laundering Authority Regulation, which establishes a dedicated European Union-level authority and is progressively shifting supervision of higher-risk obliged entities from purely national regulators toward a hybrid regime combining direct European Union-level supervision of the highest-risk entities with continued national supervision of the remainder. Algeria sits outside that European Union architecture and is not bound by any of its three instruments, but the direction of travel it illustrates, toward registers that are continuously maintained rather than periodically filed and toward coverage extending to legal arrangements such as trusts rather than only incorporated companies, is the same direction Algeria's own Decree 26-163 moves in. The comparison is useful as context for calibrating how far Algeria's domestic reform goes, not as a claim that Algeria is in any way bound by or converging with the European framework. The reform lands in the same cycle as Algeria's removal from the Financial Action Task Force's increased-monitoring list, a delisting that followed a grey-listing explicitly premised in part on weaknesses in beneficial-ownership transparency. Reading the two developments together, the register overhaul reads as a credible candidate for part of the substantive remediation that supported the delisting, though the connection between the two is an inference from timing and content rather than a claim made explicitly in the underlying reporting. The practical test of the reform's effectiveness will be whether the extended register, now covering legal arrangements and foreign-established trusts, is actually populated with accurate data and whether the annual confirmation mechanism produces genuine updates rather than pro forma re-filings. That test cannot be assessed yet, since the first annual confirmation deadline under the new decree, 31 December, has not yet arrived. The primary text of Decree 26-163 as published in the Official Gazette was not independently retrieved this cycle; the above rests on secondary commentary from international legal practitioners describing the decree's content and its Official Gazette reference, and that sourcing gap should be read as a limit on precision regarding the decree's exact operative text rather than as doubt about the fact of the reform itself, which is corroborated across two independent secondary accounts. #### Outlook The first material test of this reform falls on 31 December, when the annual confirmation duty under Decree 26-163 comes due for the first time; whether legal arrangements and foreign-established trusts newly brought within scope actually file confirmations, and in what volume, will be the first concrete indicator of whether the extended register is operating as designed rather than existing only on paper. Retrieval of the primary Official Gazette text, rather than continued reliance on secondary legal commentary, would materially strengthen confidence in the precise scope and mechanics of the obligations described here, particularly the exact definition of covered legal arrangements and any exemptions that the decree's full text may contain. Judgment: No DZ-specific beneficial-ownership development found this cycle. Uncertain #### Enabler Jurisdictions and Professional Facilitators The clearest enabler-jurisdiction signal connected to Algeria this cycle is historical rather than current, but it remains structurally instructive. Contracts awarded by the Algerian state oil company Sonatrach to the Italian engineering firm Saipem were inflated to generate commissions that were funneled through offshore special purpose vehicles, established with the assistance of offshore corporate service providers, to conceal beneficial ownership behind nominee directors; the resulting proceeds were laundered via Swiss and Italian bank accounts, according to Panama Papers-derived records. An Algerian court found a Saipem subsidiary guilty of fraud, money laundering and corruption in obtaining the underlying Sonatrach contracts in February 2016. Continue reading This scheme illustrates the durable structural role that Switzerland and Italy banking and corporate-service infrastructure has historically played as the destination end of an Algeria-origin laundering scheme, distinct from the domestic enforcement environment of Algeria itself. No new enabler-jurisdiction development touching Algeria surfaced in the research window this cycle beyond this historical scheme and its continued relevance as an illustration of nominee-director and offshore-SPV infrastructure. This is a limited-signal domain for the current cycle, and that absence of new enabler-jurisdiction material is itself noted here rather than papered over with unsupported content. #### Outlook No new enabler-jurisdiction development is expected imminently absent fresh reporting on the Sonatrach and Saipem asset-recovery position or a new offshore-leak disclosure naming additional Algeria-linked structures. The MENAFATF sustained-implementation follow-up expected in 2027 may indirectly speak to whether the corporate-service-provider and nominee-director infrastructure that enabled the historic scheme remains exploitable given the still-open beneficial-ownership registry gap. Continued absence of documented enforcement action against the offshore corporate-service providers themselves, as opposed to the underlying contracts, remains a standing enablement signal for this jurisdiction pairing. Judgment: No DZ-specific enabler-jurisdiction development found this cycle. Uncertain #### Conflict Finance and Extractive-Industry Integrity Two structurally distinct but jointly significant conflict-finance and extractive-integrity findings define this cycle assessment of Algeria. The first concerns active terrorist-financing infrastructure: AQIM, which formed in Algeria as the Salafist Group for Preaching and Combat, together with Sahelian affiliated groups, continues to fund operations through cash transportation, hawala-type informal value transfer, kidnap-for-ransom, and cross-border smuggling of fuel, cigarettes and arms, exploiting the porous desert borders Algeria shares with Mali, Niger, Libya and Mauritania. This corridor has been documented by the United Nations Security Council 1267 Committee and has proven resilient to the counter-terrorism posture of Algeria, which remains oriented predominantly toward security and military response rather than financial-flow disruption. Continue reading The second concerns extractive-sector accountability: the Sonatrach and Saipem hydrocarbon-commission laundering scheme, in which inflated contract pricing generated commissions funneled through offshore special purpose vehicles to conceal beneficial ownership, with proceeds laundered through Swiss and Italian bank accounts, produced a February 2016 Algerian court finding of fraud, money laundering and corruption against a Saipem subsidiary. Since that judicial finding, prosecutions connected to the scheme have proceeded slowly and unevenly relative to more than 200 million dollars in alleged laundered commissions, with limited documented asset recovery. That slow and partial accountability record is itself the structural finding: it preserves impunity incentives in an economy for which hydrocarbon exports, channeled through Sonatrach, remain the dominant source of state revenue. Read together, these two findings describe different mechanisms operating on the same underlying terrain. The terrorist-financing corridor is a threat to the extractive-revenue-dependent state from outside the formal financial