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Not every instrument is backed by its official text yet. At least one law or rulebook covered here has no official source (tier 1) retrieved for it yet. No finding on this page is shown with confidence above “Probable” until stronger sources are retrieved.

Financial Integrity Monitor

Netherlands NL

Domains covered
8 of 8
Sources
198
Role actions
8
Horizon <90d
1
Jurisdiction profile
FATF status: Largely Compliant Tier: A Risk direction: Stable Enablement vs enforcement: Mixed

Netherlands operates a twin-peaks AML/CFT supervisory system (DNB prudential, AFM conduct) under the Wwft, with FIU-Netherlands as national financial intelligence unit.

MoreFATF rates the framework largely compliant (10 C/29 LC/1 PC post-2025 follow-up) but flags legal-person misuse, DNFBP supervision intensity, and sanctions dissuasiveness as unresolved.

Key deficiencies
  • Beneficial ownership register historically under-populated and definitional gaps (no 'ultimate effective control' test) permitting conduit/mailbox company misuse
  • Risk-based supervision of DNFBPs (trust offices, corporate lawyers, high-value dealers) under-resourced relative to risk
  • Sanctions for ML/TF offences assessed as insufficiently proportionate and dissuasive
  • Netherlands' role as domicile/transit hub for global commodity trading houses and crypto infrastructure creates enabler exposure disproportionate to domestic risk profile
Recent developments (18m)
  • FATF 1st Enhanced Follow-Up Report (23 Sept 2025): Recommendation 15 (VASPs) upgraded Partially Compliant to Largely Compliant; NL now 10 Compliant/29 Largely Compliant/1 Partially Compliant
  • AFM published dedicated Wwft guidance annex for crypto-asset service providers (2 May 2025) covering CDD, transaction monitoring, BO verification and SAR filing
  • EU cash-payment limit of EUR 3,000 entered into force (1 Jan 2025) as part of the Dutch AML action plan
  • FIU-Netherlands reinforced with additional FTE capacity as part of national AML strengthening programme
  • AMLA became operational (mid-2025, Frankfurt seat, chair Bruna Szego) beginning to shape the future direct/indirect supervisory perimeter that will include Dutch high-risk obliged entities

Law made at European Economic Area level that applies in Netherlands is covered once, on the European Economic Area page. This page covers Netherlands’s own layer: implementation, national authorities, national options and local enforcement.

Brief

Lead signal

Lead Signal

De Nederlandsche Bank imposed a €722,160 administrative fine on Modulr Finance B.V. on 30 September 2026 for serious shortcomings in its ongoing monitoring of customers and transactions over the period 1 January 2023 to 16 July 2024, finding a breach of Wwft art. 3(2)(d). Third-party reporting indicates the firm had relied on intermediary partners, including crypto-asset service providers, for monitoring it should have performed itself. This is DNB's first publicly recorded AML fine against an electronic-money institution, and it signals continued supervisory rigour over payment-sector gatekeepers that outsource client-facing monitoring to downstream platform partners without retaining adequate oversight themselves.

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Lead Signal

De Nederlandsche Bank imposed a €722,160 administrative fine on Modulr Finance B.V. on 30 September 2026 for serious shortcomings in its ongoing monitoring of customers and transactions over the period 1 January 2023 to 16 July 2024, finding a breach of Wwft art. 3(2)(d). Third-party reporting indicates the firm had relied on intermediary partners, including crypto-asset service providers, for monitoring it should have performed itself. This is DNB's first publicly recorded AML fine against an electronic-money institution, and it signals continued supervisory rigour over payment-sector gatekeepers that outsource client-facing monitoring to downstream platform partners without retaining adequate oversight themselves.

Other Developments

Tokenisation legal gap identified. AFM and DNB jointly published an exploratory report on 12 October 2026 finding that Dutch property and securities law, specifically the Burgerlijk Wetboek and the Wet giraal effectenverkeer, provides no basis for securities issued, held and transferred exclusively as tokens. The regulators warned of migration risk to jurisdictions offering greater legal certainty and recommended a joint follow-up process involving government and market participants. This is a structural finding about the adequacy of Dutch civil and securities law for native tokenisation, not a prohibition under the Markets in Crypto-Assets Regulation, and it sits alongside the Netherlands' broader AML/CFT architecture discussed below.

AMLD6 transposition remains at consultation stage. The Netherlands' vehicle for transposing the sixth EU Anti-Money Laundering Directive, the Implementatiewet ter voorkoming van witwassen en terrorismefinanciering, which will repeal the Wwft, remains at the consultation stage opened 4 July 2025. No material progression toward enactment was identified, and the parliamentary timetable remains unconfirmed. In the interim, the directly applicable EU Anti-Money Laundering Regulation continues to apply in the Netherlands without need for domestic transposition, while supervisory and financial-intelligence-unit provisions await the Implementatiewet's eventual passage.

Cross-Monitor Connections

The Modulr Finance fine carries a direct link to payments-sector supervision: a non-bank electronic-money institution was sanctioned for monitoring failures tied to its reliance on downstream partners, including crypto-asset service providers, that is a payments-architecture finding as much as an AML one. The tokenisation legal-gap finding similarly straddles financial-market infrastructure and digital-asset oversight, since it concerns the civil-law basis for token-based securities rather than a crypto-specific licensing question, and it bears on how market participants structure dual-registration arrangements to bridge the gap pending legislative clarification.

Outlook

The Implementatiewet's consultation-stage status leaves the Netherlands' domestic AML/CFT supervisory and reporting architecture unsettled ahead of the EU package's broader implementation path, and the absence of a confirmed parliamentary timetable is itself a fact to monitor rather than a prediction of delay. The AFM/DNB recommendation for a joint government-industry follow-up process on tokenisation has no confirmed timetable either; both items warrant monitoring for the next concrete procedural step rather than for any near-term legislative outcome.

Earlier periodic briefs (3)
4 Oct 2026 · fim-2026-10-04

Lead Signal

The Netherlands enters this cycle with a transposition bill that has stalled on its own procedural track even as the directly applicable EU instrument above it keeps moving on schedule. On 17 August 2026 the Raad van State (Council of State) published its advisory opinion on the Implementatiewet ter voorkoming van witwassen en terrorismefinanciering (Iwt), the bill that transposes the Sixth Anti-Money Laundering Directive into Dutch law, concluding that the bill must be amended before it can be filed with the Tweede Kamer. The advisory cited gaps in the risk-based approach, non-discrimination safeguards and data-protection design of the draft. This is a structural finding, not an incident: it tells us the national legislative vehicle is behind where the EU timetable assumes it to be, while the AMLR, the directly applicable Regulation that does not depend on national transposition, continues toward its 10 July 2027 application date regardless of the Iwt's progress, per De Nederlandsche Bank and the Autoriteit Financiele Markten.

Running alongside the transposition delay is a concrete, already-effective obligation: from 1 January 2026, new article 1f of the Wwft imposes an absolute prohibition on cash payments of EUR 3,000 or more for the sale or purchase of goods, replacing the prior EUR 10,000 customer due diligence and reporting threshold for traders of goods. Services remain outside this specific prohibition. Taken together, the two developments show a jurisdiction tightening its operative AML control at the transactional layer while its structural transposition vehicle is told to go back and fix governance-level gaps before it can proceed.

Other Developments

The Iwt's supervisory map is settled even as its substance is contested. The same Council of State advisory carries forward the bill's designation of supervisors: DNB, the AFM, the Dienst Financieel-Economische Integriteit, Bureau Financieel Toezicht, the deken, and the Kansspelautoriteit are named as the Iwt's designated supervisory bodies. That allocation of supervisory responsibility appears stable even though the underlying bill text does not yet meet the bar the Council of State has set for it.

The AMLR's direct application date is now a corroborated standing fact for the Dutch market. Both DNB and the AFM separately confirm that the new AML/CFT framework becomes applicable on 10 July 2027, independent of whether the Iwt has completed its domestic passage by then. Firms operating in or into the Netherlands should treat the AMLR timetable as fixed even while the Iwt timetable is not.

The cash-payment prohibition narrows a previously CDD-based control into a bright-line prohibition. Article 1f Wwft does not merely lower a reporting threshold, it removes the transaction from permissible cash settlement altogether for goods above EUR 3,000, which is a different kind of control than the due-diligence trigger it replaces.

