--- title: "Cameroon (CM) — Financial-Integrity Intelligence · Sentinel" canonical: https://sentinel.gi/jurisdictions/cameroon/ source_html: /jurisdictions/cameroon/index.html description: "Financial integrity intelligence for Cameroon (CM): sanctions, beneficial ownership, enabler jurisdictions, conflict finance, digital assets and compliance technology — with sourced findings." generated_at: 2026-11-08T04:46:02Z content_sha256: ef33ae414cfe8649a176c6ec2399d612810229644ca6fa7ae7ab652bb8cf7f35 generator: "fe-fleet/md-twin@1.0" --- # Cameroon (CM) — Financial-Integrity Intelligence · Sentinel Not every instrument is backed by its official text yet. At least one law or rulebook covered here has no official source (tier 1) retrieved for it yet. No finding on this page is shown with confidence above “Probable” until stronger sources are retrieved. Financial Integrity Monitor # Cameroon CM Domains covered 8 of 8 Sources 144 Role actions 8 Horizon <90d 1 Jurisdiction profile FATF status: Grey-List Tier: C Risk direction: Stable Enablement vs enforcement: Mixed Cameroon operates under CEMAC/GABAC regional AML/CFT regulation plus national law implemented via ANIF (FIU, Egmont member since 2010) and CONAC (anti-corruption, investigative only). More Grey-listed by FATF since June 2023 following its 2021/2022 MER; action plan implementation slow, with supervision, BO-access, asset-confiscation and TF/PF targeted-sanctions deficiencies persisting through mid-2026. Key deficiencies - Weak risk-based supervision of banks, non-bank FIs and DNFBPs - Limited seizure/confiscation of criminal proceeds, especially at borders - Incomplete implementation of TF and PF targeted financial sanctions regimes - Underdeveloped risk-based NPO oversight vulnerable to TF abuse - Constrained secure FIU-to-competent-authority intelligence dissemination Recent developments (18m) - FATF October 2025, February 2026 and June 2026 Plenary follow-up statements confirm continued increased monitoring with slow, partial progress - EU Commission Delegated Regulations (EU) 2026/46 and 2026/83 (December 2025) retained Cameroon on the EU high-risk third-country list while delisting six other jurisdictions - UK HM Treasury reconfirmed Cameroon as a High-Risk Third Country under MLR Schedule 3ZA in February and June 2026 advisory notices - Belgian federal prosecutors detained Ambazonia Defense Forces leadership figures in a war-crimes/financing probe (March 2026) Brief ## Lead signal #### Lead Signal Cameroon remains on the Financial Action Task Force's list of jurisdictions under increased monitoring following the plenary held 28-30 October 2026 in Paris. The FATF's own language on Cameroon has hardened: where prior statements described continued progress against the country's action plan, the October statement records that all deadlines under that plan have now expired. The overall list shrank this plenary cycle, from 22 to 18 jurisdictions, which sharpens rather than dilutes the significance of Cameroon's continued presence on it: peers are exiting while Cameroon's own timetable has lapsed without a confirmed close-out. This is Increased monitoring in FATF terms, not Countermeasures, and the distinction matters for how obliged entities calibrate their response. Nothing in the record this cycle points to escalation toward a call-for-action designation, and the FATF statement itself is explicit that progress, however incomplete, continues to be acknowledged. Read full brief #### Lead Signal Cameroon remains on the Financial Action Task Force's list of jurisdictions under increased monitoring following the plenary held 28-30 October 2026 in Paris. The FATF's own language on Cameroon has hardened: where prior statements described continued progress against the country's action plan, the October statement records that all deadlines under that plan have now expired. The overall list shrank this plenary cycle, from 22 to 18 jurisdictions, which sharpens rather than dilutes the significance of Cameroon's continued presence on it: peers are exiting while Cameroon's own timetable has lapsed without a confirmed close-out. This is Increased monitoring in FATF terms, not Countermeasures, and the distinction matters for how obliged entities calibrate their response. Nothing in the record this cycle points to escalation toward a call-for-action designation, and the FATF statement itself is explicit that progress, however incomplete, continues to be acknowledged. The structural reading is that Cameroon's grey-list status has become a standing feature of its sanctions-architecture profile rather than a near-term resolution story. An expired deadline with no corresponding escalation signals a plateau: enough progress to avoid the next rung, not enough to exit. For banks and payment firms maintaining correspondent or counterparty exposure to Cameroonian institutions, this plateau is itself the operative fact, independent of any single enforcement action. #### Other Developments Regional supervisory attention to mobile-money payment chains surfaced at a Central African Banking Commission meeting held 25 September 2026 in Malabo, where the regulator was reported to have flagged risks tied to the expansion of mobile-money and payment-aggregator services, including fraud exposure within the customer-fund circulation chain. No new binding rule was announced alongside this statement, and the finding rests on a single secondary report of the meeting rather than a primary regulatory communiqué, a gap the record notes explicitly. The signal is nonetheless consistent with a broader regional pattern: supervisory attention to the intermediated payment chain is rising ahead of, rather than alongside, new binding compliance-technology expectations. Continued central-bank resistance to private stablecoin adoption was restated by the Bank of Central African States, whose Governor reaffirmed a preference for a sovereign digital CFA franc over private dollar-denominated stablecoins, framing the question explicitly in terms of monetary sovereignty for the CEMAC zone. This is a restatement of a position already on record rather than a new instrument, and the regional crypto-asset framework that would operationalise this preference remains unpublished. The posture is nonetheless notable for what it is not: an embrace of permissive private digital-asset innovation, in contrast to approaches seen in some other markets under monitoring. #### Cross-Monitor Connections The payment-chain monitoring concerns raised regionally intersect with questions of corporate transparency and beneficial ownership that fall outside this cycle's confirmed findings but remain structurally adjacent: fraud exposure in an aggregator chain is, in part, a function of who ultimately controls the entities in that chain. Readers tracking state-capture and governance dynamics in the broader Central African region may also find the sanctions-architecture plateau relevant context for assessing institutional capacity more broadly, though no direct state-capture finding is recorded here this cycle. #### Outlook The near-term question for Cameroon's sanctions-architecture standing is whether the next FATF plenary cycle, expected in the first half of 2027, records a new action-plan timetable, a close-out, or continued retention on unchanged terms. Nothing in the current record indicates which of these is more likely. On the payment-supervision side, whether the Central African Banking Commission's September statement develops into a binding rule on mobile-money and aggregator risk controls is a gap worth monitoring, given that the current signal rests on a single secondary account. On digital assets, the Bank of Central African States' sovereignty-first posture is likely to remain the default stance for as long as the regional crypto-asset framework stays unpublished; a shift would most plausibly be signalled by publication of that framework rather than by further restatement of the existing position. Earlier periodic briefs (5) 3 Nov 2026 · fim-2026-11-01 #### Lead Signal Cameroon remains on the Financial Action Task Force's list of jurisdictions under increased monitoring following the plenary held 28-30 October 2026 in Paris. The FATF's own language on Cameroon has hardened: where prior statements described continued progress against the country's action plan, the October statement records that all deadlines under that plan have now expired. The overall list shrank this plenary cycle, from 22 to 18 jurisdictions, which sharpens rather than dilutes the significance of Cameroon's continued presence on it: peers are exiting while Cameroon's own timetable has lapsed without a confirmed close-out. This is Increased monitoring in FATF terms, not Countermeasures, and the distinction matters for how obliged entities calibrate their response. Nothing in the record points to escalation toward a call-for-action designation, and the FATF statement itself is explicit that progress, however incomplete, continues to be acknowledged. The structural reading is that Cameroon's grey-list status has become a standing feature of its sanctions-architecture profile rather than a near-term resolution story. An expired deadline with no corresponding escalation signals a plateau: enough progress to avoid the next rung, not enough to exit. For banks and payment firms maintaining correspondent or counterparty exposure to Cameroonian institutions, this plateau is itself the operative fact, independent of any single enforcement action. #### Other Developments Regional supervisory attention to mobile-money payment chains surfaced at a Central African Banking Commission meeting held 25 September 2026 in Malabo, where the regulator was reported to have flagged risks tied to the expansion of mobile-money and payment-aggregator services, including fraud exposure within the customer-fund circulation chain. No new binding rule was announced alongside this statement, and the finding rests on a single secondary report of the meeting rather than a primary regulatory communiqué, a gap the record notes explicitly. The signal is nonetheless consistent with a broader regional pattern: supervisory attention to the intermediated payment chain is rising ahead of, rather than alongside, new binding compliance-technology expectations. Continued central-bank resistance to private stablecoin adoption was restated by the Bank of Central African States, whose Governor reaffirmed a preference for a sovereign digital CFA franc over private dollar-denominated stablecoins, framing the question explicitly in terms of monetary sovereignty for the CEMAC zone. This is a restatement of a position already on record rather than a new instrument, and the regional crypto-asset framework that would operationalise this preference remains unpublished. The posture is nonetheless