--- title: "France (FR) — Financial-Integrity Intelligence · Sentinel" canonical: https://sentinel.gi/jurisdictions/france/ source_html: /jurisdictions/france/index.html description: "Financial integrity intelligence for France (FR): sanctions, beneficial ownership, enabler jurisdictions, conflict finance, digital assets and compliance technology — with sourced findings." generated_at: 2026-11-08T04:46:02Z content_sha256: 3f78ad534401dac03bad3f62ef281dd40e031ec9c7a18180ef20a132c66a9ee3 generator: "fe-fleet/md-twin@1.0" --- # France (FR) — Financial-Integrity Intelligence · Sentinel Not every instrument is backed by its official text yet. At least one law or rulebook covered here has no official source (tier 1) retrieved for it yet. No finding on this page is shown with confidence above “Probable” until stronger sources are retrieved. Financial Integrity Monitor # France FR Domains covered 8 of 8 Sources 232 Role actions 8 Horizon <90d 0 Jurisdiction profile FATF status: Compliant Tier: A Risk direction: Stable Enablement vs enforcement: Mixed France operates a mature AML/CFT architecture built on TRACFIN (FIU), ACPR and AMF supervision, PNF/PNAT specialised prosecution, and COLB national coordination. More FATF's 2022 MER rated the system strong on prosecution, confiscation and international cooperation, but flagged supervisory gaps in real estate, virtual assets, and DNFBP sectors. MiCA transition and Russia-sanctions enforcement (shadow-fleet interdictions) are the dominant live fronts. Key deficiencies - Risk-based supervision of designated non-financial businesses and professions, notably real estate agents and notaires, assessed as insufficient by FATF - AMF's sanctions procedure historically cumbersome, yielding minimal disciplinary output relative to ACPR - Beneficial-ownership verification gaps for associations, foundations and endowment funds - Near-absence of on-site AML/CFT inspections by supervisors in French overseas territories - Reactive rather than systematic interdiction posture on Russian shadow-fleet vessels transiting French waters Recent developments (18m) - French Navy boarded the tanker Boracay off Saint-Nazaire (Sept 2025) for shadow-fleet sanctions circumvention - France fined and released the tanker Grinch at Fos-sur-Mer after a Mediterranean seizure (Jan-Feb 2026) - French Navy boarded a further shadow-fleet tanker off Sicily (June 2026) - AMF widened AML checks across 100+ registered crypto firms during MiCA authorisation transition (Oct 2025) - Wave of violent kidnappings targeting French crypto executives prompted state security response (2025-2026) - France completed the full 18-month MiCA grandfathering transition for existing PSAN/CASP registrants (ending ~30 June 2026) - BNP Paribas found liable by a US jury for enabling Sudan genocide-era financial dealings (Oct 2025), reviving sanctions-enablement scrutiny of French banks Law made at European Economic Area level that applies in France is covered once, on the [European Economic Area](/jurisdictions/eea/) page. This page covers France’s own layer: implementation, national authorities, national options and local enforcement. Brief ## Lead signal #### Lead Signal France's financial integrity posture shows continuity rather than rupture this cycle. The dominant signal is the Autorite des Marches Financiers continuing its quarterly enforcement cadence against unauthorised crypto-asset providers, adding twenty-six names to its public blacklist on 19 October 2026 and bringing the 2026 total to sixty-four. The action is routine in form but structurally significant: it confirms that the post-transitional Markets in Crypto-Assets regime, now the sole authorisation pathway for crypto-asset service activity in France, is being actively policed rather than left to lapse into a paper requirement. Read full brief #### Lead Signal France's financial integrity posture shows continuity rather than rupture this cycle. The dominant signal is the Autorite des Marches Financiers continuing its quarterly enforcement cadence against unauthorised crypto-asset providers, adding twenty-six names to its public blacklist on 19 October 2026 and bringing the 2026 total to sixty-four. The action is routine in form but structurally significant: it confirms that the post-transitional Markets in Crypto-Assets regime, now the sole authorisation pathway for crypto-asset service activity in France, is being actively policed rather than left to lapse into a paper requirement. Alongside this, a modest commercial development surfaced in the payment-verification space, where the fintech 3Pay announced on 16 October 2026 an all-share acquisition of MoneyTrack, a company focused on advancing payment verification for healthcare costs. Neither development rises to the threshold of a structural regime change, but together they describe a financial ecosystem in which oversight of digital-asset access points and consolidation of payment-adjacent infrastructure are both proceeding steadily. #### Other Developments Crypto-asset enforcement continues on a predictable cycle. The AMF's blacklist mechanism, which flags websites it has identified as offering crypto-asset services without the required authorisation, operates on a quarterly rhythm. The addition of twenty-six new names in the third-quarter update is consistent with the volume seen across 2026 and reflects sustained monitoring of the unauthorised-access perimeter rather than any escalation in enforcement posture or a new legal basis for action. Payment-verification infrastructure consolidates further. The 3Pay acquisition of MoneyTrack's assets and teams is a commercial transaction in the fraud-prevention and payment-verification technology space, a sector adjacent to financial integrity concerns because such tooling underpins the controls that obliged entities rely on to detect anomalous payment activity. The deal is structured as an all-share transaction, with the combined entity reported at a modest valuation, and is accompanied by a separate funding round. It illustrates continued consolidation among smaller technology providers serving the compliance and anti-fraud functions of payment firms, rather than a materially new capability entering the market. #### Cross-Monitor Connections The crypto-asset enforcement activity recorded here connects directly to the digital-asset regulatory architecture tracked elsewhere: the same post-transitional authorisation regime that the AMF polices through its blacklist is the backdrop against which crypto-asset service providers in France must now operate, with no national transitional pathway remaining. The payment-verification consolidation signal is commercial in nature and has only indirect bearing on sanctions, beneficial-ownership, or enabler-jurisdiction concerns; it is noted here primarily because fraud-prevention and payment-verification technology forms part of the control infrastructure that broader anti-money-laundering obligations depend upon. #### Outlook Neither development this cycle signals an imminent shift in France's financial integrity architecture. The AMF's enforcement rhythm is expected to continue on its established quarterly basis, and the broader transposition of the European Union's single AML rulebook remains on its statutory track toward mid-2027, a matter that falls outside this cycle's material findings but frames the direction of travel. Commercial consolidation in the payment-verification space is likely to continue as smaller fintech providers combine capabilities, a pattern that bears watching for its cumulative effect on the concentration of compliance-adjacent infrastructure providers, even though no single transaction observed this cycle is independently significant. Earlier periodic briefs (5) 20 Oct 2026 · fim-2026-10-20 #### Lead Signal France's financial integrity posture shows continuity rather than rupture. The dominant signal is the Autorite des Marches Financiers continuing its quarterly enforcement cadence against unauthorised crypto-asset providers, adding twenty-six names to its public blacklist on 19 October 2026 and bringing the 2026 total to sixty-four. The action is routine in form but structurally significant: it confirms that the post-transitional Markets in Crypto-Assets regime, now the sole authorisation pathway for crypto-asset service activity in France, is being actively policed rather than left to lapse into a paper requirement. Alongside this, a modest commercial development surfaced in the payment-verification space, where the fintech 3Pay announced on 16 October 2026 an all-share acquisition of MoneyTrack, a company focused on advancing payment verification for healthcare costs. Neither development rises to the threshold of a structural regime change, but together they describe a financial ecosystem in which oversight of digital-asset access points and consolidation of payment-adjacent infrastructure are both proceeding steadily. #### Other Developments Crypto-asset enforcement continues on a predictable cycle. The AMF's blacklist mechanism, which flags websites it has identified as offering crypto-asset services without the required authorisation, operates on a quarterly rhythm. The addition of twenty-six new names in the third-quarter update is consistent with the volume seen across 2026 and reflects sustained monitoring of the unauthorised-access perimeter rather than any escalation in enforcement posture or a new legal basis for action. Payment-verification infrastructure consolidates further. The 3Pay acquisition of MoneyTrack's assets and teams is a commercial transaction in the fraud-prevention and payment-verification technology space, a sector adjacent to financial integrity concerns because such tooling underpins the controls that obliged entities rely on to detect anomalous payment activity. The deal is structured as an all-share transaction, with the combined entity reported at a modest valuation, and is accompanied by a separate funding round. It illustrates continued consolidation among smaller technology providers serving the compliance and anti-fraud functions of payment firms, rather than a materially new capability entering the market. #### Cross-Monitor Connections The crypto-asset enforcement activity recorded here connects directly to the digital-asset regulatory architecture tracked elsewhere: the same post-transitional authorisation regime that the AMF polices through its blacklist is the backdrop against which crypto-asset service providers in France must now operate, with no national transitional pathway remaining. The payment-verification consolidation signal is commercial in nature and has only indirect bearing on sanctions, beneficial-ownership, or enabler-jurisdiction concerns; it is noted here primarily because fraud-prevention and payment-verification technology forms part of the control infrastructure that broader anti-money-laundering obligations depend upon. #### Outlook Neither development signals an imminent shift in France's financial integrity architecture. The AMF's enforcement rhythm is expected to continue on its established quarterly basis, and the broader transposition of the European Union's single AML rulebook remains on its statutory track toward mid-2027, a matter that falls outside the material findings but frames the direction of travel. Commercial consolidation in the payment-verification space is likely to continue as smaller fintech providers combine capabilities, a pattern that bears watching for its cumulative effect on the concentration of compliance-adjacent infrastructure providers, even though no single transaction observed is independently significant. 6 Oct 2026 · fim-2026-10-06 #### Lead Signal France used the European Union's unanimity-based sanctions-renewal mechanism to secure the removal of two individuals, Alisher Usmanov and Mikhail Fridman, from the Annex I designation list attached to Council Regulation (EU) No 269/2014, as part of a three-year renewal of the broader Russia sanctions package agreed on 22 September 2026. The reporting on this episode comes from a single Tier 3 legal-commentary source rather than from the Council's own Official Journal text, so the mechanics are probable rather than confirmed, but the shape of the episode is analytically significant regardless of the exact bargaining detail: a Member State appears to have converted its veto power within a package renewal into leverage for individualised relief, a channel structurally distinct from the humanitarian-derogation route under Article 6b of the same regulation. Where the Article 6b route is available to any affected party on humanitarian grounds and is adjudicated case by case, a renewal-linked delisting is available only to a Member State with blocking power at the moment the whole package comes up for its periodic vote. This is a structural finding about how sanctions regimes are actually administered inside the EU's unanimity architecture, not an incident about two individuals, and it is the kind of precedent other Member States may look to test in future renewal cycles. #### Other Developments Tracfin's whistleblower-reporting remit has been formally widened. A decree dated 24 April 2026 and in force from 1 July 2026 adds France's financial intelligence unit, Tracfin, to the list of external authorities competent to receive whistleblower disclosures under the Sapin II regime. The source for this is a single Tier 3 legal-press report naming the specific decree and its effective date; the decree text itself has not been independently retrieved this cycle, so the finding is held at probable confidence. The practical effect, if the reporting is accurate, is that Tracfin's intake channel now sits alongside existing Sapin II disclosure routes, potentially widening the aperture through which financial-crime-relevant tips reach the FIU outside the conventional suspicious-transaction-report channel. France's standing position outside the FATF increased-monitoring list is unchanged. The FATF's own 19 June 2026 plenary statement, checked directly, confirms France is not among the twenty-two jurisdictions currently under increased monitoring. This is a confirmed, stable finding rather than a new development, but it anchors the baseline against which France's domestic AML/CTF architecture should be read this cycle. Elsewhere on the same FATF list, Cambodia remains absent, having exited the grey list in February 2023, while Laos remains under increased monitoring, with the FATF's own language specifically citing weak risk-based supervision of casinos, banks, and reporting entities operating