--- title: "Netherlands (NL) — Financial-Integrity Intelligence · Sentinel" canonical: https://sentinel.gi/jurisdictions/netherlands/ source_html: /jurisdictions/netherlands/index.html description: "Financial integrity intelligence for Netherlands (NL): sanctions, beneficial ownership, enabler jurisdictions, conflict finance, digital assets and compliance technology — with sourced findings." generated_at: 2026-11-08T04:46:02Z content_sha256: 3d33ec57726e2b575dca3727d5bf8018d9c48fb772957ba951ccc60505024865 generator: "fe-fleet/md-twin@1.0" --- # Netherlands (NL) — Financial-Integrity Intelligence · Sentinel Not every instrument is backed by its official text yet. At least one law or rulebook covered here has no official source (tier 1) retrieved for it yet. No finding on this page is shown with confidence above “Probable” until stronger sources are retrieved. Financial Integrity Monitor # Netherlands NL Domains covered 8 of 8 Sources 198 Role actions 8 Horizon <90d 1 Jurisdiction profile FATF status: Largely Compliant Tier: A Risk direction: Stable Enablement vs enforcement: Mixed Netherlands operates a twin-peaks AML/CFT supervisory system (DNB prudential, AFM conduct) under the Wwft, with FIU-Netherlands as national financial intelligence unit. More FATF rates the framework largely compliant (10 C/29 LC/1 PC post-2025 follow-up) but flags legal-person misuse, DNFBP supervision intensity, and sanctions dissuasiveness as unresolved. Key deficiencies - Beneficial ownership register historically under-populated and definitional gaps (no 'ultimate effective control' test) permitting conduit/mailbox company misuse - Risk-based supervision of DNFBPs (trust offices, corporate lawyers, high-value dealers) under-resourced relative to risk - Sanctions for ML/TF offences assessed as insufficiently proportionate and dissuasive - Netherlands' role as domicile/transit hub for global commodity trading houses and crypto infrastructure creates enabler exposure disproportionate to domestic risk profile Recent developments (18m) - FATF 1st Enhanced Follow-Up Report (23 Sept 2025): Recommendation 15 (VASPs) upgraded Partially Compliant to Largely Compliant; NL now 10 Compliant/29 Largely Compliant/1 Partially Compliant - AFM published dedicated Wwft guidance annex for crypto-asset service providers (2 May 2025) covering CDD, transaction monitoring, BO verification and SAR filing - EU cash-payment limit of EUR 3,000 entered into force (1 Jan 2025) as part of the Dutch AML action plan - FIU-Netherlands reinforced with additional FTE capacity as part of national AML strengthening programme - AMLA became operational (mid-2025, Frankfurt seat, chair Bruna Szego) beginning to shape the future direct/indirect supervisory perimeter that will include Dutch high-risk obliged entities Law made at European Economic Area level that applies in Netherlands is covered once, on the [European Economic Area](/jurisdictions/eea/) page. This page covers Netherlands’s own layer: implementation, national authorities, national options and local enforcement. Brief ## Lead signal #### Lead Signal De Nederlandsche Bank imposed a €722,160 administrative fine on Modulr Finance B.V. on 30 September 2026 for serious shortcomings in its ongoing monitoring of customers and transactions over the period 1 January 2023 to 16 July 2024, finding a breach of Wwft art. 3(2)(d). Third-party reporting indicates the firm had relied on intermediary partners, including crypto-asset service providers, for monitoring it should have performed itself. This is DNB's first publicly recorded AML fine against an electronic-money institution, and it signals continued supervisory rigour over payment-sector gatekeepers that outsource client-facing monitoring to downstream platform partners without retaining adequate oversight themselves. Read full brief #### Lead Signal De Nederlandsche Bank imposed a €722,160 administrative fine on Modulr Finance B.V. on 30 September 2026 for serious shortcomings in its ongoing monitoring of customers and transactions over the period 1 January 2023 to 16 July 2024, finding a breach of Wwft art. 3(2)(d). Third-party reporting indicates the firm had relied on intermediary partners, including crypto-asset service providers, for monitoring it should have performed itself. This is DNB's first publicly recorded AML fine against an electronic-money institution, and it signals continued supervisory rigour over payment-sector gatekeepers that outsource client-facing monitoring to downstream platform partners without retaining adequate oversight themselves. #### Other Developments Tokenisation legal gap identified. AFM and DNB jointly published an exploratory report on 12 October 2026 finding that Dutch property and securities law, specifically the Burgerlijk Wetboek and the Wet giraal effectenverkeer, provides no basis for securities issued, held and transferred exclusively as tokens. The regulators warned of migration risk to jurisdictions offering greater legal certainty and recommended a joint follow-up process involving government and market participants. This is a structural finding about the adequacy of Dutch civil and securities law for native tokenisation, not a prohibition under the Markets in Crypto-Assets Regulation, and it sits alongside the Netherlands' broader AML/CFT architecture discussed below. AMLD6 transposition remains at consultation stage. The Netherlands' vehicle for transposing the sixth EU Anti-Money Laundering Directive, the Implementatiewet ter voorkoming van witwassen en terrorismefinanciering, which will repeal the Wwft, remains at the consultation stage opened 4 July 2025. No material progression toward enactment was identified, and the parliamentary timetable remains unconfirmed. In the interim, the directly applicable EU Anti-Money Laundering Regulation continues to apply in the Netherlands without need for domestic transposition, while supervisory and financial-intelligence-unit provisions await the Implementatiewet's eventual passage. #### Cross-Monitor Connections The Modulr Finance fine carries a direct link to payments-sector supervision: a non-bank electronic-money institution was sanctioned for monitoring failures tied to its reliance on downstream partners, including crypto-asset service providers, that is a payments-architecture finding as much as an AML one. The tokenisation legal-gap finding similarly straddles financial-market infrastructure and digital-asset oversight, since it concerns the civil-law basis for token-based securities rather than a crypto-specific licensing question, and it bears on how market participants structure dual-registration arrangements to bridge the gap pending legislative clarification. #### Outlook The Implementatiewet's consultation-stage status leaves the Netherlands' domestic AML/CFT supervisory and reporting architecture unsettled ahead of the EU package's broader implementation path, and the absence of a confirmed parliamentary timetable is itself a fact to monitor rather than a prediction of delay. The AFM/DNB recommendation for a joint government-industry follow-up process on tokenisation has no confirmed timetable either; both items warrant monitoring for the next concrete procedural step rather than for any near-term legislative outcome. Earlier periodic briefs (3) 4 Oct 2026 · fim-2026-10-04 #### Lead Signal The Netherlands enters this cycle with a transposition bill that has stalled on its own procedural track even as the directly applicable EU instrument above it keeps moving on schedule. On 17 August 2026 the Raad van State (Council of State) published its advisory opinion on the Implementatiewet ter voorkoming van witwassen en terrorismefinanciering (Iwt), the bill that transposes the Sixth Anti-Money Laundering Directive into Dutch law, concluding that the bill must be amended before it can be filed with the Tweede Kamer. The advisory cited gaps in the risk-based approach, non-discrimination safeguards and data-protection design of the draft. This is a structural finding, not an incident: it tells us the national legislative vehicle is behind where the EU timetable assumes it to be, while the AMLR, the directly applicable Regulation that does not depend on national transposition, continues toward its 10 July 2027 application date regardless of the Iwt's progress, per De Nederlandsche Bank and the Autoriteit Financiele Markten. Running alongside the transposition delay is a concrete, already-effective obligation: from 1 January 2026, new article 1f of the Wwft imposes an absolute prohibition on cash payments of EUR 3,000 or more for the sale or purchase of goods, replacing the prior EUR 10,000 customer due diligence and reporting threshold for traders of goods. Services remain outside this specific prohibition. Taken together, the two developments show a jurisdiction tightening its operative AML control at the transactional layer while its structural transposition vehicle is told to go back and fix governance-level gaps before it can proceed. #### Other Developments The Iwt's supervisory map is settled even as its substance is contested. The same Council of State advisory carries forward the bill's designation of supervisors: DNB, the AFM, the Dienst Financieel-Economische Integriteit, Bureau Financieel Toezicht, the deken, and the Kansspelautoriteit are named as the Iwt's designated supervisory bodies. That allocation of supervisory responsibility appears stable even though the underlying bill text does not yet meet the bar the Council of State has set for it. The AMLR's direct application date is now a corroborated standing fact for the Dutch market. Both DNB and the AFM separately confirm that the new AML/CFT framework becomes applicable on 10 July 2027, independent of whether the Iwt has completed its domestic passage by then. Firms operating in or into the Netherlands should treat the AMLR timetable as fixed even while the Iwt timetable is not. The cash-payment prohibition narrows a previously CDD-based control into a bright-line prohibition. Article 1f Wwft does not merely lower a reporting threshold, it removes the transaction from permissible cash settlement altogether for goods above EUR 3,000, which is a different kind of control than the due-diligence trigger it replaces. #### Cross-Monitor Connections The Iwt's data-protection gap, as identified by the Council of State, is the kind of finding that typically recurs in data-protection monitoring once a bill of this kind is amended and refiled, since risk-based AML data processing and data-minimisation obligations frequently sit in tension. The supervisory map designating the Kansspelautoriteit alongside financial supervisors also signals that gambling-sector AML obligations remain bound into the same transposition vehicle as the banking and investment-firm obligations, which is relevant to any cross-sector compliance-technology build that spans those regulated populations. #### Outlook The near-term marker to watch is whether an amended Iwt is filed with the Tweede Kamer, since the Council of State's advisory makes amendment a precondition rather than a recommendation. Separately, and on a track that does not wait for the Iwt, the AMLR's 10 July 2027 application date stands as a confirmed horizon point for Dutch firms. The practical compliance question for obliged entities is less whether the national bill passes in its current form, which it cannot, and more whether firms are already building toward the AMLR's substantive requirements ahead of a national transposition that may still be in motion when the Regulation itself takes effect. 