system, exploiting physical geography and informal value-transfer methods that fall largely outside conventional AML controls. The extractive-sector corruption scheme is a threat that operates through the formal financial system, exploiting offshore corporate structures and nominee-director arrangements that conventional beneficial-ownership frameworks are designed to expose but which, as the persistent registry gap documented elsewhere in this cycle assessment demonstrates, Algeria has not yet fully closed. Both findings point to the same underlying vulnerability: an extractive-revenue-dependent state whose formal compliance improvements, evidenced by the FATF delisting, have not yet been matched by either a functioning beneficial-ownership registry or a demonstrated capacity to disrupt informal cross-border value-transfer networks. Applying the standard conflict-finance trace of source, channel and deployment: the source for the terrorist-financing corridor is diaspora donations, extortion and kidnap-for-ransom revenue; the channel is informal value transfer and smuggling; and deployment sustains AQIM and Sahelian affiliate operations. For the extractive-sector scheme, the source is inflated hydrocarbon-sector contract commissions; the channel is offshore special purpose vehicles and correspondent banking in Switzerland and Italy; and deployment has historically been personal enrichment rather than operational reinvestment, a distinction that matters for assessing which mechanism poses an ongoing versus a historical risk. This conflict-finance architecture also carries cross-monitor significance: the Sahel and Maghreb corridor overlaps directly with conflict-finance context tracked by monitors focused on Sahel armed-group financing across the Algeria-Mali-Niger-Libya-Mauritania border region, while the Sonatrach and Saipem scheme is relevant to extractive-industry and commodity-flow integrity tracking given the centrality of Sonatrach to Algeria state oil revenue. #### Outlook Absent a documented enforcement action against the underlying hawala-and-smuggling corridor infrastructure itself, or new reporting on Sonatrach and Saipem asset-recovery outcomes, both findings should be treated as standing structural features rather than resolved risks. The MENAFATF sustained-implementation follow-up expected during 2027 is the most relevant forthcoming test, since it will examine whether beneficial-ownership and targeted-financial-sanctions reforms have begun to constrain either the extractive-sector layering technique or the terrorist-financing corridor value-transfer methods documented this cycle. Judgment: No DZ-specific conflict-finance development found this cycle. Uncertain #### Crypto / Digital Assets / Financial Innovation For Algeria, the defining feature of the crypto picture is not adoption but prohibition meeting persistent illicit demand. Virtual-asset activity is prohibited outright under Law No. 25-10 of 24 July 2025, and online betting conducted through e-commerce channels is separately prohibited under Law No. 18-05 together with the older ordinance provisions on games of chance. Against that backdrop, a network dismantled by the judicial police brigade at Akbou in Bejaia Province shows how the prohibition is being circumvented in practice rather than how it is being enforced structurally. The network is reported to have recharged accounts on the 1xBet betting platform and then converted player funds into digital assets before moving them onward through RedotPay, Binance, PayPal and Mobcash. Between eleven and twelve individuals were arrested, and roughly DZD 9,000,000 together with EUR 2,510 were seized. Continue reading The analytical point for this jurisdiction is that the total prohibition on virtual-asset activity has not removed the appeal of crypto as a conversion and exit mechanism for illegally generated funds; if anything, the same prohibition environment may push such flows further from supervised channels and toward exactly the kind of informal, platform-hopping layering seen here. The pattern is not new to this cycle: a comparable case handled by the gendarmerie in May 2026 followed the same broad shape, betting proceeds converted to crypto and pushed through payment intermediaries for cross-border reach. The recurrence across two unrelated enforcement actions in a single year is itself the signal, more so than the specifics of any one arrest count or seizure figure, because it indicates a durable technique rather than an isolated scheme. Compliance implications for global exchanges and payment firms named in Algerian enforcement reporting, RedotPay, Binance, PayPal and Mobcash, are not addressed in the evidence reviewed and are not asserted here; what is supported is that Algerian funds linked to illegal betting have been reported as moving through those rails. No primary judicial or regulatory document was available for this cycle, only press accounts relaying a police communication, and that gap is noted candidly rather than filled with inference. The legal basis cited in connection with the enforcement action spans both the e-commerce prohibition on games of chance and the virtual-asset prohibition under Law No. 25-10, which together give prosecutors parallel routes against the predicate betting activity and the layering step. #### Outlook Given the prohibition architecture is already fully in force and the Akbou case corroborates rather than changes it, the realistic expectation is continued periodic enforcement against similar networks rather than a near-term shift in the legal framework itself. Any materially new signal would most plausibly come in the form of a primary prosecutorial or regulatory document, which has not yet been located, or a further enforcement action demonstrating either an evolution in the payment and exchange intermediaries used or a change in how Algerian authorities characterise the predicate offence. Judgment: The case corroborates, rather than changes, Algeria's standing total-prohibition posture on virtual assets under Law 25-10. Probable #### Compliance Technology and Active Defence The compliance-technology picture for Algeria this cycle is defined by an unresolved capacity gap rather than by any documented technological development. The 2023 MENAFATF Mutual Evaluation Report assessed private-sector understanding of money-laundering risk in Algeria as moderate-to-weak, and of terrorist-financing risk as weak, with the weakness particularly pronounced among banks. No evidence surfaced in this research window of a material RegTech or artificial-intelligence-enabled transaction-monitoring uplift, whether vendor-driven or supervisory-mandated, that would address this baseline capacity deficit. Continue reading This absence is analytically significant on its own terms. The formal compliance architecture of Algeria has moved quickly this cycle, evidenced by the FATF delisting and the underlying Recommendation re-ratings, yet that formal progress has occurred without any documented parallel investment in the frontline technological or analytical capacity that determines whether reporting entities can actually identify and escalate suspicious activity in practice. A weak private-sector risk-understanding baseline constrains suspicious-transaction-report quality and enhanced-due-diligence execution regardless of how compliant the surrounding legal framework becomes, since the legal framework depends on frontline entities to generate the reporting that gives it operational effect. #### Outlook The MENAFATF sustained-implementation follow-up expected