Cross-Monitor Connections

The Iwt's data-protection gap, as identified by the Council of State, is the kind of finding that typically recurs in data-protection monitoring once a bill of this kind is amended and refiled, since risk-based AML data processing and data-minimisation obligations frequently sit in tension. The supervisory map designating the Kansspelautoriteit alongside financial supervisors also signals that gambling-sector AML obligations remain bound into the same transposition vehicle as the banking and investment-firm obligations, which is relevant to any cross-sector compliance-technology build that spans those regulated populations.

Outlook

The near-term marker to watch is whether an amended Iwt is filed with the Tweede Kamer, since the Council of State's advisory makes amendment a precondition rather than a recommendation. Separately, and on a track that does not wait for the Iwt, the AMLR's 10 July 2027 application date stands as a confirmed horizon point for Dutch firms. The practical compliance question for obliged entities is less whether the national bill passes in its current form, which it cannot, and more whether firms are already building toward the AMLR's substantive requirements ahead of a national transposition that may still be in motion when the Regulation itself takes effect.

28 Sep 2026 · fim-2026-09-28

Lead Signal

The Netherlands provides a structural case study this cycle in how a small, single-representation member state sits inside the emerging EU AML architecture while routine domestic enforcement continues underneath it. De Nederlandsche Bank (DNB) fined trust office International Trust Services B.V. EUR29,700 on 24 November 2025 for failing to commission a required audit under the Wwft, covering the January-December 2021 period. Taken alone this is a modest, procedural enforcement action, but it sits against a more structurally significant backdrop: the Anti-Money Laundering Authority (AMLA) General Board has been operational since 1 July 2025, and the Netherlands is one of only two AMLA member states, alongside Germany, represented on that board by a single national authority, DNB, rather than a coalition of sectoral regulators.

Other Developments

Transposition vehicle named. The Implementation Act on the Prevention of Money Laundering and Terrorist Financing, known as the Iwt, will replace the current Wwft as the Netherlands' vehicle for transposing the sixth Anti-Money Laundering Directive, operating alongside the directly-applicable AML Regulation. DNB's own published framework page confirms the Iwt as the forward transposition instrument, with AMLA's direct supervision of selected high-risk entities beginning January 2028. Dual-supervisor structure persists. DNB continues to supervise the majority of Wwft-obliged financial institutions, while the AFM retains supervisory responsibility for certain financial-market participants, a standing structural feature of the Dutch AML supervisory architecture that predates and will persist through the Iwt transition.

Cross-Monitor Connections

The single-authority representation on the AMLA General Board is a governance-architecture fact with implications beyond AML supervision narrowly defined: a jurisdiction represented by one national authority, rather than a negotiated multi-regulator delegation, concentrates both institutional knowledge and institutional risk in that single body ahead of the 2028 direct-supervision milestone. This is the kind of structural finding that typically outweighs a single enforcement fine in analytical significance, consistent with the architecture-over-incident framing this monitor applies throughout. The crypto/digital-asset AML angle for the Netherlands is intentionally not developed independently here, to avoid duplicating the coverage carried in the crypto consumer's own AML/CFT treatment this cycle.

Outlook

The period to watch is the Iwt's progression from consultation toward enactment as the Netherlands' AMLD6 transposition vehicle; the exact timetable was not established to a primary legislative calendar this cycle, and confirming it will materially sharpen the forward view. Equally, the run-up to January 2028, when AMLA begins direct supervision of selected high-risk cross-border entities, will test whether the Netherlands' unusual single-authority General Board representation translates into a smoother or more contested transition than in member states with distributed sectoral representation.

5 Sep 2026 · fim-2026-08-21

Lead Signal

De Nederlandsche Bank imposed an EUR 8.5 million administrative fine on ABN AMRO Bank N.V. on 6 July 2026 for serious customer due diligence shortcomings affecting high-risk customers between September 2023 and September 2024. The fine extends a supervisory enforcement lineage against major Dutch banks for CDD failures that traces back to DNB's landmark 2018 action against ING, and it is the clearest signal this cycle that Dutch AML/CFT supervision remains an active enforcement posture rather than a settled compliance baseline. The fine sits alongside a structural development on the beneficial-ownership side: effective 1 January 2026, the Netherlands introduced a ban on cash payments of EUR 3,000 or more between buyers and sellers of goods, while the Netherlands Chamber of Commerce (KVK) is simultaneously improving UBO-register screening, ending public access to the register, and widening the grounds on which UBO data can be shielded from disclosure. Both developments this cycle sit within the AML pillar rather than CTF or CPF, continuing a pattern in which Dutch enforcement volume concentrates on anti-money-laundering findings; no NL-specific counter-terrorist-financing or counter-proliferation-financing enforcement action surfaced this cycle.

Other Developments

The UBO transparency trade-off cuts both ways. The Netherlands' UBO-register reform is best read as a structural change with mixed transparency implications rather than a straightforward tightening or loosening. Screening rigor on the collection side is increasing, which should improve the underlying data quality DNB and other supervisors rely on, but the simultaneous restriction of public access and the widening of shielding grounds reduces the register's usefulness as a transparency tool for third parties, including investigative journalists, counterparties conducting their own due diligence, and civil-society researchers. FATF's 2025 mutual-evaluation follow-up report continues to flag beneficial-ownership transparency adequacy as an outstanding deficiency for the Netherlands, notwithstanding its largely-compliant overall rating, and this cycle's access restriction is the kind of development that outstanding FATF concern is likely to scrutinise going forward.

AMLR and AMLA supervisory perimeter build-out remains in progress. The Netherlands is directly bound by the EU AML Regulation (AMLR, Regulation (EU) 2024/1624) as an EU-27 member state, and its domestic AML-strengthening programme, the cash-payment threshold and the UBO-register reform, sits within that broader EU architecture. DNB and AFM have not yet finalised the perimeter handoff for direct supervision by the Anti-Money Laundering Authority (AMLA, established under Regulation (EU) 2024/1620) of the Netherlands' highest-risk obliged entities, leaving this as an open structural question rather than a resolved one.

DNB's enforcement lineage is structural, not episodic. The ABN AMRO fine is the latest in a sequence of DNB administrative fines against major Dutch banks for CDD failures on high-risk customers, a pattern that began with the 2018 action against ING and has continued through subsequent supervisory cycles. Read as architecture rather than incident, this lineage indicates that DNB treats CDD adequacy at systemically significant banks as a standing supervisory priority rather than a one-off compliance exercise, and that further enforcement action against other major Dutch banks in this vein would be consistent with, rather than a departure from, the existing pattern.

Cross-Monitor Connections

The ABN AMRO fine and the DNB source underpinning it are shared substrate with world-payments' tracking of Dutch payment-sector obligations, since DNB is both the AML/CFT supervisor addressed here and the prudential licensing authority for Dutch payment institutions tracked under world-payments' W1a and W12 modules this cycle. The UBO-register reform is separately relevant to advennt's Dutch gambling-licensing coverage to the extent that KSA's own renewal-policy package for remote-gambling operators references WWFT risk-analysis obligations that sit on the same statutory foundation as the UBO and cash-payment measures addressed here.

Outlook

The clearest marker of what would change the Netherlands' AML/CFT picture over the coming cycle is progress, or its absence, on the AMLR/AMLA supervisory perimeter handoff: a finalised direct-supervision designation for specific high-risk Dutch obliged entities would be a materially different structural fact than the current in-progress status. On the beneficial-ownership side, continued FATF scrutiny of the access-restriction trade-off, set against the Netherlands' largely-compliant rating, is the development most likely to generate a formal follow-up finding in a subsequent evaluation cycle.