in Special Economic Zones. FinCEN has continued its alert cadence against Mexico-based trade-based laundering networks. FIN-2026-Alert007, issued 1 October 2026 and targeting the so-called A7 Network, continues a typology thread FinCEN opened with a supplemental alert on fiscal fuel-theft and tax-evasion schemes on 30 June 2026. The alert index itself was retrieved directly from FinCEN as a Tier 1 primary source, though the content of the alert was not opened in depth this cycle. This is an episodic enforcement-communication development concentrated in the US-Mexico corridor rather than a France-specific finding, but it sits on the same cartel-finance typology thread that French correspondent banks with Latin American exposure would need to screen against. The crypto-asset-service-provider authorisation perimeter affecting payment-adjacent AML exposure remains settled rather than newly moving. The ACPR's confirmation that crypto-asset service providers transferring or custodying e-money tokens require dual authorisation, as a Payment Services and Crypto-Assets provider and as a payment institution, is a Tier 1, confirmed finding, but the relevant flexibility window, an EBA no-action position, expired on 2 March 2026. The rule itself is therefore not a this-cycle move; it is included here because it continues to define the AML-adjacent perimeter for e-money-token-handling crypto firms operating in France. #### Cross-Monitor Connections The ACPR's dual-authorisation requirement for e-money-token transfer and custody sits directly at the AML/CFT and crypto-regulatory interface: a crypto-asset service provider handling EMTs in France now carries payment-institution-level AML obligations on top of its Payment Services and Crypto-Assets registration, a convergence of two previously separate supervisory perimeters that is relevant to any crypto-market monitoring exercise tracking France's authorisation landscape. Separately, the FinCEN alert cadence against Mexico-based trade-based-laundering and fiscal-fuel-theft networks touches a corridor of interest to any conflict-finance or illicit-trade-flow tracking exercise, given the correspondent-banking and trade-finance typologies cited in the underlying alerts. #### Outlook The most consequential open question is whether the French delisting episode becomes a template other Member States test at the next Russia-sanctions renewal, or remains a one-off outcome specific to this cycle's bargaining. Confirming the underlying Council and Official Journal text for the 22 September 2026 renewal, rather than relying on secondary legal commentary, would move this finding from probable to confirmed and would also clarify whether other names were discussed and declined. On the domestic AML/CTF side, France's core architecture, Tracfin as FIU and AMF/ACPR as supervisors, remains stable, with the widened Sapin II whistleblower remit the only confirmed procedural change; the larger structural item on the horizon is the Sixth Anti-Money Laundering Directive transposition deadline of 10 July 2027, which has not yet been enacted domestically and for which no implementing legislation had been identified as at this cycle. 5 Oct 2026 · fim-2026-10-05 #### Lead Signal France's Commission nationale des sanctions (CNS) has, for the first time, confirmed AML/CFT failings by a licensed online gambling operator and imposed formal sanctions. Convened on a referral the Autorite nationale des jeux (ANJ) lodged in July 2025, the CNS held a hearing on 8 July 2026 and found that the operator had failed to apply the asset-freeze sanctions regime, had no internal AML procedures in place, and had failed to inform the economy minister as required. The CNS imposed pecuniary sanctions and a two-month suspended ban on exercising online gambling activity against the operator, an executive, and the compliance officer. ANJ announced the outcome publicly on 21 September 2026; the operator was not named and the sanction amount was not disclosed. This is a first-of-kind escalation path for the French gambling sector: a sector regulator carrying a compliance failure through to a dedicated sanctions commission rather than resolving it administratively, naming individual officer-level exposure alongside the entity. #### Other Developments New fund-freeze power against illegal operators. Loi n deg 2026-725 of 3 August 2026, in force from 5 August 2026, amends Code monetaire et financier article L.563-2 (via its article 42) to let the ANJ president freeze, for six renewable months following five days' formal notice, fund movements to and from the accounts of illegal gambling operators. This is a sanctions-adjacent mechanism: it does not add a name to a sanctions list, but it gives a sector regulator a freezing power modelled on the logic of asset-freeze regimes, aimed specifically at the unlicensed offshore operator ecosystem rather than licensed entities. The underlying statutory text could not be read directly on Legifrance this cycle; the drafting detail here rests on secondary legal commentary, and the mechanism should be treated as provisional pending direct verification of the gazetted text. #### Cross-Monitor Connections The CNS sanction sits at the intersection of sector-specific gambling regulation and the standing AML/CTF obliged-entity framework: a licensed gambling operator is treated as a reporting entity subject to asset-freeze screening and ministerial notification duties, and the enforcement outcome here demonstrates those duties are now being tested through a formal sanctions process rather than supervisory correspondence. The new fund-freeze power under article 42 parallels sanctions-list freezing mechanisms in its procedural logic, five days' notice followed by a renewable freeze, even though it is addressed at illegal operators rather than designated persons, and it illustrates how a non-financial sector regulator can be equipped with a financial-flow tool that previously sat with sanctions-implementation authorities. #### Outlook The immediate question is whether ANJ's willingness to carry an AML/CFT failure to a CNS sanctions outcome signals a broader shift toward formal referrals, or remains an isolated first case. A second referral, or publication of the sanctioned operator's identity and the sanction amount, would be the clearest confirming signal. On the fund-freeze power, confirmation of the gazetted statutory text, and any public record of its use against a named illegal operator since 5 August 2026, would move this from a provisional, secondary-sourced mechanism to a confirmed enforcement tool worth tracking as a template for other sector regulators. 28 Sep 2026 · fim-2026-09-28 #### Lead Signal France closed its national crypto-asset registration route on 1 July 2026, when the PSAN-to-MiCA transitional regime expired. Only MiCA-authorised crypto-asset service providers, or eligible Article 60 notifiers, may now provide crypto-asset services in France, a structural shift confirmed directly by the AMF. This is best read as a structural tightening of the crypto-asset enabler surface rather than an episodic enforcement action, consistent with the EU-wide MiCA harmonisation architecture that France now sits fully inside. Secondary reporting places Binance France SAS among the firms that did not obtain MiCA authorisation and ceased onboarding and deposits for French clients from the same date, though this specific claim is not yet independently corroborated against the AMF's own public register of authorised providers. #### Other Developments Beneficial-ownership transposition deadline approaches. France, as an EEA member, is bound by the EU AML Package's harmonised legitimate-interest standard for beneficial-ownership register access, with a July 2026 implementation deadline under the AMLR and 6AMLD. France's own transposition status against this deadline has not yet been independently confirmed this cycle against Legifrance, and the underlying claim rests on a lower-tier vendor-analytics source rather than a primary legal text. #### Cross-Monitor Connections The closure of France's national PSAN crypto-registration route is directly relevant to the crypto monitor's own tracking of France's licensing perimeter, and to the world-payments monitor's tracking of digital-asset market structure, since the same MiCA CASP authorisation requirement now governs market access for both consumer-facing crypto-asset services and any payments-adjacent crypto activity. The beneficial-ownership transposition question connects to the broader EU AML Package architecture that also touches obliged entities across the banking and payments sectors that world-payments and advennt separately track. #### Outlook The clearest near-term development to watch is whether the AMF names a confirmed enforcement action against any provider, including Binance France, that continued unauthorised crypto-asset service provision past the 1 July 2026 deadline; no such T1-confirmed action was identified this cycle. On beneficial ownership, confirmation of France's transposition status ahead of the July 2026 EU harmonisation deadline, ideally against a primary Legifrance text, is the key gap to close in the coming cycle. 21 Sep 2026 · fim-2026-08-21 #### Lead Signal The EU Council's 21st Russia sanctions package, adopted 23 July 2026, is the defining architecture event of this cycle for France. The package adds 48 individuals and roughly 168 to 170 entities to the asset-freeze list, reaching third-country enablers in shipping and technical management, and it applies directly in France as an EU Council Regulation with no domestic transposition step required. This is a structural expansion of the sanctions net rather than an isolated enforcement action: it extends the EU's asset-freeze architecture into adjacent facilitation layers, which is precisely the kind of enabler-side reach that determines whether a sanctions regime bites or is circumvented. Thirty-three additional Russian credit and financial institutions were added to Annex XIV effective 13 August 2026, deepening the correspondent-banking exposure that French financial institutions must screen against. The direct-applicability feature is significant in its own right: because the instrument is a Council Regulation rather than a Directive, France carries no transposition gap and no domestic legislative lag between EU adoption and enforceable obligation. #### Other Developments Beneficial ownership access has tightened, but a transparency gap persists. France now limits public access to its UBO register, administered by INPI, to holders of a three-year certificate demonstrating a recognised legitimate interest, consistent with the AMLD6/AMLR shift away from unrestricted public access following the relevant CJEU jurisprudence. UBO citizenship data continues to be withheld from disclosure. This finding rests on a single Tier-4 source without Tier-1/2 corroboration this cycle, so it is carried at Assessed rather than High confidence. A Eurojust-coordinated takedown exposed domestic enabler exposure. A joint investigation team led to 13 arrests across France and Romania in a network suspected of laundering at least EUR 306 million in drug-trafficking and other illicit proceeds between 2018 and 2024, using multiple French legal entities to channel funds. This is a Tier-1, High-confidence finding illustrating that France's own corporate-formation architecture, and not only offshore enabler jurisdictions, is being used as a laundering conduit. The MiCA cutover has become an active supervisory chokepoint. The AMF's enforcement of the 1 July 2026 hard cutover from the national PSAN/DASP registration regime to MiCA CASP authorisation is now in an active enforcement phase. Roughly 90 legacy PSAN/DASP firms faced the deadline, and the AMF has begun withdrawing registrations of non-compliant firms, including AUTOMATA France SAS, withdrawn effective 30 June 2026. Unauthorised post-cutover activity is a criminal offence carrying up to two years' imprisonment and a EUR 30,000 fine, making this a genuine AML/CFT-relevant supervisory event rather than a purely prudential transition. AMF enforcement continued against a standing AML/CFT baseline. On 30 June 2026 the AMF Enforcement Committee fined an investment services provider and its director a combined EUR 850,000 for AML/CFT-adjacent failings, and the AMF separately published a summary of its 2026 AML/CFT inspection findings, continuing supervisory pressure on obliged entities' STR and TRACFIN alignment. #### Cross-Monitor Connections The MiCA cutover enforcement phase is directly relevant to the crypto monitor's licensing coverage of the same transition, and the sanctions package's crypto-specific measures against instruments such as the A7A5 stablecoin and RUBx, and the EU-wide ban on support for the digital ruble, sit at the intersection of this monitor's D1 and D5 domains and the crypto monitor's cross-border and stablecoin coverage. The Eurojust-coordinated laundering network's use of French legal entities also intersects with any advennt-tracked payment or corporate-structuring exposure in adjacent regulated sectors, though no such overlap was independently confirmed this cycle. #### Outlook The AMLA build-out is the pipeline item most likely to reshape France's AML architecture next cycle: AMLA was due to publish its first Regulatory Technical Standards package by 10 July 2026, a deadline now passed without independent confirmation of publication, alongside the AMLD6 beneficial-ownership transposition deadline of 10 July 2026 that France appears to have pre-empted via its certificated access model. Confirmation of France's specific domestic transposition instrument, and of AMLA's RTS publication status, are the two gaps most likely to sharpen next cycle's D2 and D7 pictures. Domain intelligence (D1–D8) #### Sanctions Architecture and Evasion France sits at an operational front line of the European sanctions-evasion architecture directed at Russian oil exports, and this cycle documents both a further kinetic escalation and a parallel EU-level designation-regime shift toward instrument-aware anti-circumvention tools. On 23 June 2026 the French Navy boarded and diverted the tanker Deliver near Sicily, the fifth Russian-linked shadow-fleet vessel seized by France in the year (assessed confidence; Tier-3 sourcing, with confidence capped absent a Tier-1 EU Council or Marine Nationale primary statement). The repetition of boarding actions across a single calendar year, rather than any single interdiction, is the analytically significant fact: it