notable for what it is not: an embrace of permissive private digital-asset innovation, in contrast to approaches seen in some other markets under monitoring. #### Cross-Monitor Connections The payment-chain monitoring concerns raised regionally intersect with questions of corporate transparency and beneficial ownership that fall outside the confirmed findings but remain structurally adjacent: fraud exposure in an aggregator chain is, in part, a function of who ultimately controls the entities in that chain. Readers tracking state-capture and governance dynamics in the broader Central African region may also find the sanctions-architecture plateau relevant context for assessing institutional capacity more broadly, though no direct state-capture finding is recorded here. #### Outlook The near-term question for Cameroon's sanctions-architecture standing is whether the next FATF plenary cycle, expected in the first half of 2027, records a new action-plan timetable, a close-out, or continued retention on unchanged terms. Nothing in the current record indicates which of these is more likely. On the payment-supervision side, whether the Central African Banking Commission's September statement develops into a binding rule on mobile-money and aggregator risk controls is a gap worth monitoring, given that the current signal rests on a single secondary account. On digital assets, the Bank of Central African States' sovereignty-first posture is likely to remain the default stance for as long as the regional crypto-asset framework stays unpublished; a shift would most plausibly be signalled by publication of that framework rather than by further restatement of the existing position. 25 Oct 2026 · fim-2026-10-25 #### Lead Signal Cameroon's standing position on the Financial Action Task Force grey list is showing its first concrete movement in some time. The national coordination committee working under the regional body GABAC has reported that Cameroon has reached approximately 80 percent completion of its 24-point action plan as of 22 October 2026, up from a prior 46 percent. The figure, attributed to a government committee statement and carried by a single secondary press source, has not yet been corroborated by a primary FATF or GABAC publication, so it is treated here as probable rather than confirmed. Five measures reportedly remain outstanding, concentrated in supervision of non-profit organisations and designated non-financial businesses and professions, areas that have historically been the hardest to close in grey-list exit processes across the region. Alongside that trajectory signal, Cameroon's financial intelligence unit, the Agence Nationale d'Investigation Financiere, has relocated to new premises in Yaounde, a move the Finance Minister personally marked with a visit on 2 September 2026. Read together, the two developments point toward a capacity-building push that is plausibly linked to the broader effort to exit increased monitoring, though the institutional relocation is, on its own, a modest and largely symbolic data point. #### Other Developments Institutional capacity signal. The visit by the Finance Minister to the agency's new Yaounde premises is being read as a reaffirmation of the unit's centrality to the national financial-security architecture, set against the backdrop of the ongoing FATF-monitored action plan. The event is sourced to a single press report and should be weighted as an institutional signal rather than a confirmed programmatic milestone. Regional legal architecture. Cameroon operates within the Central African Economic and Monetary Community framework, where Reglement No. 02/24/CEMAC/UMAC/CM of 20 December 2024 abrogates and replaces the prior 2016 regional anti-money-laundering regulation. This is a stable, already-established architectural fact rather than a new development, and it continues to sit alongside Cameroon's national Law No. 2010/021 as the operative legal base for the country's anti-money-laundering and counter-terrorist-financing regime. #### Cross-Monitor Connections The grey-list trajectory and the enabler-capacity signal both carry direct relevance for correspondent banking and cross-border payment friction, a connection that payments-focused monitoring will want to track independently as the FATF review process progresses. Should the action-plan completion be confirmed and Cameroon move toward exit from increased monitoring, the practical effect would be felt first in de-risking decisions by international correspondent banks, a domain outside the present scope of this monitor but one that typically moves in lockstep with FATF status changes. #### Outlook The near-term question is whether the outstanding five action-plan items, particularly supervision of non-profit organisations and designated non-financial businesses and professions, can be closed in time for a FATF plenary decision. As scheduled, a review window falls in the fourth quarter of 2026, though no confirmed plenary decision date has been identified. A successful review would alter correspondent-banking and cross-border-flow friction for Cameroon; continued presence on the list would leave the current monitoring posture unchanged. Given that the 80 percent completion figure rests on a single secondary source, independent confirmation from FATF or GABAC primary publications would materially change the confidence with which this trajectory can be asserted going forward. 11 Oct 2026 · fim-2026-10-11 #### Lead Signal Cameroon generated a single, narrow commercial-activity signal this cycle: a press-reported, unconfirmed early-stage funding event for a domestic fintech. No sanctions, beneficial-ownership, enabler-jurisdiction, conflict-finance, crypto, compliance-technology or AML/CTF-regime development reached the floor for prose this cycle for Cameroon, and those domains are not addressed here. #### Other Developments Paysika funding report. Cameroon-headquartered neobank Paysika was reported in a September 2026 funding roundup, published 1 October 2026, to have raised up to USD 200,000 from investor Madica. The reporting source frames the figure as a ceiling ('up to') rather than a confirmed closed amount, and neither Paysika nor Madica has publicly confirmed the round as of the cycle cutoff. The item is carried as a single, small, press-reported commercial event with no standing-tracker implication. #### Cross-Monitor Connections The same Paysika/Madica funding report also surfaced in the World Payments Monitor's periodic commercial-intelligence sweep for Cameroon, where it is the sole item of material content this cycle across that monitor's fourteen-module spine. The duplication across monitors reflects a single underlying press item rather than two independent findings, and readers tracking Cameroon's payments-sector commercial activity should expect the same figure and the same sourcing caveat on both surfaces. #### Outlook Given the thinness of the underlying source -- a single tier-3 trade-press roundup with an unconfirmed, ceiling-only amount -- confirmation from the companies themselves, or from a second independent outlet, would be the next material development to watch for this item. No other Cameroon-specific financial-integrity signal is in motion this cycle. 28 Sep 2026 · fim-2026-09-28 #### Lead Signal Cameroon remains under FATF increased monitoring, per FATF's own published statement, with the country's June 2023 high-level political commitment to work with FATF and GABAC still the operative frame for its action-plan status. GABAC's 2022 mutual evaluation rated Cameroon partially compliant on several FATF Recommendations, and follow-up commentary continues to cite gaps in DNFBP supervision and beneficial-ownership transparency as live deficiencies. On the regional instrument side, secondary reporting indicates that CEMAC Regulation No. 02/24, adopted 20 December 2024, has now superseded the 2016 CEMAC AML/CFT/CPF regulation as the standing regional instrument covering Cameroon, though this rests on a single secondary source pending confirmation against a primary GABAC or CEMAC gazette text. #### Other Developments Sanctions architecture gap identified. No national legal framework in Cameroon transposes UN Security Council sanctions resolutions into domestic law, even though UN sanctions are legally binding on the state and Cameroon reports its compliance to the relevant UN sanctions committee. This is a structural gap in the sanctions-implementation architecture rather than an active designation event, and it rests on a single secondary legal-guide source not yet corroborated against a primary UN or Cameroonian government text. Crypto-facilitation prohibition and dormant licensing regime. COBAC's May 2022 directive continues to bar CEMAC-supervised banks, microfinance institutions and payment providers from facilitating crypto-asset transactions. In parallel, COSUMAF's 23 May 2023 Règlement Général established a PSAN licensing regime for digital-asset service providers operating in the CEMAC financial market, but no licence had been granted under it as of mid-2026 legal commentary, meaning the regime exists on paper without operational effect. BEAC's leadership has separately signalled a preference for a sovereign digital currency over private stablecoins. #### Cross-Monitor Connections The COSUMAF PSAN licensing dormancy and COBAC's institutional crypto-facilitation ban connect directly to the crypto monitor's parallel findings on the same instruments, which independently corroborate that no PSAN licence has been granted and that the bank-facilitation prohibition remains in force. The sanctions-architecture gap is relevant to any cross-border payment-flow analysis that assumes Cameroon has a functioning domestic mechanism for giving effect to UN designations; it does not. The FATF increased-monitoring status and the underlying beneficial-ownership and DNFBP-supervision gaps identified by GABAC's mutual evaluation are structural conditions that bear on enabler-jurisdiction risk assessments generally, independent of any single transaction or actor. #### Outlook The most consequential open item is confirmation of CEMAC Regulation No. 02/24's text and effective status against a primary GABAC or CEMAC gazette publication; the current finding rests on a single secondary source. Watch also for any movement on the reported BEAC/COBAC/COSUMAF harmonised crypto-asset framework, which secondary reporting has associated with output expected later in 2026, and for whether COSUMAF issues its first PSAN licence, which would mark the point at which that regime moves from paper to operational reality. Cameroon's continued FATF increased-monitoring status and the underlying MER-identified gaps in beneficial-ownership transparency and DNFBP supervision remain the structural