Domain intelligence (D1–D8)

D1 Sanctions

no_changestanding position

Sanctions Architecture and Evasion

The Netherlands occupies a dual position in the EU sanctions architecture against Russia: it is a frontline enforcement node for the measures the Council adopts, and it has repeatedly been the physical host for infrastructure those same measures are designed to disrupt. The EU 19th sanctions package, adopted 23 October 2025, introduced the first-ever EU sanctions on crypto providers, targeting the Russian state-linked A7A5 stablecoin ecosystem, alongside a phased LNG import ban, closed exemptions for Rosneft and Gazprom Neft, and 117 additional shadow-fleet vessel listings bringing the total to 557. The EU 20th sanctions package, adopted 23 April 2026, added 46 further vessel listings for a total of 632, delisted 11 vessels assessed as compliant, introduced a mandatory no-Russia resale clause and a scrapping clause for shadow-fleet exit, and listed Murmansk, Tuapse and the Karimun Oil Terminal in Indonesia as circumvention-linked ports. Both instruments are Council regulations, directly applicable in the Netherlands with no national transposition step, meaning the full designation set takes immediate domestic effect. Rotterdam, as the largest port in Europe, functions as a frontline node for the resulting port-access enforcement, giving the Netherlands an outsized operational role in implementing an architecture set at EU level.

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The reverse side of this frontline role is enablement. Russian-linked no-KYC exchanges, Cryptex and PM2BTC, and a DPRK Lazarus-linked mixer successor, Sinbad.io, repeatedly located servers and hosting infrastructure physically in the Netherlands despite offshore beneficial ownership and predicate criminality disconnected from Dutch soil. Disruption of the Cryptex and PM2BTC infrastructure occurred through a coordinated action on 26 September 2024 involving OFAC designation, a FinCEN finding naming PM2BTC a primary money-laundering concern, and a joint seizure operation by the US Secret Service, Netherlands Police and FIOD. The pattern is reactive rather than proactive: Dutch enforcement acted once foreign partners, principally US authorities, had already identified the infrastructure and its criminal nexus. Whether successor hosting has since emerged in the Netherlands is not established this cycle, an explicit gap for forward monitoring.

A further architectural signal is the divergence exposed by the Karimun, Indonesia port listing, which has no direct OFAC or OFSI equivalent. Dutch trading houses and Rotterdam-based shipping and insurance intermediaries face compliance friction from operating across EU, US and UK sanctions lists that do not fully align on port-level and crypto-provider designations, a structural feature of the current sanctions landscape rather than a one-off gap, and one that creates an arbitrage surface for intermediaries structuring transactions to fall between regimes.

Outlook

The sanctions architecture affecting the Netherlands will continue to expand through further EU packages, each taking immediate direct effect domestically, while the crypto-hosting enablement pattern is structural and unlikely to resolve through designation activity alone. Whether Dutch authorities develop independent detection capability for illicit infrastructure hosted on national soil, rather than continuing to rely on foreign-partner referral, is the central forward-looking question for this domain, alongside whether the EU-US-UK divergence on port and crypto-provider listings will widen or narrow in subsequent packages.

Cumulative analysis

Sanctions Architecture and Evasion — Cumulative Analysis

Across the cycles for which the Netherlands has been assessed, the defining feature of its D1 posture has remained consistent: a jurisdiction that implements EU sanctions measures immediately and without transposition delay, functioning as a compliant frontline enforcement node, while simultaneously supplying, through data-centre availability rather than institutional design, the physical hosting infrastructure for sanctioned-adjacent illicit crypto flows. As an EU member state, the Netherlands gives direct effect to each successive Council sanctions package. The 19th package, adopted 23 October 2025, marked a qualitative escalation by introducing the first-ever EU sanctions on crypto providers, targeting the Russian state-linked A7A5 stablecoin ecosystem, alongside a phased LNG import ban and 117 additional shadow-fleet vessel listings for a running total of 557. The 20th package, adopted 23 April 2026, extended this trajectory with 46 further vessel listings, taking the total to 632, alongside a delisting of 11 compliant vessels, a mandatory no-Russia resale clause, a scrapping clause for exiting shadow-fleet vessels, and the designation of Murmansk, Tuapse and, notably, the Karimun Oil Terminal in Indonesia as circumvention-linked ports.

The Karimun listing has proven analytically significant beyond its immediate designation effect, because it has no direct equivalent in the OFAC or OFSI sanctions regimes, exposing a structural divergence in third-country port-designation practice between the EU and its principal partner jurisdictions. This divergence recurs as a standing feature of the Netherlands assessment: Rotterdam-based trading houses, shipping intermediaries and insurers operate across EU, US and UK sanctions lists that do not fully align on crypto-provider and port-level measures, generating a persistent compliance-friction and arbitrage surface rather than a single-cycle anomaly. Rotterdam, as the largest port in Europe, remains the operational locus through which this friction is transmitted into day-to-day trade-finance and shipping-insurance practice.

The enablement side of the Netherlands D1 profile is equally durable across cycles. Russian-linked no-KYC exchanges, Cryptex and PM2BTC, and a DPRK Lazarus-linked mixer successor, Sinbad.io, repeatedly located servers physically within Dutch borders notwithstanding offshore beneficial ownership and predicate criminality with no genuine Dutch nexus. The coordinated disruption of the Cryptex and PM2BTC infrastructure on 26 September 2024, involving OFAC designation, a FinCEN primary money-laundering-concern finding, and a joint seizure operation by the US Secret Service, Netherlands Police and FIOD, remains the clearest documented instance of this enabler dynamic being addressed, and it illustrates a recurring structural feature: Dutch enforcement action has depended on foreign-partner referral and identification rather than independent domestic detection of infrastructure hosted on national soil. Whether successor hosting infrastructure has emerged since that 2024 disruption has not been established across the cycles assessed to date and remains the single most consequential open item for this domain, since its resolution would materially affect whether the Netherlands enabler exposure is trending toward closure or toward simple relocation of the same physical-hosting dynamic to new infrastructure.

Taken together, the cumulative picture through this cycle is of an architecture-over-incident case study: no single enforcement action defines the Netherlands D1 posture, but the durable combination of immediate sanctions implementation, frontline port exposure at Rotterdam, EU-US-UK designation divergence, and reactive rather than proactive detection of hosted illicit crypto infrastructure defines a structurally mixed enabler-and-enforcer profile that is likely to persist as EU sanctions packages continue to expand in scope and granularity.

domain_sub_briefs · D1 · Cumulative analysis
Standing baseline position

TFR Art.14/14(5) travel-rule and wallet-screening obligations confirmed in force for Dutch CASPs as of 30 December 2024.

Netherlands added to D1 standing coverage as an EU-direct-application jurisdiction with a frontline shadow-fleet port-enforcement role (Rotterdam) and a recurring crypto-infrastructure hosting vulnerability for Russian/DPRK-linked evasion networks.

D2 Beneficial Ownership

no_changestanding position

Beneficial Ownership and Corporate Transparency

The standing structural backdrop against which any Netherlands beneficial-ownership signal must be read is the three-instrument EU AML Package. The AML Regulation, Regulation (EU) 2024/1624, is directly applicable and does not require national transposition, and is expected to become applicable from 2027, progressively superseding parts of the Dutch Wwft framework, including its customer due diligence, beneficial-ownership and enhanced due diligence provisions. The sixth Anti-Money Laundering Directive is a separate instrument requiring transposition by each member state into national law, and the Anti-Money Laundering Authority Regulation, Regulation (EU) 2024/1620, established the Anti-Money Laundering Authority itself, which has been operational since mid-2025 from its Frankfurt seat under chair Bruna Szego. AMLA is expected to progressively select a first cohort of high-risk cross-border obliged entities for direct supervision, shifting the supervisory perimeter from purely national authorities toward a hybrid EU-level regime in which national supervisors such as DNB and AFM continue to operate alongside a centralised authority. This three-instrument architecture is the durable frame within which this cycle should be read, and it is structurally improving, though the Netherlands transposition status, vehicle and deadline for the sixth directive specifically are not established this cycle and are flagged as an open item rather than assumed complete.

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Against that backdrop, the Netherlands rating from the Financial Action Task Force stands at 10 Compliant, 29 Largely Compliant and 1 Partially Compliant following a September 2025 enhanced follow-up report that upgraded Recommendation 15 on virtual-asset service providers. That upgrade did not touch the Netherlands beneficial-ownership definition, which the 2022 mutual evaluation found does not capture persons exercising ultimate effective control, a gap that continues to enable the use of Dutch conduit and mailbox companies with no genuine operational presence to access favourable tax-treaty terms and layer ownership. The Netherlands is not, and has never been, listed by the Financial Action Task Force, the European Union or the United Kingdom as a high-risk jurisdiction, a status re-confirmed as of June 2026. Domestic pre-positioning ahead of AMLR harmonisation includes a EUR 3,000 national cash-payment limit that entered into force on 1 January 2025 and additional capacity added to FIU-Nederland, though the scale and timing detail on the latter is thin.