28 Sep 2026 · fim-2026-09-28 #### Lead Signal The Netherlands provides a structural case study this cycle in how a small, single-representation member state sits inside the emerging EU AML architecture while routine domestic enforcement continues underneath it. De Nederlandsche Bank (DNB) fined trust office International Trust Services B.V. EUR29,700 on 24 November 2025 for failing to commission a required audit under the Wwft, covering the January-December 2021 period. Taken alone this is a modest, procedural enforcement action, but it sits against a more structurally significant backdrop: the Anti-Money Laundering Authority (AMLA) General Board has been operational since 1 July 2025, and the Netherlands is one of only two AMLA member states, alongside Germany, represented on that board by a single national authority, DNB, rather than a coalition of sectoral regulators. #### Other Developments Transposition vehicle named. The Implementation Act on the Prevention of Money Laundering and Terrorist Financing, known as the Iwt, will replace the current Wwft as the Netherlands' vehicle for transposing the sixth Anti-Money Laundering Directive, operating alongside the directly-applicable AML Regulation. DNB's own published framework page confirms the Iwt as the forward transposition instrument, with AMLA's direct supervision of selected high-risk entities beginning January 2028. Dual-supervisor structure persists. DNB continues to supervise the majority of Wwft-obliged financial institutions, while the AFM retains supervisory responsibility for certain financial-market participants, a standing structural feature of the Dutch AML supervisory architecture that predates and will persist through the Iwt transition. #### Cross-Monitor Connections The single-authority representation on the AMLA General Board is a governance-architecture fact with implications beyond AML supervision narrowly defined: a jurisdiction represented by one national authority, rather than a negotiated multi-regulator delegation, concentrates both institutional knowledge and institutional risk in that single body ahead of the 2028 direct-supervision milestone. This is the kind of structural finding that typically outweighs a single enforcement fine in analytical significance, consistent with the architecture-over-incident framing this monitor applies throughout. The crypto/digital-asset AML angle for the Netherlands is intentionally not developed independently here, to avoid duplicating the coverage carried in the crypto consumer's own AML/CFT treatment this cycle. #### Outlook The period to watch is the Iwt's progression from consultation toward enactment as the Netherlands' AMLD6 transposition vehicle; the exact timetable was not established to a primary legislative calendar this cycle, and confirming it will materially sharpen the forward view. Equally, the run-up to January 2028, when AMLA begins direct supervision of selected high-risk cross-border entities, will test whether the Netherlands' unusual single-authority General Board representation translates into a smoother or more contested transition than in member states with distributed sectoral representation. 5 Sep 2026 · fim-2026-08-21 #### Lead Signal De Nederlandsche Bank imposed an EUR 8.5 million administrative fine on ABN AMRO Bank N.V. on 6 July 2026 for serious customer due diligence shortcomings affecting high-risk customers between September 2023 and September 2024. The fine extends a supervisory enforcement lineage against major Dutch banks for CDD failures that traces back to DNB's landmark 2018 action against ING, and it is the clearest signal this cycle that Dutch AML/CFT supervision remains an active enforcement posture rather than a settled compliance baseline. The fine sits alongside a structural development on the beneficial-ownership side: effective 1 January 2026, the Netherlands introduced a ban on cash payments of EUR 3,000 or more between buyers and sellers of goods, while the Netherlands Chamber of Commerce (KVK) is simultaneously improving UBO-register screening, ending public access to the register, and widening the grounds on which UBO data can be shielded from disclosure. Both developments this cycle sit within the AML pillar rather than CTF or CPF, continuing a pattern in which Dutch enforcement volume concentrates on anti-money-laundering findings; no NL-specific counter-terrorist-financing or counter-proliferation-financing enforcement action surfaced this cycle. #### Other Developments The UBO transparency trade-off cuts both ways. The Netherlands' UBO-register reform is best read as a structural change with mixed transparency implications rather than a straightforward tightening or loosening. Screening rigor on the collection side is increasing, which should improve the underlying data quality DNB and other supervisors rely on, but the simultaneous restriction of public access and the widening of shielding grounds reduces the register's usefulness as a transparency tool for third parties, including investigative journalists, counterparties conducting their own due diligence, and civil-society researchers. FATF's 2025 mutual-evaluation follow-up report continues to flag beneficial-ownership transparency adequacy as an outstanding deficiency for the Netherlands, notwithstanding its largely-compliant overall rating, and this cycle's access restriction is the kind of development that outstanding FATF concern is likely to scrutinise going forward. AMLR and AMLA supervisory perimeter build-out remains in progress. The Netherlands is directly bound by the EU AML Regulation (AMLR, Regulation (EU) 2024/1624) as an EU-27 member state, and its domestic AML-strengthening programme, the cash-payment threshold and the UBO-register reform, sits within that broader EU architecture. DNB and AFM have not yet finalised the perimeter handoff for direct supervision by the Anti-Money Laundering Authority (AMLA, established under Regulation (EU) 2024/1620) of the Netherlands' highest-risk obliged entities, leaving this as an open structural question rather than a resolved one. DNB's enforcement lineage is structural, not episodic. The ABN AMRO fine is the latest in a sequence of DNB administrative fines against major Dutch banks for CDD failures on high-risk customers, a pattern that began with the 2018 action against ING and has continued through subsequent supervisory cycles. Read as architecture rather than incident, this lineage indicates that DNB treats CDD adequacy at systemically significant banks as a standing supervisory priority rather than a one-off compliance exercise, and that further enforcement action against other major Dutch banks in this vein would be consistent with, rather than a departure from, the existing pattern. #### Cross-Monitor Connections The ABN AMRO fine and the DNB source underpinning it are shared substrate with world-payments' tracking of Dutch payment-sector obligations, since DNB is both the AML/CFT supervisor addressed here and the prudential licensing authority for Dutch payment institutions tracked under world-payments' W1a and W12 modules this cycle. The UBO-register reform is separately relevant to advennt's Dutch gambling-licensing coverage to the extent that KSA's own renewal-policy package for remote-gambling operators references WWFT risk-analysis obligations that sit on the same statutory foundation as the UBO and cash-payment measures addressed here. #### Outlook The clearest marker of what would change the Netherlands' AML/CFT picture over the coming cycle is progress, or its absence, on the AMLR/AMLA supervisory perimeter handoff: a finalised direct-supervision designation for specific high-risk Dutch obliged entities would be a materially different structural fact than the current in-progress status. On the beneficial-ownership side, continued FATF scrutiny of the access-restriction trade-off, set against the Netherlands' largely-compliant rating, is the development most likely to generate a formal follow-up finding in a subsequent evaluation cycle. Domain intelligence (D1–D8) #### Sanctions Architecture and Evasion The Netherlands occupies a dual position in the EU sanctions architecture against Russia: it is a frontline enforcement node for the measures the Council adopts, and it has repeatedly been the physical host for infrastructure those same measures are designed to disrupt. The EU 19th sanctions package, adopted 23 October 2025, introduced the first-ever EU sanctions on crypto providers, targeting the Russian state-linked A7A5 stablecoin ecosystem, alongside a phased LNG import ban, closed exemptions for Rosneft and Gazprom Neft, and 117 additional shadow-fleet vessel listings bringing the total to 557. The EU 20th sanctions package, adopted 23 April 2026, added 46 further vessel listings for a total of 632, delisted 11 vessels assessed as compliant, introduced a mandatory no-Russia resale clause and a scrapping clause for shadow-fleet exit, and listed Murmansk, Tuapse and the Karimun Oil Terminal in Indonesia as circumvention-linked ports. Both instruments are Council regulations, directly applicable in the Netherlands with no national transposition step, meaning the full designation set takes immediate domestic effect. Rotterdam, as the largest port in Europe, functions as a frontline node for the resulting port-access enforcement, giving the Netherlands an outsized operational role in implementing an architecture set at EU level. Continue reading The reverse side of this frontline role is enablement. Russian-linked no-KYC exchanges, Cryptex and PM2BTC, and a DPRK Lazarus-linked mixer successor, Sinbad.io, repeatedly located servers and hosting infrastructure physically in the Netherlands despite offshore beneficial ownership and predicate criminality disconnected from Dutch soil. Disruption of the Cryptex and PM2BTC infrastructure occurred through a coordinated action on 26 September 2024 involving OFAC designation, a FinCEN finding naming PM2BTC a primary money-laundering concern, and a joint seizure operation by the US Secret Service, Netherlands Police and FIOD. The pattern is reactive rather than proactive: Dutch enforcement acted once foreign partners, principally US authorities, had already identified the infrastructure and its criminal nexus. Whether successor hosting has since emerged in the Netherlands is not established this cycle, an explicit gap for forward monitoring. A further architectural signal is the divergence exposed by the Karimun, Indonesia port listing, which has no direct OFAC or OFSI equivalent. Dutch trading houses and Rotterdam-based shipping and insurance intermediaries face compliance friction from operating across EU, US and UK sanctions lists that do not fully align on port-level and crypto-provider designations, a structural feature of the current sanctions landscape rather than a one-off gap, and one that creates an arbitrage surface for intermediaries structuring transactions to fall between regimes. #### Outlook The sanctions architecture affecting the Netherlands will continue to expand through further EU packages, each taking immediate direct effect domestically, while the crypto-hosting enablement pattern is structural and unlikely to resolve through designation activity alone. Whether Dutch authorities develop independent detection capability for illicit infrastructure hosted on national soil, rather than continuing to rely on foreign-partner referral, is the central forward-looking question for this domain, alongside whether the EU-US-UK divergence on port and crypto-provider listings will widen or narrow in subsequent packages. #### Beneficial Ownership and Corporate Transparency The standing structural backdrop against which any Netherlands beneficial-ownership signal must be read is the three-instrument EU AML Package. The AML Regulation, Regulation (EU) 2024/1624, is directly applicable and does not require national transposition, and is expected to become applicable from 2027, progressively superseding parts of the Dutch Wwft framework, including its customer due diligence, beneficial-ownership and enhanced due diligence provisions. The sixth Anti-Money Laundering Directive is a separate instrument requiring transposition by each member state into national law, and the Anti-Money Laundering Authority Regulation, Regulation (EU) 2024/1620, established the Anti-Money Laundering Authority itself, which has been operational since mid-2025 from its Frankfurt seat under chair Bruna Szego. AMLA is expected to progressively select a first cohort of high-risk cross-border obliged entities for direct supervision, shifting the supervisory perimeter from purely national authorities toward a hybrid EU-level regime in which national supervisors such as DNB and AFM continue to operate alongside a centralised authority. This three-instrument architecture is the durable frame within which this cycle should be read, and it is structurally improving, though the Netherlands transposition status, vehicle and deadline for the sixth directive specifically are not established this cycle and are flagged as an open item rather than assumed complete. Continue reading Against that backdrop, the Netherlands rating from the Financial Action Task Force stands at 10 Compliant, 29 Largely Compliant and 1 Partially Compliant following a September 2025 enhanced follow-up report that upgraded Recommendation 15 on virtual-asset service providers. That upgrade did not touch the Netherlands beneficial-ownership definition, which the 2022 mutual evaluation found does not capture persons exercising ultimate effective control, a gap that continues to enable the use of Dutch conduit and mailbox companies with no genuine operational presence to access favourable tax-treaty terms and layer ownership. The Netherlands is not, and has never been, listed by the Financial Action Task Force, the European Union or the United Kingdom as a high-risk jurisdiction, a status re-confirmed as of June 2026. Domestic pre-positioning ahead of AMLR harmonisation