during 2027 is the most likely near-term source of updated evidence on whether the banking-sector risk-understanding capacity of Algeria has improved since the 2023 baseline assessment, and whether any RegTech or supervisory-technology investment has occurred in the interim. Absent new evidence, this capacity gap should be treated as a standing constraint on the practical effectiveness of the recent formal compliance improvements of Algeria. Judgment: No DZ-specific RegTech/compliance-technology development found this cycle. Uncertain #### AML/CTF Regime The standing-position update to Algeria's AML/CTF record this cycle is structural and favourable: the Financial Action Task Force removed Algeria, together with Namibia, from its list of jurisdictions under increased monitoring at the June 2026 Plenary, following successful on-site verification of sustained implementation of AML/CFT reforms. This is a High-confidence, Tier-1-sourced finding directly from FATF publication, and it should be read as an architecture-level development rather than a single incident: grey-list exit reflects a multi-year verification process against an action plan, not a discrete event. The governing instrument underpinning Algeria's regime remains Law No. 05-01, now amended and supplemented by Law No. 25-10 of 24 July 2025, with the Bank of Algeria and the Financial Intelligence Processing Unit (CTRF) continuing as the designated supervisory and financial-intelligence authorities. Continue reading Algeria's delisting does not end its FATF-track engagement: the jurisdiction continues structured follow-up with MENAFATF, its FATF-Style Regional Body, to sustain the improvements that supported removal from increased monitoring. This follow-up relationship is itself the near-term regulatory horizon item for this domain, expected to run at least through the fourth quarter of 2026. Enablement-as-signal is worth naming directly here: no divergence or gap signal was identified this cycle regarding Algeria's sanctions-designation status (no active OFAC, OFSI, EU-Council or UN designations are in force), and the grey-list exit itself is a form of positive enablement evidence — a jurisdiction moving from restrictive monitoring toward standard treatment — which correspondent banks and virtual-asset service providers are expected to reflect in country-risk re-rating, albeit with an anticipated lag of one to two risk-review cycles behind the formal delisting. Three-pillar balance: this cycle's evidence base for D7 is concentrated on the AML pillar (the grey-list exit and the governing-instrument update); no CTF- or CPF-specific finding for Algeria surfaced this cycle, which is a coverage gap in the evidence reaching this monitor rather than a finding that those pillars are static. The timing coincidence between the AML/CFT-statute amendment (Law No. 25-10, which folds the crypto prohibition into Law No. 05-01) and the delisting is analytically significant: it suggests Algeria's broader compliance push, of which the crypto prohibition is one visible component, was material to the FATF outcome, even though this cycle's sourcing does not establish a direct causal link between the two. #### Outlook The near-term horizon for this domain is MENAFATF's continued follow-up on Algeria's AML/CFT action plan, expected through the fourth quarter of 2026, with a Tier-1, FATF-sourced expectation that correspondent banks and virtual-asset service providers will re-rate Algeria's country risk downward as the delisting is absorbed into standard due-diligence practice. Watch for whether any divergence emerges between Algeria's improving FATF standing and its sanctions-designation status, which remains unchanged and unflagged this cycle. Judgment: No new AML/CTF supervisory-architecture change identified for Algeria this cycle beyond the June 2026 FATF grey-list exit, which pre-dates this window. Probable #### Commercial Activity Algeria's financial-services commercial landscape saw its first concrete test of a market-access category created three years earlier when, on 23 September 2026, the Conseil Monétaire et Bancaire authorised Djezzy Payment Services, a subsidiary of the telecommunications operator Optimum Telecom Algérie, to incorporate as a Prestataire de Services de Paiement. The payment-service-provider category itself was established by Law No. 23-09 of June 2023, Algeria's monetary and banking law, but this is the first authorisation the Conseil has granted under that category since the law created it, making the event a genuine market-structure first rather than an incremental addition to an established population of licensed providers. The authorisation is confirmed directly on the Bank of Algeria's own public listing, giving it the strongest available sourcing for a single discrete commercial event. Continue reading The authorisation granted is a step in a two-stage process rather than a final operating licence. Djezzy Payment Services now has twelve months from the date of notification to file a full application for the operating licence that would actually permit it to commence payment services in the Algerian market. Until that second filing is made and granted, the entity holds incorporation authorisation only; it is not yet a functioning, licensed payment-service provider processing transactions. This two-stage structure means the commercial significance of the 23 September authorisation lies principally in what it signals about market direction rather than in any immediate operational change to Algeria's payments landscape. What the authorisation signals is the entry of a telecommunications-sector entity into a licensed payments lane for the first time under Algeria's 2023 monetary and banking law. A telecom-affiliated applicant being the first to successfully navigate this authorisation process, rather than an established bank or an independent fintech, is itself a notable fact about how market access into Algeria's formally licensed payments sector is likely to develop going forward: it suggests that telecom-affiliated distribution networks and existing customer bases may be a meaningful vector for payment-service-provider market entry in Algeria, a pattern observed in a number of other markets where mobile-network operators have proven well positioned to convert existing subscriber relationships into financial-services customer bases. From a financial-integrity perspective rather than a pure market-structure one, this authorisation matters because, once Djezzy Payment Services clears the second stage and obtains its operating licence, it will become a newly obliged entity for Algeria's standing anti-money-laundering and counter-terrorist-financing framework under Law No. 05-01 as amended, subject to the same reporting relationship with the Cellule de Traitement du Renseignement Financier that applies to Algeria's existing banks and financial establishments. The twelve-month runway before the operating-licence application is due is therefore also, in effect, a runway for the entity to build out the compliance infrastructure, customer due-diligence processes and suspicious-transaction-reporting capability that onboarding as a licensed payment-service provider will require. #### Outlook The clock that now matters for this development runs to approximately September 2027, twelve months from the September 2026 incorporation notification, by which point Djezzy Payment Services must have filed its operating-licence application with the Bank of Algeria. Whether that filing is made, and whether it is granted, will determine whether this cycle's