backdrop against which any near-term developments should be read. 14 Sep 2026 · fim-2026-08-21 #### Lead Signal Cameroon's flag-of-convenience shipping registry has emerged this cycle as an active node in Russian shadow-fleet sanctions evasion. Africa Defense Forum reporting, corroborated by named third-party maritime-data providers including Lloyd's List and Clarksons Research, documents more than 100 vessels linked to the Russian shadow fleet registering under the Cameroonian flag since December 2025, alongside a 126 percent year-on-year rise in Cameroon-flagged registrations. Cameroonian authorities are reported to be auditing and deregistering foreign vessels, in an effort to reduce the registry's exposure to sanctions-detection risk. Beneficial-ownership verification gaps and administrative-capacity constraints within the registry itself remain unresolved, and this cycle's research reached only a T3 secondary source rather than a primary IMO or Cameroonian maritime-authority document. This is best read as an architecture finding rather than a single-incident one: it is the registry's weak vetting infrastructure, not any deliberate state policy of evasion, that has made it attractive to sanctioned shipping interests, and that structural vulnerability is unlikely to close quickly even as individual vessels are struck from the register this cycle. The absence, this cycle, of any indication that Cameroonian authorities directed or knowingly tolerated the registrations is itself an analytically significant data point under an enablement-as-signal framing: what the record shows is a permissive administrative environment overtaken by demand from sanctioned shipping interests, not a state co-opted into evasion by design. A registry that is merely under-resourced to vet beneficial ownership carries a different risk profile, and a different remediation path, than one captured by the interests it is meant to police, and this cycle's evidence base points toward the former rather than the latter, albeit at Assessed rather than High confidence given reliance on a single T3 source. #### Other Developments Enabler-jurisdiction dynamics compound the sanctions-evasion picture. The same administrative, technical and beneficial-ownership-verification weaknesses that allowed shadow-fleet vessels to flag under Cameroon's registry also define the jurisdiction's standing as a low-cost enabler this cycle: the registry's vetting gaps function as the mechanism, not merely the symptom, of the shadow-fleet surge documented above. No evidence located this cycle points to state-directed facilitation; the pattern identified is one of permissive infrastructure and capacity constraint rather than active enablement, and the underlying source base for this finding is the same single T3 investigative report that anchors the sanctions-evasion finding, so the two should be read as two lenses on one evidentiary record rather than independently corroborated developments. Structurally, an enabler-jurisdiction finding of this kind tends to persist across cycles unless there is a discrete capacity-building intervention rather than a single enforcement action, and no such intervention was identified in this cycle's record. Crypto and digital-asset posture remains restrictive at the institutional level and largely unchanged this cycle. COBAC's May 2022 directive prohibiting CEMAC banks, microfinance institutions and payment service providers from subscribing to, holding or facilitating cryptocurrency transactions remains in force. Beyond that standing prohibition, BEAC leadership has reiterated opposition to regulating private cryptocurrencies, citing foreign-exchange-reserve-depletion risk, while the May 2023 CEMAC digital-asset regulation nominally empowers COSUMAF to approve Digital Asset Service Providers; no operational approvals had issued under that regime as of early 2026. Read together, these three data points describe a jurisdiction where the institutional prohibition is firm but the alternative licensed pathway remains theoretical. The COBAC-prohibition finding itself is corroborated at only T4 source-tier this cycle, via legal-commentary sourcing rather than the underlying COBAC circular text, which was not directly retrieved, so it is carried as assessed rather than fully confirmed. No enforcement action under the prohibition was identified this cycle; its continued operation is inferred from its standing legal status rather than from any observed application. #### Cross-Monitor Connections The shipping-registry and enabler-jurisdiction findings connect to World Payments Monitor's coverage of Cameroon's broader payments-control tightening this cycle and to Advennt's coverage of the January 2025 payment-aggregator mandate, insofar as all three findings describe a state whose administrative and payments infrastructure is under active reform or reform pressure across distinct sectors simultaneously. The institutional crypto prohibition maintained by COBAC is relevant to the Crypto monitor's tracking of the unimplemented COSUMAF Digital Asset Service Provider approval regime; this cycle's financial-integrity research did not itself examine that approval regime in operational detail, and readers seeking the licensing-level view should refer to the Crypto monitor's coverage. #### Outlook No regulatory-horizon items specific to Cameroon were identified this cycle in the financial-integrity research. What would most change the picture next cycle is either concrete evidence of deregistration outcomes from the shipping-registry audit reported this cycle, or primary-source retrieval of the COBAC circular text that currently underpins the crypto-prohibition finding at only T4 corroboration. Absent either development, Cameroon's financial-integrity risk profile should be read as structurally elevated on sanctions-evasion exposure and enabler-jurisdiction weakness, with the crypto posture holding steady at institutional prohibition and no fresh enforcement signal this cycle. Domain intelligence (D1–D8) #### Sanctions Cameroon's standing within the sanctions-architecture and financial-crime-monitoring framework was confirmed unchanged in substance but sharpened in tone at the Financial Action Task Force's 28-30 October 2026 plenary in Paris. The jurisdiction was retained on the list of countries subject to increased monitoring, alongside 17 others, down from 22 at the prior review, a contraction that makes Cameroon's continued inclusion more conspicuous rather than less. The operative language shift is from an acknowledgment of continued progress toward a flat statement that all deadlines under the country's action plan have now expired. This is not, on the present record, an escalation to the Comprehensive sanctions or Countermeasures tier; it is a continuation of Increased monitoring, the FATF's standard grey-list designation, applied to a jurisdiction whose own internal timetable for remediation has run out without a corresponding exit or escalation decision. Continue reading For institutions maintaining correspondent banking relationships, payment corridors, or direct exposure to Cameroonian counterparties, the practical consequence of this status is continuity of existing enhanced due-diligence posture rather than a step-change. FATF Recommendation 16, on wire-transfer information, is the specific obligation reference tied to this finding, consistent with the correspondent-banking exposure that increased-monitoring status is designed to flag for the international financial system. The architecture-over-incident reading is that an expired deadline with no FATF escalation decision represents a plateau: Cameroon has neither been rewarded with an exit from the list nor penalised with a harsher designation. That plateau, sustained across at least this plenary cycle, is itself the signal institutions should weight, more than any single statement of non-completion. It is also worth registering what did not occur this cycle: there is no record of a call-for-action designation, no record of a bilateral embargo action by any major state actor specifically tied to this status, and no record of sectoral or capital-market restrictions being newly applied to Cameroon as a consequence of the FATF finding. The increased-monitoring designation operates independently of, and should not be conflated with, the separate and distinct EU list of high-risk third countries, which runs on its own schedule and its own criteria; nothing in this cycle's record speaks to Cameroon's status on that separate EU instrument. #### Outlook The next scheduled FATF plenary review is expected in the first half of 2027. Whether that review produces a revised action-plan timetable for Cameroon, a close-out assessment, or simple continued retention on the existing unchanged terms is not determinable from the present record, and the record does not support a prediction in either direction. What is clear is that the expiry of the existing deadlines without either exit or escalation creates a specific gap: Cameroon is now operating under an action plan whose own internal clock has run out, a status that is structurally unstable in the sense that some resolution, in one direction or the other, will eventually be required. Institutions with Cameroonian exposure should treat the current plateau as the operative baseline rather than as the eve of near-term escalation, while recognising that the baseline itself carries an element of structural tension that the next plenary cycle is likely to need to address one way or another. Judgment: FATF grey-list retention with expired deadlines is this cycle's material D1 movement. Probable #### Beneficial Ownership and Corporate Transparency Cameroon sits outside the direct perimeter of the EU AML Package, and the developments most directly relevant to its own beneficial-ownership and corporate-transparency posture this cycle are domestic and FATF-driven rather than EU-originated. The central fact is a genuine tension within a single jurisdiction file: FATF credited Cameroon by June 2025 with establishing and implementing a mechanism to maintain adequate, accurate and up-to-date beneficial-ownership information, a formal improvement, while the mechanism through which most new corporate entities are actually being created has moved in the opposite direction. The EU-backed digitisation of company registration through the MyBusiness.cm platform has cut formation times to under 72 hours across major cities and formalised over 25,000 small and medium enterprises, a genuine business-environment achievement, but formation agents operating on the platform report creating twenty to thirty companies per year with minimal beneficial-ownership verification. FATF has separately credited Cameroon with designating an AML/CFT supervisory authority covering