includes a EUR 3,000 national cash-payment limit that entered into force on 1 January 2025 and additional capacity added to FIU-Nederland, though the scale and timing detail on the latter is thin. #### Outlook The Netherlands beneficial-ownership posture through this cycle is one of a technically compliant framework carrying an unresolved definitional gap that predates and will likely outlast the current follow-up cycle absent a dedicated re-rating exercise. The 2027 AMLR application date and the prospective AMLA direct-supervision cohort around 2028 create the structural opportunity to close the conduit-company misuse pattern, but whether the shift from national to hybrid EU-level supervision resolves the underlying definitional gap, or merely relocates the same structural weakness to a different supervisory layer, remains an open assessment question, compounded by the unresolved 6AMLD transposition status for the Netherlands specifically. #### Enabler Jurisdictions and Professional Facilitators The Netherlands operates a twin-peaks AML/CFT supervisory architecture in which De Nederlandsche Bank handles prudential supervision and the Autoriteit Financiele Markten handles conduct supervision under the Wwft, with FIU-Nederland as the national financial intelligence unit. This structural description is foundational to assessing the Netherlands as an enabler jurisdiction under the Enabler Jurisdiction Filter, because the question is not whether a supervisory framework exists, but whether its capacity and intensity match the risk profile of the entities it oversees. On that question, the Financial Action Task Force continues to assess supervisory intensity for trust offices and corporate lawyers as insufficiently robust relative to identified risk, with unresolved legal ambiguity preventing effective implementation of preventive measures for corporate lawyers specifically. This finding predates and was not touched by the September 2025 follow-up report, which addressed only the virtual-asset recommendation. Continue reading The clearest illustration of the professional-facilitator and corporate-domicile dimension of Dutch enabler exposure is the Trafigura case. Trafigura Group, the Singapore-domiciled parent, and its Netherlands subsidiary, Trafigura Beheer B.V., together with former chief operating officer Mike Wainwright, were convicted by the Swiss Federal Criminal Court of bribery of an Angolan official spanning 2009 to 2011, with the conviction under appeal. The corporate structure sits in Amsterdam, yet criminal jeopardy, prosecution and enforcement resources were concentrated in Switzerland, Brazil and the United States, leaving Dutch authorities structurally peripheral to a bribery pattern channelled through a Dutch corporate wrapper. This is a capacity-versus-choice question in enabler-jurisdiction terms: the Netherlands functions as a low-friction domicile hub for global commodity-trading structures without itself directing or substantially detecting the underlying corruption, and enforcement action has occurred almost entirely through third-country referral rather than domestic-first investigation. #### Outlook The systemic significance of the Dutch enabler role in this domain lies less in any single case and more in the recurring pattern of corporate-domicile convenience combined with under-matched gatekeeper supervision. Whether the twin-peaks DNB/AFM model, as it is progressively absorbed into the AMLA supervisory perimeter, closes the DNFBP supervisory-intensity gap identified by the Financial Action Task Force, or whether legal ambiguity for corporate lawyers persists as a standing structural weakness independent of EU-level architecture change, is the key forward question for this domain. #### Conflict Finance and Extractive-Industry Integrity The extractive-industry integrity signal for the Netherlands this cycle is channelled entirely through the Trafigura corporate structure, which is domiciled in Amsterdam as Trafigura Beheer B.V. while its underlying parent, Trafigura Group, sits in Singapore. The Swiss Federal Criminal Court convicted Trafigura Group, Trafigura Beheer B.V. and former chief operating officer Mike Wainwright of bribery of an Angolan official over conduct spanning 2009 to 2011, a conviction under appeal as of the most recent reporting available. In parallel, Trafigura Beheer B.V. pleaded guilty on 6 February 2025 in the United States District Court for the Southern District of Florida to conspiracy to violate the Foreign Corrupt Practices Act, arising from a decade of bribery, from 2003 to 2014, of officials at the Brazilian state oil company Petrobras, agreeing to pay over USD 126 million to the Department of Justice. A separate Brazilian civil settlement of USD 75.8 million was agreed on 31 March 2025 to resolve related civil claims, with partial credit applied against the US fine. Continue reading Read through the Conflict Finance Filter, tracing source, channel and deployment, the Angola and Brazil episodes together illustrate an extractive-sector corruption channel in which oil-sector contracts in producer states generated illicit proceeds that moved through a Dutch corporate wrapper without material Dutch-based detection or enforcement. This is a structural extractive-industry finding rather than an episodic one: three separate enforcement actions across three years, in three jurisdictions, arising from a single underlying decade-long pattern of conduct connected through one corporate structure domiciled in the Netherlands. The absence of a Dutch-led enforcement action in this sequence is itself an analytically significant data point regarding domestic detection capacity for extractive-sector corruption channelled through Dutch corporate vehicles. #### Outlook The Trafigura sequence closes out across Switzerland, Brazil and the United States with the appeal of the Swiss conviction as the only open procedural matter, but the broader question for this domain is whether the Netherlands develops any domestic-facing mechanism for detecting extractive-sector corruption laundered through Dutch corporate domiciles, given that none of the three 2025 enforcement actions originated from Dutch authorities. #### Crypto, Digital Assets, and Financial Innovation The defining D5 development in the Netherlands this period is the joint AFM/DNB exploratory report, published 12 October 2026, finding that Dutch property and securities law, the Burgerlijk Wetboek and the Wet giraal effectenverkeer, provides no basis for securities issued, held and transferred exclusively as tokens. This is a structural legal-infrastructure finding rather than a crypto-licensing restriction: the gap concerns whether Dutch civil law can recognise a token itself as the sole legal basis of title and transfer for a security, not whether a crypto-asset service provider is permitted to operate. The regulators warned explicitly of migration risk, the prospect that issuers and market infrastructure providers could move native tokenisation activity to jurisdictions with clearer legal bases, and recommended a joint follow-up process involving government and market participants to address the gap. Continue reading From a financial-innovation-integrity perspective, this finding matters because legal uncertainty at the custody-and-title layer is a known vector for structuring risk: market participants seeking to tokenise securities in the interim must rely on hybrid or dual-registration arrangements that layer a token representation over a conventional legal title, and any such layering arrangement introduces reconciliation and beneficial-ownership-tracing complexity that a cleaner single-layer legal basis would avoid. The AFM and DNB's joint framing, as prudential and conduct regulators acting together rather than separately, signals that this is being treated as capital-markets infrastructure policy rather than purely a digital-assets supervisory matter. This tokenisation finding sits alongside the Netherlands' broader crypto-asset supervisory architecture, within which DNB and AFM share responsibility under the EU's Markets in Crypto-Assets framework, though no MiCA-specific enforcement action or licensing development was identified for the Netherlands this period. The absence of such a development is itself worth recording: the only live crypto-adjacent signal this cycle was the civil-law tokenisation gap, not a licensing or enforcement matter under the crypto-specific regulatory perimeter. #### Outlook The AFM/DNB recommendation for a joint follow-up process with government and market participants has no confirmed timetable. Whether the Dutch government elects to pursue a legislative fix to the Burgerlijk Wetboek and Wet giraal effectenverkeer, or whether market participants are left to continue relying on hybrid dual-registration structures, is the central open question for market infrastructure and financial-innovation integrity in the Netherlands going forward. No further regulatory-horizon item specific to this gap carries a confirmed stage or date at this time. #### Compliance Technology and Active Defence The clearest active-defence signal in the Netherlands this cycle is the AFM Wwft guidance annex for crypto-asset service providers, published 2 May 2025, which embeds continuous customer due diligence, transaction monitoring, beneficial-ownership verification and suspicious-activity-report filing expectations for the sector ahead of the 1 July 2026 MiCA transitional-window closure. This is a first-party supervisory action, distinguishing it from generic industry guidance, and it places crypto-asset service providers on a proactive, perpetual-KYC-oriented supervisory footing comparable to that already applied to the rest of the regulated financial sector under the twin-peaks DNB/AFM model. Alongside this, FIU-Nederland has added capacity as part of the broader national AML strengthening programme, and a EUR 3,000 national cash-payment limit entered into force on 1 January 2025, both framed as operational and control-technology pre-positioning ahead of the 2027 AMLR harmonisation date, though the specific scale and timing detail on the FIU capacity increase remains thinly evidenced. Continue reading Read against the Netherlands twin-peaks supervisory architecture, in which De Nederlandsche Bank handles prudential supervision and the AFM handles conduct supervision under the Wwft, the AFM guidance annex represents an example of a national supervisor moving proactively to extend an existing control-technology and monitoring framework onto a newly regulated sector ahead of a hard compliance deadline, rather than waiting for a deficiency to be identified through a mutual evaluation or enforcement action. This contrasts with the more reactive detection posture evident in the Netherlands D1 and D5 crypto-hosting enabler findings, where disruption has depended on foreign-partner referral. #### Outlook Whether the AFM Wwft guidance annex translates into measurable improvement in domestic detection of illicit crypto-hosting activity, closing the gap between proactive supervisory guidance for licensed entities and reactive detection of unlicensed or offshore-controlled infrastructure, is the key question to track for this domain in subsequent cycles, alongside how FIU-Nederland capacity gains are deployed operationally. #### AML/CTF Regime The Netherlands' AML/CTF architecture this period is defined by two threads: a concrete enforcement action under the existing Wwft regime, and the continued consultation-stage status of the legislative vehicle that will eventually replace it. De Nederlandsche Bank imposed a €722,160 administrative fine on Modulr Finance B.V. on 30 September 2026 for serious shortcomings in its ongoing monitoring of customers and transactions across the period 1 January 2023 to 16 July 2024, finding a breach of Wwft art. 3(2)(d)'s ongoing-monitoring obligation. Third-party reporting indicates the firm had relied on intermediary partners, including crypto-asset service providers, to perform monitoring that the Wwft requires the obliged entity itself to perform. This is DNB's first publicly recorded AML fine against an electronic-money institution, and it is a clear statement that outsourcing client-facing monitoring to downstream platform partners does not discharge an obliged entity's own Wwft duties. Continue reading At the architectural level, the Netherlands' transposition of the EU's sixth Anti-Money Laundering Directive, via the draft Implementatiewet ter voorkoming van witwassen en terrorismefinanciering, which will repeal the Wwft once enacted, remains at the consultation stage that opened 4 July 2025. No material progression toward enactment was identified this period, and the parliamentary timetable for the Implementatiewet