Financial Integrity Monitor

Algeria DZ

Domains (D1–D6)

Sources

Role actions

Horizon <90d

Jurisdiction profile

CleanTier BRisk: DecreasingMixed

Algeria's AML/CFT regime rests on the 2005 Anti-Money-Laundering/CFT Act and 2006 Anti-Corruption Act, with the CTRF financial intelligence unit at the Ministry of Finance and Bank of Algeria customer due-diligence regulations.

FATF grey-listed Algeria in October 2024; following reforms to BO sanctions, targeted financial sanctions for TF, and NPO oversight, FATF removed Algeria from increased monitoring on 19 June 2026.

Key deficiencies

Beneficial ownership information framework remains under development despite a new sanctions-for-breach legal basis
Risk-based supervision of higher-risk DNFBP sectors still maturing
Private-sector understanding of ML/TF risk assessed as moderate-to-weak in the 2023 MER, particularly among banks on TF risk
Outright criminalisation of virtual assets (Law 25-10) displaces rather than eliminates crypto activity, undermining visibility into flows
Historic extractive-sector corruption (Sonatrach/Saipem) prosecutions have proceeded slowly relative to the scale of alleged laundering

Recent developments (18m)

FATF placed Algeria under increased monitoring in October 2024 alongside Angola, Côte d'Ivoire and Lebanon
EU Delegated Regulation (EU) 2025/1184 (10 June 2025) added Algeria to the EU high-risk third country list
May 2025 FATF follow-up re-rated five Recommendations (16, 10, 11, 18 upgraded to largely compliant; 19 to partially compliant)
Algeria enacted Law No. 25-10 (24 July 2025) criminalising all cryptocurrency ownership, trading, mining and promotion
OFAC designated a Hamas/PFLP charity-financing network on 10 June 2025 including an Algerian national and an Algeria-based charity
February 2026 FATF Plenary made an initial determination that Algeria substantially completed its action plan, warranting an on-site verification visit
FATF removed Algeria from the grey list on 19 June 2026 following a successful on-site assessment
OFAC removed a cluster of long-standing Algeria-linked AQIM/GSPC figures from the SDN list on 28 May 2026

Weekly brief

Lead signal

Lead Signal

Read full brief

Lead Signal

Algeria's crypto-asset framework tightened decisively this cycle with Law No. 25-10 of 24 July 2025, which criminalises the issuance, purchase, sale, possession, use, mining and promotion of crypto-assets and explicitly amends and supplements the core AML/CFT statute, Law No. 05-01. Secondary reporting frames the measure as an FATF-alignment step on virtual-asset risk, though no Tier-1 primary source (Official Journal or Bank of Algeria) was reached this cycle, capping confidence at Assessed on convergent Tier-3 sourcing. This is an architecture-level development, not an incident: it restructures the entire legal treatment of a financial-innovation category rather than resolving a single enforcement matter, and it does so through the AML/CFT statute itself rather than a separate crypto-specific instrument.

Other Developments

FATF grey-list exit. The Financial Action Task Force removed Algeria, alongside Namibia, from its increased-monitoring list at the June 2026 Plenary, following on-site verification of sustained AML/CFT reform implementation. The governing instrument for Algeria's AML/CFT regime remains Law No. 05-01 as amended by Law No. 25-10, with the Bank of Algeria and the Financial Intelligence Processing Unit (CTRF) as designated authorities. Algeria continues structured follow-up with MENAFATF, its FATF-Style Regional Body, to sustain the improvements that supported delisting — a standing-position update rather than a one-off event, and a High-confidence, Tier-1-sourced finding.

Enforcement echo in the crypto-gambling nexus. A network of local agents in Béjaïa was reportedly dismantled by police for organising illegal online gambling and processing cryptocurrency payments on its behalf. This finding is held at Low confidence: it rests on a single Tier-3 source with no established date, and it is recorded here as an incident-level data point rather than a structural finding. It nonetheless illustrates, at the margins, the practical mechanism the new crypto prohibition is aimed at closing.