describes an enforcement posture that has moved from administrative listing toward physical interdiction as a routine tool, even though French action remains legally reactive, triggered by flag-state or documentation irregularities discovered as vessels transit French waters rather than by systemic pre-screening applied ahead of suspected shadow-fleet transits. Continue reading The corresponding architecture-level development sits with the EU Council rather than with Paris. The 20th sanctions package added 46 vessels to the shadow-fleet designation list, bringing the cumulative total to 632 listed vessels (assessed confidence; this figure rests on secondary-tier analysis, and no primary EU Council designation-list text was independently retrieved this cycle to verify the cumulative count, a documented gap). The 21st package moved the designation regime into new territory, explicitly targeting cryptocurrency-related sanctions-evasion activity for the first time in this reporting window (assessed confidence, Tier-4 sourcing). Applying the three-level sanctions-architecture analysis this monitor uses across cycles, scheme, architecture and strategic consequence, the scheme level is the individual tanker transit and its cargo; the architecture level is the EU designation regime, now broadening beyond vessel-specific listing toward instrument-aware anti-circumvention criteria; and the strategic consequence, not resolved by the evidence available this cycle, is whether a widened vessel list combined with a hardening French detention posture measurably constrains Russian oil-revenue logistics or merely raises the operating cost of the shadow fleet without materially reducing its throughput. This cycle key judgment frames the interdiction escalation as a structural shift in EU sanctions-enforcement posture with knock-on compliance implications for insurers, protection and indemnity clubs and flag registries exposed to shadow-fleet tonnage, a deteriorating cost-to-operate trajectory for actors servicing that tonnage. Separately, the standing Sanctions Regime Divergence tracker recorded no material EU, US or UK autonomous-listing drift this cycle; the coordinated OFAC and EU actions against shadow-fleet and Cartel de Jalisco Nueva Generacion-linked targets this cycle showed convergence rather than divergence across blocs, a genuine no-change finding rather than an unsearched gap. The customer-typology tags attached to this cycle sanctions-evasion claims, trade finance and correspondent banking exposure for both the Deliver interdiction and the EU vessel-listing expansion, point toward the compliance functions most directly affected: trade-finance desks financing tanker voyages and correspondent banks maintaining relationships with shipping-sector counterparties in jurisdictions adjacent to the shadow fleet. Firms in these categories face a widening designation list against which counterparty and vessel screening must be run, without a unified transatlantic equivalent, leaving screening obligations dependent on EU Council designation timing rather than a single combined list. The persistent limitation on this domain this cycle is evidentiary rather than analytical. The 632-vessel cumulative count, the crypto-evasion designation language in the 21st package, and elements of the Deliver interdiction record all rest on secondary or Tier-3/Tier-4 sourcing rather than primary EU Council or Marine Nationale text, a gap this monitor has flagged for closure in a subsequent cycle rather than treating as resolved. #### Outlook The near-term test for this domain is whether the widened EU designation list and its new anti-circumvention language translate into a further increase in French boarding frequency and detention severity, or whether the Deliver interdiction proves consistent with, rather than an acceleration beyond, the pattern already established earlier in 2026. The standing Russian Sanctions-Evasion Architecture tracker records an escalating trajectory as its current baseline; coming cycles will show whether that trajectory holds as EU Council designation activity continues. A durable coverage gap remains around primary verification of the cumulative 632-vessel count and around a Tier-1 Marine Nationale or EU Council source for the Deliver boarding specifically, both of which this monitor will attempt to close going forward. #### Beneficial Ownership and Corporate Transparency France this cycle transposed the institutional beneficial-ownership provisions of the sixth Anti-Money Laundering Directive, adopting Decret n. 2026-310 of 24 April 2026 to give effect to Articles 12 and 13 of Directive (EU) 2024/1640 (high confidence, Tier-1 Legifrance sourcing). The decree reforms the procedures that register-holders must apply when assessing the legitimate interest of a beneficial-ownership register access requester, and it creates a new mandatory LCB-FT training obligation under Article D561-38-1-1 of the Code monetaire et financier, closing a documented supervisory gap around generic, non-role-specific training. A procedural compliance deadline of 10 November 2026 applies to the register-holder access-assessment procedures specifically. Continue reading The same-day adoption of a companion CRD6-transposition decree, Decret n. 2026-309, covering supervisory powers, sanctioning authority, third-country branch treatment and ESG-risk integration, is read alongside the AMLD6 decree as evidence of an institutionally ordered, deadline-driven transposition strategy for the EU AML Package rather than reactive, piecemeal compliance. As an EEA member state, France sits inside the direct perimeter of the EU AML Package, and this transposition activity is the primary subject matter for this cycle BO and transparency signal. That EU AML Package is, as a matter of durable structural fact, three distinct instruments rather than a single measure, and this architecture forms the standing backdrop against which any single member-state development, including this cycle French transposition, should be read. The AML Regulation, Regulation (EU) 2024/1624, is directly applicable across the EU without national transposition and becomes fully applicable in 2027, ending the patchwork of national AML regimes for its scope. The sixth Anti-Money Laundering Directive, Directive (EU) 2024/1640, requires national transposition on a member-state-by-member-state basis, of which this cycle French Decret n. 2026-310 is one instance, addressing Articles 12 and 13 specifically. The AMLA Regulation, Regulation (EU) 2024/1620, establishes the Anti-Money Laundering Authority and shifts the supervisory perimeter from a purely national model toward a hybrid EU-level regime, under which AMLA will directly supervise a defined set of high-risk cross-border entities while continuing to rely on national authorities for indirect supervision of the remainder. This three-instrument, hybrid-supervision architecture is the durable structural fact against which this cycle French BO-register reform is one data point rather than the whole picture. The standing Beneficial-Ownership Register Status tracker and the standing EU AML Package/AMLA tracker both recorded material change this cycle specifically because of the French transposition, rather than because of any AMLA-level institutional development this cycle. A coverage gap persists around the current jurisdiction-baseline national risk assessment reference for France, which was not established this cycle, and this monitor records that gap explicitly rather than assuming a stable baseline. #### Outlook The 10 November 2026 procedural deadline for register-holder legitimate-interest-assessment procedures is the immediate test for this domain, and current practice is assessed as largely undocumented at the procedural level ahead of that date. Beyond that near-term marker, the AML Regulation direct-applicability date and the AMLA transition toward direct supervision of high-risk cross-border entities from January 2028 define the medium-term horizon, against which national transposition pace, evidenced this cycle by France institutionally ordered approach, will continue to vary across member states. #### Enabler Jurisdictions and Professional Facilitators This cycle domestic French signal in this domain is an enforcement outcome rather than a fresh legal-framework development: the Commission Nationale des Sanctions fined four linked real-estate mandataire entities a combined 210,000 euros for LCB-FT compliance failures, reinforced by the legal basis created under the loi narcotrafic of 13 June 2025 (assessed confidence; single Tier-4 source, pending primary CNS decision-text verification). Applying the enabler-jurisdiction filter this monitor uses across cycles, legal framework, enforcement, capacity versus choice, and systemic significance, the legal-framework layer here is adequate on paper; the enforcement layer has now produced a concrete sanction; the capacity-versus-choice question centres on whether under-calibrated supervision of fonds-de-commerce risk in the real-estate mandataire sector reflects a genuine capacity constraint or an under-prioritised choice within French DNFBP supervision; and the systemic-significance question is whether a single enforcement action of this size meaningfully shifts incentives across a sector that has, in prior assessments, been characterised as comparatively lower-friction for layering illicit proceeds into French real estate. Continue reading Outside France, two jurisdictions moved on this domain this cycle in opposite directions along the enforcement-versus-enablement axis. Cambodia mounted an active enforcement push, arresting and extraditing Chen Zhi, chairman of Prince Group, to China amid a documented effort to avoid a third FATF grey-list placement (assessed confidence; corroborated across two independent secondary-tier sources, no direct FATF or National Bank of Cambodia primary statement retrieved). This reads as a positive state-response signal under the state-capture filter this monitor applies, distinguishing state direction toward enforcement from state protection of illicit financial flows, though the underlying money-laundering exposure connected to the conglomerate structure remains high and the action is episodic rather than a demonstrated structural reform of Cambodian DNFBP supervision. A separate, lower-confidence signal concerns Mexico, where a single Tier-4 vendor source reports Chinese money-laundering organisations expanding their trade-based-money-laundering footprint serving cartels beyond coastal hubs into South Carolina, Ohio, Massachusetts and Maine. This claim is treated as possible pending primary corroboration rather than as an established geographic-expansion finding, and this monitor flags the confidence gap explicitly rather than allowing a single vendor characterisation to drive the domain assessment. Read together, the three developments describe a mixed trajectory for enabler-jurisdiction and professional-facilitator risk this cycle: active, if narrow, French domestic enforcement against a documented supervisory gap; genuine Cambodian state enforcement against a politically connected facilitator network; and an unresolved, lower-confidence signal on Chinese facilitator-network geographic expansion in the United States. #### Outlook The near-term question for the French component of this domain is whether the CNS enforcement action against the real-estate mandataire network is followed by a broader supervisory recalibration of fonds-de-commerce risk, or whether it remains an isolated sanction. For Cambodia, the test is whether the Prince Group enforcement action is sustained by structural reform to DNFBP and conglomerate-linked supervision, or whether it functions primarily as a defensive measure against grey-listing without deeper institutional change. The Mexico-linked Chinese money-laundering-organisation footprint claim requires primary-source corroboration before this monitor treats geographic expansion into new US states as an established fact rather than a possible development. #### Conflict Finance and Extractive-Industry Integrity Two jurisdiction-level developments this cycle indicate deteriorating conflict- and narcotics-finance conditions, applying the source, channel, deployment trace this monitor uses under its conflict-finance filter. The FY2026 Presidential Determination under Section 706 of the Foreign Relations Authorization Act names Colombia among five countries that failed demonstrably to meet international counternarcotics obligations, the first such finding for Colombia in roughly thirty years, issued against a backdrop of record coca cultivation (high confidence, Tier-1 State Department sourcing). At the source level, the designation reflects sustained coca cultivation; at the channel level, it raises questions about the adequacy of state interdiction and financial-flow-disruption capacity; and at the deployment level, the underlying revenue continues to sustain armed-group activity in conflict-affected departments, consistent with prior UNODC estimates of inward illicit financial flows tied to Colombian cocaine and illegal gold mining. This designation is read as a genuine capacity-and-will question for the Colombian state rather than as an isolated episodic finding, given the rarity of the failed-demonstrably classification. Continue reading Separately, FinCEN issued a supplemental alert on fiscal fuel-theft and tax-evasion schemes tied to the Cartel de Jalisco Nueva Generacion, concurrent with OFAC sanctions on two Mexican nationals and nine entities (high confidence, Tier-1 FinCEN sourcing). Traced through the same source-channel-deployment framework, the source is fuel-theft and tax-evasion revenue; the channel runs through the designated individuals and entities and the broader fiscal-fraud infrastructure FinCEN describes; and the deployment sustains cartel financial capacity, an armed non-state actor with a documented role in Mexican narcotics- and violence-linked finance. The concurrent designation of individuals and entities, rather than a single listing, indicates an effort to disrupt a fuller financial network rather than a single node. Read together, the two developments describe a worsening trajectory for this domain this cycle: a rare and structurally significant US counternarcotics-capacity designation for Colombia, and a widening US enforcement effort against Mexican cartel fiscal-fraud infrastructure. Both developments sit adjacent to, rather than within, the France-specific reporting scope of this cycle brief, and are surfaced