Outlook

The Netherlands beneficial-ownership posture through this cycle is one of a technically compliant framework carrying an unresolved definitional gap that predates and will likely outlast the current follow-up cycle absent a dedicated re-rating exercise. The 2027 AMLR application date and the prospective AMLA direct-supervision cohort around 2028 create the structural opportunity to close the conduit-company misuse pattern, but whether the shift from national to hybrid EU-level supervision resolves the underlying definitional gap, or merely relocates the same structural weakness to a different supervisory layer, remains an open assessment question, compounded by the unresolved 6AMLD transposition status for the Netherlands specifically.

Cumulative analysis

Beneficial Ownership and Corporate Transparency — Cumulative Analysis

The Netherlands D2 assessment through this cycle continues to rest on the same durable structural backdrop that has framed every prior reading of this domain: the EU AML Package is not a single instrument but three distinct ones, proceeding on separate timelines. The AML Regulation, Regulation (EU) 2024/1624, is directly applicable across the EU/EEA without national transposition and is expected to apply from 2027, progressively superseding national frameworks including the Dutch Wwft. The sixth Anti-Money Laundering Directive requires member-state transposition, and its specific vehicle and deadline for the Netherlands have not been established across any cycle assessed to date, a persistent open item rather than a resolved fact. The Anti-Money Laundering Authority Regulation, Regulation (EU) 2024/1620, established AMLA itself, which has been operational since mid-2025 from its Frankfurt seat under chair Bruna Szego and is expected to progressively select a first cohort of high-risk cross-border obliged entities for direct supervision, moving the supervisory perimeter from a purely national DNB/AFM model toward a hybrid EU-level regime.

Against that standing architecture, the substantive Netherlands-specific signal has been consistent across cycles: a technically strong compliance rating alongside two unresolved structural gaps. The Financial Action Task Force rates the Netherlands at 10 Compliant, 29 Largely Compliant and 1 Partially Compliant following the September 2025 enhanced follow-up report, which upgraded Recommendation 15 on virtual-asset service providers from Partially Compliant to Largely Compliant. That follow-up, addressing only the virtual-asset recommendation, left untouched the beneficial-ownership definitional finding from the 2022 mutual evaluation: the Dutch definition of beneficial ownership does not capture persons exercising ultimate effective control over legal arrangements, a gap that continues to enable Dutch BV conduit and mailbox companies with no genuine operational presence to be used for tax-treaty access and ownership layering. No beneficial-ownership-related recommendation has been re-rated since 2022, indicating the gap remains open through this cycle. The Netherlands has never appeared on the FATF grey or black lists, the EU high-risk third-country list, or the UK Money Laundering Regulations high-risk third-country advisory notice, a status re-confirmed as of June 2026, underscoring that the enabler exposure here is definitional and structural rather than a marker of overt non-compliance.

Domestic measures continue to accumulate as pre-positioning ahead of the 2027 AMLR harmonisation date: a EUR 3,000 national cash-payment limit entered into force on 1 January 2025, and FIU-Nederland has added capacity as part of the national AML strengthening programme, though the latter remains thinly evidenced on scale and timing across the cycles reviewed. A further standing evidentiary gap concerns the WODC National Risk Assessment 2023, whose full text has not been directly verified in any cycle to date, with an alternate accessible repository path identified but not yet re-pulled into the baseline.

The cumulative judgment through this cycle is that the Netherlands beneficial-ownership and corporate-transparency posture is improving at the level of the surrounding EU architecture, and stable to unresolved at the level of the specific Dutch definitional and evidentiary gaps that predate the current EU AML Package build-out. Whether the prospective AMLA direct-supervision cohort, expected around 2028, functions as the mechanism that finally closes the conduit-company misuse pattern, or simply relocates the same structural weakness from national to EU-level supervisory attention, is the central open question carried forward into subsequent cycles.

domain_sub_briefs · D2 · Cumulative analysis
Standing baseline position

Wijzigingsbesluit toegang UBO-registers voor bestuursorganen en rechtspersonen met een overheidstaak in force 2026-10-24, restoring UBO-register access for designated public bodies following the CJEU 2022 ruling.

Netherlands added to D2 standing coverage: BO definitional gap unresolved through the 2025 follow-up; AMLR (2027) and AMLA build-out flagged as the primary forward-looking remediation vector.

Periodic updates (2)
4 Oct 2026 · fim-2026-10-04

Beneficial Ownership and Corporate Transparency

Globally, the EU AML Package sets the structural direction for beneficial-ownership and corporate-transparency regulation: the Anti-Money Laundering Regulation (AMLR, Regulation (EU) 2024/1624) is directly applicable across Member States without national transposition, the sixth AML Directive (6AMLD) is transposed Member State by Member State, and the AMLA Regulation (Regulation (EU) 2024/1620) establishes the Anti-Money Laundering Authority with a direct and indirect supervision perimeter that shifts supervision of certain obliged entities from purely national authorities toward a hybrid EU-level regime. This is standing architecture, not a single-cycle development, and it is the durable backdrop against which the Netherlands' own transparency signal this cycle should be read.

In the Netherlands, the directly relevant development is the Council of State's 17 August 2026 advisory opinion on the Implementatiewet ter voorkoming van witwassen en terrorismefinanciering (Iwt), the bill that transposes the sixth Directive into Dutch law. The Council concluded that the bill must be amended before it can be filed with the Tweede Kamer, citing gaps in the risk-based approach, non-discrimination safeguards, and data-protection design. This is a procedural-structural finding: it does not change any obligation currently in force, but it establishes that the vehicle carrying the Netherlands' 6AMLD obligations, including supervisory governance over the beneficial-ownership and corporate-transparency elements of the regime, is not yet fit to proceed in its current form. The same advisory carries forward the Iwt's proposed supervisory map, naming DNB, the AFM, the Dienst Financieel-Economische Integriteit, Bureau Financieel Toezicht, the deken, and the Kansspelautoriteit as designated supervisors, a structural allocation that spans banking, investment, legal-profession and gambling-sector oversight.

The practical consequence is a bifurcated timeline. The AMLR's substantive content, corroborated separately by DNB and the AFM, becomes directly applicable in the Netherlands on 10 July 2027 irrespective of the Iwt's domestic progress, because the Regulation does not require national transposition to take effect. The Iwt, by contrast, is a transposition vehicle for 6AMLD provisions, and the Council of State has now made clear that amendment is a precondition to parliamentary filing, not a suggestion firms can expect to be overtaken by events. For corporate-transparency practice specifically, this means the national governance layer, including which supervisor has standing over which obliged-entity population, remains provisional pending the amended bill, even as the EU-level substantive floor keeps moving toward its fixed 2027 date.

Outlook

The marker to track is whether and when an amended Iwt is filed with the Tweede Kamer, since the current advisory treats the identified gaps as blocking rather than advisory in effect. Until that filing occurs, the Netherlands' national beneficial-ownership and corporate-transparency supervisory architecture, as distinct from the AMLR's directly applicable substantive requirements, remains in a pre-parliamentary holding pattern.

5 Sep 2026 · fim-2026-08-21

Beneficial Ownership and Corporate Transparency

As an EU-27 member state, the Netherlands' beneficial-ownership and corporate-transparency regime sits directly within the European Union's AML Package, and that package is the primary frame for reading this cycle's Dutch developments rather than contextual backdrop. The EU AML Package comprises three distinct instruments: the AML Regulation (AMLR, Regulation (EU) 2024/1624), which applies directly across all member states without domestic transposition; the sixth AML Directive (6AMLD), which each member state transposes into national law individually; and the AMLA Regulation (Regulation (EU) 2024/1620), which establishes the Anti-Money Laundering Authority and is progressively shifting the supervisory perimeter from purely national authorities toward a hybrid EU-level regime. For the Netherlands specifically, DNB and AFM have not yet finalised the handoff of direct AMLA supervision for the country's highest-risk obliged entities, meaning the Dutch AMLR/AMLA perimeter build-out remains an open, in-progress structural question rather than a resolved one. This standing architecture is the durable backdrop against which this cycle's Dutch beneficial-ownership signal should be read.