Cross-Monitor Connections

The Béjaïa enforcement action sits directly at the intersection of this monitor's D5 crypto-integrity finding and the gambling-regulatory domain tracked elsewhere in this fleet: a crypto-payment facilitation network was reportedly used specifically to process funds for illegal online gambling, meaning the same Law No. 25-10 prohibition that this monitor tracks as an AML/CFT-architecture development also removes the payment rail that the gambling-side reporting identifies as the principal access mechanism for offshore betting. Algeria sits outside the EEA, so the EU AML Package (AMLR, 6AMLD, AMLA) is not a directly applicable instrument for this jurisdiction; DZ's standing AML/CFT record is instead anchored to the FATF/MENAFATF track, which is the operative cross-reference this cycle.

Outlook

The FATF delisting is expected to prompt correspondent banks and virtual-asset service providers to re-rate Algeria's country risk downward, though general industry practice will likely lag the formal June 2026 delisting by one to two risk-review cycles as enhanced-due-diligence treatment unwinds gradually. MENAFATF follow-up on Algeria's action plan continues through at least the fourth quarter of 2026. The crypto prohibition under Law No. 25-10 is a structural, not transitional, feature of the regime going forward; watch for whether enforcement activity beyond the single Béjaïa data point emerges as evidence that the ban is being operationalised rather than existing only on the books.

weekly_brief_draft · JID DZ

Domain intelligence (D1–D6)

D1 Sanctions

Not covered

Sanctions is not yet covered for this jurisdiction in this report.

D2 Beneficial Ownership

Not covered

Beneficial Ownership is not yet covered for this jurisdiction in this report.

D3 Enabler Jurisdictions

Not covered

Enabler Jurisdictions is not yet covered for this jurisdiction in this report.

D4 Conflict Finance

Not covered

Conflict Finance is not yet covered for this jurisdiction in this report.

D5 Crypto / Digital Assets / Financial Innovation

Crypto / Digital Assets / Financial Innovation

Algeria's Law No. 25-10 of 24 July 2025 is a sweeping architecture-level intervention into the country's digital-asset environment: it criminalises the issuance, purchase, sale, possession, use, mining and promotion of crypto-assets, and it does so by explicitly amending and supplementing Law No. 05-01, Algeria's core AML/CFT statute. This is a structural choice worth foregrounding on its own terms — the prohibition is not a stand-alone crypto statute sitting beside the AML/CFT framework but is woven directly into it, meaning the criminal exposure for prohibited crypto activity is framed, at the statutory level, as an anti-money-laundering and counter-terrorist-financing matter rather than a separate financial-innovation carve-out. Secondary reporting frames the law as intended to align Algeria with FATF standards on virtual-asset risk, a framing consistent with the timing: the law postdates FATF's ongoing engagement with Algeria and precedes Algeria's eventual removal from the increased-monitoring list roughly eleven months later. No Tier-1 primary source — neither the Official Journal nor a Bank of Algeria publication — was reached this cycle to verify the statute's exact text, so this finding is held at Assessed confidence on the strength of convergent Tier-3 secondary reporting rather than primary verification.

The practical enforcement dimension of this architecture surfaced in a single reported incident this cycle: Algerian police reportedly dismantled a network of local agents in Béjaïa organising illegal online gambling and processing cryptocurrency payments on its behalf. This is held at Low confidence — a single Tier-3 source, no established date — and should be read as an incident-level data point illustrating the mechanism the new prohibition targets, not as evidence of a broader enforcement pattern. The obligation_refs attached to Law No. 25-10 flag a governance-type control gap as partial: the prohibition creates a clear criminal-liability perimeter for crypto-asset operators and cross-sector entities, but this cycle's evidence base does not extend to how supervisory examination or licensing withdrawal would operate against entities caught within that perimeter, since the underlying activity is criminalised outright rather than regulated under a licensing regime. The customer-typology tag attached to the Béjaïa finding — VASP counterparty — situates the informal facilitation network within the same typology class the broader prohibition is designed to eliminate.