all designated non-financial businesses and professions as of February 2026, yet its own follow-up statements record that effective risk-based supervision of non-bank financial institutions and DNFBPs, including these newly digitised formation agents, remains largely undeveloped. The combined picture is a mixed rather than genuinely improving trajectory for Cameroon specifically: an institutional mechanism and a nominal supervisory authority both now exist on paper, but the volume and verification standard of the entities they are meant to cover has moved faster than the capacity to supervise them. Continue reading Globally, the EU AML Package sets the structural direction against which third-country beneficial-ownership regimes are increasingly measured, even where, as with Cameroon, the country in question is not itself an EU member state. The package now comprises three distinct instruments: the AML Regulation, or AMLR, Regulation (EU) 2024/1624, which is directly applicable across EU member states without national transposition; the sixth AML Directive, or 6AMLD, which each member state transposes into domestic law; and the AMLA Regulation, Regulation (EU) 2024/1620, which establishes the Anti-Money Laundering Authority and shifts a defined perimeter of cross-border obliged-entity supervision from purely national authorities toward a hybrid EU-level regime through AMLA direct and indirect supervision. For a non-EEA jurisdiction such as Cameroon, this architecture has no direct application; its sole interface with the EU AML Package is the high-risk third-country listing mechanism, which currently operates under the AMLD framework and is scheduled to migrate to the directly applicable AMLR from July 2027. That migration will not, by itself, alter the substantive gap between Cameroon own beneficial-ownership mechanism and its verification and supervisory capacity; it will change only the EU legal instrument through which EU obliged entities are required to apply enhanced due diligence toward Cameroon-linked business, should the listing persist. The structural risk specific to Cameroon, in other words, is not a failure of registry design but a mismatch between formation velocity and verification depth, compounded by a still-largely-absent risk-based supervisory layer over non-bank financial institutions and DNFBPs, including the newly digitised formation-agent channel itself. #### Outlook The near-term watch point for this file is whether FATF, at the October 2026 Plenary, revisits the beneficial-ownership crediting in light of the MyBusiness.cm formation-volume finding, or continues to treat the two as separate tracks. The more structural question, over a longer horizon, is whether Cameroon extends risk-based DNFBP and non-bank financial institution supervision to cover digitised company-formation agents specifically, given that this is the channel through which the shell-layering exposure identified this cycle is most directly generated. Judgment: No new Cameroon BO-registry development found this cycle; standing gap remains. Uncertain #### Enabler Jurisdictions The lens of enabler jurisdictions and professional facilitators foregrounds a different reading of this cycle's Cameroon signal: not the headline grey-list percentage itself, but the institutional-capacity infrastructure that underpins whether a jurisdiction can supervise the gatekeeper professions and entities that typically enable illicit flows. Cameroon's financial intelligence unit, the Agence Nationale d'Investigation Financiere, relocated to new premises in Yaounde, with the Finance Minister personally visiting the facility on 2 September 2026. This single data point, sourced to one press report, is probable rather than confirmed, and it should be read as an institutional-capacity signal rather than a substantive operational milestone. Nonetheless, the timing is notable: it sits within the same window as the broader national effort to close out a Financial Action Task Force action plan, where progress is reported at approximately 80 percent completion as of 22 October 2026, up from 46 percent. Continue reading The analytically significant point for an enabler-jurisdiction reading is where the outstanding gaps in that action plan are concentrated. The remaining measures are reported to focus on supervision of non-profit organisations and designated non-financial businesses and professions, precisely the categories of enabler and facilitator that regional mutual-evaluation processes have historically flagged as under-supervised across the Central African Economic and Monetary Community zone. A relocated, better-resourced financial intelligence unit is a plausible structural step toward closing that supervisory gap, but relocation of premises alone does not establish that supervisory capacity over non-profits or designated non-financial businesses and professions has actually improved. The architecture-over-incident principle applies directly here: the premises move is an incident; the open question is whether it translates into a structural uplift in supervisory reach over the enabler categories that remain flagged. It is also worth noting what is absent from this cycle's substrate for the enabler lens. No new finding on the supervision regime for designated non-financial businesses and professions itself, nor any specific enforcement or registration action targeting professional facilitators, surfaced this cycle. The institutional relocation is the only concrete, dateable fact available, and the connection to the broader supervisory gap is an inference presented as probable, not a reported causal claim. #### Outlook The trajectory to watch is whether the national coordination committee's reported progress on non-profit and designated non-financial business and profession supervision converts into a documented supervisory framework or enforcement record before a Financial Action Task Force plenary review, expected as scheduled in the fourth quarter of 2026, though no confirmed decision date has been identified. If the outstanding five action-plan items are closed, the financial intelligence unit's enhanced premises and apparent ministerial backing would be a credible structural underpinning for that outcome. If they are not closed, the institutional move documented this cycle would stand as capacity investment without yet having closed the supervisory gap it appears intended to address. Independent confirmation of both the completion percentage and any concrete non-profit or designated non-financial business and profession supervisory action would materially strengthen this reading. Judgment: No qualifying finding this cycle. Uncertain #### Conflict Finance and Extractive-Industry Integrity Judgment: No qualifying finding this cycle. Uncertain #### Crypto / Digital Assets / Financial Innovation Cameroon's crypto and digital-asset regulatory architecture presents a pattern of institutional restriction alongside an unoperationalised licensing regime. COBAC's May 2022 directive continues to bar CEMAC-supervised banks, microfinance institutions and payment providers from facilitating any crypto-asset transactions, a prohibition that remains in active force across the CEMAC zone including Cameroon. This means that even where a Cameroonian resident or business wishes to engage with a licensed or would-be-licensed digital-asset service provider, the regulated financial-institution channel for doing so remains closed by directive. Continue reading In parallel, COSUMAF's 23 May 2023 Règlement Général established what is reportedly the first legally binding CEMAC-zone text imposing a PSAN, or virtual-asset-service-provider, licensing requirement. As of mid-2026 legal commentary, however, no licence had actually been granted under this regime, meaning it exists as a licensing framework on paper without producing any operational, licensed digital-asset service provider in the more than two years since its adoption. This combination, a licensing gateway that has issued nothing and a banking-facilitation channel that is affirmatively closed, is the structural core of Cameroon's current digital-asset posture from a financial-integrity perspective: it creates a regulatory vacuum in which crypto-asset activity involving Cameroonian users or counterparties is likely to occur, if at all, outside any supervised or licensed channel, which is itself a financial-integrity concern independent of any specific illicit-finance typology. BEAC's institutional posture adds a further data point: its leadership has stated a preference for a sovereign digital currency pegged to the CFA franc over private stablecoins, and BEAC is reported to be working with the IMF on a sub-regional digital-currency framework. This signals that the region's central bank sees its own digital-currency initiative, rather than accommodation of private crypto-asset service providers, as the preferred path forward, which is consistent with the restrictive posture reflected in both the COBAC directive and the dormant COSUMAF licensing regime. These findings rest on secondary sourcing at T3 and T4 tiers; no primary BEAC, COBAC, or COSUMAF instrument text was independently retrieved this cycle, though the underlying facts are corroborated across multiple secondary sources and align with the crypto monitor's parallel independent findings on the same instruments. #### Outlook Watch for confirmation of whether COSUMAF has issued any PSAN licence since the mid-2026 commentary that identified the regime as still dormant, and for the status of the reported BEAC/COBAC/COSUMAF harmonised crypto-asset framework targeted for later in 2026. Neither has been independently confirmed this cycle. A first licence grant, or a formal harmonised framework, would each mark a material shift from the currently dormant-on-paper posture described above. Judgment: BEAC restated its sovereign digital-CFA-franc preference; no new instrument. Probable #### Compliance Technology and Active Defence Judgment: COBAC flagged payment-chain monitoring complexity without new RegTech expectation. Probable #### AML/CTF Regime The defining financial-integrity development for Cameroon this cycle is the Financial Action Task Force's 30 October 2026 plenary statement, which retained the jurisdiction among 18 countries under increased monitoring, down from 22 after four exits at the same sitting. The statement credits Cameroon with continued progress across its action plan but records, for the first time in this sharper form, that all deadlines under that plan have now expired. That shift in language, from an open-ended call to keep implementing toward an explicit statement that the timetable has lapsed, is the single most significant architectural marker in the jurisdiction's AML/CTF file this cycle, even though it