Against that backdrop, the Netherlands introduced two concrete domestic measures effective 1 January 2026. First, a ban on cash payments of EUR 3,000 or more between buyers and sellers of goods, aimed at closing a channel historically associated with unrecorded high-value transactions. Second, and more structurally significant, the Netherlands Chamber of Commerce (KVK) is simultaneously improving UBO-register screening quality while ending public access to the register and widening the grounds on which UBO data can be shielded from disclosure. This is a genuine trade-off rather than a one-directional tightening: the collection-side rigor is increasing, which should improve the underlying data DNB, KVK and other authorities rely upon for their own supervisory and due-diligence purposes, but the access-side restriction reduces the register's usefulness as a transparency tool for parties outside the supervisory apparatus, including counterparties conducting independent due diligence, investigative journalists and civil-society researchers who have historically used public UBO registers to identify concealed ownership structures.

This trade-off arrives against a backdrop of outstanding FATF concern. The Financial Action Task Force's 2025 mutual-evaluation follow-up report maintains the Netherlands' largely-compliant rating but continues to flag beneficial-ownership transparency adequacy, alongside risk-based supervisory resourcing, as outstanding deficiencies. A structural reform that narrows public access to UBO data, even where it strengthens internal screening, is precisely the kind of development that a jurisdiction already under outstanding FATF scrutiny on BO-transparency adequacy should expect to see examined in a subsequent follow-up evaluation.

Outlook

The most consequential open question for the Netherlands' beneficial-ownership regime over the coming cycles is less the domestic UBO-access trade-off itself than how it interacts with the unresolved AMLR/AMLA supervisory perimeter handoff: a finalised designation of specific high-risk Dutch obliged entities for direct AMLA supervision would materially change how, and by whom, Dutch beneficial-ownership data quality is assessed going forward. A subsequent FATF communication specifically addressing the UBO public-access restriction would be the clearest signal that the transparency side of this cycle's trade-off has drawn formal international scrutiny.

D3 Enabler Jurisdictions

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Enabler Jurisdictions and Professional Facilitators

The Netherlands operates a twin-peaks AML/CFT supervisory architecture in which De Nederlandsche Bank handles prudential supervision and the Autoriteit Financiele Markten handles conduct supervision under the Wwft, with FIU-Nederland as the national financial intelligence unit. This structural description is foundational to assessing the Netherlands as an enabler jurisdiction under the Enabler Jurisdiction Filter, because the question is not whether a supervisory framework exists, but whether its capacity and intensity match the risk profile of the entities it oversees. On that question, the Financial Action Task Force continues to assess supervisory intensity for trust offices and corporate lawyers as insufficiently robust relative to identified risk, with unresolved legal ambiguity preventing effective implementation of preventive measures for corporate lawyers specifically. This finding predates and was not touched by the September 2025 follow-up report, which addressed only the virtual-asset recommendation.

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The clearest illustration of the professional-facilitator and corporate-domicile dimension of Dutch enabler exposure is the Trafigura case. Trafigura Group, the Singapore-domiciled parent, and its Netherlands subsidiary, Trafigura Beheer B.V., together with former chief operating officer Mike Wainwright, were convicted by the Swiss Federal Criminal Court of bribery of an Angolan official spanning 2009 to 2011, with the conviction under appeal. The corporate structure sits in Amsterdam, yet criminal jeopardy, prosecution and enforcement resources were concentrated in Switzerland, Brazil and the United States, leaving Dutch authorities structurally peripheral to a bribery pattern channelled through a Dutch corporate wrapper. This is a capacity-versus-choice question in enabler-jurisdiction terms: the Netherlands functions as a low-friction domicile hub for global commodity-trading structures without itself directing or substantially detecting the underlying corruption, and enforcement action has occurred almost entirely through third-country referral rather than domestic-first investigation.

Outlook

The systemic significance of the Dutch enabler role in this domain lies less in any single case and more in the recurring pattern of corporate-domicile convenience combined with under-matched gatekeeper supervision. Whether the twin-peaks DNB/AFM model, as it is progressively absorbed into the AMLA supervisory perimeter, closes the DNFBP supervisory-intensity gap identified by the Financial Action Task Force, or whether legal ambiguity for corporate lawyers persists as a standing structural weakness independent of EU-level architecture change, is the key forward question for this domain.

Cumulative analysis

Enabler Jurisdictions and Professional Facilitators — Cumulative Analysis

The cumulative assessment of the Netherlands as an enabler jurisdiction rests on two durable and mutually reinforcing findings that have held consistent across the cycles reviewed. The first is structural: the Netherlands operates a twin-peaks AML/CFT supervisory architecture, with De Nederlandsche Bank responsible for prudential supervision and the Autoriteit Financiele Markten responsible for conduct supervision under the Wwft, supported by FIU-Nederland as the national financial intelligence unit. This is a well-resourced, institutionally mature architecture on its face, and it is precisely this combination of institutional maturity and residual under-supervision of specific gatekeeper categories that gives the Netherlands enabler profile its distinctive character. The Financial Action Task Force has consistently assessed the supervisory intensity applied to trust offices and corporate lawyers as insufficiently robust relative to identified risk, with legal ambiguity around preventive-measure obligations for corporate lawyers remaining unresolved since the 2022 mutual evaluation and untouched by the September 2025 follow-up report, which addressed only the virtual-asset recommendation. This is not a capacity failure in the DNB/AFM architecture generally; it is a targeted, persistent gap in a specific gatekeeper category, and it has proven resistant to a follow-up cycle that otherwise demonstrated the capacity of Dutch authorities to close identified deficiencies.

The second durable finding is the corporate-domicile dimension, most clearly illustrated by the Trafigura case, which has anchored this domain across cycles. Trafigura Group, the Singapore-domiciled parent, and its Netherlands subsidiary, Trafigura Beheer B.V., together with former chief operating officer Mike Wainwright, were convicted by the Swiss Federal Criminal Court of bribery of an Angolan official spanning 2009 to 2011, a conviction under appeal as of the most recent reporting. The pattern that recurs across cycles is not that the Netherlands directed or substantially concealed the underlying conduct, but that a Dutch corporate wrapper concentrated the legal and tax benefits of the domicile while the criminal jeopardy, investigation and enforcement resources were located almost entirely in Switzerland, Brazil and the United States. This is a capacity-versus-choice distinction central to enabler-jurisdiction analysis: the Netherlands does not appear to have chosen a permissive posture toward this conduct, but its corporate-domicile attractiveness for global commodity-trading structures creates a structural exposure that is disproportionate to the size of any domestic detection or enforcement effort.

Across the cycles assessed, the systemic significance of these two findings, gatekeeper under-supervision and corporate-domicile convenience, is that they are structural rather than episodic, and neither has moved materially since first identified. Whether AMLA absorption of Dutch supervisory oversight closes the DNFBP intensity gap, or whether corporate lawyers and trust offices continue to structure layered ownership arrangements under supervisory attention not matched to their risk profile, remains the central open question carried forward. Similarly, whether the Netherlands corporate-domicile role for global trading houses attracts a more proactive domestic detection posture following the Trafigura precedent, or continues to rely on third-country prosecutorial referral as the primary enforcement mechanism, is unresolved and will be a key marker to track in subsequent cycles.

domain_sub_briefs · D3 · Cumulative analysis
Standing baseline position

AMLR (EU 2024/1624) widens NL's obliged-entity population to crypto-asset service providers, crowdfunding platforms, credit intermediaries managing funds, luxury-goods dealers and (conditionally) professional football clubs/player agents, narrowing prior professional-facilitator gaps.

D4 Conflict Finance

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Conflict Finance and Extractive-Industry Integrity

The extractive-industry integrity signal for the Netherlands this cycle is channelled entirely through the Trafigura corporate structure, which is domiciled in Amsterdam as Trafigura Beheer B.V. while its underlying parent, Trafigura Group, sits in Singapore. The Swiss Federal Criminal Court convicted Trafigura Group, Trafigura Beheer B.V. and former chief operating officer Mike Wainwright of bribery of an Angolan official over conduct spanning 2009 to 2011, a conviction under appeal as of the most recent reporting available. In parallel, Trafigura Beheer B.V. pleaded guilty on 6 February 2025 in the United States District Court for the Southern District of Florida to conspiracy to violate the Foreign Corrupt Practices Act, arising from a decade of bribery, from 2003 to 2014, of officials at the Brazilian state oil company Petrobras, agreeing to pay over USD 126 million to the Department of Justice. A separate Brazilian civil settlement of USD 75.8 million was agreed on 31 March 2025 to resolve related civil claims, with partial credit applied against the US fine.