Three-pillar balance is worth naming explicitly here: this is fundamentally an AML-pillar development (the statute amends Law No. 05-01 directly), and the CTF and CPF dimensions of the same prohibition are not separately evidenced this cycle — a gap rather than an indication that those pillars are unaffected. The absence of enforcement volume beyond the single Béjaïa data point is itself worth surfacing under an enablement-as-signal lens: a comprehensive criminal prohibition enacted just over a year ago has, on the evidence reaching this monitor, produced one reported enforcement action to date, which may reflect either genuinely low informal crypto-gambling volume in Algeria or an evidence gap in this cycle's sourcing rather than an enforcement gap in fact.

Outlook

Watch for whether enforcement activity against crypto-asset use expands beyond the single Béjaïa network, and whether any Tier-1 Bank of Algeria or Official Journal publication becomes reachable to verify the statute's exact scope and any implementing regulations. The prohibition's explicit framing as an amendment to the AML/CFT statute means any future MENAFATF follow-up assessment of Algeria's AML/CFT regime will necessarily engage with the crypto prohibition as part of that regime, not as a separate track — a structural linkage that should keep this domain and D7 moving together in subsequent cycles.

D6 Compliance Technology & Active Defence

Not covered

Compliance Technology & Active Defence is not yet covered for this jurisdiction in this report.

D7 AML/CTF Regime

AML/CTF Regime

The standing-position update to Algeria's AML/CTF record this cycle is structural and favourable: the Financial Action Task Force removed Algeria, together with Namibia, from its list of jurisdictions under increased monitoring at the June 2026 Plenary, following successful on-site verification of sustained implementation of AML/CFT reforms. This is a High-confidence, Tier-1-sourced finding directly from FATF publication, and it should be read as an architecture-level development rather than a single incident: grey-list exit reflects a multi-year verification process against an action plan, not a discrete event. The governing instrument underpinning Algeria's regime remains Law No. 05-01, now amended and supplemented by Law No. 25-10 of 24 July 2025, with the Bank of Algeria and the Financial Intelligence Processing Unit (CTRF) continuing as the designated supervisory and financial-intelligence authorities.

Algeria's delisting does not end its FATF-track engagement: the jurisdiction continues structured follow-up with MENAFATF, its FATF-Style Regional Body, to sustain the improvements that supported removal from increased monitoring. This follow-up relationship is itself the near-term regulatory horizon item for this domain, expected to run at least through the fourth quarter of 2026. Enablement-as-signal is worth naming directly here: no divergence or gap signal was identified this cycle regarding Algeria's sanctions-designation status (no active OFAC, OFSI, EU-Council or UN designations are in force), and the grey-list exit itself is a form of positive enablement evidence — a jurisdiction moving from restrictive monitoring toward standard treatment — which correspondent banks and virtual-asset service providers are expected to reflect in country-risk re-rating, albeit with an anticipated lag of one to two risk-review cycles behind the formal delisting.

Three-pillar balance: this cycle's evidence base for D7 is concentrated on the AML pillar (the grey-list exit and the governing-instrument update); no CTF- or CPF-specific finding for Algeria surfaced this cycle, which is a coverage gap in the evidence reaching this monitor rather than a finding that those pillars are static. The timing coincidence between the AML/CFT-statute amendment (Law No. 25-10, which folds the crypto prohibition into Law No. 05-01) and the delisting is analytically significant: it suggests Algeria's broader compliance push, of which the crypto prohibition is one visible component, was material to the FATF outcome, even though this cycle's sourcing does not establish a direct causal link between the two.