here because conflict- and extractive-industry-finance signal for this monitor is jurisdiction-agnostic by design. #### Outlook The near-term question for Colombia is whether the failed-demonstrably designation prompts a measurable shift in coca-cultivation trend or in state financial-flow-disruption capacity, or whether the designation functions primarily as a diplomatic and policy signal without near-term operational effect. For Mexico, the test is whether the FinCEN supplemental alert and concurrent OFAC designations meaningfully disrupt the fuel-theft and tax-evasion revenue streams sustaining Cartel de Jalisco Nueva Generacion financial capacity, or whether designated individuals and entities are readily replaced within the existing network architecture. This monitor coverage of D4 for France specifically remained thin this cycle, a gap flagged in the coverage-gaps register alongside D6. #### Crypto / Digital Assets / Financial Innovation France's digital-asset integrity posture is defined this cycle by continuity of enforcement rather than new architecture. The Autorite des Marches Financiers added twenty-six names to its public list of unauthorised crypto-asset websites on 19 October 2026, bringing the cumulative 2026 total to sixty-four. This is a quarterly mechanism, not an escalation, and its persistence through the year is itself the signal worth noting: the national transitional registration regime for crypto-asset providers ended on 1 July 2026, meaning that any entity now offering crypto-asset services in France without the required European Union authorisation under the Markets in Crypto-Assets framework operates outside the only lawful pathway remaining. The blacklist is the visible face of that enforcement perimeter, identifying websites that have not obtained, and in many cases have not sought, the authorisation now required. Continue reading The analytical significance of this pattern lies less in any single quarter's additions than in its consistency. A regulator that continues to publish and update an unauthorised-provider list every quarter, through a full regime transition, demonstrates sustained monitoring capacity rather than a one-time compliance sweep tied to the transition deadline itself. For firms and counterparties assessing exposure to French-facing crypto-asset activity, the blacklist functions as a negative-assurance tool: inclusion is a clear red flag, but absence from the list should not be read as a positive endorsement of authorisation status, since the list reflects what the regulator has identified, not an exhaustive survey of the market. No sanctions-specific or beneficial-ownership-specific digital-asset finding arose this cycle, and the broader European single-rulebook transposition for anti-money-laundering obligations, while structurally relevant to how crypto-asset service providers will eventually be supervised, remains on its own separate statutory timeline rather than being driven by this quarter's enforcement activity. The picture is one of steady-state enforcement against a backdrop of a regime that has already completed its most significant structural transition, the closure of the national transitional pathway, earlier in the year. #### Outlook The quarterly blacklist cadence is likely to continue on its established schedule, and absent a new enforcement action of materially different character, subsequent updates should be read as continuations of the same monitoring pattern rather than as new developments in their own right. The more structurally significant date to watch remains the European Union's single AML rulebook application date in mid-2027, which will reshape the supervisory architecture around obliged entities more broadly, including crypto-asset service providers, though that shift falls outside the current cycle's findings and is better tracked as a separate horizon item. #### Compliance Technology and Active Defence No fresh RegTech, supervisory-technology or AI-compliance guidance surfaced for France this cycle; this domain remains a standing watch item, consistent with its exemption from the substantive-finding floor applied to the other five domains this cycle (assessed confidence, per the interpreter cycle judgment). The absence of fresh material is recorded here as a genuine coverage state rather than an unsearched gap: no Tier-1 or Tier-2 RegTech or AI-compliance supervisory source was located this cycle for the French jurisdiction, and the domain baseline is treated as stable pending fresh signal. Enablement-as-signal framing applies with limited force here, since a watch-status domain absent enforcement activity is not itself evidence of a permissive gap, only of the absence of tracked developments this cycle. Continue reading Coverage in this domain has been structurally thin across recent cycles for the French jurisdiction specifically, a pattern flagged in the coverage-gaps register alongside D4 conflict-finance thinness this cycle. This monitor treats the absence as an honest state of the record rather than padding it with adjacent findings drawn from other domains. #### Outlook The domain remains on watch pending fresh RegTech, supervisory-technology or active-defence guidance from French or EU supervisory authorities. No specific horizon date is available this cycle for a D6-relevant instrument; this absence is itself recorded as a coverage gap rather than assumed non-development. Where fresh signal does emerge, whether transaction-monitoring technology mandates, AI-driven compliance tooling guidance, or active-defence information-sharing frameworks, this monitor will surface it under the domain standing coverage rather than treating its current watch status as a permanent baseline. #### AML/CTF Regime France's AML/CTF regime continued to operate under the standing AMF/TRACFIN supervisory framework this cycle, with active enforcement against the standing baseline. On 30 June 2026, the AMF Enforcement Committee fined an investment services provider and its director a combined EUR 850,000 for AML/CFT-adjacent failings, a Tier-1, High-confidence enforcement action sourced directly from the AMF's own publication. The AMF separately published a summary of its 2026 AML/CFT inspection findings, continuing supervisory pressure on obliged entities' suspicious-transaction-reporting and TRACFIN alignment more broadly than the single enforcement action alone would suggest. Continue reading This domain also intersects with the MiCA cutover covered under D5: the AMF's willingness to withdraw registrations from non-compliant crypto-asset service providers is itself an AML/CFT-relevant supervisory action, since unauthorised crypto-asset activity outside the regulated perimeter removes those firms from TRACFIN-aligned reporting obligations entirely. Read together, the EUR 850,000 investment-services fine and the crypto-cutover enforcement activity indicate an AMF posture of active supervisory pressure across both traditional and digital-asset-adjacent obliged entities this cycle, rather than a quiet or purely administrative period. France's current FATF mutual-evaluation round status was not identified this cycle, and France was not named in the June 2026 FATF Plenary's grey-list movements, remaining outside increased monitoring, though this latter fact is a standing tracker position rather than a fresh finding. #### Outlook The AMLA RTS package, due by 10 July 2026 and not independently confirmed as published this cycle, will eventually convert AMLR's general obligations into binding technical standards applicable to France as an EEA member; its publication status is the most consequential AML/CTF-regime item to confirm next cycle. Whether the AMF publishes further inspection-findings summaries, and whether additional enforcement actions follow the EUR 850,000 fine, are the near-term markers to watch. #### Commercial Activity The commercial signal in France this cycle is narrow but illustrative of a broader pattern in the payment-verification and anti-fraud technology sector. On 16 October 2026, the fintech 3Pay announced its first acquisition, taking on the assets and teams of MoneyTrack, a company whose focus has been advancing payment verification in the healthcare-costs context. The transaction is structured as an all-share deal, with the combined entity reported at a modest valuation, and is paired with a separate funding round for the enlarged business. No further financial terms were disclosed. Continue reading While this is a small transaction by absolute value, it is worth situating within the financial integrity frame because the underlying capability, payment verification and advance-of-funds checking, sits directly adjacent to the control infrastructure that obliged entities and payment firms rely upon to detect irregular or fraudulent payment activity. Consolidation among smaller technology providers in this space does not itself constitute an anti-money-laundering or counter-terrorist-financing development, but it reflects the ongoing maturation and concentration of the tooling layer beneath compliance functions. A payment-verification capability that moves from a standalone fintech into a larger combined entity changes, in a modest way, who controls and maintains that tooling, which is a fact worth tracking even where it carries no immediate regulatory implication. No other commercial-activity-relevant development was identified in France this cycle. The transaction does not appear to implicate sanctions exposure, beneficial-ownership questions, or enabler-jurisdiction concerns, and it was not accompanied by any announced regulatory review or notification requirement in the material available. #### Outlook Consolidation in the payment-verification and anti-fraud technology space is likely to continue as smaller providers combine capabilities and funding, a pattern consistent with broader fintech-sector dynamics rather than one specific to France. Future cycles should watch for whether such consolidation begins to concentrate critical compliance-adjacent tooling among a small number of providers, which would be a structurally more significant development than any single acquisition, though no such concentration is evident from this transaction alone. Regulatory horizon Adopted 10 Jul 2027 · ±quarter ### AMLR / 6AMLD application date A directly-applicable EU regulation replaces most nationally-transposed AML/CFT obligations; AMLA begins its first direct-supervision selection by 1 July 2027. [Source](https://www.docaposte.com/blog/article/amlr-2027-le-nouveau-socle-europeen-de-la-lutte-anti-blanchiment) Proposed 2027-Q3 · ±year ### 6AMLD transposition into French law Harmonisation of 22 predicate offences for money laundering and expanded FIU (Tracfin) powers once transposed. [European Commission / French Parliament Source](https://www.euroleads.eu/fr/ressources/blog/amld6-france-transposition) 2 dated · 3 pending date · baseline fim-2026-07-08 Role action cards MLRO ### AMF sustains quarterly enforcement against unauthorised crypto-asset providers. The continuation of the quarterly blacklist mechanism signals that the regulator maintains active monitoring of the unauthorised-access perimeter for crypto-asset services, relevant to screening and reportable-activity assessments involving French-facing crypto counterparties. 1 evidence refs Compliance ### Post-transitional crypto-asset authorisation regime continues to be actively policed. With the national transitional pathway closed since 1 July 2026, the only lawful route for crypto-asset service provision in France is the European authorisation framework, and the ongoing blacklist activity indicates the regulator treats this perimeter as a continuing enforcement priority. 2 evidence refs Board ### Payment-verification sector consolidation continues at a modest scale. The acquisition of a payment-verification fintech by a smaller competitor reflects ongoing consolidation in compliance-adjacent technology, a trend of indirect strategic relevance but not an immediate material risk. 1 evidence refs Risk ### Enforcement cadence against unauthorised crypto-asset providers remains stable and structural. The consistent quarterly pattern of blacklist additions indicates a structural, rather than episodic, enforcement posture, relevant to ongoing exposure assessments for digital-asset counterparty risk. 1 evidence refs Audit ### Regulator maintains documented quarterly enforcement record for unauthorised crypto-asset providers. The sustained publication of a dated, cumulative blacklist provides a traceable audit record of the regulator's own enforcement activity against the unauthorised-provider perimeter. 1 evidence refs Scenario sketches ### AMLA transition reshaping cross-border supervisory reach Illustrative scenario for analytical orientation only. As the Anti-Money Laundering Authority moves from a design phase toward its first direct-supervision selections ahead of the mid-2027 application date, cross-border obliged entities currently supervised purely at the national level could see a portion of their compliance relationship shift toward a hybrid European-level structure. This is a possible structural mechanism illustrating how the directly-applicable regulation and the per-state transposed directive could interact with the new authority's perimeter, not an observed fact about France specifically. Illustrative scenario for analytical orientation only. Not compliance advice, not a prediction, and not a statement of observed fact. Standing trackers (T1–T6) Tracker Status Note T1 · Sanctions Implementation watch Joint ACPR/DGT guidelines on asset-freeze implementation adopted March 2026. T2 · Beneficial Ownership Transparency stable T3 · Enabler Jurisdiction Risk no_change T4 · Conflict Finance Exposure no_change T5 · Crypto/Digital Asset Regime stable MiCA Title V CASP regime fully applicable from 30 December 2024. T6 · Sanctions Regime Divergence no_change Registers ### Enforcement actions - 27 Sep 2025 - 17 Feb 2026 - 23 Jun 2026 - 17 Oct 2025 - 17 Oct 2025 - 27 Sep 2025 - 17 Feb 2026 - 23 Jun 2026 - 2 Jul 2026 - 17 Oct 2025 - 17 Oct 2025 - 27 May 2026 - 30 Jun 2026 - AMF published a supervisory summary of 46 AML/CFT inspections conducted between 2021 and 2025 across asset management companies, financial investment advisers, and crowdfunding providers. 