remains unconfirmed. In the meantime, the EU's Anti-Money Laundering Regulation applies directly in the Netherlands without requiring domestic transposition, meaning obliged entities already face a two-track compliance landscape: directly applicable EU-level requirements under the AMLR running alongside the still-in-force Wwft, pending the Implementatiewet's eventual passage and the Wwft's repeal. This dual-track posture is itself the structural fact to track: the AML Regulation, the sixth directive, and the AMLA Regulation establishing the EU's Anti-Money Laundering Authority together represent three distinct instruments moving supervision from a purely national model toward a hybrid EU-level regime, and the Netherlands' Modulr Finance fine demonstrates that national supervision under the existing Wwft framework remains active and consequential in the interim. #### Outlook The principal item to watch is whether the Implementatiewet progresses beyond consultation stage toward a confirmed parliamentary timetable; no such progression was identified this period. Separately, whether DNB's enforcement posture toward payment-sector gatekeepers relying on downstream monitoring partners, as demonstrated by the Modulr Finance fine, extends to further firms with similar outsourcing arrangements is a pattern worth monitoring, though no further such action was identified this period. FIU-Nederland reporting volumes and DNB payment-fraud statistics for 2025 are market facts, not commercial transactions; no qualifying M&A/investment/partnership event among NL financial-integrity market participants found within the 12-month window. Regulatory horizon Proposed 2026-Q4 · ±half_year ### UBO-register legitimate-interest access decree Creates a closed system of categories of persons with legitimate interest eligible for UBO-register access; published 2 April 2026, not yet in force. [Source](https://www.taxence.nl/nieuws/wijzigingsbesluit-toegang-ubo-registers-voor-natuurlijke-personen-en-rechtspersonen-met-legitiem-belang/) Adopted 2027 · ±year ### AMLR / 6AMLD application date and AMLA direct supervision phase-in Wwft is progressively displaced by a directly-applicable EU single rulebook (AMLR) with a wider obliged-entity population and a new supranational supervisor (AMLA). [European Commission / AMLA Source](https://acginter.com/en/new-european-anti-money-laundering-rules-will-have-major-impact-in-the-netherlands/) Adopted 10 Jul 2027 · ±year ### AMLR direct effect in Netherlands The EU AMLR becomes directly applicable, replacing most Wwft material rules as a single rulebook for reporting entities. [Source](https://www.advocatenorde.nl/voor-advocaten/wwft-en-sanctieregelgeving/europees-aml-pakket) Consultation 2027-Q3 · ±multi_year ### Implementatiewet ter voorkoming van witwassen en terrorismefinanciering (Iwt) — AMLD6 transposition, Wwft repeal Wwft repeal; national AMLD6 transposition enters into force on an unconfirmed date within the EU package's July 2027 outer deadline. [Source](https://www.regulationtomorrow.com/the-netherlands/draft-act-implementing-6amld-published-for-consultation/) Proposed 2030-Q1 · ±multi_year ### FATF 5th-round mutual evaluation of the Netherlands The Netherlands is scheduled for its next mutual evaluation round under the 2022 FATF Methodology. [Source](https://www.fatf-gafi.org/en/calendars/assessments.html) 5 dated · 2 pending date · baseline fim-2026-07-08 Role action cards MLRO ### DNB fined an electronic-money institution for AML monitoring failures tied to reliance on downstream platform partners. The Modulr Finance fine shows DNB will sanction ongoing-monitoring failures even where an obliged entity relies on intermediary partners, including crypto-asset service providers, to perform customer and transaction monitoring; outsourcing monitoring functions does not discharge the Wwft art. 3(2)(d) obligation. 1 evidence refs Compliance ### The Netherlands' AMLD6 transposition vehicle remains at consultation stage with no confirmed timetable. Obliged entities continue to operate under the existing Wwft pending the Implementatiewet's eventual passage, while the EU AML Regulation already applies directly; compliance functions should track both tracks as parallel, not sequential, obligations. 2 evidence refs Legal ### AFM and DNB jointly identified a legal gap preventing native securities tokenisation under Dutch civil and securities law. The absence of a legal basis for token-only securities under the Burgerlijk Wetboek and Wet giraal effectenverkeer creates structuring risk for any transaction relying on native tokenisation; counsel should expect continued reliance on hybrid dual-registration arrangements pending any legislative fix. 1 evidence refs Board ### DNB's first public AML fine against an EMI signals continued supervisory rigour over payment-sector gatekeepers. The €722,160 Modulr Finance fine is a reputational and precedent-setting signal for any institution with similar outsourced-monitoring arrangements; board-level oversight of third-party monitoring reliance is now a demonstrated supervisory focus area. 1 evidence refs CTO ### The AFM/DNB tokenisation report identifies a civil-law gap, not a technical or MiCA-licensing restriction, for native token-based securities infrastructure. Technical architecture for tokenised securities in the Netherlands must continue to layer over conventional legal title via dual-registration arrangements; the gap is in private law, not in the crypto-licensing perimeter, so no change to CASP authorisation requirements follows from this finding. 1 evidence refs Risk ### Reliance on downstream intermediary partners, including crypto-asset service providers, for AML monitoring is a demonstrated supervisory exposure. The Modulr Finance fine demonstrates that outsourced-monitoring arrangements concentrate risk at the point where an obliged entity fails to retain adequate oversight of a partner performing monitoring on its behalf; this is a model-risk and third-party-risk concentration point worth flagging in exposure reviews. 1 evidence refs Operations ### No material change for this persona this cycle. No material change for this persona this cycle Audit ### The Modulr Finance fine identifies a documented monitoring-control failure spanning an 18-month period. DNB's finding covers 1 January 2023 to 16 July 2024, a sustained period during which ongoing monitoring did not meet Wwft art. 3(2)(d) standards; audit scope for comparable payment-sector institutions relying on intermediary monitoring partners should consider whether equivalent control gaps exist. 1 evidence refs Scenario sketches ### AMLA direct-supervision transition and Dutch obliged-entity exposure Illustrative only: as AMLA direct and indirect supervision of cross-border obliged entities phases in under the AMLA Regulation (Reg (EU) 2024/1620), alongside the directly-applicable AML Regulation (Reg 2024/1624) and per-state sixth directive transposition such as the Netherlands' still-consultation-stage Implementatiewet, a Dutch payment-sector gatekeeper combining national Wwft-era enforcement exposure (illustrated this cycle by the Modulr Finance fine) with eventual EU-level supervisory oversight could face a reshaped compliance landscape in which national and supranational supervisory expectations must be reconciled during the transition window. This is architecture-over-incident illustration, not a prediction of any specific future enforcement action. Illustrative scenario for analytical orientation only. Not compliance advice, not a prediction, and not a statement of observed fact. Standing trackers (T1–T6) Tracker Status Note T1 · Sanctions Architecture and Evasion no_change Sanctiewet 1977 screening/freezing/reporting regime unchanged. T2 · EU AML Package (AMLR/6AMLD/AMLA) no_change T3 · Enabler Jurisdiction Dynamics no_change T4 · Conflict Finance Tracking no_change T5 · Crypto / VASP Regulatory Framework stable MiCA CASP authorisation and TFR travel-rule obligations confirmed in force in NL. T6 · Sanctions Regime Divergence no_change Registers ### Enforcement actions - 31 Jan 2025 - 31 Mar 2025 - 2 May 2025 - 23 Sep 2025 - 31 Jan 2025 - 31 Mar 2025 - 6 Feb 2025 - 2 May 2025 - 26 Sep 2024 - 6 Jul 2026 - 5 Feb 2026 - 25 Jun 2025 - 22 Jun 2026 - 24 Nov 2025 - 30 Sep 2026 - Trafigura and its former chief operating officer were convicted on bribery charges relating to payments to an Angolan official between 2009-2011, the first conviction of a senior commodity-trading executive for corruption; the Amsterdam-domiciled parent entity itself was also convicted for inadequate internal controls. 31 Jan 2025 - Trafigura agreed to a civil settlement resolving Brazilian bribery-related cases dating to at least 2020, following a 2024 guilty plea to a decade of bribery in Brazil entered in a Miami federal court. 31 Mar 2025 - AFM published a dedicated annex to its Wwft guidelines specifically for CASPs, embedding EBA-aligned expectations on customer due diligence, transaction monitoring, beneficial-ownership verification and suspicious-activity reporting into the same supervisory footing as the rest of the regulated financial sector. 2 May 2025 - FATF adopted the 1st Enhanced Follow-Up Report on the Netherlands, re-rating Recommendation 15 (new technologies/VASPs) from Partially Compliant to Largely Compliant following technical-compliance improvements since the 2022 mutual evaluation. 23 Sep 2025 ### Sanctions changes - 23 Oct 2025 - 23 Apr 2026 - 23 Oct 2025 - 23 Apr 2026 - 15 Jun 2026 - 14 May 2026 - 23 Apr 2026 - 1 Apr 2026 - 28 Apr 2025 - EU 19th sanctions package against Russia introduced a phased LNG import ban, closed exemptions for Rosneft/Gazprom Neft transactions, added 117 shadow-fleet vessel listings (total 557) and imposed the EU's first-ever sanctions on crypto providers, targeting the Russian-state-linked A7A5 stablecoin ecosystem — all directly applicable in the Netherlands as an EU member state, including at Rotterdam port and via Dutch-domiciled trading/financial intermediaries. 23 Oct 2025 - EU 20th sanctions package added 46 further shadow-fleet vessel listings (bringing the EU total to 632), delisted 11 vessels returning to compliance, introduced a mandatory 'no Russia' clause for EU sellers, a scrapping clause for shadow-fleet exit, and listed Murmansk, Tuapse and the Karimun Oil Terminal (Indonesia) as ports linked to shadow-fleet circumvention. 23 Apr 2026 ### Regulatory horizon (register) - UK ECCTA 2023 failure-to-prevent-fraud offence in force - AMLR / 6AMLD application date and AMLA direct supervision phase-in - UK ECCTA 2023 failure-to-prevent-fraud offence in force - Implementation Act on the Prevention of Money Laundering and Terrorist Financing (Iwt) - Implementatiewet ter voorkoming van witwassen en terrorismefinanciering (Iwt) — AMLD6 transposition, Wwft repeal - AMLD6 transposition bill (Iwt) targeting Wwft repeal - AMLR direct effect in Netherlands - UBO-register legitimate-interest access decree - FATF 5th-round mutual evaluation of the Netherlands - AML Regulation (AMLR, Reg (EU) 2024/1624) becomes directly applicable - MiCA transitional window for Dutch CASPs closes - AMLA direct/indirect supervisory perimeter selection affecting Dutch entities ### Active schemes - [HIGH] Netherlands as physical infrastructure host for Russian/DPRK-linked crypto laundering - Netherlands as domicile hub for global commodity-trading corporate structures - Dutch BV conduit/mailbox companies with no real presence - Trust offices and corporate lawyers as under-supervised gatekeepers Sources - [The Netherlands](https://www.fatf-gafi.org/media/fatf/documents/reports/mer4/Mutual-Evaluation-Report-Netherlands-2022.pdf) - [De Nederlandsche Bank](https://www.dnb.nl/en/general-news/enforcement-measures-2026/fine-for-abn-amro-bank-n-v-for-inadequate-customer-due-diligence-for-high-risk-customers/) - [Taylor Wessing](https://www.taylorwessing.com/en/insights-and-events/insights/2025/12/the-cash-paradox-the-dutch-aml-reforms-as-of-1-january-2026) - [Osborne Clarke](https://www.osborneclarke.com/insights/key-implications-anti-money-laundering-regulation-amlr-financial-institutions-aml-policies) - [Government of Sweden](https://www.government.se/press-releases/2026/04/eu-adopts-20th-sanctions-package-against-russia/) - [AGB / National Bank of Cambodia](https://agbrief.com/news/cambodia/26/01/2026/cambodia-battles-to-avoid-third-fatf-grey-list-placement-amid-scam-crackdown/) - [Wikipedia (sourced to US Treasury/UNODC)](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Golden_Triangle_Special_Economic_Zone) - [FinCEN](https://www.fincen.gov/news/news-releases/fincen-combats-financial-support-sinaloa-cartel-finding-transactions-involving) - [CryptoTimes](https://www.cryptotimes.io/2026/06/29/micas-july-1-deadline-what-it-means-for-your-crypto-in-europe/) - [Stout](https://www.stout.com/en/insights/article/modernizing-aml-transaction-monitoring-model-risk-management) - [UK