authorisation converts into Algeria's first genuinely operational nonbank payment-service provider or instead lapses without the entity ever commencing services. Separately, whether other applicants, whether additional telecom-affiliated entities or independent fintech operators, follow Djezzy's path toward incorporation authorisation under the same Law No. 23-09 category will indicate whether this cycle's event opens a genuine new market-access channel or remains an isolated first case. Judgment: No commercial events involving financial-integrity-infrastructure firms identified for Algeria this cycle. Uncertain Regulatory horizon In Force 2026-Q4 · ±half_year ### MENAFATF continued follow-up on Algeria's AML/CFT action plan post-delisting Correspondent banks and VASPs are expected to re-rate DZ country risk downward following the June 2026 delisting. [MENAFATF / FATF Source](https://www.fatf-gafi.org/content/fatf-gafi/en/publications/Fatfgeneral/outcomes-fatf-plenary-june-2026.html) In Force 2027 · ±year ### MENAFATF continued post-delisting monitoring of Algeria's AML/CFT reforms Algeria continues bilateral engagement with MENAFATF to sustain the reforms that led to its June 2026 delisting. [MENAFATF Source](https://www.menafatf.org/mutual-evaluations-follow/follow-up-reports-2) 2 dated · 3 pending date · baseline financial-integrity-2026-07-05 Role action cards MLRO ### A crypto-enabled betting-proceeds laundering network was dismantled at Akbou, Bejaia Province, reinforcing a recurring domestic typology. The case confirms that illegal online betting proceeds continue to be laundered through conversion into digital assets and movement via global payment and exchange platforms, a pattern consistent with an earlier case in May 2026. This is relevant to reportable-activity thresholds tied to unlicensed gambling and virtual-asset conversion. 1 evidence refs Compliance ### Enforcement at Akbou underscores the dual prohibition on unlicensed online betting and virtual-asset activity in Algeria. The parallel prohibitions under Law No. 18-05 and Law No. 25-10 remain the operative framework, and this case is a fresh instance of their application rather than a change to the framework itself. 1 evidence refs Legal ### The Akbou matter proceeds under parallel offences covering unlicensed betting and virtual-asset conversion of proceeds. Prosecution appears to rest on provisions addressing games of chance conducted through e-commerce channels alongside the virtual-asset prohibition in Law No. 25-10, giving authorities more than one legal route against the same conduct. 1 evidence refs CTO ### Proceeds from an illegal betting network were reported moving through crypto conversion and several payment applications. The reported conversion path, from a betting platform into digital assets and onward through named exchange and payment intermediaries, illustrates a technical layering route available despite a domestic prohibition on virtual-asset activity. 1 evidence refs Risk ### A recurring typology of betting-proceeds laundering via crypto conversion has now surfaced in at least two cases within the year. Recurrence across separate enforcement actions indicates a durable technique rather than an isolated incident, warranting continued monitoring of this exposure pattern. 1 evidence refs Audit ### The sole evidentiary basis for this cycle's finding is press reporting of a police communication, with no primary judicial document retrieved. The absence of a government or prosecutorial document to corroborate press accounts is a documented evidentiary gap rather than a resolved fact, relevant to the adequacy of the evidence trail behind this finding. 1 evidence refs Standing trackers (T1–T6) Tracker Status Note T1 · Russian Sanctions-Evasion Architecture no_change T2 · EU AML Package / AMLA no_change T3 · FATF Grey List no_change T4 · Beneficial-Ownership Register Status no_change T5 · Crypto / Digital-Asset Integrity stable T6 · Sanctions Regime Divergence no_change Registers ### Enforcement actions - 10 Jun 2025 - 28 Mar 2025 - 28 May 2026 - 19 Jun 2026 - - 2 Oct 2026 - 23 Feb 2026 - 27 May 2026 - 26 Oct 2026 - 26 Oct 2026 - OFAC designated a Hamas and PFLP charity-financing network including an Algerian national and an Algeria-registered charity association as Specially Designated Global Terrorists, disrupting a sham overseas charity structure used to move funds to Hamas and PFLP. 10 Jun 2025 - OFAC updated existing SDN entries for Algerian-born AQIM/GSPC-linked individuals, adding secondary sanctions risk language pursuant to Executive Order 13224 as amended, as part of a broader administrative update to counter-terrorism designations. 28 Mar 2025 - OFAC removed a cluster of historic Algeria-linked AQIM/GSPC designees from the SDN list in a designations-removal action, reflecting changed operational status of these long-listed individuals. 28 May 2026 - Following a February 2026 initial determination that Algeria had substantially completed its FATF action plan, MENAFATF conducted an on-site verification visit assessing sustained implementation of risk-based supervision, BO sanctions frameworks, STR regimes and TF targeted financial sanctions. 19 Jun 2026 ### Sanctions changes - 10 Jun 2025 - 28 Mar 2025 - 28 May 2026 - 22 Jun 2026 - The European Commission adopted Delegated Regulation (EU) 2025/1184 (10 June 2025), amending Delegated Regulation (EU) 2016/1675 to add Algeria to the EU list of high-risk third countries with AML/CFT strategic deficiencies, triggering mandatory enhanced due diligence for EU-regulated entities dealing with Algerian counterparties. 10 Jun 2025 - OFAC added secondary sanctions risk language to existing SDGT designations of Algerian-origin AQIM/GSPC-linked individuals as part of a March 2025 administrative list update tied to a Hizballah finance-network action. 28 Mar 2025 - OFAC removed a cluster of long-standing Algeria-linked AQIM/GSPC designees from the SDN list on 28 May 2026, reflecting a reassessed threat status for individuals designated years earlier. 28 May 2026 - HM Treasury's Money Laundering Advisory Notice was updated on 22 June 2026 to reflect the FATF's 19 June 2026 removal of Algeria from increased monitoring, implying removal of Algeria from the UK's High-Risk Third Countries list under MLR Regulation 33, while the EU's parallel high-risk third country listing (Delegated Regulation (EU) 2025/1184) had not yet been amended as of this baseline date. 22 Jun 2026 ### Regulatory horizon (register) - MENAFATF continued follow-up on Algeria's AML/CFT action plan post-delisting - MENAFATF continued follow-up on Algeria's AML/CFT action plan post-delisting - MENAFATF continued post-delisting monitoring of Algeria's AML/CFT reforms - EU delisting of Algeria from high-risk third country list - MENAFATF post-delisting sustained-implementation monitoring - Algeria's next full FATF/MENAFATF mutual evaluation cycle ### Active schemes - Sahel/Maghreb hawala-and-smuggling terrorist financing corridor - Hydrocarbon-sector commission laundering via offshore SPVs - Underground crypto activity persisting despite total ban Sources - [https://www.fatf-gafi.org/content/fatf-gafi/en/publications/Fatfgeneral/outcomes-fatf-plenary-june-2026.html](https://www.fatf-gafi.org/content/fatf-gafi/en/publications/Fatfgeneral/outcomes-fatf-plenary-june-2026.html) - [https://www.fatf-gafi.org/content/fatf-gafi/en/publications/High-risk-and-other-monitored-jurisdictions/increased-monitoring-february-2026.html](https://www.fatf-gafi.org/content/fatf-gafi/en/publications/High-risk-and-other-monitored-jurisdictions/increased-monitoring-february-2026.html) - [https://news.bitcoin.com/algeria-enacts-sweeping-ban-on-crypto-use-exchange-and-mining/](https://news.bitcoin.com/algeria-enacts-sweeping-ban-on-crypto-use-exchange-and-mining/) - [https://gamblingmaps.org/map/regulations/algeria/for-operators](https://gamblingmaps.org/map/regulations/algeria/for-operators) - [https://www.knowyourcountry.com/country-reports/algeria/](https://www.knowyourcountry.com/country-reports/algeria/) - [https://amluae.com/fatf-grey-list-countries-update-19th-june-2026/](https://amluae.com/fatf-grey-list-countries-update-19th-june-2026/) - [https://citadel365.com/blogs/fatf-june-2026-update-grey-list-and-black-list-changes/](https://citadel365.com/blogs/fatf-june-2026-update-grey-list-and-black-list-changes/) - [FATF](https://www.fatf-gafi.org/en/publications/High-risk-and-other-monitored-jurisdictions/increased-monitoring-june-2026.html) - [U.S. Department of the Treasury](https://ofac.treasury.gov/recent-actions/20261002) - [Wikimedia Foundation](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Algeria%E2%80%93United_Arab_Emirates_relations) - [Reuters](https://www.reuters.com/world/middle-east/algeria-cuts-diplomatic-ties-with-uae-algerian-state-tv-says-2026-09-10/) - [Mali24](https://mali24.info/trafic-et-blanchiment-lalgerie-mene-une-guerre-totale-des-frontieres-sahariennes-a-la-capitale/) - [Observ'Algérie](https://observalgerie.com/2026/10/02/faits-divers/blanchiment-de-largent-de-la-drogue-250-milliards-de-centimes-de-biens-saisis-en-algerie) - [Atlantic Council](https://www.atlanticcouncil.org/blogs/menasource/algerias-financial-reforms-are-showing-progress-washington-should-take-note/) - [Sanction Scanner](https://www.sanctionscanner.com/blog/fatf-plenary-june-2026-grey-list-changes-and-key-outcomes-1391) - [FATF](https://www.fatf-gafi.org/en/countries/detail/Algeria.html) - [CTRF / Bank of Algeria](https://www.bank-of-algeria.dz/stoodroa/2024/03/Instruction-CTRF-n%C2%B002-2023.pdf) - [Algérie Éco](https://algerie-eco.com/2026/10/07/banque-dalgerie-de-nouvelles-regles-pour-les-etats-comptables-des-banques-et-psp/) - [Maghreb Émergent](https://maghrebemergent.news/fr/la-banque-dalgerie-verrouille-la-surveillance-des-risques-bancaires/) - [Journal Officiel de la République Algérienne (via bwcimplementation.org mirror)](https://bwcimplementation.org/sites/default/files/resource/Algeria_Law0501_Amended2023.pdf) - [https://www.gide.com/en/news-insights/strengthening-the-framework-for-beneficial-owners/](https://www.gide.com/en/news-insights/strengthening-the-framework-for-beneficial-owners/) - [https://www.upgrowth.dz/en/beneficial-owner-declaration-algeria](https://www.upgrowth.dz/en/beneficial-owner-declaration-algeria) - [https://www.sanctionscanner.com/blog/fatf-plenary-june-2026-grey-list-changes-and-key-outcomes-1391](https://www.sanctionscanner.com/blog/fatf-plenary-june-2026-grey-list-changes-and-key-outcomes-1391) - [https://www.fatf-gafi.org/en/publications/High-risk-and-other-monitored-jurisdictions/increased-monitoring-february-2026.html](https://www.fatf-gafi.org/en/publications/High-risk-and-other-monitored-jurisdictions/increased-monitoring-february-2026.html) - [https://www.menafatf.org/mutual-evaluations-follow/follow-up-reports-2](https://www.menafatf.org/mutual-evaluations-follow/follow-up-reports-2) - [https://www.bank-of-algeria.dz/wp-content/uploads/2025/09/Synthese-du-rapport-devaluation-des-risques-BC-FT-lies-aux-AV-1.pdf](https://www.bank-of-algeria.dz/wp-content/uploads/2025/09/Synthese-du-rapport-devaluation-des-risques-BC-FT-lies-aux-AV-1.pdf) - [https://fatoura.app/blog/cryptomonnaie-lalgerie-renforce-linterdiction/](https://fatoura.app/blog/cryptomonnaie-lalgerie-renforce-linterdiction/) - [https://techcabal.com/2026/09/29/francophone-weekly-by-techcabal-042/](https://techcabal.com/2026/09/29/francophone-weekly-by-techcabal-042/) - [https://www.bank-of-algeria.dz/](https://www.bank-of-algeria.dz/) - [https://www.algerie360.com/registres-du-commerce-comme-couverture-lincroyable-logistique-dun-reseau-de-paris-en-ligne-demantele/](https://www.algerie360.com/registres-du-commerce-comme-couverture-lincroyable-logistique-dun-reseau-de-paris-en-ligne-demantele/) - [https://www.bank-of-algeria.dz/stoodroa/2024/03/Instruction-CTRF-n%C2%B002-2023.pdf](https://www.bank-of-algeria.dz/stoodroa/2024/03/Instruction-CTRF-n%C2%B002-2023.pdf) - [TSA Algérie](https://www.tsa-algerie.com/jeux-dargent-en-ligne-un-reseau-lie-a-1xbet-demantele-a-bejaia/) - [Algérie360](https://www.algerie360.com/1xbet-reseau-demantele-akbou-bejaia/) - [Le Jour d'Algérie](https://www.lejourdalgerie.com/blanchiment-dargent-et-paris-illicites-en-ligne-a-akbou-un-vaste-reseau-international-demantele/) - [https://www.tsa-algerie.com/jeux-dargent-en-ligne-un-reseau-lie-a-1xbet-demantele-a-bejaia/](https://www.tsa-algerie.com/jeux-dargent-en-ligne-un-reseau-lie-a-1xbet-demantele-a-bejaia/) - [https://www.algerie360.com/1xbet-reseau-demantele-akbou-bejaia/](https://www.algerie360.com/1xbet-reseau-demantele-akbou-bejaia/) - [https://www.lejourdalgerie.com/blanchiment-dargent-et-paris-illicites-en-ligne-a-akbou-un-vaste-reseau-international-demantele/](https://www.lejourdalgerie.com/blanchiment-dargent-et-paris-illicites-en-ligne-a-akbou-un-vaste-reseau-international-demantele/) - [Mutual Evaluation of Algeria](https://www.fatf-gafi.org/en/publications/Mutualevaluations/mutual-evaluation-of-algeria.html) - [Jurisdictions under Increased Monitoring - 13 June 2025](https://www.fatf-gafi.org/en/publications/High-risk-and-other-monitored-jurisdictions/increased-monitoring-june-2025.html) - [Algeria's progress in strengthening measures to tackle money laundering and terrorist financing](https://www.fatf-gafi.org/en/publications/Mutualevaluations/efur-algeria-2025.html) - [News](https://www.fatf-gafi.org/en/the-fatf/news.html) - [Algeria](https://www.fatf-gafi.org/en/countries/detail/Algeria.html) - [Jurisdictions under Increased Monitoring - 13 February 2026](https://www.fatf-gafi.org/en/publications/High-risk-and-other-monitored-jurisdictions/increased-monitoring-february-2026.html) - [Jurisdictions under Increased Monitoring - 21 February 2025](https://www.fatf-gafi.org/en/publications/High-risk-and-other-monitored-jurisdictions/increased-monitoring-february-2025.html) - [Middle East and North Africa Financial Action Task Force (MENAFATF)](https://www.fatf-gafi.org/en/countries/global-network/middle-east-and-north-africa-financial-action-task-force--menafa.html) - [Jurisdictions under Increased Monitoring - 24 October 2025](https://www.fatf-gafi.org/en/publications/High-risk-and-other-monitored-jurisdictions/increased-monitoring-october-2025.html) - [The People's Democratic Republic of Algeria](https://www.fatf-gafi.org/content/dam/fatf-gafi/fsrb-mer/MENAFATF-MER-Algeria-2023.pdf.coredownload.inline.pdf) - [Sanctions Programs and Country Information | Office of Foreign Assets Control](https://ofac.treasury.gov/sanctions-programs-and-country-information) - [Counter Terrorism Designations | Office of Foreign Assets Control](https://ofac.treasury.gov/recent-actions/20250610) - [Counter Terrorism Designations; Administrative List Updates: Addition of Secondary Sanctions Information | Office of Foreign Assets Control](https://ofac.treasury.gov/recent-actions/20250328) - [Designations Removals | Office of Foreign Assets Control](https://ofac.treasury.gov/recent-actions/20260528) - [DEPARTMENT OF THE TREASURY OFFICE OF FOREIGN ASSETS CONTROL](https://ofac.treasury.gov/system/files/2025-12/20251216_exodus.pdf) - [Sanctions List Service | Office of Foreign