30 Jun 2026 - AMF opened the application window for crypto-asset service provider (CASP) authorisation under EU Regulation 2023/1114 (MiCA) from 1 July 2024 ahead of the 30 June 2026 transition end date. 1 Jul 2024 - 8 Jul 2026 - 8 Jul 2026 - 10 Jul 2026 - French Navy boarded the tanker Boracay off Saint-Nazaire on 27 September 2025 after it failed to prove its nationality/flag and refused navy requests; prosecutors opened an investigation and summoned the captain to appear before a court. 27 Sep 2025 - France fined and released the tanker Grinch after seizing it in the Mediterranean in January 2026 for flouting EU sanctions on Russian oil; the vessel was immobilised for three weeks at Fos-sur-Mer. 17 Feb 2026 - France's navy boarded another Russia-linked oil tanker in the Mediterranean off Sicily as part of the continuing European crackdown on shadow-fleet vessels used to export sanctioned crude. 25 Jun 2026 - The AMF widened anti-money-laundering checks across more than 100 entities registered to offer crypto services in France, as it determines which firms will receive EU-wide MiCA authorisation. 17 Oct 2025 - A Manhattan federal jury found BNP Paribas liable for enabling human rights abuses connected to the al-Bashir dictatorship in Sudan (2002-2008), reviving scrutiny of the French bank's historical role as a financial enabler of sanctioned regimes following its record 2014 OFAC settlement. 17 Oct 2025 ### Sanctions changes - 24 Feb 2025 - 18 Jul 2025 - 9 Jun 2026 - 11 Jun 2025 - 24 Feb 2025 - 18 Jul 2025 - 9 Jun 2026 - 11 Jun 2025 - 23 Apr 2026 - 2026-06 - 30 Jun 2026 - 2026-04 - 24 Jul 2026 - 24 Apr 2026 - 29 Jan 2026 - 22 Sep 2026 - EU's 16th sanctions package (Feb 2025) added 83 new listings (48 individuals, 35 entities) targeting Russian military-industrial support, sanctions circumvention, crypto-asset exchanges and the maritime sector; expanded the shadow-fleet vessel list to 153 and introduced criteria enabling blacklisting of financial institutions/crypto providers facilitating price-cap evasion. 24 Feb 2025 - EU's 18th sanctions package (July 2025) expanded the shadow-fleet list to 444 vessels and individual listings beyond 2,500, targeting energy revenue, the banking sector, the military-industrial complex, and anti-circumvention measures. 18 Jul 2025 - The EU's 21st sanctions package (June 2026) added 30 further shadow-fleet vessels (to 632 total), extended transaction bans to 31 more Russian banks and 20 crypto/oil-trading firms in third countries, and for the first time proposed the possibility of a country-wide ban on crypto-asset services. 9 Jun 2026 - The European Commission updated its high-risk third-country AML/CFT list in June 2025, adding Algeria, Angola, Côte d'Ivoire, Kenya, Laos, Lebanon, Monaco, Namibia, Nepal and Venezuela while delisting Barbados, Gibraltar, Jamaica, Panama, Philippines, Senegal (partial list); Monaco's addition is geographically and economically significant for France given close customs/financial ties. 11 Jun 2025 ### Regulatory horizon (register) - AMLA first Regulatory Technical Standards (RTS) package - AMLD6 beneficial-ownership-register provisions transposition - AMLA first Regulatory Technical Standards (RTS) package - 6AMLD/AMLR beneficial-ownership access harmonisation for France - 6AMLD transposition into French law - AMLR / 6AMLD application date - EU AMLR/AMLA single rulebook replacing LCB-FT scope - AML Regulation (AMLR, Reg 2024/1624) becomes directly applicable - 6AMLD transposition deadline for France - MiCA full CASP authorisation deadline for French-registered firms - AMLA direct supervision of highest-risk entities begins ### Active schemes - [HIGH] Russian shadow-fleet oil transit through French waters - TotalEnergies structural exposure to Russian LNG/oil revenue - Crypto VASP/MiCA-transition compliance gap in France - Real estate agent / notaire AML supervision gap Sources - [China and Russia’s Shadow Fleet Delivers Putin a Gas Lifeline](https://www.bloomberg.com/graphics/2025-china-russia-lng-shadow-fleet/) - [US Naval Institute News](https://news.usni.org/2026/06/26/french-seizes-5th-russian-shadow-fleet-tanker) - [The Moscow Times](https://www.themoscowtimes.com/2026/06/25/france-intercepts-shadow-fleet-tanker-near-sicily-a93096) - [The Maritime Executive](https://maritime-executive.com/article/france-fines-and-releases-shadow-fleet-tanker-held-for-a-month) - [The Barents Observer](https://www.thebarentsobserver.com/news/the-hidden-beneficiaries-of-yamal-lng/451593) - [TASS (Russian state media)](https://tass.com/economy/2085555) - [Autorite des marches financiers (AMF)](https://www.amf-france.org/en/news-publications/news/end-mica-transitional-period-esma-sets-out-its-expectations-professionals-and-warns-retail-investors) - [Elliptic](https://www.elliptic.co/blog/the-end-of-micas-transitional-period) - [KuCoin News](https://www.kucoin.com/news/flash/france-sets-june-30-2026-deadline-for-mica-licensing) - [https://www.legifrance.gouv.fr/jorf/id/JORFTEXT000053957292](https://www.legifrance.gouv.fr/jorf/id/JORFTEXT000053957292) - [https://www.legifrance.gouv.fr/jorf/id/JORFTEXT000053957207](https://www.legifrance.gouv.fr/jorf/id/JORFTEXT000053957207) - [https://lesbrouzils.immo/2026/06/26/tracfin-un-reseau-sanctionne-a-210-000-euros-un-mandataire-condamne-a-titre-personnel-ce-que-cela-change-pour-vous/](https://lesbrouzils.immo/2026/06/26/tracfin-un-reseau-sanctionne-a-210-000-euros-un-mandataire-condamne-a-titre-personnel-ce-que-cela-change-pour-vous/) - [https://cryptobriefing.com/french-navy-shadow-fleet-tanker-crypto-sanctions/](https://cryptobriefing.com/french-navy-shadow-fleet-tanker-crypto-sanctions/) - [https://kyivindependent.com/french-navy-intercepts-sanctioned-russian-shadow-fleet-tanker-in-atlantic-macron-says/](https://kyivindependent.com/french-navy-intercepts-sanctioned-russian-shadow-fleet-tanker-in-atlantic-macron-says/) - [https://www.logisticsmiddleeast.com/analysis/how-far-can-europe-go-against-russias-shadow-fleet](https://www.logisticsmiddleeast.com/analysis/how-far-can-europe-go-against-russias-shadow-fleet) - [https://lcb.org/news/france-implements-jonum-rules-for-web3-games](https://lcb.org/news/france-implements-jonum-rules-for-web3-games) - [https://agbrief.com/news/cambodia/26/01/2026/cambodia-battles-to-avoid-third-fatf-grey-list-placement-amid-scam-crackdown/](https://agbrief.com/news/cambodia/26/01/2026/cambodia-battles-to-avoid-third-fatf-grey-list-placement-amid-scam-crackdown/) - [https://www.fincen.gov/news/news-releases/fincen-issues-supplemental-alert-fuel-smuggling-and-tax-evasion-schemes-southern](https://www.fincen.gov/news/news-releases/fincen-issues-supplemental-alert-fuel-smuggling-and-tax-evasion-schemes-southern) - [https://illicitedge.com/chinese-money-laundering-networks-serving-mexico-based-drug-cartels/](https://illicitedge.com/chinese-money-laundering-networks-serving-mexico-based-drug-cartels/) - [https://www.state.gov/wp-content/uploads/2026/04/The-Government-of-Colombias-Drug-Interdiction-Efforts-and-Cooperation-with-the-United-States-.pdf](https://www.state.gov/wp-content/uploads/2026/04/The-Government-of-Colombias-Drug-Interdiction-Efforts-and-Cooperation-with-the-United-States-.pdf) - [https://www.amf-france.org/en/news-publications/news/crypto-actifs-lamf-clarifie-sa-doctrine-applicable-aux-psan-autorises-dans-le-cadre-de-la-loi-pacte](https://www.amf-france.org/en/news-publications/news/crypto-actifs-lamf-clarifie-sa-doctrine-applicable-aux-psan-autorises-dans-le-cadre-de-la-loi-pacte) - [https://www.amf-france.org/en/news-publications/news/amf-reminds-digital-asset-service-providers-transitional-period-allowing-them-continue-providing](https://www.amf-france.org/en/news-publications/news/amf-reminds-digital-asset-service-providers-transitional-period-allowing-them-continue-providing) - [https://www.mayerbrown.com/en/insights/publications/2026/07/european-union-adopts-21st-package-against-russia-and-parallel-sanctions-on-belarus](https://www.mayerbrown.com/en/insights/publications/2026/07/european-union-adopts-21st-package-against-russia-and-parallel-sanctions-on-belarus) - [https://www.cov.com/en/news-and-insights/insights/2026/07/eu-adopts-21st-package-of-russia-sanctions-extends-belarus-sanctions](https://www.cov.com/en/news-and-insights/insights/2026/07/eu-adopts-21st-package-of-russia-sanctions-extends-belarus-sanctions) - [https://www.tradecomplianceresourcehub.com/2026/07/29/eus-21st-sanctions-package-banks-barrels-and-a-bigger-blacklist/](https://www.tradecomplianceresourcehub.com/2026/07/29/eus-21st-sanctions-package-banks-barrels-and-a-bigger-blacklist/) - [https://www.mayerbrown.com/en/insights/publications/2026/04/eu-adopts-20th-package-against-russia-and-parallel-sanctions-on-belarus](https://www.mayerbrown.com/en/insights/publications/2026/04/eu-adopts-20th-package-against-russia-and-parallel-sanctions-on-belarus) - [https://www.coverpin.com/resources/eu-beneficial-ownership-ubo-register-compliance](https://www.coverpin.com/resources/eu-beneficial-ownership-ubo-register-compliance) - [https://eucrim.eu/news/new-anti-money-laundering-directive-amld-6/](https://eucrim.eu/news/new-anti-money-laundering-directive-amld-6/) - [https://www.eurojust.europa.eu/news/action-against-eur-306-million-money-laundering-network](https://www.eurojust.europa.eu/news/action-against-eur-306-million-money-laundering-network) - [https://www.fatf-gafi.org/en/publications/Fatfgeneral/outcomes-fatf-plenary-june-2026.html](https://www.fatf-gafi.org/en/publications/Fatfgeneral/outcomes-fatf-plenary-june-2026.html) - [https://www.amf-france.org/en/news-publications/news/autorite-des-marches-financiers-publishes-summary-its-anti-money-laundering-and-combating-financing](https://www.amf-france.org/en/news-publications/news/autorite-des-marches-financiers-publishes-summary-its-anti-money-laundering-and-combating-financing) - [https://finconduit.com/resources/amla-rts-deadline-july-2026](https://finconduit.com/resources/amla-rts-deadline-july-2026) - [https://cryptoslate.com/crypto-laws/amf-mica-casp-transition-regime-france/](https://cryptoslate.com/crypto-laws/amf-mica-casp-transition-regime-france/) - [https://cryptopulseinfo.com/psan-mica-etat-lieux-post-1-juillet-2026/](https://cryptopulseinfo.com/psan-mica-etat-lieux-post-1-juillet-2026/) - [https://zavia.ai/france-beneficial-ownership-register-rbe-ubo-data-access-2026-changes/](https://zavia.ai/france-beneficial-ownership-register-rbe-ubo-data-access-2026-changes/) - [https://www.aoshearman.com/en/insights/french-crd-vi-transposition-a-first-milestone-reached](https://www.aoshearman.com/en/insights/french-crd-vi-transposition-a-first-milestone-reached) - [https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Tracfin](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Tracfin) - [https://www.economie.gouv.fr/tracfin](https://www.economie.gouv.fr/tracfin) - [https://www.amlintelligence.com/2026/09/news-french-banks-suspicious-transaction-reports-nearly-doubled-in-2025-tracfin/](https://www.amlintelligence.com/2026/09/news-french-banks-suspicious-transaction-reports-nearly-doubled-in-2025-tracfin/) - [https://acpr.banque-france.fr/fr/reglementation/registre-officiel/decisions](https://acpr.banque-france.fr/fr/reglementation/registre-officiel/decisions) - [https://www.amf-france.org/en/news-publications/news-releases/crypto-assets-end-pacte-law-and-european-mica-regulation-transitional-period-establishes-new-role](https://www.amf-france.org/en/news-publications/news-releases/crypto-assets-end-pacte-law-and-european-mica-regulation-transitional-period-establishes-new-role) - [https://anj.fr/lutte-contre-le-blanchiment-de-capitaux-une-premiere-sanction-de-la-commission-nationale-des-sanctions](https://anj.fr/lutte-contre-le-blanchiment-de-capitaux-une-premiere-sanction-de-la-commission-nationale-des-sanctions) - [https://www.amla.europa.eu/amla-takes-next-step-toward-2027-selection-entities-direct-supervision_en](https://www.amla.europa.eu/amla-takes-next-step-toward-2027-selection-entities-direct-supervision_en) - [https://gdroit.fr/lcb-ft/les-personnes-assujetties-au-dispositif-du-beneficiaire-effectif/](https://gdroit.fr/lcb-ft/les-personnes-assujetties-au-dispositif-du-beneficiaire-effectif/) - [https://kohenavocats.com/casino-en-ligne-illegal-vpn-loi-3-aout-2026-risques-joueur-recuperer-argent/](https://kohenavocats.com/casino-en-ligne-illegal-vpn-loi-3-aout-2026-risques-joueur-recuperer-argent/) - [https://www.tresor.economie.gouv.fr/services-aux-entreprises/sanctions-economiques/russie-en-lien-avec-la-violation-par-la-russie-de-la-souverainete-et-de-l-integrite-territoriale-de-l-ukraine](https://www.tresor.economie.gouv.fr/services-aux-entreprises/sanctions-economiques/russie-en-lien-avec-la-violation-par-la-russie-de-la-souverainete-et-de-l-integrite-territoriale-de-l-ukraine) - [https://kohenavocats.fr/2026/09/23/sanctions-russie-gel-avoirs-france-qui-concerne-contester-2026/](https://kohenavocats.fr/2026/09/23/sanctions-russie-gel-avoirs-france-qui-concerne-contester-2026/) - [https://acpr.banque-france.fr/system/files/2026-03/20260318_lignes_directrices_gel_des_avoirs.pdf](https://acpr.banque-france.fr/system/files/2026-03/20260318_lignes_directrices_gel_des_avoirs.pdf) - [https://www.decideurs-juridiques.com/regulation-juridiques/65030-lutte-antiblanchiment-tracfin-elargit-son-champ-de-vision-avec-l-integration-du-dispositif-des-lanceurs-d-alerte.html](https://www.decideurs-juridiques.com/regulation-juridiques/65030-lutte-antiblanchiment-tracfin-elargit-son-champ-de-vision-avec-l-integration-du-dispositif-des-lanceurs-d-alerte.html) - [https://acpr.banque-france.fr/fr/actualites/attentes-de-lacpr-en-vue-de-lagrement-en-qualite-detablissement-de-paiement-des-prestataires-offrant](https://acpr.banque-france.fr/fr/actualites/attentes-de-lacpr-en-vue-de-lagrement-en-qualite-detablissement-de-paiement-des-prestataires-offrant) - [https://www.economie.gouv.fr/files/files/media-document/Tracfin_RA_Tome1_FR_web.pdf](https://www.economie.gouv.fr/files/files/media-document/Tracfin_RA_Tome1_FR_web.pdf) - [https://www.fatf-gafi.org/en/publications/High-risk-and-other-monitored-jurisdictions/increased-monitoring-june-2026.html](https://www.fatf-gafi.org/en/publications/High-risk-and-other-monitored-jurisdictions/increased-monitoring-june-2026.html) - [https://www.fincen.gov/resources/advisoriesbulletinsfact-sheets](https://www.fincen.gov/resources/advisoriesbulletinsfact-sheets) - [https://www.euroleads.eu/fr/ressources/blog/amld6-france-transposition](https://www.euroleads.eu/fr/ressources/blog/amld6-france-transposition) - [FATF](https://www.fatf-gafi.org/en/countries/detail/France.html) - [FATF](https://www.fatf-gafi.org/en/publications/Mutualevaluations/Mutualevaluationoffrance.html) - [République française / Légifrance](https://www.legifrance.gouv.fr/jorf/id/JORFTEXT000053957292) - [Docaposte](https://www.docaposte.com/blog/article/amlr-2027-le-nouveau-socle-europeen-de-la-lutte-anti-blanchiment) - [Maddyness](https://www.maddyness.com/2026/10/16/3pay-rachete-moneytrack-la-fintech-veut-en-finir-avec-lavance-des-frais-de-sante/) - [Autorité des Marchés Financiers (AMF)](https://www.amf-france.org/en/news-publications/news-releases/amf-news-releases/crypto-assets-autorite-des-marches-financiers-warns-public-about-activities-several-unauthorized-3) - [Ministère de l'Économie / Tracfin](https://www.economie.gouv.fr/tracfin/tracfin-integre-le-dispositif-des-lanceurs-dalerte) - [Village de la Justice](https://www.village-justice.com/articles/loi-pacte-quelle-sont-les-nouvelles-regles-relatives-aux-prestataires-services,32106.html) - [ACPR](https://acpr.banque-france.fr/premier-bilan-de-lenregistrement-des-psan) - [Hashtag Finance](https://hashtagfinance.fr/blog/reglement-mica-en-france/) - [Xpollens](https://www.xpollens.com/blog/blog-prestataires-de-services-sur-crypto-actifs-le-guide-complet/) - [Leto Legal](https://www.leto.legal/guides/lcb-ft) - [Conseil d'État](https://conseil-etat.fr/avis-consultatifs/derniers-avis-rendus/au-gouvernement/avis-relatif-a-la-portee-de-l-obligation-de-declaration-prevue-a-l-article-l.