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title: "Italy — AML/CTF Regime | Financial Integrity Monitor"
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description: "Italy — AML/CTF Regime: D7 AML/CTF Regime AML/CTF Regime Continue reading Italy's financial-intelligence unit, the Unità di Informazione Finanziaria, has used its Quaderno dell'antiriciclaggio n.36 to nam"
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# Italy — AML/CTF Regime | Financial Integrity Monitor

Italy (IT) · Module Detail

# Italy: AML/CTF Regime

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#### AML/CTF Regime

Continue reading Italy's financial-intelligence unit, the Unità di Informazione Finanziaria, has used its Quaderno dell'antiriciclaggio n.36 to name the gambling sector expressly as carrying high money-laundering risk. The stated grounds are structural rather than anecdotal: identity-only customer due diligence that stops short of ongoing risk assessment, weak screening for politically exposed persons, the absence of cross-account or cross-outlet relationship reconstruction that would allow a gambling-service provider to see a single customer's activity across multiple accounts or venues, and limited information sharing within corporate groups that operate multiple gambling brands or channels. This is architecture-level criticism of how the sector conducts due diligence, not a report on any single incident.

The UIF has paired this characterisation with a concrete instrument: suspicious-transaction-reporting instructions issued under Provvedimento UIF of 18 December 2025, in force from 1 July 2026, which expressly list gambling-service providers (prestatori di servizi di gioco) as addressees alongside banks, financial intermediaries and professionals. This is a notable architectural step — gambling-service providers are now named in the same reporting-addressee category as core financial-sector obliged entities, rather than treated as a peripheral or secondary category. The instructions direct that suspicious-transaction reports combine financial and subjective risk profiles, and the UIF has signalled that defensive, boilerplate reporting will not satisfy the new quality expectation.

This sits within a broader supervisory architecture in which Italy's Ministry of Economy and Finance holds non-financial-sector AML supervisory delegation since 10 July 2025, with the Guardia di Finanza carrying inspection competence. No new transposition delta specific to Italy under the EU AML Package was identified this cycle; the gambling-sector designation should be read as Italy's domestic supervisory authority sharpening enforcement of an existing architecture rather than as a change to that architecture itself. The three-pillar balance point worth noting: this cycle's signal is squarely AML-focused CDD and reporting-quality criticism, with no corresponding CTF- or CPF-specific finding surfaced for the gambling sector, which may reflect genuine absence of CTF/CPF risk in this vertical or may reflect under-coverage that a future cycle should test directly rather than assume.

#### Outlook

The clearest forward signal is that the UIF's designation of gambling-service providers as SOS addressees, now four months into force, is likely to generate visible enforcement or supervisory commentary on reporting quality in coming cycles, particularly given the UIF's explicit rejection of defensive, boilerplate reporting. Italy's EU AML Package implementation — the MEF/Guardia di Finanza supervisory-coordination model — is expected to continue maturing through roughly the first quarter of 2027, ahead of AMLA's fuller operational build-out; this gambling-sector designation sits inside that broader architecture rather than apart from it. The general gap between current sector practice (identity-only CDD) and the UIF's stated expectation (risk-based, relationship-level reporting) is itself a risk-direction indicator: closing that gap would represent an improving risk trajectory for the sector, and its persistence or closure is worth tracking as a discrete marker in the next reporting window.