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Read through the Conflict Finance Filter, tracing source, channel and deployment, the Angola and Brazil episodes together illustrate an extractive-sector corruption channel in which oil-sector contracts in producer states generated illicit proceeds that moved through a Dutch corporate wrapper without material Dutch-based detection or enforcement. This is a structural extractive-industry finding rather than an episodic one: three separate enforcement actions across three years, in three jurisdictions, arising from a single underlying decade-long pattern of conduct connected through one corporate structure domiciled in the Netherlands. The absence of a Dutch-led enforcement action in this sequence is itself an analytically significant data point regarding domestic detection capacity for extractive-sector corruption channelled through Dutch corporate vehicles.

Outlook

The Trafigura sequence closes out across Switzerland, Brazil and the United States with the appeal of the Swiss conviction as the only open procedural matter, but the broader question for this domain is whether the Netherlands develops any domestic-facing mechanism for detecting extractive-sector corruption laundered through Dutch corporate domiciles, given that none of the three 2025 enforcement actions originated from Dutch authorities.

Cumulative analysis

Conflict Finance and Extractive-Industry Integrity — Cumulative Analysis

The cumulative D4 record for the Netherlands is anchored entirely in the Trafigura corporate structure and the extractive-sector bribery pattern it channelled, a pattern that has now been assessed across every cycle to date without material change to the underlying facts, only to the procedural status of the enforcement actions themselves. Trafigura Beheer B.V., the Amsterdam-domiciled subsidiary of the Singapore-headquartered Trafigura Group, together with former chief operating officer Mike Wainwright, was convicted by the Swiss Federal Criminal Court of bribery of an Angolan official over conduct spanning 2009 to 2011, with that conviction under appeal as of the most recent reporting. Separately, and arising from an unrelated decade of conduct, Trafigura Beheer B.V. pleaded guilty on 6 February 2025 in the United States District Court for the Southern District of Florida to conspiracy to violate the Foreign Corrupt Practices Act in connection with bribery of officials at the Brazilian state oil company Petrobras between 2003 and 2014, agreeing to pay over USD 126 million, with a further USD 75.8 million Brazilian civil settlement following on 31 March 2025 and receiving partial credit against the US penalty.

What the cumulative record makes clear, more than any single cycle in isolation, is the consistency of the enforcement geography relative to the corporate-domicile geography. Across two distinct bribery patterns, in Angola and in Brazil, spanning a combined period of roughly two decades of underlying conduct, prosecution and financial penalty have been assessed and imposed exclusively by Swiss, Brazilian and US authorities. No enforcement action originating from Dutch authorities appears in the record for either pattern, despite the corporate vehicle through which both patterns were channelled being domiciled in Amsterdam. This is the structural extractive-industry integrity finding that the Netherlands case illustrates for FIM purposes: a producer-state corruption channel does not require the domicile jurisdiction to participate in detection or enforcement in order for that domicile to serve as the operative legal and financial wrapper for the underlying conduct.

The Trafigura sequence appears substantively concluded across the jurisdictions that did act, with the Swiss conviction appeal as the principal open procedural item carried forward. The persistent open question for the Netherlands specifically, unresolved across every cycle assessed to date, is whether any domestic mechanism exists or is being developed to detect extractive-sector corruption channelled through Dutch corporate vehicles independent of foreign prosecutorial initiative, a question the Trafigura case has not yet answered in the affirmative.

domain_sub_briefs · D4 · Cumulative analysis

D5 Crypto / Digital Assets / Financial Innovation

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Crypto, Digital Assets, and Financial Innovation

The defining D5 development in the Netherlands this period is the joint AFM/DNB exploratory report, published 12 October 2026, finding that Dutch property and securities law, the Burgerlijk Wetboek and the Wet giraal effectenverkeer, provides no basis for securities issued, held and transferred exclusively as tokens. This is a structural legal-infrastructure finding rather than a crypto-licensing restriction: the gap concerns whether Dutch civil law can recognise a token itself as the sole legal basis of title and transfer for a security, not whether a crypto-asset service provider is permitted to operate. The regulators warned explicitly of migration risk, the prospect that issuers and market infrastructure providers could move native tokenisation activity to jurisdictions with clearer legal bases, and recommended a joint follow-up process involving government and market participants to address the gap.

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From a financial-innovation-integrity perspective, this finding matters because legal uncertainty at the custody-and-title layer is a known vector for structuring risk: market participants seeking to tokenise securities in the interim must rely on hybrid or dual-registration arrangements that layer a token representation over a conventional legal title, and any such layering arrangement introduces reconciliation and beneficial-ownership-tracing complexity that a cleaner single-layer legal basis would avoid. The AFM and DNB's joint framing, as prudential and conduct regulators acting together rather than separately, signals that this is being treated as capital-markets infrastructure policy rather than purely a digital-assets supervisory matter.

This tokenisation finding sits alongside the Netherlands' broader crypto-asset supervisory architecture, within which DNB and AFM share responsibility under the EU's Markets in Crypto-Assets framework, though no MiCA-specific enforcement action or licensing development was identified for the Netherlands this period. The absence of such a development is itself worth recording: the only live crypto-adjacent signal this cycle was the civil-law tokenisation gap, not a licensing or enforcement matter under the crypto-specific regulatory perimeter.

Outlook

The AFM/DNB recommendation for a joint follow-up process with government and market participants has no confirmed timetable. Whether the Dutch government elects to pursue a legislative fix to the Burgerlijk Wetboek and Wet giraal effectenverkeer, or whether market participants are left to continue relying on hybrid dual-registration structures, is the central open question for market infrastructure and financial-innovation integrity in the Netherlands going forward. No further regulatory-horizon item specific to this gap carries a confirmed stage or date at this time.

Cumulative analysis

Crypto, Digital Assets, and Financial Innovation — Cumulative Analysis

The cumulative Netherlands D5 profile through this cycle continues to combine two distinct threads that have each held consistent across prior assessment: a genuinely constructive and improving domestic regulatory posture toward licensed crypto-asset activity, and a persistent, structurally distinct exposure to offshore-controlled illicit infrastructure physically hosted on Dutch soil. On the regulatory side, the closure of the MiCA transitional window on 1 July 2026 under Article 143(3) ended the national-grandfathering legal basis under which many Dutch crypto-asset service providers previously operated, shifting full AML/CFT supervisory responsibility onto AFM and DNB under the harmonised EU regime. This closure was preceded by the AFM Wwft guidance annex for crypto-asset service providers, published 2 May 2025, which formalised continuous customer due diligence, transaction monitoring, beneficial-ownership verification and suspicious-activity-report-filing expectations ahead of the deadline, an early-mover supervisory posture relative to peer jurisdictions still working through MiCA implementation. This domestic trajectory is corroborated internationally: the Financial Action Task Force upgraded the Netherlands Recommendation 15 rating, covering virtual-asset service providers specifically, from Partially Compliant to Largely Compliant in the September 2025 enhanced follow-up report, the only recommendation re-rated in that exercise, and one directly tied to supervisory improvements in the digital-asset space.

The second thread, running in parallel rather than in tension with the first, is the recurring pattern of Dutch data-centre and hosting infrastructure being used by offshore-controlled illicit crypto operations disconnected from any genuine Dutch nexus. Russian-linked no-KYC exchanges, Cryptex and PM2BTC, and the DPRK Lazarus-linked mixer successor Sinbad.io, repeatedly located servers physically within the Netherlands notwithstanding beneficial ownership, customer base and predicate criminality situated entirely offshore. This infrastructure was disrupted through a coordinated action on 26 September 2024 involving OFAC designation, a FinCEN primary money-laundering-concern finding for PM2BTC, and a joint seizure operation by the US Secret Service, Netherlands Police and FIOD. Across the cycles assessed to date, this disruption has stood as the clearest documented instance of the pattern being addressed, but whether successor hosting infrastructure has since emerged in the Netherlands has not been established in any cycle reviewed, leaving the underlying enabler dynamic formally unresolved even where a specific instance of it has been shut down.