Home Office / GOV.UK](https://www.gov.uk/government/publications/offence-of-failure-to-prevent-fraud-introduced-by-eccta) - [https://www.government.nl/themes/economy/financial-sector/combating-money-laundering-and-terrorist-financing](https://www.government.nl/themes/economy/financial-sector/combating-money-laundering-and-terrorist-financing) - [https://www.fatf-gafi.org/en/countries/detail/netherlands.html](https://www.fatf-gafi.org/en/countries/detail/netherlands.html) - [https://www.fatf-gafi.org/en/publications/Mutualevaluations/Mer-netherlands-2022.html](https://www.fatf-gafi.org/en/publications/Mutualevaluations/Mer-netherlands-2022.html) - [https://www.dnb.nl/en/sector-news/supervision-2025/instant-payments-regulation-new-obligations/](https://www.dnb.nl/en/sector-news/supervision-2025/instant-payments-regulation-new-obligations/) - [https://www.fluxforce.ai/jurisdictions/netherlands](https://www.fluxforce.ai/jurisdictions/netherlands) - [https://www.dnb.nl/en/sector-information/open-book-supervision/laws-and-eu-regulations/anti-money-laundering-and-anti-terrorist-financing-act/introduction-wwft/](https://www.dnb.nl/en/sector-information/open-book-supervision/laws-and-eu-regulations/anti-money-laundering-and-anti-terrorist-financing-act/introduction-wwft/) - [https://www.dnb.nl/en/sector-information/open-book-supervision/open-book-supervision-themes/supervision-of-financial-crime-prevention-integrity-supervision/](https://www.dnb.nl/en/sector-information/open-book-supervision/open-book-supervision-themes/supervision-of-financial-crime-prevention-integrity-supervision/) - [https://www.taylorwessing.com/en/insights-and-events/insights/2025/12/the-cash-paradox-the-dutch-aml-reforms-as-of-1-january-2026](https://www.taylorwessing.com/en/insights-and-events/insights/2025/12/the-cash-paradox-the-dutch-aml-reforms-as-of-1-january-2026) - [https://www.deloitte.com/nl/en/services/consulting-financial/perspectives/amla-and-amlr-a-blessing-or-curse-for-dutch-financial-institutions.html](https://www.deloitte.com/nl/en/services/consulting-financial/perspectives/amla-and-amlr-a-blessing-or-curse-for-dutch-financial-institutions.html) - [https://acginter.com/en/new-european-anti-money-laundering-rules-will-have-major-impact-in-the-netherlands/](https://acginter.com/en/new-european-anti-money-laundering-rules-will-have-major-impact-in-the-netherlands/) - [https://financialregulations.eu/jurisdictions/netherlands](https://financialregulations.eu/jurisdictions/netherlands) - [https://www.cryptacount.com/en/news/afm-dnb-caribbean-netherlands-aml-rules-consultation-2026/](https://www.cryptacount.com/en/news/afm-dnb-caribbean-netherlands-aml-rules-consultation-2026/) - [https://www.fatf-gafi.org/en/publications/Mutualevaluations/Netherlands-FUR-2025.html](https://www.fatf-gafi.org/en/publications/Mutualevaluations/Netherlands-FUR-2025.html) - [https://home.treasury.gov/news/press-releases/sb0113](https://home.treasury.gov/news/press-releases/sb0113) - [https://home.treasury.gov/news/press-releases/sb0243](https://home.treasury.gov/news/press-releases/sb0243) - [https://uk.practicallaw.thomsonreuters.com/w-039-9590](https://uk.practicallaw.thomsonreuters.com/w-039-9590) - [https://app.croneri.co.uk/topics/failure-prevent-fraud/indepth?topic=3604](https://app.croneri.co.uk/topics/failure-prevent-fraud/indepth?topic=3604) - [https://www.dnb.nl/en/sector-information/open-book-supervision/laws-and-eu-regulations/european-amlcft-framework/](https://www.dnb.nl/en/sector-information/open-book-supervision/laws-and-eu-regulations/european-amlcft-framework/) - [https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Anti-Money_Laundering_Authority](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Anti-Money_Laundering_Authority) - [https://cascade.lu/resources/netherlands-amlr-compliance/](https://cascade.lu/resources/netherlands-amlr-compliance/) - [https://www.regulationtomorrow.com/the-netherlands/draft-act-implementing-6amld-published-for-consultation/](https://www.regulationtomorrow.com/the-netherlands/draft-act-implementing-6amld-published-for-consultation/) - [https://obsidianri.com/blog/newsroom-nl-20260817-council-state-aml-implementation-bill](https://obsidianri.com/blog/newsroom-nl-20260817-council-state-aml-implementation-bill) - [https://www.afm.nl/en/sector/themas/voorkomen-witwassen-terrorismefinanciering-naleving-sanctiewet/nieuwe-europese-wetgeving](https://www.afm.nl/en/sector/themas/voorkomen-witwassen-terrorismefinanciering-naleving-sanctiewet/nieuwe-europese-wetgeving) - [https://eucrim.eu/news/new-anti-money-laundering-directive-amld-6/](https://eucrim.eu/news/new-anti-money-laundering-directive-amld-6/) - [https://fintech.global/2026/09/01/mollie-completes-gocardless-acquisition-to-expand-payments-offering/](https://fintech.global/2026/09/01/mollie-completes-gocardless-acquisition-to-expand-payments-offering/) - [https://www.fintechfutures.com/m-a/adyen-to-acquire-orb-for-335m](https://www.fintechfutures.com/m-a/adyen-to-acquire-orb-for-335m) - [https://nldaily.com/tech/adyen-netherlands-fintech-payments/](https://nldaily.com/tech/adyen-netherlands-fintech-payments/) - [https://www.dnb.nl/en/general-news/enforcement-measures-2026/administrative-fine-imposed-on-modulr-finance-b-v-for-inadequate-customer-due-diligence/](https://www.dnb.nl/en/general-news/enforcement-measures-2026/administrative-fine-imposed-on-modulr-finance-b-v-for-inadequate-customer-due-diligence/) - [https://complyadvantage.com/insights/fatf-plenary-june-2026-outcomes/](https://complyadvantage.com/insights/fatf-plenary-june-2026-outcomes/) - [https://www.afm.nl/en/sector/actueel/2026/okt/sb-tokenisatie](https://www.afm.nl/en/sector/actueel/2026/okt/sb-tokenisatie) - [https://www.njb.nl/wetgeving/staatsbladen/aanscherping-wwft-voor-cryptoactivadiensten/](https://www.njb.nl/wetgeving/staatsbladen/aanscherping-wwft-voor-cryptoactivadiensten/) - [https://ondernemersplein.overheid.nl/klanten-controleren-op-sancties-sanctiewet/](https://ondernemersplein.overheid.nl/klanten-controleren-op-sancties-sanctiewet/) - [https://www.dnb.nl/voor-de-sector/open-boek-toezicht/wet-regelgeving/sanctiewet-1977-sw/verantwoordelijkheidsverdeling-bij-de-uitvoering-van-sanctieregelgeving/](https://www.dnb.nl/voor-de-sector/open-boek-toezicht/wet-regelgeving/sanctiewet-1977-sw/verantwoordelijkheidsverdeling-bij-de-uitvoering-van-sanctieregelgeving/) - [https://newtone.nl/inzichten/welke-informatie-moet-je-opgeven-in-het-ubo-register/](https://newtone.nl/inzichten/welke-informatie-moet-je-opgeven-in-het-ubo-register/) - [https://www.mr-online.nl/het-ubo-register-en-de-terugmeldplicht/](https://www.mr-online.nl/het-ubo-register-en-de-terugmeldplicht/) - [https://www.viajuridica.nl/informatiesoorten/wetstoelichtingen/pep-onderzoek-art-8-lid-6-wwft](https://www.viajuridica.nl/informatiesoorten/wetstoelichtingen/pep-onderzoek-art-8-lid-6-wwft) - [https://wetten.overheid.nl/BWBR0041583/2025-03-01/0](https://wetten.overheid.nl/BWBR0041583/2025-03-01/0) - [https://www.afm.nl/en/sector/themas/voorkomen-witwassen-terrorismefinanciering-naleving-sanctiewet/andere-toezichthouders](https://www.afm.nl/en/sector/themas/voorkomen-witwassen-terrorismefinanciering-naleving-sanctiewet/andere-toezichthouders) - [https://eumica.com/mica-license-by-country/netherlands](https://eumica.com/mica-license-by-country/netherlands) - [https://zoek.officielebekendmakingen.nl/stb-2024-415.html](https://zoek.officielebekendmakingen.nl/stb-2024-415.html) - [https://gencompl.ai/regulations/wwft](https://gencompl.ai/regulations/wwft) - [https://governancedocs.com/crypto-travel-rule/](https://governancedocs.com/crypto-travel-rule/) - [https://www.afm.nl/en/sector/themas/voorkomen-witwassen-terrorismefinanciering-naleving-sanctiewet/transfer-of-funds-regulation](https://www.afm.nl/en/sector/themas/voorkomen-witwassen-terrorismefinanciering-naleving-sanctiewet/transfer-of-funds-regulation) - [https://www.raadvanstate.nl/adviezen/@158150/w06-26-00123-iii/](https://www.raadvanstate.nl/adviezen/@158150/w06-26-00123-iii/) - [https://www.advocatenorde.nl/voor-advocaten/wwft-en-sanctieregelgeving/europees-aml-pakket](https://www.advocatenorde.nl/voor-advocaten/wwft-en-sanctieregelgeving/europees-aml-pakket) - [https://www.taxence.nl/nieuws/wijzigingsbesluit-toegang-ubo-registers-voor-bestuursorganen-en-rechtspersonen-met-een-overheidstaak/](https://www.taxence.nl/nieuws/wijzigingsbesluit-toegang-ubo-registers-voor-bestuursorganen-en-rechtspersonen-met-een-overheidstaak/) - [https://www.taxence.nl/nieuws/wijzigingsbesluit-toegang-ubo-registers-voor-natuurlijke-personen-en-rechtspersonen-met-legitiem-belang/](https://www.taxence.nl/nieuws/wijzigingsbesluit-toegang-ubo-registers-voor-natuurlijke-personen-en-rechtspersonen-met-legitiem-belang/) - [https://www.banken.nl/nieuws/27254/dnb-beboet-abn-amro-met-85-miljoen-voor-gebrekkige-witwascontroles](https://www.banken.nl/nieuws/27254/dnb-beboet-abn-amro-met-85-miljoen-voor-gebrekkige-witwascontroles) - [https://www.dnb.nl/algemeen-nieuws/handhavingsmaatregel-2025/boetes-van-in-totaal-20-miljoen-euro-voor-de-volksbank/](https://www.dnb.nl/algemeen-nieuws/handhavingsmaatregel-2025/boetes-van-in-totaal-20-miljoen-euro-voor-de-volksbank/) - [https://www.dnb.nl/algemeen-nieuws/handhavingsmaatregel-2026/boete-aan-ccv-wegens-tekortkomingen-clientenonderzoek/](https://www.dnb.nl/algemeen-nieuws/handhavingsmaatregel-2026/boete-aan-ccv-wegens-tekortkomingen-clientenonderzoek/) - [https://governance-web.nl/nieuws/dnb-beboet-bunq-met-e26-miljoen-wegens-tekortkomingen-in-anti-witwascontroles/](https://governance-web.nl/nieuws/dnb-beboet-bunq-met-e26-miljoen-wegens-tekortkomingen-in-anti-witwascontroles/) - [https://zoek.officielebekendmakingen.nl/stb-2024-414](https://zoek.officielebekendmakingen.nl/stb-2024-414) - [https://www.dnb.nl/media/v4bd2ru0/besluit-tot-het-opleggen-van-een-bestuurlijke-boete-aan-coinbase.pdf](https://www.dnb.nl/media/v4bd2ru0/besluit-tot-het-opleggen-van-een-bestuurlijke-boete-aan-coinbase.pdf) - [https://www.wetbeschermingklokkenluiders.nl/home/de-wet-op-hoofdlijnen](https://www.wetbeschermingklokkenluiders.nl/home/de-wet-op-hoofdlijnen) - [https://www.fiu-nederland.nl/jaaroverzicht-2025-criminele-geldstromen-worden-slimmer-en-breder-ingezet/](https://www.fiu-nederland.nl/jaaroverzicht-2025-criminele-geldstromen-worden-slimmer-en-breder-ingezet/) - [https://www.dnb.nl/nieuws-voor-de-sector/toezicht-2026/dnb-publiceert-toezicht-in-beeld-2025-2026/](https://www.dnb.nl/nieuws-voor-de-sector/toezicht-2026/dnb-publiceert-toezicht-in-beeld-2025-2026/) - [https://www.fatf-gafi.org/en/calendars/assessments.html](https://www.fatf-gafi.org/en/calendars/assessments.html) - [Autoriteit Financiële Markten (AFM)](http://www.digitaal.loket.afm.nl/nl-NL/Diensten/Effectenuitgevende-ondernemingen/Pages/melding-mar19-transacties-leidinggevenden.aspx) - [Autoriteit Financiële Markten (AFM)](https://www.afm.nl/en/sector/effectenuitgevende-ondernemingen/meldingen/bestuurders-en-commissarissen) - [The Netherlands' progress in strengthening measures to tackle money laundering and terrorist financing](https://www.fatf-gafi.org/en/publications/Mutualevaluations/Netherlands-FUR-2025.html) - [Mutual Evaluation Report of the Netherlands](https://www.fatf-gafi.org/en/publications/mutualevaluations/documents/mutualevaluationreportofthenetherlands.html) - [Assessments](https://www.fatf-gafi.org/en/calendars/assessments.html) - [Netherlands](https://www.fatf-gafi.org/en/countries/detail/netherlands.html) - [Mutual Evaluations](https://www.fatf-gafi.org/en/publications/Mutualevaluations.html) - [The Netherlands' measures to combat money laundering and terrorist financing](https://www.fatf-gafi.org/en/publications/Mutualevaluations/Mer-netherlands-2022.html) - [Consolidated assessment ratings](https://www.fatf-gafi.org/en/publications/Mutualevaluations/Assessment-ratings.html) - [Mutual Evaluation of the Netherlands – Executive Summary](https://www.fatf-gafi.org/content/dam/fatf-gafi/mer/MER%20Netherlands%20ES.pdf.coredownload.pdf) - [The FATF Recommendations](https://www.fatf-gafi.org/en/publications/Fatfrecommendations/Fatf-recommendations.html) - [Frequently Asked Questions](https://www.fatf-gafi.org/en/pages/frequently-asked-questions.html) - [Anti-Money Laundering Policy - Reforms and Investments](https://reforms-investments.ec.europa.eu/projects/anti-money-laundering-policy_en) - [Global Crypto Policy Review Outlook 2025/26 Report | TRM Labs](https://www.trmlabs.com/reports-and-whitepapers/global-crypto-policy-review-outlook-2025-26) - [THE NETHERLANDS](https://www.fatf-gafi.org/content/dam/fatf-gafi/mer/MER%20Netherlands%20full.pdf) - [United States