Assets Control](https://ofac.treasury.gov/sanctions-list-service) - [Sanctions List Search Tool | Office of Foreign Assets Control](https://ofac.treasury.gov/sanctions-list-search-tool) - [International Criminal Court-Related Sanctions | Office of Foreign Assets Control](https://ofac.treasury.gov/sanctions-programs-and-country-information/international-criminal-court-related-sanctions) - [Publication of Sanctions Advisory: Guidance on Sham Transactions and Sanctions Evasion | Office of Foreign Assets Control](https://ofac.treasury.gov/recent-actions/20260331_33) - [Secret Offshore Deals Deprive Africa of Billions in Natural Resource Dollars - ICIJ](https://www.icij.org/investigations/panama-papers/20160725-natural-resource-africa-offshore/) - ['Get them all out!' The Panama Papers connections to Algeria's latest revolution - ICIJ](https://www.icij.org/investigations/panama-papers/get-them-all-out-the-panama-papers-connections-to-algerias-latest-revolution/) - [Jurisdictions under Increased Monitoring - 24 October 2025](https://www.fatf-gafi.org/content/fatf-gafi/en/publications/High-risk-and-other-monitored-jurisdictions/increased-monitoring-october-2025.html) - [THEMATIC COMPILATION OF RELEVANT INFORMATION SUBMITTED BY ALGERIA](https://www.unodc.org/documents/corruption/WG-Prevention/Art_11_Judicial_and_prosecutorial_integrity/Algeria.pdf) - [United Nations CAC/COSP/IRG/II/3/1 Conference of the States Parties](https://www.unodc.org/documents/treaties/UNCAC/WorkingGroups/ImplementationReviewGroup/ExecutiveSummaries2/V2003416e.pdf) - [Algeria launches money laundering probe on back of Panama Papers - ICIJ](https://www.icij.org/inside-icij/2018/09/algeria-launches-money-laundering-probe-on-back-of-panama-papers/) - [Guidance on Beneficial Ownership of Legal Persons](https://www.fatf-gafi.org/en/publications/Fatfrecommendations/Guidance-Beneficial-Ownership-Legal-Persons.html) - [Jurisdictions under Increased Monitoring - 19 June 2026](https://www.fatf-gafi.org/en/publications/High-risk-and-other-monitored-jurisdictions/increased-monitoring-june-2026.html) - [GUIDANCE FOR A RISK-BASED APPROACH BENEFICIAL OWNERSHIP AND](https://www.fatf-gafi.org/content/dam/fatf-gafi/recommendations/Guidance-Beneficial-Ownership-Transparency-Legal-Arrangements.pdf.coredownload.inline.pdf) - [Jurisdictions under Increased Monitoring - 21 February 2025](https://www.fatf-gafi.org/content/fatf-gafi/en/publications/High-risk-and-other-monitored-jurisdictions/increased-monitoring-february-2025.html) - [Treasury Department won’t enforce beneficial ownership rule under the Corporate Transparency Act - ICIJ](https://www.icij.org/inside-icij/2025/03/treasury-department-wont-enforce-beneficial-ownership-rule-under-the-corporate-transparency-act/) - [U.S. Beneficial Ownership Information Registry Now Accepting Reports | FinCEN.gov](https://www.fincen.gov/news/news-releases/us-beneficial-ownership-information-registry-now-accepting-reports) - [Outcomes FATF Plenary, 17-19 June 2026](https://www.fatf-gafi.org/en/publications/Fatfgeneral/outcomes-fatf-plenary-june-2026.html) - ["Black and grey" lists](https://www.fatf-gafi.org/en/countries/black-and-grey-lists.html) - [Countries / Jurisdictions](https://www.fatf-gafi.org/en/countries.html) - [Commission updates list of high-risk countries to strengthen international fight against financial crime - Finance](https://finance.ec.europa.eu/news/commission-updates-list-high-risk-countries-strengthen-international-fight-against-financial-crime-2025-06-10_en) - [Sahel Now Accounts for Half of Global Terror Deaths, Secretary-General Tells Security Council, Urging Coordinated Action | UN Meetings Coverage and Press Releases](https://press.un.org/en/2025/sc16226.doc.htm) - [Category deep-dive: Use of crypto in terrorist financing expanded in 2024 | TRM Labs](https://www.trmlabs.com/resources/blog/category-deep-dive-use-of-crypto-in-terrorist-financing-expanded-in-2024) - [FATF report highlights evolving terrorist financing risks and warns of gaps in global understanding of the threats](https://www.fatf-gafi.org/en/publications/Methodsandtrends/comprehensive-update-terrorist-financing-risks-2025.html) - [Comprehensive Update on Terrorist Financing Risks FATF REPORT July 2025](https://www.fatf-gafi.org/content/dam/fatf-gafi/publications/Comprehensive-Update-on-Terrorist-Financing-Risks-2025.pdf.coredownload.inline.pdf) - [CTED Trends Tracker Evolving Trends in the Financing of Foreign Terrorist](https://www.un.org/securitycouncil/ctc/sites/www.un.org.securitycouncil.ctc/files/cted_trends_tracker_evolving_trends_in_the_financing_of_foreign_terrorist_fighters_activity_2014_-_2024.pdf) - [FinCEN Advisory, FIN-2025-A001, April 1, 2025](https://www.fincen.gov/system/files/advisory/2025-04-01/FinCEN-Advisory-ISIS-508C.pdf) - [Cryptocurrency and Terrorism Financing: Correcting the Record](https://www.chainalysis.com/blog/cryptocurrency-terrorism-financing-accuracy-check/) - [Assessing Terrorism Financing On-chain is Crucial and Complex - Chainalysis](https://www.chainalysis.com/blog/assessing-terrorism-financing-on-chain/) - [Fight against the financing of terrorism - Migration and Home Affairs](https://home-affairs.ec.europa.eu/policies/internal-security/counter-terrorism-and-radicalisation/fight-against-financing-terrorism_en) - [Anti-money laundering and countering the financing of terrorism at international level - Finance](https://finance.ec.europa.eu/financial-crime/anti-money-laundering-and-countering-financing-terrorism-international-level_en) - [Anti-Money Laundering and Terrorist Financing Directive 4 - Finance](https://finance.ec.europa.eu/regulation-and-supervision/financial-services-legislation/implementing-and-delegated-acts/anti-money-laundering-and-terrorist-financing-directive-4_en) - [European Commission updates list of high-risk countries to strengthen international fight against financial crime - Finance](https://finance.ec.europa.eu/news/european-commission-updates-list-high-risk-countries-strengthen-international-fight-against-2025-12-04_en) - [High risk third countries and the international context content of anti-money laundering and countering the financing of terrorism - European Commission](https://finance.ec.europa.eu/financial-crime/high-risk-third-countries-and-international-context-content-anti-money-laundering-and-countering_en) - [EU methodology for the identification of high-risk third countries - Finance](https://finance.ec.europa.eu/financial-crime/anti-money-laundering-and-countering-financing-terrorism-international-level/eu-methodology-identification-high-risk-third-countries_en) - [UAE Off EU Watchlist, Critics Say Reforms Fall Short | OCCRP](https://www.occrp.org/en/news/uae-off-eu-watchlist-critics-say-reforms-fall-short) - [High-risk and other monitored jurisdictions](https://www.fatf-gafi.org/en/topics/high-risk-and-other-monitored-jurisdictions.html) - [Money Laundering Advisory Notice: June 2026 - GOV.UK](https://www.gov.uk/government/publications/money-laundering-advisory-notice-high-risk-third-countries--2/money-laundering-advisory-notice-high-risk-third-countries--2) - [From trading bans to total embrace, a global guide to crypto regulation](https://www.icij.org/investigations/coin-laundry/cryptocurrency-regulations-global-explainer/) - [Crypto giants moved billions linked to money launderers, drug traffickers and North Korean hackers](https://www.icij.org/investigations/coin-laundry/cryptocurrency-exchanges-binance-okx-money-laundering-crime/) - [2025 Crypto Regulatory Round-Up](https://www.chainalysis.com/blog/2025-crypto-regulatory-round-up/) - [Nigeria Slaps