The cumulative judgment is that these two threads should be read as distinct rather than conflated: the Netherlands licensed crypto-asset sector is on an improving regulatory trajectory under MiCA and Wwft supervision, while the physical-hosting exposure to offshore-controlled illicit infrastructure operates largely outside that licensed perimeter and has not shown comparable improvement, since detection to date has depended on foreign-partner referral rather than Dutch-led identification. The central forward question, carried across cycles, remains whether Dutch authorities develop independent capacity to detect such infrastructure proactively, rather than relying on the same reactive pattern that resolved the 2024 Cryptex and PM2BTC case.

domain_sub_briefs · D5 · Cumulative analysis
Standing baseline position

AFM/DNB joint report (12 Oct 2026) finds Dutch property/securities law provides no basis for native securities tokenisation.

AFM is competent authority for CASP authorisation and conduct under MiCA; DNB supervises ART/EMT issuers; the former Wwft Chapter 3A DNB registration regime was repealed 4 February 2025.

Netherlands added to D5 standing coverage: recurring host jurisdiction for Russian/DPRK crypto-laundering infrastructure, with tightening AFM/DNB supervisory posture ahead of the 1 July 2026 MiCA deadline.

Periodic updates (1)
4 Nov 2026 · fim-2026-11-04

Crypto, Digital Assets, and Financial Innovation

The defining D5 development in the Netherlands this period is the joint AFM/DNB exploratory report, published 12 October 2026, finding that Dutch property and securities law, the Burgerlijk Wetboek and the Wet giraal effectenverkeer, provides no basis for securities issued, held and transferred exclusively as tokens. This is a structural legal-infrastructure finding rather than a crypto-licensing restriction: the gap concerns whether Dutch civil law can recognise a token itself as the sole legal basis of title and transfer for a security, not whether a crypto-asset service provider is permitted to operate. The regulators warned explicitly of migration risk, the prospect that issuers and market infrastructure providers could move native tokenisation activity to jurisdictions with clearer legal bases, and recommended a joint follow-up process involving government and market participants to address the gap.

From a financial-innovation-integrity perspective, this finding matters because legal uncertainty at the custody-and-title layer is a known vector for structuring risk: market participants seeking to tokenise securities in the interim must rely on hybrid or dual-registration arrangements that layer a token representation over a conventional legal title, and any such layering arrangement introduces reconciliation and beneficial-ownership-tracing complexity that a cleaner single-layer legal basis would avoid. The AFM and DNB's joint framing, as prudential and conduct regulators acting together rather than separately, signals that this is being treated as capital-markets infrastructure policy rather than purely a digital-assets supervisory matter.

This tokenisation finding sits alongside the Netherlands' broader crypto-asset supervisory architecture, within which DNB and AFM share responsibility under the EU's Markets in Crypto-Assets framework, though no MiCA-specific enforcement action or licensing development was identified for the Netherlands this period. The absence of such a development is itself worth recording: the only live crypto-adjacent signal was the civil-law tokenisation gap, not a licensing or enforcement matter under the crypto-specific regulatory perimeter.

Outlook

The AFM/DNB recommendation for a joint follow-up process with government and market participants has no confirmed timetable. Whether the Dutch government elects to pursue a legislative fix to the Burgerlijk Wetboek and Wet giraal effectenverkeer, or whether market participants are left to continue relying on hybrid dual-registration structures, is the central open question for market infrastructure and financial-innovation integrity in the Netherlands going forward. No further regulatory-horizon item specific to this gap carries a confirmed stage or date at this time.

D6 Compliance Technology & Active Defence

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Compliance Technology and Active Defence

The clearest active-defence signal in the Netherlands this cycle is the AFM Wwft guidance annex for crypto-asset service providers, published 2 May 2025, which embeds continuous customer due diligence, transaction monitoring, beneficial-ownership verification and suspicious-activity-report filing expectations for the sector ahead of the 1 July 2026 MiCA transitional-window closure. This is a first-party supervisory action, distinguishing it from generic industry guidance, and it places crypto-asset service providers on a proactive, perpetual-KYC-oriented supervisory footing comparable to that already applied to the rest of the regulated financial sector under the twin-peaks DNB/AFM model. Alongside this, FIU-Nederland has added capacity as part of the broader national AML strengthening programme, and a EUR 3,000 national cash-payment limit entered into force on 1 January 2025, both framed as operational and control-technology pre-positioning ahead of the 2027 AMLR harmonisation date, though the specific scale and timing detail on the FIU capacity increase remains thinly evidenced.

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Read against the Netherlands twin-peaks supervisory architecture, in which De Nederlandsche Bank handles prudential supervision and the AFM handles conduct supervision under the Wwft, the AFM guidance annex represents an example of a national supervisor moving proactively to extend an existing control-technology and monitoring framework onto a newly regulated sector ahead of a hard compliance deadline, rather than waiting for a deficiency to be identified through a mutual evaluation or enforcement action. This contrasts with the more reactive detection posture evident in the Netherlands D1 and D5 crypto-hosting enabler findings, where disruption has depended on foreign-partner referral.

Outlook

Whether the AFM Wwft guidance annex translates into measurable improvement in domestic detection of illicit crypto-hosting activity, closing the gap between proactive supervisory guidance for licensed entities and reactive detection of unlicensed or offshore-controlled infrastructure, is the key question to track for this domain in subsequent cycles, alongside how FIU-Nederland capacity gains are deployed operationally.

Cumulative analysis

Compliance Technology and Active Defence — Cumulative Analysis

The Netherlands D6 signal has, across the cycles assessed, centred consistently on the AFM Wwft guidance annex for crypto-asset service providers, published 2 May 2025, which remains the clearest documented instance of a Dutch supervisor proactively extending an existing control-technology and monitoring framework onto a newly regulated sector ahead of a hard compliance deadline rather than in response to an identified deficiency. The guidance annex embeds continuous customer due diligence, transaction monitoring, beneficial-ownership verification and suspicious-activity-report filing expectations for crypto-asset service providers, placing them on the same supervisory footing as the rest of the regulated financial sector operating under the twin-peaks model in which De Nederlandsche Bank handles prudential supervision and the AFM handles conduct supervision under the Wwft. This action preceded, and appears deliberately timed ahead of, the 1 July 2026 closure of the MiCA transitional authorisation window under Article 143(3), after which all Dutch crypto-asset service providers were required to be fully MiCA-authorised.

Alongside this centrepiece development, two supporting control-technology measures have been logged across cycles: a EUR 3,000 national cash-payment limit that entered into force on 1 January 2025, restricting a specific cash-based laundering vector ahead of EU-wide AMLR harmonisation, and additional capacity added to FIU-Nederland as part of the broader national AML strengthening programme, though the latter has remained thinly evidenced on scale and timing across every cycle reviewed to date, with no independent quantification available beyond the same aggregate narrative source.

The cumulative significance of this domain lies in the contrast it presents with the Netherlands D1 and D5 enabler findings. Where the physical-hosting exposure to offshore-controlled illicit crypto infrastructure has depended on foreign-partner referral for detection and disruption, the AFM guidance annex demonstrates that Dutch supervisory technology and active-defence posture can move proactively when the regulated population is clearly defined and the compliance deadline is fixed and known in advance, as with MiCA authorisation. This suggests the reactive detection pattern documented elsewhere in the Netherlands profile may be less a function of institutional capacity limits and more a function of the specific difficulty of detecting infrastructure operated by entities with no genuine Dutch beneficial-ownership or customer nexus, a harder detection problem than supervising a defined, licensed population.