Department of the Treasury Financial Crimes Enforcement Network - Home | FinCEN.gov](https://www.fincen.gov/) - [Netherlands - Reforms and Investments - European Commission](https://reforms-investments.ec.europa.eu/technical-support-instrument-0/our-projects/tsi-country-factsheets/netherlands_en) - [Netherlands - Reform Support - European Commission](https://reform-support.ec.europa.eu/our-projects/country-factsheets/netherlands_en) - ["Black and grey" lists](https://www.fatf-gafi.org/en/countries/black-and-grey-lists.html) - [US Treasury Takes Coordinated Actions Against Illicit Russian Virtual Currency Exchanges and Cybercrime Facilitators PM2BTC and Cryptex | TRM Labs](https://www.trmlabs.com/resources/blog/us-treasury-takes-coordinated-actions-against-illicit-russian-virtual-currency-exchanges-and-cybercrime-facilitators-pmbtc-and-cryptex) - [OFAC Sanctions Tracker: How Sanctions Impact Crypto Crime - Chainalysis](https://www.chainalysis.com/blog/ofac-sanctions/) - [Netherlands](https://www.fatf-gafi.org/content/dam/fatf-gafi/fur/Netherlands-Follow-Up-Report-2025.pdf.coredownload.inline.pdf) - [OFAC Designates Russian Exchange Cryptex, FinCEN names PM2BTC - Chainalysis](https://www.chainalysis.com/blog/ofac-sanctions-russian-exchange-cryptex-uaps-fraud-shop-2024/) - [The Netherlands' progress in strengthening measures to tackle money laundering and terrorist financing](https://www.fatf-gafi.org/content/fatf-gafi/en/publications/Mutualevaluations/Netherlands-FUR-2025.html) - [EU sanctions against Russia: questions and answers - Consilium](https://www.consilium.europa.eu/en/policies/sanctions-against-russia-explained/) - [FATF Report highlights major gaps in global response to Proliferation Financing and Sanctions Evasion](https://www.fatf-gafi.org/en/publications/Financingofproliferation/complex-proliferation-financing-sanction-evasion-schemes.html) - [EU sanctions whistleblower tool - Finance - European Commission](https://finance.ec.europa.eu/eu-and-world/sanctions-restrictive-measures/overview-sanctions-and-related-resources/eu-sanctions-whistleblower-tool_en) - [RUSSIA-RELATED ILLICIT FINANCE AND SANCTIONS FIU WORKING GROUP STATEMENT OF INTENT | FinCEN.gov](https://www.fincen.gov/news/news-releases/russia-related-illicit-finance-and-sanctions-fiu-working-group-statement-intent) - [Enforcement Release - Office of Foreign Assets Control](https://ofac.treasury.gov/media/934806/download?inline=) - [The TOP Takeover: Tornado Cash’s Latest Chapter | TRM Labs](https://www.trmlabs.com/resources/blog/the-top-takeover-tornado-cashs-latest-chapter) - [(TORN) Dutch Arrest Man Suspected of Being Involved in Tornado Cash - Bloomberg](https://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2022-08-12/dutch-arrest-man-suspected-of-being-involved-in-tornado-cash) - [Tornado Cash Co-Founder Found Guilty But Avoids Worst Counts - Bloomberg](https://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2025-08-06/tornado-cash-co-founder-storm-guilty-in-crypto-laundering-case) - [1 (BILLINGCODE: 4810-02-P) DEPARTMENT OF THE TREASURY](https://www.fincen.gov/system/files/federal_register_notices/2023-10-19/FinCEN_311MixingNPRM_FINAL.pdf) - [Understanding Tornado Cash, Its Sanctions Implications, and Key Compliance Questions - Chainalysis](https://www.chainalysis.com/blog/tornado-cash-sanctions-challenges/) - [Dutch Authorities Make Arrests in Crypto Money Laundering Probes | OCCRP](https://www.occrp.org/en/news/dutch-authorities-make-arrests-in-crypto-money-laundering-probes) - [Tornado Cash Token Tumbles After Developer Arrest](https://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2022-08-12/tornado-cash-cryptocurrency-torn-tumbles-after-developer-arrest) - [OFAC sanctions Tornado Cash developer Roman Semenov](https://www.elliptic.co/blog/ofac-sanctions-tornado-cash-developer-roman-semenov) - [OFAC Sanctions Tornado Cash Founder Roman Semenov](https://www.chainalysis.com/blog/ofac-sanctions-roman-semenov-tornado-cash/) - [Tornado Cash Co-Founders Charged for Money Laundering | OCCRP](https://www.occrp.org/en/news/tornado-cash-co-founders-charged-for-money-laundering) - [FAQ: The EU Ruling on Ownership Transparency and What It Means for Journalists | OCCRP](https://www.occrp.org/en/project/beneficial-ownership-data-is-critical-in-the-fight-against-corruption/faq-the-eu-ruling-on-ownership-transparency-and-what-it-means-for-journalists) - [Frequently Asked Questions | FinCEN.gov](https://www.fincen.gov/boi-faqs) - [European e-Justice Portal - Beneficial Ownership Registers – search for beneficial ownership information](https://webgate.ec.europa.eu/e-justice/38576/EN/beneficial_ownership_registers__search_for_beneficial_ownership_information) - [Treasury Department won’t enforce beneficial ownership rule under the Corporate Transparency Act - ICIJ](https://www.icij.org/inside-icij/2025/03/treasury-department-wont-enforce-beneficial-ownership-rule-under-the-corporate-transparency-act/) - [Guidance on Beneficial Ownership of Legal Persons](https://www.fatf-gafi.org/en/publications/Fatfrecommendations/Guidance-Beneficial-Ownership-Legal-Persons.html) - [Beneficial Ownership Information Reporting | FinCEN.gov](https://www.fincen.gov/boi) - [Beneficial Ownership Data is Critical in the Fight Against Corruption | OCCRP](https://www.occrp.org/en/project/beneficial-ownership-data-is-critical-in-the-fight-against-corruption) - [Beneficial Ownership Information Reporting Rule Fact Sheet | FinCEN.gov](https://www.fincen.gov/beneficial-ownership-information-reporting-rule-fact-sheet) - [Fact Sheet: Beneficial Ownership Information Access and Safeguards Final Rule | FinCEN.gov](https://www.fincen.gov/news/news-releases/fact-sheet-beneficial-ownership-information-access-and-safeguards-final-rule) - [FinCEN Removes Beneficial Ownership Reporting Requirements for U.S. Companies and U.S. Persons, Sets New Deadlines for Foreign Companies | FinCEN.gov](https://www.fincen.gov/news/news-releases/fincen-removes-beneficial-ownership-reporting-requirements-us-companies-and-us) - [Largest Norwegian Bank Faces Fine For Anti-Money Laundering Failures | OCCRP](https://www.occrp.org/en/news/largest-norwegian-bank-faces-fine-for-anti-money-laundering-failures) - [Global Crypto Policy Review Outlook 2025/26 Report | TRM Labs](https://www.trmlabs.com/reports-and-whitepapers/global-crypto-policy-review-outlook-2025-26?scLang=en) - [FATF publishes new Guidance on Financial Inclusion and Anti-Money Laundering and Terrorist Financing Measures](https://www.fatf-gafi.org/en/publications/Financialinclusionandnpoissues/guidance-financial-inclusion-aml-tf-measures.html) - [ABN Amro in Dutch Central Bank Crosshairs Over Pay Restrictions - Bloomberg](https://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2025-03-14/abn-amro-in-dutch-central-bank-crosshairs-over-pay-restrictions) - [Executive Summary Key Findings](https://www.fatf-gafi.org/content/dam/fatf-gafi/mer/Executive-Summary-Mutual-Evaluation-Report-Netherlands-2022.pdf) - [De Nederlandsche Bank (DNB) | EU Digital Finance Platform](https://digital-finance-platform.ec.europa.eu/cross-border-services/cross-border-testing/participants/de-nederlandsche-bank-dnb) - [Fatf-gafi](https://fatf-gafi.org/media/fatf/documents/reports/mer4/Executive-Summary-Mutual-Evaluation-Report-Netherlands-2022.pdf) - [Mutual Evaluation of the Netherlands: 2nd Follow-up Report](https://www.fatf-gafi.org/en/publications/mutualevaluations/documents/fur-netherlands-2014.html) - [Anti-money laundering and countering the financing of terrorism at EU level - Finance](https://finance.ec.europa.eu/financial-crime/anti-money-laundering-and-countering-financing-terrorism-eu-level_en) - [Anti-money laundering and countering the financing of terrorism legislative package - Finance](https://finance.ec.europa.eu/publications/anti-money-laundering-and-countering-financing-terrorism-legislative-package_en) - [FINANCIAL ACTION TASK FORCE Mutual Evaluation Report](https://www.fatf-gafi.org/media/fatf/documents/reports/mer/MER%20Netherlands%20full.pdf) - [Anti-money laundering directive V (AMLD V) - transposition status | Europese Commissie](https://ec.europa.eu/info/publications/anti-money-laundering-directive-5-transposition-status_nl) - [Anti-money laundering: Council adopts package of rules - Consilium](https://www.consilium.europa.eu/en/press/press-releases/2024/05/30/anti-money-laundering-council-adopts-package-of-rules/) - [Mutual Evaluation Report of the Netherlands](https://www.fatf-gafi.org/en/countries/n-r/netherlandskingdomof/documents/mutualevaluationreportofthenetherlands.html) - [Russia's war of aggression against Ukraine: Council sanctions 41 vessels of the Russian shadow fleet - Consilium](https://www.consilium.europa.eu/en/press/press-releases/2025/12/18/russia-s-war-of-aggression-against-ukraine-council-sanctions-41-vessels-of-the-russian-shadow-fleet/) - [Timeline - EU sanctions against Russia - Consilium](https://www.consilium.europa.eu/en/policies/sanctions-against-russia/timeline-sanctions-against-russia/) - [Daily News 18 / 12 / 2025](https://finance.ec.europa.eu/news/sanctions-member-states-designate-41-additional-vessels-russias-shadow-fleet-2025-12-18_en) - [Council sanctions 41 vessels of the Russian shadow fleet](https://www.consilium.europa.eu/en/press/press-releases/2025/12/18/russia-s-war-of-aggression-against-ukraine-council-sanctions-41-vessels-of-the-russian-shadow-fleet/pdf/) - [EU adopts 19th package of sanctions against Russia - Finance](https://finance.ec.europa.eu/news/eu-adopts-19th-package-sanctions-against-russia-2025-10-23_en) - [Russia's war of aggression against Ukraine: Council sanctions 9 shadow fleet enablers - Consilium](https://www.consilium.europa.eu/en/press/press-releases/2025/12/15/russia-s-war-of-aggression-against-ukraine-council-sanctions-9-shadow-fleet-enablers/) - [Russia’s war of aggression against Ukraine: EU agrees 17th package of sanctions - Consilium](https://www.consilium.europa.eu/en/press/press-releases/2025/05/20/russia-s-war-of-aggression-against-ukraine-eu-agrees-17th-package-of-sanctions/) - [EU adopts 20th package of sanctions against Russia - Finance](https://finance.ec.europa.eu/news/eu-adopts-20th-package-sanctions-against-russia-2026-04-23_en) - [19th package of sanctions against Russia: EU targets Russian energy, third-country banks and crypto providers - Consilium](https://www.consilium.europa.eu/en/press/press-releases/2025/10/23/19th-package-of-sanctions-against-russia-eu-targets-russian-energy-third-country-banks-and-crypto-providers/) - [ABN Amro Adds to Wave of European Money Laundering Scandals - Bloomberg](https://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2019-09-26/abn-amro-faces-criminal-probe-under-anti-money-laundering-law) - [ABN Amro Sees Quarterly Loss After $574 Million Settlement - Bloomberg](https://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2021-04-19/abn-amro-agrees-to-pay-574-million-to-settle-dutch-probe) - [Joint News Release: Assessment of civil money penalty in the matter of ABN AMRO Bank, N.V. | FinCEN.gov](https://www.fincen.gov/news/news-releases/joint-news-release-assessment-civil-money-penalty-matter-abn-amro-bank-nv) - [Danske Bank CEO Quits Amid Dutch Probe of Laundering Allegations - Bloomberg](https://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2021-04-19/danske-ceo-quits-amid-dutch-probe-into-laundering-allegations) - [In Fight Against Dirty Money, Dutch Banks Team Up on Algorithms - Bloomberg](https://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2019-09-13/dutch-banks-explore-ways-to-jointly-monitor-dirty-money-flows) - [ABN AMRO BANK N.V. overview - Find and update company information - GOV.UK](https://find-and-update.company-information.service.gov.uk/company/FC029630) - [ABN Amro Fined by Dutch Central Bank for Bonus Ban Violation - Bloomberg](https://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2025-06-19/abn-amro-fined-by-dutch-central-bank-for-bonus-ban-violation) - [The EU’s New Action Plan to Fight Money Laundering | OCCRP](https://www.occrp.org/en/news/the-eus-new-action-plan-to-fight-money-laundering) - [Jail Sentence For Trafigura Powerbroker Shows Bribery Crackdown - Bloomberg](https://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2025-02-01/trafigura-powerbroker-s-jail-sentence-is-a-watershed-for-traders) - [Trafigura Appeals Swiss Conviction Over Bribery Controls - Bloomberg](https://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2025-12-10/trafigura-appeals-swiss-conviction-over-bribery-controls) - [Trafigura Agrees to Pay $76 Million in Brazil Bribery Cases - Bloomberg](https://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2025-03-31/trafigura-agrees-to-pay-brazil-49-million-over-bribery-scandal) - [Trafigura and Ex-COO Convicted of Bribery by Swiss Court - Bloomberg](https://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2025-01-31/trafigura-and-ex-coo-convicted-of-bribery-by-swiss-court) - [Trafigura Bribery Case: The Once Powerful Executive Now Facing Charges - Bloomberg](https://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2023-12-07/trafigura-bribery-case-the-once-powerful-executive-now-facing-charges) - [Trafigura Beheer BV, Amsterdam, Branch | ICIJ Offshore Leaks Database](https://offshoreleaks.icij.org/nodes/80136817) - [Swiss Prosecutor Who Busted Trafigura Wants US-Style Powers - Bloomberg](https://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2025-04-03/swiss-attorney-general-who-busted-trafigura-wants-us-style-prosecution-powers) - [Trafigura Charged in Switzerland Over Alleged Angola Bribery - Bloomberg](https://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2023-12-06/trafigura-charged-in-switzerland-over-alleged-angola-bribery) - [Trafigura Defends Its Controls During Time It Was Paying Bribes](https://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2024-12-05/trafigura-defends-its-controls-during-time-it-was-paying-bribes) - [Trafigura’s Bribery Case Puts Commodity Trading Culture on Trial in Switzerland](https://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2024-12-02/trafigura-mike-wainwright-bribery-trial-begins-in-switzerland) - [Sanctions: Iranians Flock to Crypto; Int'l Actions Target Russia - Chainalysis](https://www.chainalysis.com/blog/crypto-crime-sanctions-2025/) - [What is a crypto mixer?](https://www.elliptic.co/blockchain-basics/what-is-a-crypto-mixer) - [U.S. Treasury Sanctions Widely Used Crypto Mixer Tornado Cash | TRM Labs](https://www.trmlabs.com/resources/blog/u-s-treasury-sanctions-widely-used-crypto-mixer-tornado-cash) - [Tornado Cash Founders Storm, Semenov Charged by US in Money Laundering Scheme](https://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2023-08-23/tornado-cash-founders-charged-by-us-in-money-laundering-scheme) - [Jurisdictions under Increased Monitoring - 19 June 2026](https://www.fatf-gafi.org/en/publications/High-risk-and-other-monitored-jurisdictions/increased-monitoring-june-2026.html) - [Jurisdictions under Increased Monitoring - 13 February 2026](https://www.fatf-gafi.org/en/publications/High-risk-and-other-monitored-jurisdictions/increased-monitoring-february-2026.html) - [High-risk and other monitored jurisdictions](https://www.fatf-gafi.org/en/publications/High-risk-and-other-monitored-jurisdictions.html) - [High-Risk Jurisdictions subject to a Call for Action - 13 February 2026](https://www.fatf-gafi.org/en/publications/High-risk-and-other-monitored-jurisdictions/Call-for-action-february-2026.html) - [Countries / Jurisdictions](https://www.fatf-gafi.org/en/countries.html) - [High-Risk Jurisdictions subject to a Call for Action - 19 June 2026](https://www.fatf-gafi.org/en/publications/High-risk-and-other-monitored-jurisdictions/call-for-action-june-2026.html) - [FATF changes its grey listing criteria to further focus on risk](https://www.fatf-gafi.org/en/publications/Fatfgeneral/FATF-grey-listing-criteria.html) - [Jurisdictions under Increased Monitoring - 24 October 2025](https://www.fatf-gafi.org/en/publications/High-risk-and-other-monitored-jurisdictions/increased-monitoring-october-2025.html) - [FIOD (Netherlands) | OCCRP](https://www.occrp.org/en/organizations/fiod/page/1) - [Police Arrest 90 Alleged Mafia Members in Europe and Latin America | OCCRP](https://www.occrp.org/en/daily/9007-police-arrest-90-alleged-mafia-members-in-europe-and-latin-america) - [Asset Seizure and Cryptocurrency - Chainalysis](https://www.chainalysis.com/blog/cryptocurrency-asset-seizure/) - [Crypto Mixers and AML Compliance - Chainalysis](https://www.chainalysis.com/blog/crypto-mixers/) - [Vertegenwoordiging van de Europese Commissie in Nederland - European Commission](https://ec.europa.eu/netherlands/news/inbreukprocedures-februari-luchtkwaliteit-en-witwassen_nl) - [Fight against money laundering and terrorist financing - Consilium](https://www.consilium.europa.eu/en/policies/fight-against-terrorist-financing/) - [Tijdlijn: EU-optreden ter bestrijding van witwassen van ...](https://www.consilium.europa.eu/en/policies/fight-against-terrorist-financing/timeline/) - [Anti-money laundering: Council and Parliament strike deal on stricter rules - Consilium](https://www.consilium.europa.eu/en/press/press-releases/2024/01/18/anti-money-laundering-council-and-parliament-strike-deal-on-stricter-rules/) - [Netherlands and the euro - Economy and Finance - European Commission](https://economy-finance.ec.europa.eu/euro/eu-countries-and-euro/netherlands-and-euro_en) - [Lower House of the Dutch Parliament 2 Meeting year 2025–2026 36 849](https://technical-regulation-information-system.ec.europa.eu/en/notification/27688/text/I/EN) - [Infographic - What is money laundering](https://www.consilium.europa.eu/en/infographics/anti-money-laundering/) - [Commission fines Rabobank €26.6 million over Euro-denominated bonds trading cartel](https://ec.europa.eu/commission/presscorner/detail/en/ip_23_5960) - [Money laundering & terrorism financing – action plan](https://ec.europa.eu/info/law/better-regulation/have-your-say/initiatives/12176-Action-Plan-on-anti-money-laundering/feedback?p_id=6371156) - [Dutch Fintech Bunq Reapplies to Become a Bank in the US - Bloomberg](https://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2026-01-07/dutch-fintech-bunq-reapplies-to-become-a-bank-in-the-us) - [The Netherlands' measures to combat money laundering and terrorist financing](https://www.fatf-gafi.org/en/publications/mutualevaluations/documents/mer-netherlands-2022.html) - [Rabobank Fined by EU for Euro Bond-Trading Cartel - Bloomberg](https://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2023-11-22/rabobank-fined-26-6-million-by-eu-for-euro-bond-trading-cartel) - [Antitrust: Commission sends Statement of Objections to Deutsche Bank and Rabobank over Euro-denominated bonds trading cartel case](https://ec.europa.eu/commission/presscorner/detail/en/ip_22_7409) - [The Netherlands](https://www.fatf-gafi.org/media/fatf/documents/reports/mer4/Mutual-Evaluation-Report-Netherlands-2022.pdf) - [FATF (multilateral first-party mutual evaluation of the Netherlands)](https://www.fatf-gafi.org/content/dam/fatf-gafi/mer/MER%20Netherlands%20full.pdf) - [FATF](https://www.fatf-gafi.org/en/publications/Mutualevaluations/Netherlands-FUR-2025.html) - [FATF](https://www.fatf-gafi.org/en/publications/High-risk-and-other-monitored-jurisdictions/increased-monitoring-june-2026.html) - [Council of the European Union](https://www.consilium.europa.eu/en/press/press-releases/2025/10/23/19th-package-of-sanctions-against-russia-eu-targets-russian-energy-third-country-banks-and-crypto-providers/) - [European Commission](https://finance.ec.europa.eu/news/eu-adopts-20th-package-sanctions-against-russia-2026-04-23_en) - [TRM Labs](https://www.trmlabs.com/reports-and-whitepapers/global-crypto-policy-review-outlook-2025-26) - [Chainalysis](https://www.chainalysis.com/blog/ofac-sanctions-russian-exchange-cryptex-uaps-fraud-shop-2024/) - [Bloomberg](https://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2025-01-31/trafigura-and-ex-coo-convicted-of-bribery-by-swiss-court) - [ICIJ Offshore Leaks Database](https://offshoreleaks.icij.org/nodes/80136817) - [OCCRP](https://www.occrp.org/en/news/dutch-authorities-make-arrests-in-crypto-money-laundering-probes) Coverage gaps fim-int-2026-07-07-G001: The WODC National Risk Assessment 2… fim-int-2026-07-07-G001: The WODC National Risk Assessment 2023 could not be verbatim-cited this cycle; challenger evidence suggests alternate accessible repository paths exist and should be re-pulled at the next cycle. [resolved] fim-int-2026-07-07-G002: The specific FATF Recommendation re… fim-int-2026-07-07-G002: The specific FATF Recommendation remaining Partially Compliant in the Netherlands' September 2025 follow-up report is not identified in Research and would clarify the residual BO/DNFBP risk surface. [resolved] fim-int-2026-07-07-G003: Whether successor hosting infrastru… fim-int-2026-07-07-G003: Whether successor hosting infrastructure has emerged following the September 2024 Cryptex/PM2BTC disruption is not established this cycle. [resolved] fim-int-2026-07-07-G004: The Netherlands' 6AMLD transpositio… fim-int-2026-07-07-G004: The Netherlands' 6AMLD transposition status, vehicle, and deadline are not established in Research this cycle. [resolved] fim-int-2026-07-07-G005: Precise corporate-hierarchy detail … fim-int-2026-07-07-G005: Precise corporate-hierarchy detail distinguishing the Singapore-based Trafigura Group parent from the Amsterdam-domiciled Trafigura Beheer B.V. subsidiary in the Swiss and Brazilian convictions requires clarification for accurate enabler-jurisdiction attribution. [resolved] fim-int-2026-07-13-G001: No standalone Colombia-specific enf… fim-int-2026-07-13-G001: No standalone Colombia-specific enforcement action identified this cycle; peso-broker mechanics only surfaced as contextual material within a Mexico-focused FinCEN advisory. [resolved] fim-int-2026-07-13-G002: Sub-Saharan Africa/Central Asia/Pac… fim-int-2026-07-13-G002: Sub-Saharan Africa/Central Asia/Pacific extractive-industry conflict-finance vector remains under-covered this cycle (D4). [resolved] fim-int-2026-07-13-G003: No Tier-1/2 primary EU Official Jou… fim-int-2026-07-13-G003: No Tier-1/2 primary EU Official Journal citation retrieved for AMLR/AMLD6/AMLA NL transposition detail; capped at Assessed confidence pending primary-source retrieval. [resolved] fim-int-2026-07-13-G004: SR 26-2 primary Federal Reserve/FDI… fim-int-2026-07-13-G004: SR 26-2 primary Federal Reserve/FDIC/OCC text not directly retrieved this cycle; reliance on secondary vendor commentary caps confidence at Assessed. [resolved] fim-int-2026-08-20-G001: Tier D jurisdictions (KH/LA/MX/CO) … fim-int-2026-08-20-G001: Tier D jurisdictions (KH/LA/MX/CO) cross-reference to NL was not actively searched this cycle; run was NL-JID-bound. [resolved] fim-int-2026-08-20-G002: D1, D3, D4, D5, D6 NL-specific find… fim-int-2026-08-20-G002: D1, D3, D4, D5, D6 NL-specific findings were thin or absent this cycle; no distinct material beyond standing frameworks was located. [resolved] fim-int-2026-09-05-G001 ({'scheme': 'financial_integrity', '… fim-int-2026-09-05-G001 ({'scheme': 'financial_integrity', 'value': 'D2'}): No T1 legislative text for AMLR obliged-entity scope expansion or Wwft Article 1f was independently retrieved this cycle; both rest on T3 law-firm sourcing. [resolved] fim-int-2026-09-05-G002 ({'scheme': 'financial_integrity', '… fim-int-2026-09-05-G002 ({'scheme': 'financial_integrity', 'value': 'D6'}): No NL-specific AI/ML transaction-monitoring supervisory guidance was located this cycle, leaving the D6 compliance-technology posture gap unresolved. [resolved] fim-int-2026-09-05-G003: Tier D jurisdictions (KH, LA, MX, C… fim-int-2026-09-05-G003: Tier D jurisdictions (KH, LA, MX, CO) were not searched this cycle; this is a run-scope constraint, not a finding of quiet conditions there. [resolved] fim-int-2026-09-28-G001 ({'scheme': 'financial_integrity', '… fim-int-2026-09-28-G001 ({'scheme': 'financial_integrity', 'value': 'D1'}): D1 (Sanctions Architecture) had no NL-specific finding identified this cycle within the pooled research budget. [resolved] fim-int-2026-09-28-G002 ({'scheme': 'financial_integrity', '… fim-int-2026-09-28-G002 ({'scheme': 'financial_integrity', 'value': 'D2'}): D2 (Beneficial Ownership) had no NL-specific UBO-register development identified this cycle within the pooled research budget. [resolved] fim-int-2026-09-28-G003 ({'scheme': 'financial_integrity', '… fim-int-2026-09-28-G003 ({'scheme': 'financial_integrity', 'value': 'D3'}): D3 (Enabler Jurisdictions) had no NL-specific finding identified this cycle within the pooled research budget. [resolved] fim-int-2026-09-28-G004 ({'scheme': 'financial_integrity', '… fim-int-2026-09-28-G004 ({'scheme': 'financial_integrity', 'value': 'D4'}): D4 (Conflict Finance) had no NL-specific finding identified this cycle within the pooled research budget. [resolved] fim-int-2026-09-28-G005 ({'scheme': 'financial_integrity', '… fim-int-2026-09-28-G005 ({'scheme': 'financial_integrity', 'value': 'D7'}): Exact stage and confirmed transposition timeline for the Iwt (AMLD6 transposition vehicle) is not established to a primary legislative calendar this cycle. [resolved] fim-int-2026-10-04-G001 ({'scheme': 'financial_integrity', '… fim-int-2026-10-04-G001 ({'scheme': 'financial_integrity', 'value': 'D1'}): No NL-specific D1 (sanctions), D3 (enabler jurisdiction) or D6 (compliance technology) development was located this cycle; coverage for these domains is thin. [resolved] fim-int-2026-10-04-G002: No Tier D jurisdiction search (KH/L… fim-int-2026-10-04-G002: No Tier D jurisdiction search (KH/LA/MX/CO) was run this cycle within the shared pooled budget; absence of findings is a coverage gap, not a confirmed no-material-change result. [resolved] fim-int-2026-10-04-G003 ({'scheme': 'financial_integrity', '… fim-int-2026-10-04-G003 ({'scheme': 'financial_integrity', 'value': 'D2'}): The Raad van State advisory document itself (W06.26.00123/III) was not directly retrieved this cycle; the finding rests on T3 secondary reporting only. [resolved] fim-int-2026-10-11-G001: D1-D7 domain updates for NL within … fim-int-2026-10-11-G001: D1-D7 domain updates for NL within the 2026-10-04 to 2026-10-11 periodic window were not located; this is logged as a coverage gap given NL's chained/delta-only research posture against EEA. [resolved] fim-int-2026-10-11-G002: Tier D jurisdiction check (KH/LA/MX… fim-int-2026-10-11-G002: Tier D jurisdiction check (KH/LA/MX/CO) was not actively re-swept this cycle within the shared research budget. [resolved] fim-int-2026-10-11-G003 ({'scheme': 'financial_integrity', '… fim-int-2026-10-11-G003 ({'scheme': 'financial_integrity', 'value': 'D8'}): No T1 regulatory filing was retrieved confirming closing conditions or competition/financial-sector approval status for the Adyen Orb/Talon.One or Mollie/GoCardless transactions. [resolved] fim-int-2026-10-18-G001: Tier D jurisdictions (KH, LA, MX, C… fim-int-2026-10-18-G001: Tier D jurisdictions (KH, LA, MX, CO) were not actively searched this cycle; the pooled union search budget was allocated primarily to NL across five consumers, which crowded out the mandatory Tier D sweep. [open] fim-int-2026-10-18-G002 ({'scheme': 'financial_integrity', '… fim-int-2026-10-18-G002 ({'scheme': 'financial_integrity', 'value': 'D7'}): October 2026 FATF plenary outcomes were not available as of this cycle's cut-off (2026-10-18); current grey-list status carried forward from June 2026 plenary. [open] fim-int-2026-10-18-G003: FR-1260 producer-need lenses for ga… fim-int-2026-10-18-G003: FR-1260 producer-need lenses for gambling_operator, payment_company and crypto_asset_operator were not researched this cycle for NL. [open] fim-int-2026-11-02-G001: Conflict-minerals/extractive-indust… fim-int-2026-11-02-G001: Conflict-minerals/extractive-industry transparency (D4) and counter-proliferation-specific risk assessment were not reached within research budget for this jurisdiction. [open] fim-int-2026-11-02-G002: Nominee/bearer-share disclosure (D2… fim-int-2026-11-02-G002: Nominee/bearer-share disclosure (D2) and unexplained-wealth-order mechanics were not located within budget. [open] fim-int-2026-11-04-G001: Conflict-minerals/extractive transp… fim-int-2026-11-04-G001: Conflict-minerals/extractive transparency (CF1) obligations for NL were not reached within research budget this cycle. [open] fim-int-2026-11-04-G002: Counter-proliferation-specific risk… fim-int-2026-11-04-G002: Counter-proliferation-specific risk assessment (CPF1) obligations for NL were not reached within research budget this cycle. [open] fim-int-2026-11-04-G003: Nominee/bearer-share disclosure rul… fim-int-2026-11-04-G003: Nominee/bearer-share disclosure rules (BO2) were not reached within research budget this cycle. [open] fim-int-2026-11-04-G004: No official aggregate obliged-entit… fim-int-2026-11-04-G004: No official aggregate obliged-entity population count or frozen-asset total was located for NL within research budget this cycle. [open] FIM-GAP-001 (D2): FATF's 2022 mutual evaluation and 2025 fol… FIM-GAP-001 (D2): FATF's 2022 mutual evaluation and 2025 follow-up continue to flag that the Netherlands has not fully closed gaps around preventing misuse of legal persons and ensuring adequate, accurate and current beneficial-ownership information, including a beneficial-ownership definition that historically failed to capture persons with ultimate effective control over legal arrangements. FIM-GAP-002 (D3): FATF assessors found the frequency, scope … FIM-GAP-002 (D3): FATF assessors found the frequency, scope and intensity of AML/CFT supervision and monitoring for DNFBPs (including trust offices and corporate lawyers) insufficiently robust relative to identified risk, with legal ambiguities around preventive-measure obligations for corporate lawyers left unresolved. FIM-GAP-003 (D2): The seed-designated authoritative NRA sour… FIM-GAP-003 (D2): The seed-designated authoritative NRA source (WODC — Dutch National Risk Assessment on Money Laundering 2023) returned a 403 response on automated fetch attempt during this baseline run, consistent with the seed's own bot-block hint, preventing verbatim citation of its content in this baseline. ## Evidence #### Confidence-tiered claims Adyen (Amsterdam-headquartered, Euronext-listed) agreed to acquire Talon.One (Berlin, ~EUR750m) and Orb (US, $335m), both slated to close 1 July 2026 subject to regulatory approval. [[Source 1]](#sec-sources) Probable · 1 source Mollie (Amsterdam-founded payments firm) completed its acquisition of UK-based GoCardless on 1 September 2026 (reported deal value c. $1.1bn), combining card/local-payment and bank-payment capability across 38 countries. [[Source 1]](#sec-sources) Probable · 1 source Mollie committed EUR350m over five years to expansion outside its home NL and UK markets, upon reaching full EEA (30-country) operational coverage on 18 June 2026. [[Source 1]](#sec-sources) Probable · 1 source Council of State advisory (17 Aug 2026) concluded the Iwt must be amended before filing with the Tweede Kamer, citing risk-based-approach, non-discrimination and data-protection gaps. [[Source 1]](#sec-sources) Probable · 1 source Absolute prohibition on cash payments of EUR 3,000 or more for sale/purchase of goods, effective 1 January 2026, replacing prior EUR 10,000 CDD threshold for traders of goods. [[Source 1]](#sec-sources) Probable · 1 source The new AML/CFT framework (AMLR) will become directly applicable in NL on 10 July 2027, per DNB and AFM published guidance. [[Source 1]](#sec-sources) Probable · 1 source DNB, AFM, the Dienst Financieel-Economische Integriteit, Bureau Financieel Toezicht, the deken and the Kansspelautoriteit are designated supervisors under the Iwt. [[Source 1]](#sec-sources) Probable · 1 source Remains in legislative preparation to replace the Wwft as NL's AMLD6 transposition vehicle; Council of State's 17 August 2026 advisory opinion (flagging risk-based-supervision, discrimination and data-protection gaps) is the most recent substantive marker, now outside this week's window. [[Source 1]](#sec-sources) Probable · 1 source DNB imposed a €722,160 administrative fine on Modulr Finance B.V. on 30 September 2026 for serious shortcomings in ongoing monitoring of customers and transactions (1 Jan 2023-16 Jul 2024), breaching Wwft art. 3(2)(d); third-party reporting indicates reliance on intermediary partners including crypto-asset service providers for monitoring the firm should have performed itself. [[Source 1]](#sec-sources) Probable · 1 source The Netherlands' AMLD6 transposition vehicle (Iwt), which will repeal the Wwft, remains at the consultation stage opened 4 July 2025; no material progression toward enactment identified this cycle and the parliamentary timetable is unconfirmed. [[Source 1]](#sec-sources) Probable · 1 source AFM and DNB jointly published an exploratory report (12 October 2026) finding Dutch property law (Burgerlijk Wetboek, Wet giraal effectenverkeer) provides no basis for securities issued, held and transferred exclusively as tokens, warning of migration risk without timely legal clarification, and recommending a joint follow-up process with government and market participants. [[Source 1]](#sec-sources) Probable · 1 source DNB is designated supervisor for (intermediary) payment service providers under the Transfer of Funds Regulation, and AFM for (intermediary) crypto-asset service providers; CASPs falling under the TFR are brought within scope of the Sanctiewet 1977. [[Source 1]](#sec-sources) Probable · 1 source Financial institutions, crypto-asset service providers and trust offices must screen for sanctions matches, freeze funds without delay on a confirmed hit and notify DNB/AFM without delay; new Russia-related freezes must be reported within 2 weeks; banks, trust offices and crypto providers must report every 3 months even if nothing is frozen. [[Source 1]](#sec-sources) Probable · 1 source DNB and AFM jointly supervise compliance with the Sanctiewet 1977 for the financial sector under the Regeling toezicht Sanctiewet 1977, established 1 October 2005, screening against the EU asset-freezing list, National Terrorism List and UN sanctions list. [[Source 1]](#sec-sources) Probable · 1 source A UBO is a natural person holding more than 25% of shares, voting rights or economic interest in a legal entity, verified by the obliged institution independently of the UBO register; absent such a person, senior managing officials are registered as pseudo-UBOs. [[Source 1]](#sec-sources) Probable · 1 source Since 1 October 2024, Wwft-obliged institutions must report discrepancies between the KVK UBO register and the UBO(s) the institution itself identified to the Chamber of Commerce; absence of any UBO registration is not treated as a discrepancy. [[Source 1]](#sec-sources) Probable · 1 source Enhanced due diligence is mandatory for higher ML/TF-risk relationships, clients established in EU-designated high-risk third countries, or PEP clients/UBOs, requiring senior-management approval and source-of-wealth checks; PEP status retained for at least 12 months after leaving the prominent function. [[Source 1]](#sec-sources) Probable · 1 source It is prohibited for anyone seated in the Netherlands to provide trust services professionally without a DNB licence, and for anyone seated in another Member State to provide trust services into the Netherlands without one; five categories of trust service are designated and DNB keeps a public register. [[Source 1]](#sec-sources) Probable · 1 source Six Wwft supervisors are designated by activity, not legal form: DNB (banks, trust offices, crypto-asset services), AFM (investment firms/funds, CASPs, life-insurance intermediaries), BFT (notaries, accountants, tax advisers), NOvA (lawyers), Bureau Toezicht Wwft (estate agents, high-value goods dealers), and Kansspelautoriteit (casinos). [[Source 1]](#sec-sources) Probable · 1 source AFM is the Dutch competent authority for CASP authorisation and conduct under MiCA Title V; DNB supervises ART/EMT issuers prudentially. Professional provision of crypto-asset services requires AFM authorisation. [[Source 1]](#sec-sources) Probable · 1 source This Act amends the Wft and Wet op de economische delicten to implement MiCA, designating AFM and DNB as competent authorities and attaching economic-offence penalties for breaches of MiCA-related Wft provisions. [[Source 1]](#sec-sources) Probable · 1 source The pre-MiCA AML-only DNB registration regime for crypto-exchange and custodial-wallet providers (former Wwft Chapter 3A) was repealed effective 4 February 2025; CASPs become ordinary obliged entities under the new MiCA-aligned regime. [[Source 1]](#sec-sources) Probable · 1 source CASPs must ensure every crypto-asset transfer is accompanied by required originator and beneficiary information, with no de minimis threshold (unlike the EUR 1,000 threshold for ordinary fund transfers). [[Source 1]](#sec-sources) Probable · 1 source For transfers to or from a self-hosted address exceeding EUR 1,000, the CASP must take adequate measures to assess whether the address is owned or controlled by its own customer using suitable technical means. [[Source 1]](#sec-sources) Probable · 1 source fine_8500000_EUR_ABN_AMRO_Wwft [[Source 1]](#sec-sources) Probable · 1 source fine_20000000_EUR_de_Volksbank_Wwft_Wft [[Source 1]](#sec-sources) Probable · 1 source fine_2656250_EUR_CCV_Wwft [[Source 1]](#sec-sources) Probable · 1 source fine_2600000_EUR_bunq_Wwft [[Source 1]](#sec-sources) Probable · 1 source 10_compliant_29_largely_compliant_1_partially_compliant_regular_follow_up [[Source 1]](#sec-sources) Probable · 1 source bill_published_by_raad_van_state_2026-08-17_repeals_wwft [[Source 1]](#sec-sources) Probable · 1 source 2027-07-10 [[Source 1]](#sec-sources) Probable · 1 source in_force_2024-12-30_designates_dnb_afm_crypto_travel_rule_supervisors [[Source 1]](#sec-sources) Probable · 1 source fine_3325000_EUR_Wwft_art30_unregistered_operation [[Source 1]](#sec-sources) Probable · 1 source internal_reporting_channel_required_financial_sector_regardless_of_size_since_2023-02-18 [[Source 1]](#sec-sources) Probable · 1 source 3055362_reports_2025 [[Source 1]](#sec-sources) Probable · 1 source 35_enforcement_actions_2025_EUR_38500000_fines [[Source 1]](#sec-sources) Probable · 1 source