Strict Rules on Banks After Lifting Cryptocurrency Ban - Bloomberg](https://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2024-01-03/nigeria-slaps-strict-rules-on-banks-after-lifting-cryptocurrency-ban) - [2025 Crypto Adoption and Stablecoin Usage Report | TRM Labs](https://www.trmlabs.com/reports-and-whitepapers/2025-crypto-adoption-and-stablecoin-usage-report) - [Cryptocurrency Regulation: How Governments Around the World Regulate Crypto](https://www.chainalysis.com/blog/cryptocurrency-regulation-explained/) - [Middle East & North Africa: Regulatory Momentum and DeFi Fuel Adoption - Chainalysis](https://www.chainalysis.com/blog/middle-east-north-africa-crypto-adoption-2024/) - [Crypto compliance](https://www.trmlabs.com/glossary/crypto-compliance) - [Money Laundering Advisory Notice: High Risk Third Countries - GOV.UK](https://www.gov.uk/government/publications/money-laundering-advisory-notice-high-risk-third-countries--2) - [High-risk third countries](https://www.gamblingcommission.gov.uk/licensees-and-businesses/notice/high-risk-third-countries) - [TERRORIST FINANCING IN WEST AND CENTRAL AFRICA October 2016](https://www.fatf-gafi.org/media/fatf/documents/reports/Terrorist-Financing-West-Central-Africa.pdf) - [THE ORGANIZATION OF AL-QAIDA IN THE ISLAMIC MAGHREB | Security Council](https://main.un.org/securitycouncil/en/sanctions/1267/aq_sanctions_list/summaries/entity/the-organization-of-al-qaida-in-the-islamic) - [fatf REPORT TERRORIST FINANCING IN WEST AFRICA October 2013](https://www.fatf-gafi.org/content/dam/fatf-gafi/reports/TF-in-West-Africa.pdf.coredownload.inline.pdf) - [Safety and security - Algeria travel advice - GOV.UK](https://www.gov.uk/foreign-travel-advice/algeria/safety-and-security) - [good practices at the intersection of maritime security and ...](https://www.un.org/counterterrorism/sites/default/files/2026-02/compendium_on_maritime_security_oct_2025.pdf) - [ABDELMALEK DROUKDEL | Security Council](https://main.un.org/securitycouncil/en/sanctions/1267/aq_sanctions_list/summaries/individual/abdelmalek-droukdel) - [Helpdesk Research Report www.gsdrc.org helpdesk@gsdrc.org](https://assets.publishing.service.gov.uk/media/57a08a0040f0b6497400038a/hdq945.pdf) - [MENAFATF (endorsed by FATF)](https://www.fatf-gafi.org/content/dam/fatf-gafi/fsrb-mer/MENAFATF-MER-Algeria-2023.pdf.coredownload.inline.pdf) - [FATF](https://www.fatf-gafi.org/en/publications/High-risk-and-other-monitored-jurisdictions/increased-monitoring-june-2026.html) - [FATF](https://www.fatf-gafi.org/en/publications/Fatfgeneral/outcomes-fatf-plenary-june-2026.html) - [European Commission](https://finance.ec.europa.eu/news/commission-updates-list-high-risk-countries-strengthen-international-fight-against-financial-crime-2025-06-10_en) - [HM Treasury](https://www.gov.uk/government/publications/money-laundering-advisory-notice-high-risk-third-countries--2/money-laundering-advisory-notice-high-risk-third-countries--2) - [US Treasury OFAC](https://ofac.treasury.gov/recent-actions/20250610) - [US Treasury OFAC](https://ofac.treasury.gov/recent-actions/20260528) - [ICIJ](https://www.icij.org/investigations/panama-papers/20160725-natural-resource-africa-offshore/) - [ICIJ](https://www.icij.org/investigations/coin-laundry/cryptocurrency-regulations-global-explainer/) - [UN Security Council 1267 Committee](https://main.un.org/securitycouncil/en/sanctions/1267/aq_sanctions_list/summaries/entity/the-organization-of-al-qaida-in-the-islamic) Coverage gaps fim-int-2026-07-05-G001: The ratified typology library (sent… fim-int-2026-07-05-G001: The ratified typology library (sentinel-typology-library-v1.0.json) was not provided in this cycle's context, so no typology matching could be performed against fim-typ-001..020. [resolved] fim-int-2026-07-05-G002: No evidence establishes whether Alg… fim-int-2026-07-05-G002: No evidence establishes whether Algeria's beneficial-ownership registry is publicly operable or merely legally authorised; a MENAFATF sustained-implementation report on registry operability would resolve this. [resolved] fim-int-2026-07-05-G003: No Algeria-specific on-chain transa… fim-int-2026-07-05-G003: No Algeria-specific on-chain transaction-volume analytics exist to corroborate the adoption-index-based inference of underground crypto usage post-ban; Algeria-specific blockchain analytics would improve this claim beyond Possible confidence. [resolved] fim-int-2026-07-05-G004: The European Commission has not yet… fim-int-2026-07-05-G004: The European Commission has not yet issued the delegated regulation removing Algeria from the EU high-risk third country list; the EU Official Journal publication would confirm timing and resolve the current Assessed-confidence horizon estimate. [resolved] fim-int-2026-07-05-G005: No documented asset-recovery outcom… fim-int-2026-07-05-G005: No documented asset-recovery outcomes exist for the Sonatrach/Saipem hydrocarbon-corruption scheme; Algerian court or prosecutorial records on recovered proceeds would improve the slow-prosecution claim's evidentiary basis. [resolved] fim-int-2026-08-21-G001 ({'scheme': 'financial_integrity', '… fim-int-2026-08-21-G001 ({'scheme': 'financial_integrity', 'value': 'D2'}): No systemic beneficial-ownership registry or professional-enabler search was run for Algeria this cycle; pooled search budget was directed at the DZ-bound union sweep. [resolved] fim-int-2026-08-21-G002 ({'scheme': 'financial_integrity', '… fim-int-2026-08-21-G002 ({'scheme': 'financial_integrity', 'value': 'D5'}): No T1 primary source (Official Journal / Bank of Algeria) for Law No. 25-10 was reached this cycle; claim rests on convergent T3 secondary reporting. [resolved] fim-int-2026-08-21-G003: Tier D watch jurisdictions (Cambodi… fim-int-2026-08-21-G003: Tier D watch jurisdictions (Cambodia, Laos, Mexico, Colombia) were not actively re-derived this cycle due to pooled retrieval-budget allocation to the DZ-scoped sweep. [resolved] fim-int-2026-10-04-G001: Tier D mandatory sweep (KH/LA/MX/CO… fim-int-2026-10-04-G001: Tier D mandatory sweep (KH/LA/MX/CO) and the monthly regional-balance pass were not performed in this single-jurisdiction (DZ) union dispatch; this is a structural coverage gap, not an assertion of no material change in those jurisdictions. [resolved] fim-int-2026-10-04-G002: No Algerian MFA primary statement o… fim-int-2026-10-04-G002: No Algerian MFA primary statement or direct Reuters article text was retrieved to corroborate the UAE diplomatic-rupture illicit-finance allegation; only a secondary aggregator was reached this cycle. [resolved] fim-int-2026-10-04-G003: No CTRF or Ministry of Justice prim… fim-int-2026-10-04-G003: No CTRF or Ministry of Justice primary document was retrieved disclosing a precise DZD seizure valuation for the DGSN narcotics-TBML prosecution; reported figures (billion-centimes vs dinars) carry denomination ambiguity. [resolved] fim-int-2026-10-11-G001: No T1 CTRF typology bulletin or AML… fim-int-2026-10-11-G001: No T1 CTRF typology bulletin or AML-specific primary source was located this cycle beyond general prudential/accounting instructions; no T1 confirmation of whether the new PSP accounting-attribute regime will be followed by AML-specific CTRF guidance. [resolved] fim-int-2026-10-11-G002: Date of Algeria's next MENAFATF fol… fim-int-2026-10-11-G002: Date of Algeria's next MENAFATF follow-up report is not yet established; standing-follow-up monitoring continues after the June 2026 FATF delisting. [resolved] fim-int-2026-10-25-G001 ({'scheme': 'financial_integrity', '… fim-int-2026-10-25-G001 ({'scheme': 'financial_integrity', 