carries no change in formal listing status. Continue reading The practical consequence of increased monitoring, sustained now with expired deadlines, is continuity of the enhanced due-diligence treatment that correspondent banks, payment licensors and counterparties generally apply to counterparties domiciled in a grey-listed jurisdiction. Cameroon has not been escalated to the call-for-action list, meaning the comprehensive countermeasures associated with that higher tier remain inapplicable. But a deadline that has expired without either an exit or an escalation leaves the jurisdiction in an ambiguous interim position: progress is acknowledged, yet the mechanism meant to time-bound that progress no longer functions as a forcing device. This is best read as an architecture-level observation about the FATF's own grey-list process as applied to Cameroon, not as a prediction of imminent escalation. A second, lower-confidence signal touches the same regime from the supervisory side. At its 25 September 2026 annual meeting in Malabo, the Central African Banking Commission is reported to have discussed risks associated with the expansion of mobile-money services, including fraud and compliance exposure tied to the circulation of customer funds across the chain linking payment providers, aggregators and banks. No new binding rule emerged from that discussion, and the reporting rests on a single secondary account rather than a primary regulatory communiqué, so the finding is held at a correspondingly measured confidence. Taken together with the FATF statement, the picture is one of a regime under acknowledged, continuing strain: a supervisory authority flagging a known risk vector without yet codifying a response, against the backdrop of an international standard-setter whose own deadline mechanism has lapsed without resolution. #### Outlook The question this cycle leaves open is sequencing. As scheduled, Cameroon's status will be revisited at a subsequent FATF plenary, and the explicit expiry of deadlines this cycle raises the stakes of that review in a way the prior, softer language did not. Whether the Central African Banking Commission converts its Malabo-meeting discussion into a binding instrument addressing fund-circulation risk in the mobile-money chain is the parallel domestic marker to watch; nothing in the record to date commits the Commission to a timetable for doing so. Any scenario in which deadline expiry is followed by a revised action plan, by further delay, or by escalation should be read as illustrative framing rather than as a forecast grounded in a specific stated intention from the Task Force. Judgment: Standing regime (Law 2014/028, COBAC Reg R-2015/01, CEMAC Reg 01/CEMAC/UMAC/CM) unchanged this cycle. Probable #### Commercial Activity Cameroon's single commercial-activity item this cycle concerns Paysika, a Cameroon-headquartered neobank, reported to have raised up to USD 200,000 from investor Madica. The report surfaced in a September 2026 funding roundup published by a trade-press aggregator on 1 October 2026. The figure is presented as a ceiling -- 'up to' USD 200,000 -- rather than a confirmed closed amount, and the underlying report rests on a single tier-3 source with no company or investor confirmation located this cycle. Neither the full terms of the round, the instrument used, nor the precise closing date have been independently verified. Continue reading Viewed through a financial-integrity lens, an early-stage, modest-sized funding event of this kind in a neobank operating in a market under continued FATF increased-monitoring scrutiny carries limited direct typology significance on its own, but it is the kind of commercial data point that compliance-technology and sanctions-screening functions at correspondent banks and investors active in the region may want to track as part of ordinary counterparty due diligence on emerging payment-sector entities headquartered in grey-listed jurisdictions. No link between this funding event and any sanctions, beneficial-ownership, or enforcement finding has been identified this cycle, and none should be inferred from the proximity of the two topics in this brief. The item is classified as commercial activity rather than as a standing AML/CTF or enabler-jurisdiction finding because it carries no regulatory or enforcement content of its own; it is a market event, reported at arm's length, with the normal caveats that attach to single-source, ceiling-only funding disclosures in early-stage African fintech reporting. #### Outlook The next development to watch for is either company or investor confirmation of the round's actual size and terms, or a second independent outlet corroborating the figure. Absent that, the item remains a single, unconfirmed press report and should be weighted accordingly in any counterparty assessment that draws on this brief. Judgment: No financial-integrity-sector commercial event located this cycle. Uncertain Regulatory horizon In Force Pending 2026-Q4 · ±quarter ### FATF grey-list exit pathway for Cameroon A successful FATF review could remove Cameroon from increased monitoring, altering correspondent-banking and cross-border-flow friction; no confirmed FATF plenary decision date within this window. [FATF / GABAC Source](https://www.fatf-gafi.org/en/countries/global-network/gabac.html) Proposed 2027-Q1 · ±year ### CEMAC sub-regional crypto-asset regulatory framework A dedicated sub-regional licensing and prudential regime for virtual-asset service providers, expected to displace current uncertainty over crypto authorisation status. [BEAC / COSUMAF / COBAC (CEMAC) Source](https://www.businessincameroon.com/finance/1005-16150-stablecoins-beac-pushes-digital-cfa-franc-to-preserve-monetary-sovereignty) 2 dated · 2 pending date · baseline financial-integrity-2026-07-05 Role action cards MLRO ### Cameroon's FATF increased-monitoring status continues with a hardened deadline finding, not an escalation. The expiry of all action-plan deadlines without a corresponding FATF escalation decision means existing enhanced due-diligence treatment of Cameroonian exposure remains the applicable standard. It does not, on the current record, trigger a higher sanctions-regime tier or a new reporting obligation. 1 evidence refs Compliance ### A regional banking supervisor flagged mobile-money payment-chain risk without issuing a new binding rule. The Central African Banking Commission statement on fraud and compliance-gap exposure in the aggregator chain signals a direction of supervisory attention, but the absence of a binding instrument and the single-source nature of the report mean no new control obligation has been confirmed this cycle. 1 evidence refs Legal ### Cameroon's grey-list retention carries no escalation to a higher sanctions or call-for-action designation this cycle. The FATF finding is confined to continued Increased monitoring; it does not, on the present record, support representation to clients that Cameroon faces Comprehensive sanctions, Countermeasures, or a newly elevated EU high-risk-third-country designation this cycle. 1 evidence refs Board ### Cameroon's grey-list status has become a structural plateau rather than a near-term resolution story. The combination of an expired action-plan timetable and continued retention, against a shrinking overall list, indicates a jurisdiction whose compliance trajectory is stalled rather than actively deteriorating or improving, a distinction relevant to longer-horizon exposure decisions. 1 evidence refs CTO ### The Bank of Central African States restated its preference for a sovereign digital CFA franc over private stablecoins, with the regional crypto framework still unpublished. No new technical or regulatory instrument governing digital-asset activity has been introduced; the architecture question for platforms and infrastructure remains unresolved pending publication of the CEMAC crypto-asset framework. 1 evidence refs Risk ### Mobile-money payment-chain fraud exposure was flagged regionally without a new control mandate. This is an early-stage supervisory signal on an emerging exposure concentration in intermediated payment flows, resting on limited sourcing, and warrants monitoring for escalation into a binding instrument rather than immediate action. 1 evidence refs Operations ### No new screening or transaction-monitoring threshold change applies to Cameroon this cycle. The FATF finding and the regional supervisory statement are both status/posture developments rather than operational rule changes; existing monitoring configurations for Cameroonian exposure and CEMAC payment flows remain the applicable baseline. 2 evidence refs Audit ### The regional payment-chain risk finding rests on a single secondary source and should be noted as a sourcing gap. Control-testing scope relying on this finding should recognise that no primary regulatory communiqué has been retrieved, limiting the evidentiary weight of the underlying finding pending stronger sourcing. 1 evidence refs Standing trackers (T1–T6) Tracker Status Note T1 · Russian Sanctions-Evasion Architecture no_change T2 · EU AML Package / AMLA no_change T3 · FATF Grey List material_change T4 · Beneficial-Ownership Register Status no_change T5 · Crypto & Digital-Asset Integrity watch T6 · Sanctions Regime Divergence no_change Registers ### Enforcement actions - 24 Oct 2025 - 13 Feb 2026 - 19 Jun 2026 - 3 Mar 2026 - FATF Plenary follow-up review of Cameroon's implementation of its June 2023 action plan; Cameroon credited with establishing interagency AML coordination mechanisms but retained under increased monitoring. 24 Oct 2025 - FATF February 2026 Plenary follow-up; Cameroon credited with designating an AML/CFT supervisory authority for all DNFBPs and conducting parallel financial investigations, but deficiencies in TF/PF targeted financial sanctions and NPO risk-based supervision persisted. 13 Feb 2026 - FATF June 2026 Plenary follow-up review; FATF explicitly noted that all of Cameroon's action-plan deadlines had now expired with work still required, particularly on border asset seizure and TF/PF targeted financial sanctions implementation. 19 Jun 2026 - Belgian federal prosecutors arrested four and detained three individuals suspected of holding leadership roles in the Ambazonia Defense Forces, as part of a war-crimes and crimes-against-humanity investigation tied to Cameroon's Anglophone separatist conflict, implicating diaspora-based financing and command networks. 3 Mar 2026 ### Sanctions changes - 22 Jun 2026 - 4 Dec 2025 - HM Treasury reconfirmed Cameroon as a High-Risk Third Country under Regulation 33/Schedule 3ZA of the UK Money Laundering Regulations in its February and June 2026 advisory notices, requiring UK regulated firms to apply enhanced due diligence to Cameroon-linked business relationships and transactions. 