-561-15-du-code-monetaire-et-financier) - [Direction générale du Trésor](https://www.tresor.economie.gouv.fr/services-aux-entreprises/sanctions-economiques/dispositif-national-de-gel-des-avoirs) - [Efficiale](https://www.efficiale.fr/blog/lignes-directrices-gel-des-avoirs) - [Légifrance](https://www.legifrance.gouv.fr/codes/article_lc/LEGIARTI000032745425) - [GDroit](https://gdroit.fr/lcb-ft/lcb-ft-tracfin/) - [Autorité nationale des jeux](https://anj.fr/lutte-contre-le-blanchiment-de-capitaux-une-premiere-sanction-de-la-commission-nationale-des-sanctions) - [Direction générale du Trésor / TRACFIN](https://www.economie.gouv.fr/tracfin/tracfin-publie-son-rapport-dactivite-et-dimpact-2025) - [RisqueBlanchiment](https://risqueblanchiment.fr/articles/06-sanctions-non-conformite-lcb-ft) - [GDroit](https://gdroit.fr/lcb-ft/lcb-ft-les-personnes-politiquement-exposees/) - [Selectra](https://selectra.info/finance/actualites/marche/plafond-especes-europe-10000-euros-2027) - [Direction générale du Trésor / TRACFIN](https://www.economie.gouv.fr/files/files/directions_services/tracfin/CMF.%202023.06.08.pdf?v=1686312711) - [Légifrance](https://legifrance.gouv.fr/codes/article_lc/LEGIARTI000036824634/2019-10-31) - [Légifrance](https://www.legifrance.gouv.fr/codes/article_lc/LEGIARTI000036824549) - [Légifrance](https://legifrance.gouv.fr/codes/article_lc/LEGIARTI000038613667/2020-02-08) - [LexisNexis](https://www.lexisnexis.com/fr-fr/glossaire/personne-politiquement-exposee-pep) - [Légifrance](https://www.legifrance.gouv.fr/codes/article_lc/LEGIARTI000050361200) - [Études Fiscales Internationales](https://www.etudes-fiscales-internationales.com/media/02/01/1314469139.pdf) - [Legalstart](https://www.legalstart.fr/fiches-pratiques/creer-sa-societe/liste-beneficiaires-effectifs/) - [LS Compta](https://www.lscompta.fr/blog/declaration-beneficiaires-effectifs/) - [TRACFIN](https://tracfin.finances.gouv.fr/Documentation/GuideUtilisateurs.pdf) - [DGFiP / CSOEC / TRACFIN](https://www.economie.gouv.fr/files/lignes%20directrices%20tracfin%20csoec_0.pdf) - [GovernanceDocs](https://governancedocs.com/crypto-travel-rule/) - [ACPR / Direction générale du Trésor](https://acpr.banque-france.fr/system/files/2026-03/20260318_lignes_directrices_gel_des_avoirs.pdf) - [Swim Legal](https://www.swim.legal/blog/gel-des-avoirs-obligations-procedure-risques) - [Légavox](https://www.legavox.fr/blog/maitre-anthony-bem/delit-penal-blanchiment-definition-sanctions-27597.htm) - [ACPR](https://acpr.banque-france.fr/fr/nos-missions/sanctionner-les-manquements/procedure-disciplinaire) - [Fleurus Avocats](https://www.fleurusavocats.com/journal/loi-sapin-2-entreprises-concernees) - [Lexbase](https://www.lexbase.fr/article-juridique/84650831-textesloiwasermanunnouveaustatutpourlelanceurdalerte) - [AMF](https://www.amf-france.org/sites/institutionnel/files/pdf/61047/fr/Le_reglement_europeen_Abus_de_marche_(MAR).pdf?1697284576=) - [CMS Law](https://cms.law/fr/fra/news-information/allegement-des-obligations-en-matiere-d-abus-de-marche) - [EUR-Lex / Journal officiel de l'Union européenne](https://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/FR/TXT/PDF/?uri=CELEX:32017R0821) - [Direction générale des douanes et droits indirects](https://www.douane.gouv.fr/demarche/importer-du-tungstene-de-letain-du-tantale-ou-leurs-minerais-ou-de-lor-3tg) - [Direction générale du Trésor](https://www.tresor.economie.gouv.fr/Articles/2026/05/11/lancement-du-fichier-national-des-comptes-signales-pour-risque-de-fraude-un-nouveau-rempart-contre-la-fraude-aux-virements) - [Banque de France](https://www.banque-france.fr/fr/communiques-de-presse/lancement-de-la-plateforme-des-iban-suspects-un-nouvel-outil-cle-de-lutte-contre-la-fraude-aux) - [ACPR](https://acpr.banque-france.fr/en/node/26429) - [ACPR](https://acpr.banque-france.fr/system/files/2025-07/20250717_Rapport_blanchiment_comptes_rebonds.pdf) - [ACPR / TRACFIN](https://acpr.banque-france.fr/system/files/2025-04/20250423_Lignes_directrices_obligations_Tracfin.pdf) - [AMF](https://www.amf-france.org/sites/institutionnel/files/doctrine/fr/Position/DOC-2010-23/2.2/Lignes%20directrices%20sur%20l'obligation%20de%20declaration%20a%20Tracfin.pdf) - [AMF](https://www.amf-france.org/sites/institutionnel/files/doctrine/fr/Position/DOC-2013-23/2.2/Lignes%20directrices%20sur%20la%20notion%20de%20personne%20politiquement%20exposee%20en%20matiere%20de%20lutte%20contre%20le%20blanchiment%20des%20capitaux%20et%20le%20financement%20du%20terrorisme.pdf) - [LCB-FT.fr](https://www.lcb-ft.fr/news/tracfin-rapport-activite-2025) - [Autorité de régulation des jeux en ligne (ARJEL/ANJ)](https://anj.fr/sites/default/files/2020-02/2011-025.pdf) - [Autorité nationale des jeux (ANJ)](https://anj.fr/nos-actions/lutter-contre-le-blanchiment-de-capitaux) - [Légifrance / République française](https://www.legifrance.gouv.fr/jorf/id/JORFTEXT000044041426) - [Autorité nationale des jeux (ANJ)](https://anj.fr/sites/default/files/2021-09/Cadre%20de%20r%C3%A9f%C3%A9rence%20pour%20la%20lutte%20contre%20la%20fraude,%20le%20blanchiment%20des%20capitaux%20et%20le%20financement%20du%20terrorisme.pdf) - [Autorité nationale des jeux (ANJ)](https://anj.fr/sites/default/files/2021-06/D%C3%A9cision%202021-154_Proposition_Cadre%20de%20r%C3%A9f%C3%A9rence_Fraude_Blanchiment_annexe.pdf) - [Mutual Evaluations](https://www.fatf-gafi.org/en/publications/Mutualevaluations.html) - [Mutual Evaluation of France](https://www.fatf-gafi.org/en/publications/Mutualevaluations/Mutualevaluationoffrance.html) - [Assessments](https://www.fatf-gafi.org/en/calendars/assessments.html) - [The FATF Recommendations](https://www.fatf-gafi.org/en/publications/Fatfrecommendations/Fatf-recommendations.html) - [Consolidated assessment ratings](https://www.fatf-gafi.org/en/publications/Mutualevaluations/Assessment-ratings.html) - [Consolidated Processes and Procedures for Mutual Evaluations and Follow-Up: “Universal Procedures”](https://www.fatf-gafi.org/en/publications/Mutualevaluations/Universal-Procedures-2023.html) - [Publications](https://www.fatf-gafi.org/en/publications.html) - [The 2022 and 2013 Methodologies for Assessing Technical Compliance with the FATF Recommendations and the Effectiveness of AML/CFT/CPF Systems](https://www.fatf-gafi.org/en/publications/Mutualevaluations/Fatf-methodology.html) - [2022 Procedures for the FATF AML/CFT/CPF Mutual Evaluations, Follow-Up and ICRG](https://www.fatf-gafi.org/en/publications/Mutualevaluations/5th-Round-Procedures.html) - [Calendars](https://www.fatf-gafi.org/en/calendars.html) - [mai 2022 Mesures de lutte contre le blanchiment de capitaux](https://www.fatf-gafi.org/content/dam/fatf-gafi/mer/Rapport-Evaluation-Mutuelle-France-2022.pdf) - [Lignes directrices sur l’évaluation nationale des risques](https://www.fatf-gafi.org/fr/publications/methodesettendances/Lignesdirectricessurlevaluationnationaledesrisques.html) - [Stratégies d'évaluation du risque de blanchiment de capitaux et de financement du terrorisme](https://www.fatf-gafi.org/fr/publications/methodesettendances/Strategiesdevaluationdurisquedeblanchimentdecapitauxetdefinancementduterrorisme.html) - [Evaluations mutuelles](https://www.fatf-gafi.org/fr/Sujets/Evaluations-mutuelles.html) - [Blanchiment de capitaux et financement du terrorisme par le biais du secteur immobilier](https://www.fatf-gafi.org/fr/publications/methodesettendances/Blanchimentdecapitauxetfinancementduterrorismeparlebiaisdusecteurimmobilier.html) - [La Commission met à jour la liste des pays à haut risque afin de renforcer la lutte internationale contre la criminalité financière - Représentation en France](https://france.representation.ec.europa.eu/informations/la-commission-met-jour-la-liste-des-pays-haut-risque-afin-de-renforcer-la-lutte-internationale-2025-06-11_fr) - [Blanchiment de capitaux et financement du terrorisme liés au COVID-19](https://www.fatf-gafi.org/fr/publications/Gafiengeneral/Covid-19-lbc-ft.html) - [Juridictions à haut risque faisant l'objet d'un appel à action - 21 février 2025](https://www.fatf-gafi.org/fr/publications/Juridictions-haut-risques-et-sous-surveillance/Call-for-action-february-2025.html) - [Blanchiment de capitaux basé sur le commerce Tendances et évolution](https://www.fatf-gafi.org/content/dam/fatf-gafi/reports/Blanchiment-de-capitaux-bas%C3%A9-sur-le-commerce-tendances-et-%C3%A9volution.pdf.coredownload.inline.pdf) - [NORMES INTERNATIONALES SUR LA LUTTE CONTRE LE BLANCHIMENT DE](https://www.fatf-gafi.org/content/dam/fatf-gafi/recommendations/Recommandations%20du%20GAFI%202012.pdf) - [mai 2022 Mesures de lutte contre le blanchiment de capitaux](https://www.fatf-gafi.org/content/dam/fatf-gafi/mer/Rapport-Evaluation-Mutuelle-France-2022.pdf.coredownload.inline.pdf) - [La liste noire et la liste grise - FATF](https://www.fatf-gafi.org/fr/countries/liste-noire-et-liste-gris.html) - [GROUPE D'ACTION FINANCIERE Rapport d’évaluation mutuelle](https://www.fatf-gafi.org/content/dam/fatf-gafi/mer/MER%20France%20ful.pdf.coredownload.inline.pdf) - [APPROCHE FONDÉE SUR LES RISQUES EN MATIÈRE ...](https://www.fatf-gafi.org/content/dam/fatf-gafi/translations/guidance/Lignes-Directrices-AFR-Contr%C3%B4le.pdf.coredownload.inline.pdf) - [May 2022 Anti-money laundering and counter-terrorist financing measures France](https://www.fatf-gafi.org/content/dam/fatf-gafi/mer/Mutual-Evaluation-France-2022.pdf) - [Les Recommandations du GAFI - FATF](https://www.fatf-gafi.org/fr/publications/Recommandationsgafi/Recommandations-gafi.html) - [capitaux et le financement du terrorisme](https://www.fatf-gafi.org/content/dam/fatf-gafi/fsrb-fur/GABAC-2eme-RAP-RDC.pdf.coredownload.pdf) - [Pays](https://www.fatf-gafi.org/fr/countries.html) - [Fatf-gafi](https://www.fatf-gafi.org/content/dam/fatf/documents/reports/mer4/Mutual-Evaluation-France-2022.pdf) - [Sanctions financières ciblées liées au terrorisme et à son financement (Recommandation 6)](https://www.fatf-gafi.org/fr/publications/Recommandationsgafi/Bpp-finsanctions-tf-r6.html) - [Sanctions contre les oligarques russes et biélorusses](https://ec.europa.eu/commission/presscorner/detail/fr/ip_22_1828) - [EU sanctions against Russia: questions and answers - Consilium](https://www.consilium.europa.eu/en/policies/sanctions-against-russia-explained/) - [Déclaration de la présidente von der Leyen sur le 19e train de sanctions contre la Russie - Commission européenne](https://france.representation.ec.europa.eu/informations/declaration-de-la-presidente-von-der-leyen-sur-le-19e-train-de-sanctions-contre-la-russie-2025-09-19_fr) - [Guerre menée par la Russie contre l'Ukraine: Sanctions de l'UE](https://www.consilium.europa.eu/en/policies/sanctions-against-russia/) - [Près de 30 milliards d'euros d'actifs d'oligarques et d'entités russes et biélorusses gelés par l'UE jusqu'à présent](https://france.representation.ec.europa.eu/informations/pres-de-30-milliards-deuros-dactifs-doligarques-et-dentites-russes-et-bielorusses-geles-par-lue-2022-04-08_fr) - [Questions et réponses sur le quatorzième train de mesures restrictives contre la Russie](https://ec.europa.eu/commission/presscorner/detail/fr/qanda_25_586) - [Conseil de l'UE PRESS FR COMMUNIQUÉ DE PRESSE 1090/25 15/12/2025](https://www.consilium.europa.eu/fr/press/press-releases/2025/12/15/russian-hybrid-threats-council-sanctions-twelve-individuals-and-two-entities-over-information-manipulation-and-cyber-attacks/pdf/) - [Déclaration de la présidente von der Leyen sur le 19e train de sanctions contre la Russie](https://ec.europa.eu/commission/presscorner/detail/fr/statement_25_2138) - [Déclaration de la présidente von der Leyen sur le dixième train de sanctions contre la Russie - Représentation en France](https://france.representation.ec.europa.eu/informations/declaration-de-la-presidente-von-der-leyen-sur-le-dixieme-train-de-sanctions-contre-la-russie-2023-02-15_fr) - [Chronologie - Sanctions de l'UE à l'encontre de la Russie](https://www.consilium.europa.eu/en/policies/sanctions-against-russia/timeline-sanctions-against-russia/) - [Bénéficiaires de fonds de la PAC](https://agriculture.ec.europa.eu/common-agricultural-policy/financing-cap/beneficiaries_en) - [Registre des documents - consilium.europa.eu](https://www.consilium.europa.eu/en/documents/public-register/) - [Recherche publique dans la base de données des aides d’État Transparency](https://webgate.ec.europa.eu/competition/transparency/public?lang=fr) - [L'UE en bref - Représentation en France - Commission européenne](https://france.representation.ec.europa.eu/qui-sommes-nous/lue-en-bref_fr) - [Subventions & financements - Représentation en France](https://france.representation.ec.europa.eu/entreprises-financements/subventions-financements_fr) - [The reinforced Youth Guarantee - Employment, Social Affairs and Inclusion](https://employment-social-affairs.ec.europa.eu/policies-and-activities/eu-employment-policies/youth-employment-support/reinforced-youth-guarantee_en) - [Latest documents - Consilium](https://www.consilium.europa.eu/en/documents/public-register/latest/?year=0&%3Bamp%3Bamp%3Bamp%3Bamp%3Bamp%3Bamp%3Bamp%3Bamp%3Bamp%3Bamp%3Bamp%3Bamp%3Bamp%3BPage=2) - [FRANCE - Interoperable Europe Portal](https://interoperable-europe.ec.europa.eu/sites/default/files/inline-files/NIFO_2024%20Supportive%20Document_France_vFinal_rev.pdf) - [Scoreboard - Competition Policy - European Commission](https://competition-policy.ec.europa.eu/state-aid/scoreboard_en?prefLang=fr) - [COMMISSION