Outlook

The near-term horizon for this domain is MENAFATF's continued follow-up on Algeria's AML/CFT action plan, expected through the fourth quarter of 2026, with a Tier-1, FATF-sourced expectation that correspondent banks and virtual-asset service providers will re-rate Algeria's country risk downward as the delisting is absorbed into standard due-diligence practice. Watch for whether any divergence emerges between Algeria's improving FATF standing and its sanctions-designation status, which remains unchanged and unflagged this cycle.

Regulatory horizon

In Force2026-Q4 · ±half_year

MENAFATF continued follow-up on Algeria's AML/CFT action plan post-delisting

Correspondent banks and VASPs are expected to re-rate DZ country risk downward following the June 2026 delisting.

Source

1 dated · 3 pending date · baseline financial-integrity-2026-07-05

Role action cards

MLROHigh

Algeria's FATF grey-list exit and its new blanket crypto-asset prohibition both land in the AML/CFT statute this cycle, reshaping the country-risk and typology baseline for DZ exposure.

The FATF delisting (High confidence) should factor into enhanced-due-diligence calibration for DZ counterparties, while Law No. 25-10's criminalisation of crypto-asset activity (Assessed confidence) changes the predicate landscape for any DZ-linked crypto-adjacent SAR triggers, including the reported Béjaïa payment-facilitation case.

4 evidence refs

ComplianceHigh

DZ's AML/CFT governing framework was updated this cycle (Law No. 25-10 amending Law No. 05-01) alongside a favourable FATF standing change.

Compliance policies referencing DZ as a monitored jurisdiction should be reviewed against the June 2026 delisting, and any crypto-related control language for DZ exposure should reflect the new blanket prohibition under Law No. 25-10.

3 evidence refs

LegalAssessed

Law No. 25-10 creates direct criminal liability for crypto-asset issuance, possession, use and promotion in Algeria, with one reported enforcement action this cycle.

Any client instruction touching DZ-linked crypto-asset activity now carries statutory criminal exposure under an AML/CFT-integrated prohibition; the Béjaïa enforcement action is a low-confidence but concrete illustration that facilitators, not only operators, face prosecution.

2 evidence refs

BoardHigh

Algeria's removal from the FATF increased-monitoring list is a structural improvement in the country's AML/CFT standing, occurring alongside a sweeping new crypto-asset prohibition.

This is a reputational and strategic-level positive signal for DZ exposure, though the concurrent crypto prohibition indicates the jurisdiction's broader financial-integrity environment is still actively tightening rather than settled.

2 evidence refs

CTOAssessed

Algeria's Law No. 25-10 criminalises the entire crypto-asset stack, including issuance, wallets, exchanges and promotion, eliminating any lawful DZ-linked crypto infrastructure.

Any technical architecture with DZ-facing crypto rails or wallet infrastructure now sits in a criminally prohibited environment; the Béjaïa case shows enforcement has already reached the payment-facilitation layer, not just end-user activity.

2 evidence refs

RiskHigh

DZ presents a bifurcated risk signal this cycle: improving AML/CFT standing at the FATF level alongside an escalating, newly criminalised crypto-asset typology domestically.

Exposure-concentration models for DZ should decouple the sovereign/FATF-standing risk factor (improving) from the crypto-asset-typology risk factor (escalating) rather than netting them into a single directional score.

3 evidence refs

OperationsAssessed

DZ country-risk screening parameters are expected to shift following the June 2026 FATF delisting, with a lag of one to two risk-review cycles.

Screening thresholds calibrated to DZ's prior grey-list status should be scheduled for review; crypto-related transaction-monitoring rules touching DZ should reflect the new blanket prohibition under Law No. 25-10.

2 evidence refs

AuditAssessed

The governing instrument and designated-authority record for DZ's AML/CFT regime was updated this cycle to reflect Law No. 25-10 and the FATF delisting.