22 Jun 2026 - The European Commission adopted Delegated Regulations (EU) 2026/46 and (EU) 2026/83 (December 2025), retaining Cameroon on the EU list of high-risk third countries with AML/CFT strategic deficiencies, while simultaneously delisting Burkina Faso, Mali, Mozambique, Nigeria, South Africa and Tanzania. 4 Dec 2025 ### Regulatory horizon (register) - AMLR and 6AMLD application date affecting third-country due diligence toward Cameroon - FATF grey-list exit pathway for Cameroon - CEMAC sub-regional crypto-asset regulatory framework - Next FATF Plenary follow-up review of Cameroon's action plan - EU high-risk third-country list next update cycle post-October 2026 FATF Plenary - EU AML Regulation (AMLR) full application affecting third-country due diligence ### Active schemes - [HIGH] Boko Haram and ISWAP cattle-rustling and hawala financing, Far North Cameroon - [HIGH] Ambazonia separatist diaspora crowdfunding and extortion financing - Regional conflict-gold consolidation and export-tax evasion via Cameroon - [HIGH] Foreign bribery of Cameroonian officials via corporate intermediaries - Rapid low-verification company formation exploited for shell layering Sources - [Cameroon](https://www.fatf-gafi.org/en/countries/detail/Cameroon.html) - [https://www.fatf-gafi.org/en/publications/High-risk-and-other-monitored-jurisdictions/increased-monitoring-june-2026.html](https://www.fatf-gafi.org/en/publications/High-risk-and-other-monitored-jurisdictions/increased-monitoring-june-2026.html) - [https://www.fatf-gafi.org/en/publications/Mutualevaluations/Mer-cameroon-2022.html](https://www.fatf-gafi.org/en/publications/Mutualevaluations/Mer-cameroon-2022.html) - [https://www.businessincameroon.com/public-management/3010-15274-cameroon-remains-on-fatf-grey-list-despite-progress-on-anti-money-laundering](https://www.businessincameroon.com/public-management/3010-15274-cameroon-remains-on-fatf-grey-list-despite-progress-on-anti-money-laundering) - [https://www.knowyourcountry.com/cameroon/](https://www.knowyourcountry.com/cameroon/) - [https://www.anqacompliance.com/cameroon-aml-gabac/](https://www.anqacompliance.com/cameroon-aml-gabac/) - [https://adf-magazine.com/2026/08/cameroon-fights-shipping-registry-abuse/](https://adf-magazine.com/2026/08/cameroon-fights-shipping-registry-abuse/) - [https://issafrica.org/countries/cameroon](https://issafrica.org/countries/cameroon) - [https://www.africansecurityanalysis.com/reports/boko-haram-s-illicit-trade-in-gold-and-other-resources](https://www.africansecurityanalysis.com/reports/boko-haram-s-illicit-trade-in-gold-and-other-resources) - [https://www.lightspark.com/knowledge/is-crypto-legal-in-cameroon](https://www.lightspark.com/knowledge/is-crypto-legal-in-cameroon) - [https://4mlegaltax.com/regulation-of-cryptocurrency-in-the-cemac/](https://4mlegaltax.com/regulation-of-cryptocurrency-in-the-cemac/) - [https://www.cameroonintelligencereport.com/beac-pushes-digital-cfa-franc-to-preserve-monetary-sovereignty/](https://www.cameroonintelligencereport.com/beac-pushes-digital-cfa-franc-to-preserve-monetary-sovereignty/) - [https://www.knowyourcountry.com/country-reports/cameroon/](https://www.knowyourcountry.com/country-reports/cameroon/) - [FATF](https://www.fatf-gafi.org/en/publications/High-risk-and-other-monitored-jurisdictions/increased-monitoring-february-2025.html) - [VOVE ID](https://blog.voveid.com/aml-compliance-in-cameroon-a-2025-guide-for-fintechs-and-regulated-businesses/) - [Eversheds Sutherland](https://ezine.eversheds-sutherland.com/global-sanctions-guide/cameroon) - [Zavia (registry-data vendor)](https://zavia.ai/companies/country/cameroon/) - [Village Justice](https://www.village-justice.com/articles/reglement-general-cosumaf-mai-2023-premier-cadre-communautaire-des-prestataires,57886.html) - [Business in Cameroon](https://www.businessincameroon.com/finance/0502-13620-cemac-beac-rejects-cryptocurrency-regulation-amid-fintech-demands) - [FATF](https://www.fatf-gafi.org/en/publications/High-risk-and-other-monitored-jurisdictions/increased-monitoring-june-2026.html) - [AllAfrica (reproducing press reporting)](https://fr.allafrica.com/stories/202609040177.html) - [EcoMatin](https://ecomatin.net/blanchiment-des-capitaux-le-cameroun-proche-dune-sortie-de-la-liste-grise-selon-le-gabac) - [GABAC](https://gabac.org/) - [ATPE (Chad)](https://www.atpe.td/lutte-contre-le-blanchiment-le-gabac-tient-sa-15eme-pleniere-statutaire/) - [VOVE ID](https://voveid.com/downloads/cameroon-kyc-kyb-aml-checklist.pdf) - [African Startups](https://african-startups.com/news/funding/african-startups-that-raised-funding-in-september-2026/) - [Camer.be](https://www.camer.be/94601/12:1/liste-grise-du-gafi-le-cameroun-joue-son-avenir-financier-a-abidjan.html) - [https://www.fatf-gafi.org/en/countries/global-network/gabac.html](https://www.fatf-gafi.org/en/countries/global-network/gabac.html) - [https://camerounactuel.com/cameroun-les-5-derniers-obstacles-a-franchir-pour-quitter-la-liste-grise-du-gafi/](https://camerounactuel.com/cameroun-les-5-derniers-obstacles-a-franchir-pour-quitter-la-liste-grise-du-gafi/) - [https://gabac.org/textes-organiques/](https://gabac.org/textes-organiques/) - [https://www.newsducamer.com/lutte-contre-le-blanchiment-des-capitaux-le-cameroun-outille-son-agence-dinvestigation-financiere/](https://www.newsducamer.com/lutte-contre-le-blanchiment-des-capitaux-le-cameroun-outille-son-agence-dinvestigation-financiere/) - [Maathis](https://app.maathis.com/droit/cemac/reglement/02-24-cemac-umac-cm-reglement-n0224cemacumaccm-portant-prevention-repression-bla) - [FATF](https://www.fatf-gafi.org/en/publications/High-risk-and-other-monitored-jurisdictions/increased-monitoring-october-2026.html) - [Business in Cameroon](https://www.businessincameroon.com/finance/2809-16848-cemac-regulator-tightens-scrutiny-of-customer-funds-in-mobile-money-transactions) - [Business in Cameroon](https://www.businessincameroon.com/finance/1005-16150-stablecoins-beac-pushes-digital-cfa-franc-to-preserve-monetary-sovereignty) - [Jurisdictions under Increased Monitoring - 13 February 2026](https://www.fatf-gafi.org/en/publications/High-risk-and-other-monitored-jurisdictions/increased-monitoring-february-2026.html) - [Jurisdictions under Increased Monitoring - 19 June 2026](https://www.fatf-gafi.org/en/publications/High-risk-and-other-monitored-jurisdictions/increased-monitoring-june-2026.html) - ["Black and grey" lists](https://www.fatf-gafi.org/en/countries/black-and-grey-lists.html) - [Jurisdictions under Increased Monitoring - 24 October 2025](https://www.fatf-gafi.org/en/publications/High-risk-and-other-monitored-jurisdictions/increased-monitoring-october-2025.html) - [Jurisdictions under Increased Monitoring - 13 June 2025](https://www.fatf-gafi.org/en/publications/High-risk-and-other-monitored-jurisdictions/increased-monitoring-june-2025.html) - [Jurisdictions under Increased Monitoring - 21 February 2025](https://www.fatf-gafi.org/en/publications/High-risk-and-other-monitored-jurisdictions/increased-monitoring-february-2025.html) - [Jurisdictions under Increased Monitoring - 23 February 2024](https://www.fatf-gafi.org/en/publications/High-risk-and-other-monitored-jurisdictions/Increased-monitoring-february-2024.html) - [Assessments](https://www.fatf-gafi.org/en/calendars/assessments.html) - [FATF changes its grey listing criteria to further focus on risk](https://www.fatf-gafi.org/en/publications/Fatfgeneral/FATF-grey-listing-criteria.html) - [Jurisdictions under Increased Monitoring - 25 October 2024](https://www.fatf-gafi.org/en/publications/High-risk-and-other-monitored-jurisdictions/increased-monitoring-october-2024.html) - [Cameroon](https://www.fatf-gafi.org/en/countries/detail/Cameroon.html) - [The Republic of Cameroon's measures to combat money laundering and terrorist financing](https://www.fatf-gafi.org/en/publications/Mutualevaluations/Mer-cameroon-2022.html) - [Page 1 of 142 Country Review Report of Cameroon](https://www.unodc.org/documents/treaties/UNCAC/CountryVisitFinalReports/2017_04_03_Cameroon_Final_Country_Report.pdf) - [Anti-money laundering and counter-terrosist financing ...](https://www.fatf-gafi.org/content/dam/fatf-gafi/fsrb-mer/Central-African-Republic-MER.pdf.coredownload.inline.pdf) - [Jurisdictions under Increased Monitoring - 24 October 2025](https://www.fatf-gafi.org/content/fatf-gafi/en/publications/High-risk-and-other-monitored-jurisdictions/increased-monitoring-october-2025.html) - [Nigeria](https://www.fatf-gafi.org/en/countries/detail/Nigeria.html) - [Mali](https://www.fatf-gafi.org/en/countries/detail/Mali.html) - [South Africa](https://www.fatf-gafi.org/en/countries/detail/South-Africa.html) - [Senegal](https://www.fatf-gafi.org/en/countries/detail/Senegal.html) - [TERRORIST FINANCING IN WEST AND CENTRAL AFRICA October 2016](https://www.fatf-gafi.org/content/dam/fatf-gafi/reports/Terrorist-Financing-West-Central-Africa.pdf) - [Security Council Strongly Condemns Terrorist Attacks, Other Violations in Lake Chad Basin Region, Unanimously Adopting Resolution 2349 (2017) | UN Meetings Coverage and Press Releases](https://press.un.org/en/2017/sc12773.doc.htm) - [CTED Trends Alert – June 2022 1 CONCERNS OVER THE USE OF PROCEEDS FROM](https://www.un.org/securitycouncil/ctc/sites/www.un.org.securitycouncil.ctc/files/files/documents/2022/Jun/cted_cft_trends_alert_june_2022.pdf) - [Denouncing terrorist attacks in West Africa, Security Council stresses need to address root causes | UN News](https://news.un.org/en/story/2017/01/549942) - [CT Week side-event UNSCR2349 210623](https://www.unodc.org/unodc/en/speeches/2023/ct-week-side-event-unscr2349-210623.html) - [Terrorist Financing in West and Central Africa](https://www.fatf-gafi.org/en/publications/Methodsandtrends/Terrorist-financing-west-central-africa.html) - [Jihad over Centuries](https://arxiv.org/pdf/2211.04763) - [JAS vs. ISWAP: The War of the Boko Haram Splinters](https://www.un.org/peacebuilding/sites/www.un.org.peacebuilding/files/documents/icg_-_boko_haram_splitners_march_2024.pdf) - [Report: $4 Billion in African Conflict Gold Floods World Markets | OCCRP](https://www.occrp.org/en/news/report-4-billion-in-african-conflict-gold-floods-world-markets) - [Illegal Gold Smuggling Choking Legitimate Markets in the DRC | OCCRP](https://www.occrp.org/en/news/illegal-gold-smuggling-choking-legitimate-markets-in-the-drc) - [Africa Gold Advisory](https://ofac.treasury.gov/system/files/2023-06/africa_gold_advisory_06272023.pdf) - [The Sentry: African Conflict Gold is Being Laundered in Dubai | OCCRP](https://www.occrp.org/en/news/the-sentry-african-conflict-gold-is-being-laundered-in-dubai) - [Report: Criminals in Central Africa Profit from New Surge in Gold Prices | OCCRP](https://occrp.org/en/daily/14747-report-criminals-in-central-africa-profit-from-new-surge-in-gold-prices) - [RESPONDING