EUROPÉENNE DIRECTION GÉNÉRALE FISCALITÉ ET UNION DOUANIÈRE](https://taxation-customs.ec.europa.eu/system/files/2020-12/vatecommerceexplanatory_28102020_fr.pdf) - [May 2022 Anti-money laundering and counter-terrorist financing measures France](https://www.fatf-gafi.org/content/dam/fatf-gafi/mer/Mutual-Evaluation-France-2022.pdf.coredownload.inline.pdf) - [Lutte contre le blanchiment de capitaux et le financement du ...](https://www.consilium.europa.eu/en/policies/fight-against-terrorist-financing/) - [Foire aux questions](https://www.fatf-gafi.org/fr/pages/frequently-asked-questions.html) - [Actifs virtuels : indicateurs de blanchiment de capitaux et de financement du terrorisme](https://www.fatf-gafi.org/fr/publications/methodesettendances/Virtual-assets-red-flag-indicators.html) - [What is the Best Crypto AML and Compliance Solution in 2026? | TRM Labs](https://www.trmlabs.com/resources/blog/what-is-the-best-crypto-aml-and-compliance-solution-in-2026) - [Les mesures de la France pour lutter contre le blanchiment de capitaux et le financement du terrorisme](https://www.fatf-gafi.org/fr/publications/evaluationsmutuelles/documents/rem-france-2022.html?hf=10&=&b=0&=&s=desc%28fatf_releasedate%29) - [Juridictions soumises à une surveillance renforcée - 21 février 2025](https://www.fatf-gafi.org/fr/publications/Juridictions-haut-risques-et-sous-surveillance/increased-monitoring-february-2025.html) - [Anti-money laundering and countering the financing of terrorism at EU level - Finance](https://finance.ec.europa.eu/financial-crime/anti-money-laundering-and-countering-financing-terrorism-eu-level_en) - [Chronologie: Action de l'UE contre le blanchiment de capitaux ...](https://www.consilium.europa.eu/en/policies/fight-against-terrorist-financing/timeline/) - [Anti-money laundering: Council adopts package of rules - Consilium](https://www.consilium.europa.eu/en/press/press-releases/2024/05/30/anti-money-laundering-council-adopts-package-of-rules/) - [Un système efficace de lutte contre le blanchiment d'argent et le financement du terrorisme](https://www.fatf-gafi.org/fr/publications/Gafiengeneral/Efficacite.html) - [Anti-money laundering directive V (AMLD V) - transposition status | European Commission](https://ec.europa.eu/info/publications/anti-money-laundering-directive-5-transposition-status_en) - [Anti-money laundering directive IV (AMLD IV) - transposition status | European Commission](https://ec.europa.eu/info/publications/anti-money-laundering-directive-4-transposition-status_en) - [NORMES INTERNATIONALES SUR LA LUTTE CONTRE LE BLANCHIMENT DE](https://www.fatf-gafi.org/content/dam/fatf-gafi/recommendations/Recommandations%20du%20GAFI%202012.pdf.coredownload.pdf) - [France: BNP Pays Fine For Violating US Sanctions | OCCRP](https://www.occrp.org/en/news/france-bnp-pays-fine-for-violating-us-sanctions) - [TotalEnergies CEO Signals Russia LNG Redirection If EU Ban Comes - Bloomberg](https://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2025-09-29/totalenergies-ceo-signals-russia-lng-redirection-if-eu-ban-comes) - [Settlement Agreement between the U.S. Department of the Treasury's Office of Foreign Assets Control and BNP Paribas SA | Office of Foreign Assets Control](https://ofac.treasury.gov/recent-actions/20140630) - [BNP Paribas Stops New Business in Russia, Joining European Peers - Bloomberg](https://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2022-03-21/bnp-paribas-stops-new-business-in-russia-amid-ukraine-invasion) - [TotalEnergies’ Siberian oil linked to Russian military attacks on civilians in Ukraine | Global Witness](https://globalwitness.org/en/press-releases/investigation-totalenergies-siberian-oil-linked-to-russian-military-attacks-on-civilians-in-ukraine/) - [SocGen Flags Potential Capital Hit as Russia Crisis Reverberates - Bloomberg](https://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2022-03-03/socgen-flags-half-point-capital-hit-in-extreme-russia-scenario) - [BNP to Pay Almost $9 Billion Over U.S. Sanctions Case - Bloomberg](https://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2014-06-30/bnp-paribas-charged-in-sanctions-violation-probe-in-new-york) - [BNP Drops as Sudan Verdict Raises Fear of Costly Settlement - Bloomberg](https://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2025-10-20/bnp-slumps-most-since-april-on-france-downgrade-court-ruling) - [TotalEnergies Announces €4.5 billion Quarterly Profits While Remaining A Top Buyer of Russian Liquified Gas | Global Witness](https://globalwitness.org/en/press-releases/totalenergies-announces-45-billion-quarterly-profits-while-remaining-a-top-buyer-of-russian-liquified-gas/) - [Europe Can Cope With Ban on Russian Gas, TotalEnergies CEO Says - Bloomberg](https://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2025-07-05/europe-can-cope-with-ban-on-russian-gas-totalenergies-ceo-says) - [MÉTHODOLOGIE D’ÉVALUATION DE LA CONFORMITÉ TECHNIQUE AUX RECOMMANDATIONS DU](https://www.fatf-gafi.org/content/dam/fatf-gafi/methodology/GAFI-M%C3%A9thodologie-Evaluation-2022.pdf.coredownload.inline.pdf) - [Les mesures lutte contre le blanchiment des capitaux, le financement](https://fatf-gafi.org/media/fatf/documents/reports/mer-fsrb/French-GIABA-Mutual-Evaluation-Mali-2019.pdf) - [Juridictions à haut risque faisant l'objet d'un appel à action - 24 octobre 2025](https://www.fatf-gafi.org/fr/publications/Juridictions-haut-risques-et-sous-surveillance/Call-for-action-october-2025.html) - [APPROCHE FONDÉE SUR LES RISQUES EN MATIÈRE DE CONTRÔLE](https://www.fatf-gafi.org/content/dam/fatf-gafi/guidance/Lignes-Directrices-AFR-Contr%C3%B4le.pdf) - [Binance Among Crypto Firms Hit by French Money-Laundering Checks - Bloomberg](https://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2025-10-17/binance-among-crypto-firms-hit-by-french-money-laundering-checks) - [Global Crypto Policy Review Outlook 2025/26 Report | TRM Labs](https://www.trmlabs.com/reports-and-whitepapers/global-crypto-policy-review-outlook-2025-26) - [France Crypto Abductions Prompt New Security Steps From Interior Minister - Bloomberg](https://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2025-05-16/crypto-abductions-prompt-new-security-steps-from-french-minister) - [France: Over 20 Arrested in Connection to Crypto-Related Kidnappings | OCCRP](https://www.occrp.org/en/news/france-over-20-arrested-in-connection-to-crypto-related-kidnappings) - [French Authorities Shield Crypto Execs After Kidnapping Spree - Bloomberg](https://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2026-04-16/french-authorities-shield-crypto-execs-after-kidnapping-spree) - [Crypto Crime Is the Future. Bank Heists Are History. - Bloomberg](https://www.bloomberg.com/opinion/articles/2025-05-22/crypto-crime-is-the-future-bank-heists-are-history) - [What the end of MiCA's transitional period means for crypto businesses](https://www.elliptic.co/blog/the-end-of-micas-transitional-period) - [2025 Crypto Regulatory Round-Up](https://www.chainalysis.com/blog/2025-crypto-regulatory-round-up/) - [Organized Crime Shows High Level of Professionalization, Low Level of Crypto Sophistication - Chainalysis](https://www.chainalysis.com/blog/organized-crime-crypto/) - [2025 Crypto Crime Mid-Year Update - Chainalysis](https://www.chainalysis.com/blog/2025-crypto-crime-mid-year-update/) - [La Commission européenne se félicite de l'adoption par le Conseil du 16ᵉ paquet de sanctions contre la Russie - Commission européenne](https://france.representation.ec.europa.eu/informations/la-commission-europeenne-se-felicite-de-ladoption-par-le-conseil-du-16-paquet-de-sanctions-contre-la-2025-02-24_fr) - [The OLAF report 2024: Activités d’enquête - Protection des recettes de l’UE - Lutte contre le contournement des sanctions](https://ec.europa.eu/olaf-report/2024/investigative-activities/protecting-eu-revenue/fighting-the-circumvention-of-sanctions_fr.html) - [Les sanctions contre la Russie fonctionnent - Représentation en France](https://france.representation.ec.europa.eu/informations/les-sanctions-contre-la-russie-fonctionnent-2024-05-17_fr) - [L'UE adopte le 16 e train de sanctions à l'encontre de la Russie - Commission européenne](https://luxembourg.representation.ec.europa.eu/actualites-et-evenements/actualites/eu-verabschiedet-16-sanktionspaket-gegen-russland-2025-02-24_fr) - [L'UE adopte le 18e train de sanctions contre la Russie - Représentation en France](https://france.representation.ec.europa.eu/informations/lue-adopte-le-18e-train-de-sanctions-contre-la-russie-2025-07-18_fr) - [Council gives final approval to introduce criminal offences and penalties for EU sanctions’ violation - Consilium](https://www.consilium.europa.eu/en/press/press-releases/2024/04/12/council-gives-final-approval-to-introduce-criminal-offences-and-penalties-for-eu-sanctions-violation/) - [L’UE adopte un 20e train de sanctions à l’encontre de la Russie - Représentation en France](https://france.representation.ec.europa.eu/informations/lue-adopte-un-20e-train-de-sanctions-lencontre-de-la-russie-2026-04-23_fr) - [L’UE adopte de nouvelles sanctions contre l’écosystème de la flotte fantôme russe et la Biélorussie - Représentation en France](https://france.representation.ec.europa.eu/informations/lue-adopte-de-nouvelles-sanctions-contre-lecosysteme-de-la-flotte-fantome-russe-et-la-bielorussie-2025-12-16_fr) - [Flotte fantôme russe : les États membres de l’UE inscrivent 41 navires supplémentaires sur la liste - Représentation en France](https://france.representation.ec.europa.eu/informations/flotte-fantome-russe-les-etats-membres-de-lue-inscrivent-41-navires-supplementaires-sur-la-liste-2025-12-18_fr) - [Déclaration de la Présidente von der Leyen sur le 21e train de sanctions contre la Russie - Représentation en France](https://france.representation.ec.europa.eu/informations-et-evenements/informations/declaration-de-la-presidente-von-der-leyen-sur-le-21e-train-de-sanctions-contre-la-russie-2026-06-09_fr) - [L\'UE adopte le 15\ne train de sanctions à l\'encontre de la Russie en raison de la poursuite de sa guerre illégale contre l\'Ukraine](https://ec.europa.eu/commission/presscorner/detail/fr/ip_24_6430) - [France Fines Russia-Linked Oil Tanker for Sanctions Breach, Releases Vessel - Bloomberg](https://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2026-02-17/france-fines-russia-linked-oil-tanker-in-shadow-fleet-crackdown) - [France Says Detaining Oil Tankers Will Help Kill Russia’s Shadow Fleet - Bloomberg](https://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2025-10-02/france-says-detaining-oil-tankers-will-help-kill-russia-s-shadow-fleet) - [Belgium Seizes Russian ‘Shadow Fleet Tanker’ in North Sea - Bloomberg](https://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2026-03-01/belgian-forces-seize-russian-shadow-fleet-tanker-in-north-sea) - [Macron Says French Navy Boards Shadow Fleet Tanker Off Sicily - Bloomberg](https://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2026-06-25/macron-says-french-navy-boards-shadow-fleet-tanker-off-sicily) - [UK forces intercept Russian shadow fleet vessel for the first time in blow to Putin's war chest - GOV.UK](https://www.gov.uk/government/news/uk-forces-intercept-russian-shadow-fleet-vessel-for-the-first-time-in-blow-to-putins-war-chest) - [France Boards Russia-Linked Oil Tanker in Shadow Fleet Move](https://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2026-01-22/france-boards-russia-linked-oil-tanker-in-mediterranean-macron) - [Dark Fleet Oil Tanker Seized Off Venezuela Linked to Iran Trade - Bloomberg](https://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2025-12-11/dark-fleet-oil-tanker-seized-off-venezuela-linked-to-iran-trade) - [1 Red ALERT Shadow Fleet Sanctions Evasion and Avoidance Network](https://www.nationalcrimeagency.gov.uk/who-we-are/publications/753-red-alert-shadow-fleet-sanctions-evasion-and-avoidance-network/file) - [Eyes On The Crew: The Russian Watchmen Aboard Moscow's Sanctioned ‘Shadow Fleet’ Tankers | OCCRP](https://www.occrp.org/en/investigation/eyes-on-the-crew-the-russian-watchmen-aboard-moscows-sanctioned-shadow-fleet-tankers) - [China and Russia’s Shadow Fleet Delivers Putin a Gas Lifeline](https://www.bloomberg.com/graphics/2025-china-russia-lng-shadow-fleet/) - [FATF (Financial Action Task Force) — multilateral first-party assessment of France](https://www.fatf-gafi.org/content/dam/fatf-gafi/mer/Mutual-Evaluation-France-2022.pdf) - [Autorité des marchés financiers (AMF) / COLB — French national authority](https://www.amf-france.org/fr/actualites-publications/actualites/blanchiment-de-capitaux-et-financement-du-terrorisme-actualisation-de-lanalyse-nationale-des-risques-du-colb) - [Council of the European Union](https://www.consilium.europa.eu/en/policies/sanctions-against-russia-explained/) - [European Commission Representation in France](https://france.representation.ec.europa.eu/informations/la-commission-met-jour-la-liste-des-pays-haut-risque-afin-de-renforcer-la-lutte-internationale-2025-06-11_fr) - [Bloomberg](https://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2025-10-02/france-says-detaining-oil-tankers-will-help-kill-russia-s-shadow-fleet) - [Bloomberg](https://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2026-02-17/france-fines-russia-linked-oil-tanker-in-shadow-fleet-crackdown) - [Global Witness / Le Monde](https://globalwitness.org/en/press-releases/investigation-totalenergies-siberian-oil-linked-to-russian-military-attacks-on-civilians-in-ukraine/) - [Bloomberg](https://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2025-10-17/binance-among-crypto-firms-hit-by-french-money-laundering-checks) - [TRM Labs (vendor analytics report)](https://www.trmlabs.com/reports-and-whitepapers/global-crypto-policy-review-outlook-2025-26) - [European Commission (DG FISMA)](https://finance.ec.europa.eu/financial-crime/anti-money-laundering-and-countering-financing-terrorism-eu-level_en) - [Bloomberg](https://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2025-10-20/bnp-slumps-most-since-april-on-france-downgrade-court-ruling) - [OCCRP](https://www.occrp.org/en/news/france-bnp-pays-fine-for-violating-us-sanctions) Coverage gaps fim-int-2026-07-05-G001: No confirmed French government or n… fim-int-2026-07-05-G001: No confirmed French government or naval primary source (only T2/T3 press) exists for the Boracay, Grinch and MT Deliver shadow-fleet boarding enforcement actions; a Marine nationale or Parquet de Brest statement would upgrade these claims from Assessed to High confidence. [resolved] fim-int-2026-07-05-G002: France-specific post-2022-CJEU publ… fim-int-2026-07-05-G002: France-specific post-2022-CJEU public-access posture for the Registre des Beneficiaires Effectifs has not been verified with a primary French-specific source this cycle. [resolved] fim-int-2026-07-05-G003: The ratified sentinel typology libr… fim-int-2026-07-05-G003: The ratified sentinel typology library (sentinel-typology-library-v1.0.json) was not provided as context this cycle, preventing typology_observations matching against fim-typ-001 through fim-typ-020. [resolved] fim-int-2026-07-05-G004: Post-deadline outcome data (how man… fim-int-2026-07-05-G004: Post-deadline outcome data (how many of the approximately 90 non-authorised French PSAN firms actually wound down versus continued unauthorised operation) has not yet been retrieved from a primary AMF register source. [resolved] fim-int-2026-07-05-G005: The specific French 6AMLD transposi… fim-int-2026-07-05-G005: The specific French 6AMLD transposition vehicle (draft law, ordonnance, or Code monetaire et financier amendment reference) has not been identified in Research this cycle. [resolved] fim-int-2026-07-05-G006: The activation status and scope of … fim-int-2026-07-05-G006: The activation status and scope of the EU 21st sanctions package proposed country-wide crypto-asset services ban tool has not been confirmed this cycle. [resolved] fim-int-2026-07-07-G001: France's current post-2022-CJEU pub… fim-int-2026-07-07-G001: France's current post-2022-CJEU public-access posture for the RBE beneficial-ownership register has no independently verified French-specific primary source this cycle. [resolved] fim-int-2026-07-07-G002: France's specific 6AMLD transpositi… fim-int-2026-07-07-G002: France's specific 6AMLD transposition vehicle and drafting status ahead of the 2027-07-10 deadline was not established this cycle. [resolved] fim-int-2026-07-07-G003: On-site AML/CFT inspection intensit… fim-int-2026-07-07-G003: On-site AML/CFT inspection intensity in French overseas territories was not independently re-verified this cycle to confirm whether the FATF-identified capacity deficit has narrowed. [resolved] fim-int-2026-07-07-G004: No primary French Navy or Parquet d… fim-int-2026-07-07-G004: No primary French Navy or Parquet de Brest statement was retrieved for the Boracay boarding; the record rests entirely on T2 journalism, inverting the expected source hierarchy for a national enforcement action. [resolved] fim-int-2026-07-07-G005: Independent, non-Russian-state-medi… fim-int-2026-07-07-G005: Independent, non-Russian-state-media corroboration of TotalEnergies' planned 2027 Yamal LNG contract exit timeline would improve confidence beyond the current Barents Observer/TASS sourcing. [resolved] fim-int-2026-08-05-G001: No primary EU Council designation-l… fim-int-2026-08-05-G001: No primary EU Council designation-list text retrieved to verify the 632-vessel cumulative shadow-fleet count independently of secondary press reporting. [resolved] fim-int-2026-08-05-G002: No primary CNS decision text retrie… fim-int-2026-08-05-G002: No primary CNS decision text retrieved for the €210,000 real-estate mandataire sanction; only secondary property-sector blog coverage available. [resolved] fim-int-2026-08-05-G003: PEP-classification thematic-review … fim-int-2026-08-05-G003: PEP-classification thematic-review findings (FCA/FATF) were absent this cycle — no source located. [resolved] fim-int-2026-08-05-G004: D6 (Compliance Technology and Activ… fim-int-2026-08-05-G004: D6 (Compliance Technology and Active Defence) coverage remained thin this cycle; no fresh RegTech/AI-compliance guidance identified for FR. [resolved] fim-int-2026-08-05-G005: OFSI Houthi/Yemen designation delta… fim-int-2026-08-05-G005: OFSI Houthi/Yemen designation delta was not located this cycle — treated as a genuine no-change rather than an unsearched gap. [resolved] fim-int-2026-08-21-G001 ({'scheme': 'financial_integrity', '… fim-int-2026-08-21-G001 ({'scheme': 'financial_integrity', 'value': 'D1'}): No direct EUR-Lex/Council primary fetch for the 21st sanctions package; relied on three independent Tier-3 legal-alert sources. [resolved] fim-int-2026-08-21-G002 ({'scheme': 'financial_integrity', '… fim-int-2026-08-21-G002 ({'scheme': 'financial_integrity', 'value': 'D2'}): France's specific domestic transposition instrument for the AMLD6 BO-register tranche was not independently confirmed against a primary French gazette source. [resolved] fim-int-2026-08-21-G003: Tier-D jurisdictions (KH, LA, MX, C… fim-int-2026-08-21-G003: Tier-D jurisdictions (KH, LA, MX, CO) were not actively searched this cycle given pooled union search budget; genuine coverage gap, not a no-change finding. [resolved] fim-int-2026-08-21-G004 ({'scheme': 'financial_integrity', '… fim-int-2026-08-21-G004 ({'scheme': 'financial_integrity', 'value': 'D4'}): No FR-specific D4 Conflict Finance finding located this cycle. [resolved] fim-int-2026-08-21-G005 ({'scheme': 'financial_integrity', '… fim-int-2026-08-21-G005 ({'scheme': 'financial_integrity', 'value': 'D7'}): France's current FATF mutual-evaluation round status was not identified this cycle. [resolved] fim-int-2026-09-28-G001 ({'scheme': 'financial_integrity', '… fim-int-2026-09-28-G001 ({'scheme': 'financial_integrity', 'value': 'D2'}): France's formal 6AMLD transposition text has not been independently retrieved this cycle; the Zavia.ai claim of a July 2026 deadline is T4-sourced and not yet corroborated against Légifrance. [resolved] fim-int-2026-09-28-G002 ({'scheme': 'financial_integrity', '… fim-int-2026-09-28-G002 ({'scheme': 'financial_integrity', 'value': 'D5'}): AMF's post-1-July-2026 enforcement posture against unauthorised crypto providers (including any named action against Binance France) was not confirmed at T1 this cycle. [resolved] fim-int-2026-09-28-G003 ({'scheme': 'financial_integrity', '… fim-int-2026-09-28-G003 ({'scheme': 'financial_integrity', 'value': 'D6'}): No named ACPR guidance document on perpetual/event-driven KYC expectations was identified at T1 this cycle for France, though industry commentary describes this direction of travel. [resolved] fim-int-2026-10-04-G001 ({'scheme': 'financial_integrity', '… fim-int-2026-10-04-G001 ({'scheme': 'financial_integrity', 'value': 'D3'}): No D3 enabler-jurisdiction finding specific to French professional facilitators was located this cycle. [resolved] fim-int-2026-10-04-G002 ({'scheme': 'financial_integrity', '… fim-int-2026-10-04-G002 ({'scheme': 'financial_integrity', 'value': 'D4'}): No D4 conflict-finance finding specific to France was located this cycle. [resolved] fim-int-2026-10-04-G003: Tier D jurisdiction watch (KH, LA, … fim-int-2026-10-04-G003: Tier D jurisdiction watch (KH, LA, MX, CO) was not independently re-run this cycle because this run was bound to France; pending next full-sweep FIM cycle. [resolved] fim-int-2026-10-04-G004 ({'scheme': 'financial_integrity', '… fim-int-2026-10-04-G004 ({'scheme': 'financial_integrity', 'value': 'D6'}): D6 compliance-technology development specific to France was not located this cycle; the enforcement-practice gap between nominal AML policy and effective application remains a standing theme pending a dedicated comparison next cycle. [resolved] fim-int-2026-10-05-G001 ({'scheme': 'financial_integrity', '… fim-int-2026-10-05-G001 ({'scheme': 'financial_integrity', 'value': 'D1'}): Statutory text of Loi n° 2026-725 (JORFTEXT000054608060) could not be read directly on Légifrance, so the exact financial-crime-relevant drafting of art. 42 / CMF art. L.563-2 rests on secondary commentary. [resolved] fim-int-2026-10-05-G002 ({'scheme': 'financial_integrity', '… fim-int-2026-10-05-G002 ({'scheme': 'financial_integrity', 'value': 'D7'}): The sanction amount imposed by the CNS on the licensed operator was not disclosed in the ANJ release; no figure available for tracked-metric assessment. [resolved] fim-int-2026-10-06-G001 ({'scheme': 'financial_integrity', '… fim-int-2026-10-06-G001 ({'scheme': 'financial_integrity', 'value': 'D4'}): No current-cycle primary or secondary Colombia-specific narco-finance/FATF-trajectory material located within research budget. [resolved] fim-int-2026-10-06-G002 ({'scheme': 'financial_integrity', '… fim-int-2026-10-06-G002 ({'scheme': 'financial_integrity', 'value': 'D2'}): No FR-specific D2 (beneficial ownership) or D4 (conflict finance) development located this cycle. [resolved] fim-int-2026-10-06-G003 ({'scheme': 'financial_integrity', '… fim-int-2026-10-06-G003 ({'scheme': 'financial_integrity', 'value': 'D6'}): No FR-specific D6 (compliance technology) RegTech development located this cycle. [resolved] fim-int-2026-10-20-G001 ({'scheme': 'financial_integrity', '… fim-int-2026-10-20-G001 ({'scheme': 'financial_integrity', 'value': 'D1'}): Tier D jurisdictions (Cambodia, Laos, Mexico, Colombia) and domains D1, D3, D4, D6 received thin coverage this cycle; a dedicated follow-up pass is needed for France-nexus signals. [resolved] fim-int-2026-11-01-G001 ({'scheme': 'financial_integrity', '… fim-int-2026-11-01-G001 ({'scheme': 'financial_integrity', 'value': 'D7'}): No research items were supplied this cycle for D1 Sanctions, D2 Beneficial Ownership, D5 Crypto/Digital Assets, D6 beyond the fraud-file/mule items, and D8 Commercial Activity; coverage for these modules could not be evidenced and prior standing positions are carried forward unchanged. [open] FIM-GAP-001 (D2): FATF's 2022 mutual evaluation found benefi… FIM-GAP-001 (D2): FATF's 2022 mutual evaluation found beneficial-ownership verification weak for associations, foundations and endowment funds, with limited publication of discrepancy information to obliged entities and authorities. FIM-GAP-002 (D3): The AMF's sanctions system, while technica… FIM-GAP-002 (D3): The AMF's sanctions system, while technically satisfactory, was assessed by FATF as suffering from cumbersome procedures that significantly reduced its effectiveness, having produced only one sanction between 2016 and the 2022 evaluation, without repressive aim, compared to 39 ACPR sanctions in the same period. FIM-GAP-003 (D3): FATF found a virtual absence of on-site AM… FIM-GAP-003 (D3): FATF found a virtual absence of on-site AML/CFT inspections by the AMF in France's overseas territories, and called for the ACPR to substantially increase its inspection activity there; non-financial professions operating overseas reported inadequate professional-body guidance on AML/CFT obligations. FIM-GAP-004 (D1): French shadow-fleet interdiction (Boracay,… FIM-GAP-004 (D1): French shadow-fleet interdiction (Boracay, Grinch, Sicily incident) is triggered reactively on documentation/flag irregularities rather than through systematic pre-screening of all suspected vessels transiting French-controlled waters, leaving an unknown volume of shadow-fleet transits undetected or unchallenged. FIM-GAP-005 (D2): This baseline could not independently veri… FIM-GAP-005 (D2): This baseline could not independently verify the current French RBE (Registre des Bénéficiaires Effectifs) public-access posture following the EU-wide 2022 CJEU ruling restricting general public access to beneficial-ownership registers, as no primary French-specific source was retrieved this cycle. ## Evidence #### Confidence-tiered claims Removed from EU Regulation 269/2014 Annex I on 22 September 2026, at the request of France and Luxembourg, as part of a 3-year sanctions-renewal package. [[Source 1]](#sec-sources) Probable · 1 source A decree of 24 April 2026, in force from 1 July 2026, adds Tracfin to the list of external authorities competent to receive whistleblower disclosures under the Sapin-2 regime. [[Source 1]](#sec-sources) Probable · 1 source Not a FATF-grey-listed jurisdiction as of the 19 June 2026 plenary. [[Source 1]](#sec-sources) Probable · 1 source Absent from the FATF 22-jurisdiction increased-monitoring list published after the 19 June 2026 plenary; removed from the grey list in February 2023. [[Source 1]](#sec-sources) Probable · 1 source Remains under FATF increased monitoring as of 19 June 2026, with weak risk-based supervision of casinos, banks and reporting entities in Special Economic Zones specifically cited. [[Source 1]](#sec-sources) Probable · 1 source FinCEN issued FIN-2026-Alert007 on the A7 Network on 1 October 2026, targeting Mexico-based TCOs, continuing cartel fiscal-fuel-theft typology guidance from a 30 June 2026 supplemental alert. [[Source 1]](#sec-sources) Probable · 1 source CASPs providing EMT transfer/custody services needed dual PSCA plus payment-institution authorisation, with EBA no-action flexibility expiring 2 March 2026. [[Source 1]](#sec-sources) Probable · 1 source 26 new names added 19 Oct 2026, bringing 2026 total to 64 [[Source 1]](#sec-sources) Probable · 1 source Has not yet enacted a consolidated AMLD6 transposition instrument; AMLR/AMLD6 application date 10 July 2027 [[Source 1]](#sec-sources) Probable · 1 source Since 1 July 2026, Tracfin may receive and process reports submitted by whistleblowers [[Source 1]](#sec-sources) Probable · 1 source MoneyTrack (payment-verification fintech), all-share deal, combined entity valued at EUR 2.2m, with a EUR 1.5m funding round [[Source 1]](#sec-sources) Probable · 1 source MiCA Title V CASP authorisation, replacing national PSAN registration [[Source 1]](#sec-sources) Probable · 1 source True [[Source 1]](#sec-sources) Probable · 1 source True [[Source 1]](#sec-sources) Probable · 1 source sans délai, before execution where possible [[Source 1]](#sec-sources) Probable · 1 source True [[Source 1]](#sec-sources) Probable · 1 source no de minimis threshold; self-hosted wallet checks above EUR 1,000 [[Source 1]](#sec-sources) Probable · 1 source True [[Source 1]](#sec-sources) Probable · 1 source up to 7 years imprisonment and €750,000 fine [[Source 1]](#sec-sources) Probable · 1 source greater of €100m or 10% of net annual turnover [[Source 1]](#sec-sources) Probable · 1 source first AML/CFT sanction - 2-month suspended activity ban [[Source 1]](#sec-sources) Probable · 1 source 278484 [[Source 1]](#sec-sources) Probable · 1 source 2026-05-07 [[Source 1]](#sec-sources) Probable · 1 source Banque de France [[Source 1]](#sec-sources) Probable · 1 source True [[Source 1]](#sec-sources) Probable · 1 source 278484 [[Source 1]](#sec-sources) Probable · 1 source operations particulièrement complexes ou d'un montant inhabituel [[Source 1]](#sec-sources) Probable · 1 source CMF L.561-2, 9° bis [[Source 1]](#sec-sources) Probable · 1 source 6 years post account closure [[Source 1]](#sec-sources) Probable · 1 source Regulation (EU) 2017/821 [[Source 1]](#sec-sources) Probable · 1 source