Audit documentation referencing DZ's AML/CFT framework or FATF status should be updated to Law No. 05-01 as amended by Law No. 25-10, with Bank of Algeria and CTRF as designated authorities, and the June 2026 delisting reflected in country-risk rationale files.

2 evidence refs

Decision lens

MLRO

Algeria's FATF grey-list exit and its new blanket crypto-asset prohibition both land in the AML/CFT statute this cycle, reshaping the country-risk and typology baseline for DZ exposure.

Compliance

DZ's AML/CFT governing framework was updated this cycle (Law No.

Legal

Law No.

Board

Algeria's removal from the FATF increased-monitoring list is a structural improvement in the country's AML/CFT standing, occurring alongside a sweeping new crypto-asset prohibition.

CTO

Algeria's Law No.

Risk

DZ presents a bifurcated risk signal this cycle: improving AML/CFT standing at the FATF level alongside an escalating, newly criminalised crypto-asset typology domestically.

Operations

DZ country-risk screening parameters are expected to shift following the June 2026 FATF delisting, with a lag of one to two risk-review cycles.

Audit

The governing instrument and designated-authority record for DZ's AML/CFT regime was updated this cycle to reflect Law No.

Shared evidence: 4 refs

Scenario sketches

AMLA transition and cross-border supervisory reach — illustrative orientation

Illustrative scenario for analytical orientation: as the EU's AMLA Regulation (Reg (EU) 2024/1620) matures alongside the directly-applicable AMLR (Reg 2024/1624) and per-state 6AMLD transposition, the supervisory perimeter for cross-border obliged entities could shift from purely national authorities toward a hybrid EU-level regime. For a non-EEA jurisdiction such as Algeria, this architecture is structural backdrop rather than a directly applicable instrument, but it illustrates a possible template for how regional bodies such as MENAFATF could evolve their own follow-up mechanisms over time. This is illustration only and does not describe any confirmed development in Algeria's own regime.

Illustrative scenario for analytical orientation only. Not compliance advice, not a prediction, and not a statement of observed fact.

Crypto-prohibition enforcement scale-up — illustrative orientation

Illustrative scenario for analytical orientation: if Algerian authorities were to scale enforcement of Law No. 25-10 beyond the single reported Béjaïa network, a plausible structural pattern would involve targeting payment-facilitation intermediaries first (as in the Béjaïa case) before pursuing individual end-users, given the relative ease of identifying networked facilitators over dispersed retail activity. This is an illustrative structural sketch, not an observed trend or a prediction of Algerian enforcement policy.

Illustrative scenario for analytical orientation only. Not compliance advice, not a prediction, and not a statement of observed fact.

Standing trackers (T1–T6)

Tracker	Status	Note
T1 · Sanctions Architecture and Evasion	no_change	No material DZ-specific Russian sanctions-evasion signal surfaced this cycle.
T2 · EU AML Package / AMLA	no_change	DZ is outside the EEA and not bound by AMLR/6AMLD/AMLA; no applicable instrument moved for this jurisdiction.
T3 · FATF Grey List	improving	Algeria removed from FATF increased-monitoring list at June 2026 Plenary following successful on-site verification.
T4 · Beneficial-Ownership Register Status	no_change	No DZ-specific beneficial-ownership registry development located this cycle.
T5 · Crypto / Digital-Asset Integrity	escalating	Law No. 25-10 imposes a comprehensive criminal ban on crypto-asset issuance, trading, possession, mining and promotion in DZ, framed as an AML/CFT and FATF-alignment measure.
T6 · Sanctions Regime Divergence	no_change	No OFAC, OFSI, EU-Council or UN sanctions designations currently in force against Algeria; no divergence signal this cycle.