TO ILLEGAL MINING AND TRAFFICKING IN METALS AND MINERALS](https://www.unodc.org/cld/uploads/pdf/Illegal_Mining_and_Trafficking_in_Metals_and_Minerals_E.pdf) - [A Game of Stones: smuggling diamonds in the Central African Republic | Global Witness](https://www.globalwitness.org/en/campaigns/central-african-republic-car/game-of-stones/?accessible=true) - [Organized Crime and Corruption Reporting Project | OCCRP](https://www.occrp.org/en/rss-listing) - [Seismic change needed at Glencore following a decade of corruption | Global Witness](https://www.globalwitness.org/en/press-releases/seismic-change-needed-glencore-following-decade-corruption/) - [Part 2b – Minerals Crime: Illegal Gold Mining](https://www.unodc.org/documents/data-and-analysis/Crimes%20on%20Environment/ECR25_P2b_Minerals_Crime.pdf) - [Sanctions Programs and Country Information | Office of Foreign Assets Control](https://ofac.treasury.gov/sanctions-programs-and-country-information) - [Where is OFAC's Country List? What countries do I need to worry about in terms of U.S. sanctions? | Office of Foreign Assets Control](https://ofac.treasury.gov/sanctions-programs-and-country-information/where-is-ofacs-country-list-what-countries-do-i-need-to-worry-about-in-terms-of-us-sanctions) - [Central African Republic Sanctions | Office of Foreign Assets Control](https://ofac.treasury.gov/sanctions-programs-and-country-information/central-african-republic-sanctions) - [Recent Actions | Office of Foreign Assets Control](https://ofac.treasury.gov/recent-actions) - [Sanctions List Updates](https://ofac.treasury.gov/recent-actions/sanctions-list-updates) - [Central African Republic Designation | Office of Foreign Assets Control](https://ofac.treasury.gov/recent-actions/20211217) - [Sanctions List Service | Office of Foreign Assets Control](https://ofac.treasury.gov/sanctions-list-service) - [Archive of Changes to OFAC's Sanctions Lists | Office of Foreign Assets Control](https://ofac.treasury.gov/specially-designated-nationals-list-sdn-list/archive-of-changes-to-the-sdn-list) - [Additional Sanctions Lists | Office of Foreign Assets Control](https://ofac.treasury.gov/other-ofac-sanctions-lists) - [Beneficial Ownership](https://www.fatf-gafi.org/en/topics/beneficial-ownership.html) - [United States Department of the Treasury Financial Crimes Enforcement Network - Home | FinCEN.gov](https://www.fincen.gov/) - [Cameroon: MyBusiness.cm, supporting private sector for easier registration - International Partnerships](https://international-partnerships.ec.europa.eu/news-and-events/stories/cameroon-mybusinesscm-supporting-private-sector-easier-registration_en) - [Croatia](https://www.fatf-gafi.org/en/countries/detail/Croatia.html) - [Living in Cameroon - GOV.UK](https://www.gov.uk/government/publications/living-in-cameroon) - [Trade and invest: Cameroon - GOV.UK](https://www.gov.uk/world/trade-and-invest-cameroon) - [CAMEROON AIR LINES overview - Find and update company information - GOV.UK](https://find-and-update.company-information.service.gov.uk/company/FC011813) - [European Commission updates list of high-risk countries to strengthen international fight against financial crime - Finance](https://finance.ec.europa.eu/news/european-commission-updates-list-high-risk-countries-strengthen-international-fight-against-2025-12-04_en) - [Anti-money laundering and countering the financing of terrorism at international level - Finance](https://finance.ec.europa.eu/financial-crime/anti-money-laundering-and-countering-financing-terrorism-international-level_en) - [Commission updates list of high-risk countries to strengthen international fight against financial crime - Finance](https://finance.ec.europa.eu/news/commission-updates-list-high-risk-countries-strengthen-international-fight-against-financial-crime-2025-06-10_en) - [High risk third countries and the international context content of anti-money laundering and countering the financing of terrorism - European Commission](https://finance.ec.europa.eu/financial-crime/high-risk-third-countries-and-international-context-content-anti-money-laundering-and-countering_en) - [EU methodology for the identification of high-risk third countries - Finance](https://finance.ec.europa.eu/financial-crime/anti-money-laundering-and-countering-financing-terrorism-international-level/eu-methodology-identification-high-risk-third-countries_en) - [Protecting the EU’s financial system - Finance - European Commission](https://finance.ec.europa.eu/news/protecting-eus-financial-system-2025-07-16_en) - [Country Classification List - Green Forum - European Commission](https://green-forum.ec.europa.eu/nature-and-biodiversity/deforestation-regulation-implementation/eudr-cooperation-and-partnerships/country-classification-list_en) - [Anti-money laundering: the Commission updates its list of high-risk third-country jurisdictions to strengthen the international fight against financial crime - Finance](https://finance.ec.europa.eu/news/anti-money-laundering-commission-updates-its-list-high-risk-third-country-jurisdictions-strengthen-2022-12-20_en) - [Cameroon: North-West/South-West crisis](https://assets.publishing.service.gov.uk/media/66bca8b6b45d6a81cd314634/Withdrawn-Cameroon_-_North-West_South-West_crisis_-_CPIN_-_v2.0_.pdf) - [Home | Africa Renewal](https://www.un.org/africarenewal/magazine/december-2018-march-2019/crisis-worsens-cameroon) - [How Schoolchildren Became Pawns in Cameroon’s Anglophone Crisis - bellingcat](https://www.bellingcat.com/news/africa/2021/07/16/how-schoolchildren-became-pawns-in-cameroons-anglophone-crisis/) - [Cameroon - European Civil Protection and Humanitarian Aid Operations](https://civil-protection-humanitarian-aid.ec.europa.eu/where/africa/cameroon_en) - [cameroon | UN News](https://news.un.org/en/tags/cameroon) - [This publication was archived on 14 August 2024](https://assets.publishing.service.gov.uk/government/uploads/system/uploads/attachment_data/file/944073/Cameroon_-_North-West_South-West_crisis_-_CPIN_-_v2.0_.pdf) - [TOPONYMIC FACTFILE © Crown Copyright 2026 1 OFFICIAL Cameroon Country name](https://assets.publishing.service.gov.uk/media/695fb33557e7407fe07765da/Cameroon_Toponymic_Factfile.pdf) - [A/HRC/48/NGO/131 General Assembly - the United Nations](https://docs.un.org/en/A/HRC/48/NGO/131) - [Overseas business risks: Cameroon - GOV.UK](https://www.gov.uk/government/publications/cameroon-overseas-business-risk/cameroon-overseas-business-risks) - [Belgium Detains Three in Cameroon Secessionist War Crimes Probe - Bloomberg](https://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2026-03-03/belgium-detains-three-in-cameroon-secessionist-war-crimes-probe) - [Money Laundering Advisory Notice: June 2026 - GOV.UK](https://www.gov.uk/government/publications/money-laundering-advisory-notice-high-risk-third-countries--2/money-laundering-advisory-notice-high-risk-third-countries--2) - [Money Laundering Advisory Notice: High Risk Third Countries - GOV.UK](https://www.gov.uk/government/publications/money-laundering-advisory-notice-high-risk-third-countries--2) - [HM Treasury Advisory Notice: High Risk Third Countries - GOV.UK](https://www.gov.uk/government/publications/money-laundering-advisory-notice-high-risk-third-countries--2/hm-treasury-advisory-notice-high-risk-third-countries) - [Changes to the FATF's Public Lists The Money Laundering, ...](https://assets.publishing.service.gov.uk/media/69988878b33a4db7ff889ef3/Annex_C_-_Advisory_Notice_-_February_2026.pdf) - [High-risk third countries](https://www.gamblingcommission.gov.uk/licensees-and-businesses/notice/high-risk-third-countries) - [HM Treasury publish updated list of high risk third jurisdictions](https://www.gamblingcommission.gov.uk/licensees-and-businesses/notice/hm-treasury-publish-updated-list-of-high-risk-third-jurisdictions) - [2023 No. 1306 FINANCIAL SERVICES The Money ...](https://www.legislation.gov.uk/uksi/2023/1306/pdfs/uksi_20231306_en.pdf) - [Belgium](https://www.fatf-gafi.org/en/countries/detail/Belgium.html) - [Bringing a war criminal to justice | UN News](https://news.un.org/en/story/2023/07/1138657) - [Belgium's measures to counter money laundering, terrorist financing and proliferation financing](https://www.fatf-gafi.org/en/publications/Mutualevaluations/mer-belgium-2025.html) - [Jurisdictions under Increased Monitoring - 19 June 2026](https://www.fatf-gafi.org/content/fatf-gafi/en/publications/High-risk-and-other-monitored-jurisdictions/increased-monitoring-june-2026.html) - [ONUC - UN Peacekeeping](https://peacekeeping.un.org/sites/default/files/past/onucB.htm) - [2025 Crypto Regulatory Round-Up](https://www.chainalysis.com/blog/2025-crypto-regulatory-round-up/) - [From trading bans to total embrace, a global guide to crypto regulation](https://www.icij.org/investigations/coin-laundry/cryptocurrency-regulations-global-explainer/) - [Global Crypto Policy Review Outlook 2025/26 Report | TRM Labs](https://www.trmlabs.com/reports-and-whitepapers/global-crypto-policy-review-outlook-2025-26) - [How crypto regulation changed in 2025: a global review](https://www.elliptic.co/blog/how-crypto-regulation-changed-in-2025) - [Sub-Saharan Africa Crypto Adoption Trends and Analysis](https://www.chainalysis.com/blog/africa-cryptocurrency-adoption/) - [Crypto: Regulation - Bloomberg](https://www.bloomberg.com/crypto/regulation) - [South Africa Flags Crypto, Stablecoins as New Financial Risk - Bloomberg](https://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2025-11-25/south-africa-central-bank-flags-crypto-stablecoins-as-new-risk) - [Global crypto regulation review 2025](https://www.elliptic.co/resources/global-crypto-regulation-review-2025) - [Bitcoin’s First African Adopter Faces Backlash From Central Bank - Bloomberg](https://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2022-05-13/bitcoin-s-first-african-adopter-faces-backlash-from-central-bank) - [AC-Cameroon - Whatson - Unodc](https://whatson.unodc.org/whatson/data/databases/ngo/public/a/anti_corruption_organization.html) - [Former Nigerian oil minister stands trial in the UK on bribery charges - ICIJ](https://www.icij.org/investigations/panama-papers/former-nigerian-oil-minister-stands-trial-in-the-uk-on-bribery-charges/) - [Conference of the States Parties to the United Nations ...](https://www.unodc.org/documents/treaties/UNCAC/WorkingGroups/ImplementationReviewGroup/ExecutiveSummaries2/V2003421e.pdf) - [Panama: Ex-President Stands Trial Over Alleged Odebrecht Bribes | OCCRP](https://www.occrp.org/en/news/panama-ex-president-stands-trial-over-alleged-odebrecht-bribes) - [How a company linked to Congolese president stands to earn millions from new fee | Global Witness](https://globalwitness.org/en/campaigns/corruption-and-money-laundering/presidential-profiteering/) - [Panama Papers trial concludes with all defendants acquitted of money laundering - ICIJ](https://www.icij.org/investigations/panama-papers/panama-papers-trial-concludes-with-all-defendants-absolved-of-money-laundering-charge/) - [UNODC Corruption and Financial Crime Branch](https://www.unodc.org/corruption/en/index.html) - [What’s the Philippines Flood Corruption Scandal? How Has Marcos Jr. Responded? - Bloomberg](https://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2025-11-19/what-s-the-philippines-flood-corruption-scandal-how-has-marcos-jr-responded) - [FATF](https://www.fatf-gafi.org/en/publications/Mutualevaluations/Mer-cameroon-2022.html) - [FATF](https://www.fatf-gafi.org/en/publications/High-risk-and-other-monitored-jurisdictions/increased-monitoring-june-2026.html) - [HM Treasury](https://www.gov.uk/government/publications/money-laundering-advisory-notice-high-risk-third-countries--2/money-laundering-advisory-notice-high-risk-third-countries--2) - [European Commission](https://finance.ec.europa.eu/news/european-commission-updates-list-high-risk-countries-strengthen-international-fight-against-2025-12-04_en) - [Bloomberg](https://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2026-03-03/belgium-detains-three-in-cameroon-secessionist-war-crimes-probe) - [OCCRP](https://www.occrp.org/en/news/report-4-billion-in-african-conflict-gold-floods-world-markets) - [Global Witness](https://www.globalwitness.org/en/press-releases/seismic-change-needed-glencore-following-decade-corruption/) - [UK FCDO/Department for Business and Trade](https://www.gov.uk/government/publications/cameroon-overseas-business-risk/cameroon-overseas-business-risks) - [UNODC (UNCAC Country Review)](https://www.unodc.org/documents/treaties/UNCAC/CountryVisitFinalReports/2017_04_03_Cameroon_Final_Country_Report.pdf) Coverage gaps fim-int-2026-07-07-G001: Direct access to Cameroon own nativ… fim-int-2026-07-07-G001: Direct access to Cameroon own native-language legislative texts and ANIF and CONAC primary reporting portals was not obtainable this cycle, limiting granularity on domestic supervisory posture beyond FATF summary characterisations. [resolved] fim-int-2026-07-07-G002: No confirmed on-site FATF assessmen… fim-int-2026-07-07-G002: No confirmed on-site FATF assessment date or explicit escalation trigger for Cameroon exists beyond the scheduled October 2026 Plenary follow-up review. [resolved] fim-int-2026-07-07-G003: Quantified enforcement statistics, … fim-int-2026-07-07-G003: Quantified enforcement statistics, such as the number of asset seizures or beneficial-ownership access requests, are absent to independently verify the improving beneficial-ownership trajectory beyond FATF qualitative crediting. [resolved] fim-int-2026-07-07-G004: No Cameroon-specific VASP regulator… fim-int-2026-07-07-G004: No Cameroon-specific VASP regulatory text or BEAC-level policy statement was retrieved to substantiate the D5 crypto assessment beyond an indirect adoption-ranking inference. [resolved] fim-int-2026-07-07-G005: No direct OFAC designation-history … fim-int-2026-07-07-G005: No direct OFAC designation-history search result was included in this bundle to positively confirm the absence of a Cameroon-linked SDN nexus, beyond a negative-search inference. [resolved] fim-int-2026-08-21-G001 ({'scheme': 'financial_integrity', '… fim-int-2026-08-21-G001 ({'scheme': 'financial_integrity', 'value': 'D1'}): No T1 IMO or Cameroonian maritime-authority primary document was reached this cycle for the shipping-registry shadow-fleet finding. [resolved] fim-int-2026-08-21-G002 ({'scheme': 'financial_integrity', '… fim-int-2026-08-21-G002 ({'scheme': 'financial_integrity', 'value': 'D2'}): No CM-specific BO-registry primary document was reached this cycle beyond the standing 25% threshold requirement. [resolved] fim-int-2026-08-21-G003: Tier-D watch jurisdictions (KH/LA/M… fim-int-2026-08-21-G003: Tier-D watch jurisdictions (KH/LA/MX/CO) were not actively searched this cycle; pooled union web-search budget was allocated to CM-primary coverage. [resolved] fim-int-2026-09-28-G001 ({'scheme': 'financial_integrity', '… fim-int-2026-09-28-G001 ({'scheme': 'financial_integrity', 'value': 'D7'}): No GABAC/CEMAC official gazette text was independently retrieved this cycle to confirm CEMAC Regulation No. 02/24's text and effective status against a primary publication. [resolved] fim-int-2026-09-28-G002: Tier D jurisdiction watch (Cambodia… fim-int-2026-09-28-G002: Tier D jurisdiction watch (Cambodia, Laos, Mexico, Colombia) was not reached this cycle; pooled search budget was concentrated on the bound jurisdiction CM. [resolved] fim-int-2026-09-28-G003 ({'scheme': 'financial_integrity', '… fim-int-2026-09-28-G003 ({'scheme': 'financial_integrity', 'value': 'D5'}): No independent confirmation of whether COSUMAF has issued any PSAN licence since the mid-2026 commentary source, or of the status of the reported BEAC/COBAC/COSUMAF harmonised crypto-asset framework targeted for later in 2026. [resolved] fim-int-2026-10-11-G001: Tier D jurisdictions (KH, LA, MX, C… fim-int-2026-10-11-G001: Tier D jurisdictions (KH, LA, MX, CO) were not actively re-searched this cycle; awaiting_primary_source going into the next cycle. [resolved] fim-int-2026-10-11-G002 ({'scheme': 'financial_integrity', '… fim-int-2026-10-11-G002 ({'scheme': 'financial_integrity', 'value': 'D7'}): CEMAC Regulation No. 02/24's stated repeal of the 2016 regulation rests on a single T3 compliance vendor and has not been verified against the CEMAC Official Journal text. [resolved] fim-int-2026-10-11-G003 ({'scheme': 'financial_integrity', '… fim-int-2026-10-11-G003 ({'scheme': 'financial_integrity', 'value': 'D3'}): ANIF's reported new director (Jean Bertin Meba, appointed April 2026) has not been corroborated by a primary government notice this cycle. [resolved] fim-int-2026-10-25-G001 ({'scheme': 'financial_integrity', '… fim-int-2026-10-25-G001 ({'scheme': 'financial_integrity', 'value': 'D7'}): No FATF or GABAC primary-source corroboration was located this cycle for the specific 80% action-plan-completion figure; it rests on a single T2 press report of a government committee statement. [resolved] fim-int-2026-10-25-G002: Tier-D watch jurisdictions (KH, LA,… fim-int-2026-10-25-G002: Tier-D watch jurisdictions (KH, LA, MX, CO) were not actively searched this cycle given the single-jurisdiction union dispatch scope. [resolved] fim-int-2026-11-01-G001 ({'scheme': 'financial_integrity', '… fim-int-2026-11-01-G001 ({'scheme': 'financial_integrity', 'value': 'D7'}): No COBAC primary communiqué text retrieved this cycle; the 25 September 2026 Malabo-meeting finding rests on a single T3 secondary report. [open] fim-int-2026-11-01-G002 ({'scheme': 'financial_integrity', '… fim-int-2026-11-01-G002 ({'scheme': 'financial_integrity', 'value': 'D2'}): No new Cameroon-specific beneficial-ownership register development was located this cycle; FATF's call for timely BO access remains flagged as outstanding by secondary commentary only. [open] fim-int-2026-11-01-G003 ({'scheme': 'financial_integrity', '… fim-int-2026-11-01-G003 ({'scheme': 'financial_integrity', 'value': 'D6'}): No COBAC primary communiqué text retrieved for the 25 September 2026 Malabo meeting; reliance is on a single T3 secondary report. [open] FIM-GAP-001 (D1): Across every FATF follow-up statement from… FIM-GAP-001 (D1): Across every FATF follow-up statement from October 2024 through June 2026, Cameroon has been repeatedly flagged for failing to implement effective policies and procedures for seizing and confiscating proceeds and instrumentalities of crime, particularly at border crossings. FIM-GAP-002 (D1): Cameroon has not demonstrated effective im… FIM-GAP-002 (D1): Cameroon has not demonstrated effective implementation of targeted financial sanctions regimes for terrorist financing (TF) and proliferation financing (PF), a deficiency reiterated in every FATF statement across the 18-month window. FIM-GAP-003 (D1): Cameroon has not fully implemented a risk-… FIM-GAP-003 (D1): Cameroon has not fully implemented a risk-based approach to non-profit organisations (NPOs) without disrupting legitimate activity, leaving the NPO sector exposed to potential terrorist-financing abuse in the Far North and Anglophone conflict zones. FIM-GAP-004 (D2): Risk-based supervision of banks is only pa… FIM-GAP-004 (D2): Risk-based supervision of banks is only partially developed, and effective risk-based supervision of non-bank financial institutions and DNFBPs (including newly digitised company-formation agents) remains largely absent, a deficiency flagged in every FATF statement in the window. FIM-GAP-005 (D6): Direct access to Cameroon's own national-l… FIM-GAP-005 (D6): Direct access to Cameroon's own national-language legislative texts, ANIF/CONAC native reporting portals, and disaggregated sector-specific risk assessments was not obtainable in this research cycle; findings rely on FATF/GABAC assessments and UK/EU secondary characterisations rather than primary Cameroonian regulatory publication. ## Evidence #### Confidence-tiered claims Up to USD 200,000 from Madica, reported September 2026 [[Source 1]](#sec-sources) Uncertain · 1 source ~70% (17 of 24 items) [[Source 1]](#sec-sources) Probable · 1 source 15th Statutory Ministerial Plenary, 3 October 2026, N'Djamena [[Source 1]](#sec-sources) Probable · 1 source Retained under increased monitoring per 30 October 2026 plenary statement; all action-plan deadlines recorded as now expired [[Source 1]](#sec-sources) Probable · 1 source In force since 20 December 2024; reported to have repealed Regulation No. 01/CEMAC/UMAC/CM of 11 April 2016 [[Source 1]](#sec-sources) Uncertain · 1 source approximately 80% as at 22 October 2026, up from 46% [[Source 1]](#sec-sources) Probable · 1 source ANIF relocated to new premises in Yaoundé, visited by the Finance Minister on 2 September 2026. [[Source 1]](#sec-sources) Probable · 1 source Règlement N°02/24/CEMAC/UMAC/CM of 20 December 2024 abrogates and replaces the prior Règlement N°01/CEMAC/UMAC/CM of 11 April 2016. [[Source 1]](#sec-sources) Probable · 1 source expired [[Source 1]](#sec-sources) Probable · 1 source 25 September 2026 Malabo annual meeting, without announcing new binding rule [[Source 1]](#sec-sources) Probable · 1 source monetary sovereignty for the CEMAC zone [[Source 1]](#sec-sources) Probable · 1 source Flagged customer-fund circulation risk across the CEMAC payment-provider/aggregator chain (fraud, cybercrime, AML/CFT compliance gaps) at 25 September 2026 Malabo meeting, without announcing a new binding rule [[Source 1]](#sec-sources) Probable · 1 source BEAC Governor reaffirmed preference for sovereign digital-CFA-franc over private dollar-stablecoin adoption, citing monetary-sovereignty concerns; CEMAC crypto-asset framework remains expected but unpublished [[Source 1]](#sec-sources) Probable · 1 source