'value': 'D2'}): Primary joradp.dz text of Executive Decree No. 26-163 was not directly retrieved this cycle; the register is sourced only via T3 law-firm commentary. [resolved] fim-int-2026-10-25-G002 ({'scheme': 'financial_integrity', '… fim-int-2026-10-25-G002 ({'scheme': 'financial_integrity', 'value': 'D1'}): The June 2026 FATF Plenary decision removing Algeria from the grey list was not directly retrieved as a T1 primary source this cycle; corroboration rests on T3/T4 aggregator reporting. [resolved] fim-int-2026-10-25-G003 ({'scheme': 'financial_integrity', '… fim-int-2026-10-25-G003 ({'scheme': 'financial_integrity', 'value': 'D1'}): No DZ-specific linkage to Russian sanctions-evasion architecture or Yemen-related sanctions channels was found this cycle for standing tracker T1. [resolved] fim-int-2026-11-01-G001 ({'scheme': 'financial_integrity', '… fim-int-2026-11-01-G001 ({'scheme': 'financial_integrity', 'value': 'D5'}): No Tier-1 (government/regulator-hosted) instrument was retrieved for the 26 Oct 2026 Akbou enforcement item; only Tier-2 press relaying the police communication cell was reached. [open] fim-int-2026-11-01-G002: Tier-D watch jurisdictions (KH, LA,… fim-int-2026-11-01-G002: Tier-D watch jurisdictions (KH, LA, MX, CO) were not researched this cycle because this run was dispatched as a single-jurisdiction (DZ) union pass. [open] FIM-GAP-001 (D2): Across successive FATF follow-up cycles (F… FIM-GAP-001 (D2): Across successive FATF follow-up cycles (Feb 2025, June 2025, Oct 2025, Feb 2026), "developing an effective framework for basic and beneficial ownership information" persisted as an open action item even as Algeria approached delisting, indicating the BO registry remains structurally underdeveloped relative to other reformed areas. FIM-GAP-002 (D5): Algeria's blanket criminalisation of crypt… FIM-GAP-002 (D5): Algeria's blanket criminalisation of cryptocurrency (Law 25-10, July 2025) removes any licensing or monitoring perimeter, and adoption/usage data indicate North African markets continue engaging with crypto through informal channels despite formal bans, meaning enforcement capacity has no visibility into the displaced activity. FIM-GAP-003 (D4): Prosecutions arising from the Sonatrach/Sa… FIM-GAP-003 (D4): Prosecutions arising from the Sonatrach/Saipem bribery-and-laundering scandal proceeded slowly and unevenly relative to the scale of alleged proceeds (over $200 million in laundered commissions per ICIJ reporting), with limited asset recovery outcomes publicly documented. FIM-GAP-004 (D6): Algeria's 2023 MENAFATF Mutual Evaluation … FIM-GAP-004 (D6): Algeria's 2023 MENAFATF Mutual Evaluation found private-sector, and particularly banking-sector, understanding of ML risk ranging from moderate to weak, with TF risk understanding assessed as weak; no evidence surfaced in this baseline window of a material RegTech/AI transaction-monitoring uplift addressing this capacity gap. ## Evidence #### Confidence-tiered claims Algeria severed diplomatic relations with the UAE on 10 September 2026, citing (among other grievances) that the UAE was 'investing in money laundering, utilizing illicit funds, and harboring fugitives from justice'. [[Source 1]](#sec-sources) Probable · 1 source Eleven individuals referred to the courts on 30 September 2026 over a narcotics-trafficking and money-laundering network that cleaned proceeds through vehicle and motorcycle dealerships; assets seized reported at roughly DZD 250 billion-centimes equivalent including 636 motorcycles, 16 vehicles and approximately DZD 6 billion in cash. [[Source 1]](#sec-sources) Probable · 1 source Removed from the FATF grey list at the 19 June 2026 plenary; no new plenary action this cycle. [[Source 1]](#sec-sources) Probable · 1 source A public beneficial-ownership registry went live at the National Commercial Registry Center, built on Bank of Algeria Regulation 24-03, and the financial intelligence unit (CTRF) saw its powers and resources strengthened as part of Algeria's post-delisting reform package; this remains the operative infrastructure with no new development dated to this cycle. [[Source 1]](#sec-sources) Probable · 1 source Algeria's blanket criminal prohibition on virtual-asset issuance, use, possession, trading, promotion, mining, and exchange/wallet operation remains in force; no amendment, enforcement action, or MiCA-style development dated to this cycle was found. [[Source 1]](#sec-sources) Probable · 1 source banks, financial establishments and payment service providers to produce standardised periodic accounting statements under a common nomenclature, applying Article 8 of Règlement n°25-07 [[Source 1]](#sec-sources) Probable · 1 source banks, financial establishments and PSPs to identify and codify 19 regulatory attributes on operations and counterparties [[Source 1]](#sec-sources) Probable · 1 source Removed from the FATF grey list on 19 June 2026 after an on-site visit confirmed completion of its October 2024 action plan. [[Source 1]](#sec-sources) Probable · 1 source Issuance, possession, purchase, sale, mining and promotion of any digital asset, inserting Article 6 bis into AML Law 05-01 [[Source 1]](#sec-sources) Probable · 1 source AML/CFT regime in Algeria, as amended most recently by Law n°23-01 (7 Feb 2023) and Law n°25-10 (2025, crypto provisions); CTRF is the financial intelligence unit; CDD trigger threshold of 150,000 DZD for occasional wire transfers under CTRF Instruction n°02-2023. [[Source 1]](#sec-sources) Probable · 1 source Repeals and replaces Executive Decree No. 23-429 of 2023, extending the public beneficial-ownership register held by CNRC to legal arrangements including foreign-established trusts, with an annual confirmation duty by 31 December (Art.12) and continuously updated internal register (Art.17). [[Source 1]](#sec-sources) Probable · 1 source Algeria's AML/CFT regime is governed by Law No. 05-01 of 2005 as amended, with the CTRF as designated FIU; Algeria was removed from the FATF grey list at the 19 June 2026 Plenary following a MENAFATF on-site visit and 3rd Enhanced Follow-Up Report (24 May 2026). [[Source 1]](#sec-sources) Probable · 1 source Obliged institutions must implement a mechanism to block any operation involving virtual assets and report it immediately to the CTRF; enforcement continued via a Béjaïa police operation (23 Feb 2026) and a Gendarmerie Nationale dismantling of a trade-register-fronted betting/crypto-conversion network (26-28 May 2026). [[Source 1]](#sec-sources) Probable · 1 source On 23 September 2026 the Conseil Monétaire et Bancaire authorised Djezzy Payment Services to incorporate as a Prestataire de Services de Paiement (PSP), the first such authorisation since the PSP category was created by Law 23-09 of June 2023; Djezzy has 12 months to file for the operating licence. [[Source 1]](#sec-sources) Probable · 1 source 11-12 individuals arrested; ~DZD 9,000,000 and EUR 2,510 seized; proceeds moved via 1xBet, RedotPay, Binance, PayPal, Mobcash [[Source 1]](#sec-sources) Probable · 1 source Béjaïa judicial police dismantled a network converting illegal online-betting proceeds into foreign-currency/digital-asset form via Binance, RedotPay, PayPal and Mobcash; ~DZD 9,000,000 and EUR 2,510 seized. [[Source 1]](#sec-sources) Probable · 1 source Total criminal prohibition on virtual assets (Law 25-10, Art. 6 bis) is operationalised in the banking sector by Bank of Algeria/Banking Commission AML supervision blocking crypto-linked bank operations, and in criminal law by cases such as the Akbou network. [[Source 1]](#sec-sources) Probable · 1 source