Registers

Enforcement actions

OFAC designated a Hamas and PFLP charity-financing network including an Algerian national and an Algeria-registered charity association as Specially Designated Global Terrorists, disrupting a sham overseas charity structure used to move funds to Hamas and PFLP. 10 Jun 2025
OFAC updated existing SDN entries for Algerian-born AQIM/GSPC-linked individuals, adding secondary sanctions risk language pursuant to Executive Order 13224 as amended, as part of a broader administrative update to counter-terrorism designations. 28 Mar 2025
OFAC removed a cluster of historic Algeria-linked AQIM/GSPC designees from the SDN list in a designations-removal action, reflecting changed operational status of these long-listed individuals. 28 May 2026
Following a February 2026 initial determination that Algeria had substantially completed its FATF action plan, MENAFATF conducted an on-site verification visit assessing sustained implementation of risk-based supervision, BO sanctions frameworks, STR regimes and TF targeted financial sanctions. 19 Jun 2026

Sanctions changes

The European Commission adopted Delegated Regulation (EU) 2025/1184 (10 June 2025), amending Delegated Regulation (EU) 2016/1675 to add Algeria to the EU list of high-risk third countries with AML/CFT strategic deficiencies, triggering mandatory enhanced due diligence for EU-regulated entities dealing with Algerian counterparties. 10 Jun 2025
OFAC added secondary sanctions risk language to existing SDGT designations of Algerian-origin AQIM/GSPC-linked individuals as part of a March 2025 administrative list update tied to a Hizballah finance-network action. 28 Mar 2025
OFAC removed a cluster of long-standing Algeria-linked AQIM/GSPC designees from the SDN list on 28 May 2026, reflecting a reassessed threat status for individuals designated years earlier. 28 May 2026
HM Treasury's Money Laundering Advisory Notice was updated on 22 June 2026 to reflect the FATF's 19 June 2026 removal of Algeria from increased monitoring, implying removal of Algeria from the UK's High-Risk Third Countries list under MLR Regulation 33, while the EU's parallel high-risk third country listing (Delegated Regulation (EU) 2025/1184) had not yet been amended as of this baseline date. 22 Jun 2026

Regulatory horizon (register)

EU delisting of Algeria from high-risk third country list
MENAFATF post-delisting sustained-implementation monitoring
Algeria's next full FATF/MENAFATF mutual evaluation cycle

Active schemes

[HIGH] Sahel/Maghreb hawala-and-smuggling terrorist financing corridor
[HIGH] Hydrocarbon-sector commission laundering via offshore SPVs
Underground crypto activity persisting despite total ban

Sources

Coverage gaps

Across successive FATF follow-up cycles (Feb 2025, June 2025…

Across successive FATF follow-up cycles (Feb 2025, June 2025, Oct 2025, Feb 2026), "developing an effective framework for basic and beneficial ownership information" persisted as an open action item even as Algeria approached delisting, indicating the BO registry remains structurally underdeveloped relative to other reformed areas.

Algeria's blanket criminalisation of cryptocurrency (Law 25-…

Algeria's blanket criminalisation of cryptocurrency (Law 25-10, July 2025) removes any licensing or monitoring perimeter, and adoption/usage data indicate North African markets continue engaging with crypto through informal channels despite formal bans, meaning enforcement capacity has no visibility into the displaced activity.

Prosecutions arising from the Sonatrach/Saipem bribery-and-l…

Prosecutions arising from the Sonatrach/Saipem bribery-and-laundering scandal proceeded slowly and unevenly relative to the scale of alleged proceeds (over $200 million in laundered commissions per ICIJ reporting), with limited asset recovery outcomes publicly documented.

Algeria's 2023 MENAFATF Mutual Evaluation found private-sect…

Algeria's 2023 MENAFATF Mutual Evaluation found private-sector, and particularly banking-sector, understanding of ML risk ranging from moderate to weak, with TF risk understanding assessed as weak; no evidence surfaced in this baseline window of a material RegTech/AI transaction-monitoring uplift addressing this capacity gap.

Evidence

Confidence-tiered claims

No structured claims published for this jurisdiction yet.