The open question carried forward across cycles is whether the AFM guidance annex, once its expectations are operational for a full supervisory cycle, produces measurable improvement in domestic detection of illicit crypto-hosting activity of the kind documented in the Cryptex, PM2BTC and Sinbad.io cases, or whether the active-defence uplift remains confined to the licensed, MiCA-authorised population while the physical-hosting enabler dynamic for unlicensed or offshore-controlled infrastructure continues on its separate, largely foreign-referral-dependent detection track.

domain_sub_briefs · D6 · Cumulative analysis

D7 AML/CTF Regime

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AML/CTF Regime

The Netherlands' AML/CTF architecture this period is defined by two threads: a concrete enforcement action under the existing Wwft regime, and the continued consultation-stage status of the legislative vehicle that will eventually replace it. De Nederlandsche Bank imposed a €722,160 administrative fine on Modulr Finance B.V. on 30 September 2026 for serious shortcomings in its ongoing monitoring of customers and transactions across the period 1 January 2023 to 16 July 2024, finding a breach of Wwft art. 3(2)(d)'s ongoing-monitoring obligation. Third-party reporting indicates the firm had relied on intermediary partners, including crypto-asset service providers, to perform monitoring that the Wwft requires the obliged entity itself to perform. This is DNB's first publicly recorded AML fine against an electronic-money institution, and it is a clear statement that outsourcing client-facing monitoring to downstream platform partners does not discharge an obliged entity's own Wwft duties.

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At the architectural level, the Netherlands' transposition of the EU's sixth Anti-Money Laundering Directive, via the draft Implementatiewet ter voorkoming van witwassen en terrorismefinanciering, which will repeal the Wwft once enacted, remains at the consultation stage that opened 4 July 2025. No material progression toward enactment was identified this period, and the parliamentary timetable for the Implementatiewet remains unconfirmed. In the meantime, the EU's Anti-Money Laundering Regulation applies directly in the Netherlands without requiring domestic transposition, meaning obliged entities already face a two-track compliance landscape: directly applicable EU-level requirements under the AMLR running alongside the still-in-force Wwft, pending the Implementatiewet's eventual passage and the Wwft's repeal.

This dual-track posture is itself the structural fact to track: the AML Regulation, the sixth directive, and the AMLA Regulation establishing the EU's Anti-Money Laundering Authority together represent three distinct instruments moving supervision from a purely national model toward a hybrid EU-level regime, and the Netherlands' Modulr Finance fine demonstrates that national supervision under the existing Wwft framework remains active and consequential in the interim.

Outlook

The principal item to watch is whether the Implementatiewet progresses beyond consultation stage toward a confirmed parliamentary timetable; no such progression was identified this period. Separately, whether DNB's enforcement posture toward payment-sector gatekeepers relying on downstream monitoring partners, as demonstrated by the Modulr Finance fine, extends to further firms with similar outsourcing arrangements is a pattern worth monitoring, though no further such action was identified this period.

Cumulative analysis

AML/CTF Regime

De Nederlandsche Bank imposed an EUR 8.5 million administrative fine on ABN AMRO Bank N.V. on 6 July 2026, for serious customer due diligence shortcomings affecting high-risk customers over the period September 2023 to September 2024. The action continues a supervisory enforcement lineage against major Dutch banks for CDD failures that traces back to DNB's landmark 2018 action against ING, and it demonstrates that DNB continues to treat CDD adequacy at systemically significant Dutch banks as an active, standing supervisory priority rather than a settled compliance baseline. Read as architecture rather than as an isolated incident, the ABN AMRO fine is best understood as the latest instance of a recurring supervisory pattern, and further action against other major Dutch banks in this vein would be consistent with, rather than a departure from, DNB's established enforcement posture.

The fine also functions as evidence that the Netherlands' Wwft-based CDD framework, the domestic transposition vehicle for AML customer-due-diligence obligations, remains actively enforced notwithstanding the broader EU-level transition toward the AML Regulation (AMLR, Regulation (EU) 2024/1624). The Netherlands is directly bound by AMLR as an EU-27 member, and the AMLA Regulation (Regulation (EU) 2024/1620) is progressively building out a supervisory perimeter that could eventually bring the country's highest-risk obliged entities, potentially including systemically significant banks such as ABN AMRO, under a degree of direct EU-level supervision alongside DNB. DNB and AFM have not yet finalised that perimeter handoff, so for this cycle DNB's national enforcement action, rather than any AMLA-level intervention, is the operative supervisory mechanism.

FATF's 2025 mutual-evaluation follow-up report maintains the Netherlands' largely-compliant rating while continuing to flag risk-based supervisory resourcing, alongside beneficial-ownership transparency adequacy, as an outstanding area. The ABN AMRO fine is consistent with active, resourced supervisory enforcement at the level of individual systemically significant institutions, even as FATF's broader resourcing concern presumably speaks to capacity across the wider population of Dutch obliged entities rather than to DNB's largest-bank enforcement specifically.

Outlook

The clearest marker of what would change the Netherlands' AML/CTF picture over the coming cycle is further DNB enforcement action, or its absence, against other major Dutch banks; a further fine in this lineage would confirm the pattern as structural, while a prolonged absence of new action would itself be a notable data point about the current state of Dutch bank CDD compliance. Progress, or its absence, on the AMLR/AMLA supervisory-perimeter handoff for the Netherlands' highest-risk obliged entities is the second marker to watch, since a finalised direct-supervision designation would represent a genuinely new EU-level enforcement layer above DNB's existing national posture.

domain_sub_briefs · D7 · Cumulative analysis
Standing baseline position

AMLD6 transposition bill (Iwt) published by Raad van State 2026-08-17; repeals the Wwft; targets AMLR application date of 2027-07-10.

10 Compliant / 29 Largely Compliant / 1 Partially Compliant (R.15 re-rated Partially Compliant -> Largely Compliant, 2025 Follow-Up Report); NL remains in regular follow-up.

Periodic updates (2)
4 Oct 2026 · fim-2026-10-04

AML/CTF Regime

The Netherlands' AML/CTF regime shows two movements on two different clocks this cycle. The first is an already-effective domestic control: from 1 January 2026, new article 1f of the Wwft (the Dutch Anti-Money Laundering and Anti-Terrorist Financing Act) establishes an absolute prohibition on cash payments of EUR 3,000 or more for the sale or purchase of goods. This replaces the prior arrangement, under which traders of goods faced a EUR 10,000 threshold triggering customer due diligence and reporting obligations rather than an outright prohibition. The shift from a due-diligence trigger to a bright-line prohibition is a meaningful change in control architecture: above EUR 3,000, the cash payment for goods is no longer a permissible transaction to manage through enhanced monitoring, it is simply not permitted. Services transactions remain outside the scope of this specific prohibition, preserving a goods/services distinction that obliged entities handling mixed transaction types will need to track carefully.

The second movement sits on a longer and more structural clock. The Council of State's 17 August 2026 advisory on the Implementatiewet ter voorkoming van witwassen en terrorismefinanciering found that the bill transposing the sixth AML Directive must be amended before it reaches the Tweede Kamer, citing risk-based-approach, non-discrimination and data-protection gaps. That bill also carries the Netherlands' proposed supervisory map for the AML/CTF regime going forward, naming DNB, the AFM, the Dienst Financieel-Economische Integriteit, Bureau Financieel Toezicht, the deken, and the Kansspelautoriteit as designated supervisors across the banking, investment, legal and gambling sectors. Separately from the Iwt's progress, De Nederlandsche Bank and the Autoriteit Financiele Markten both confirm that the EU AML Regulation becomes directly applicable in the Netherlands on 10 July 2027, a date that does not depend on the Iwt completing its domestic passage because the Regulation takes direct effect by its own force.

The net picture for the AML/CTF regime is of a jurisdiction where the operative, transaction-level control is tightening now, the Wwft's cash-payment restriction being the clearest example, while the structural, governance-level transposition of the sixth Directive is explicitly held back pending amendment. Firms subject to the Wwft should treat the EUR 3,000 cash prohibition as a present, binding obligation, while treating the Iwt's supervisory architecture, including the specific allocation of supervisory responsibility across the six named bodies, as provisional until the amended bill is filed and passed.

Outlook

Two dates anchor the forward view: the next filing of an amended Iwt with the Tweede Kamer, which the Council of State has made a precondition rather than a recommendation, and the AMLR's confirmed 10 July 2027 application date, which proceeds independent of the Iwt's domestic timetable. Firms should expect the EUR 3,000 cash-payment prohibition to remain a stable, present-tense obligation in the interim, while treating any description of the Iwt's supervisory governance as subject to revision until parliamentary filing occurs.

28 Sep 2026 · fim-2026-09-28

AML/CTF Regime

The Netherlands' AML/CTF regime this cycle is defined by two things happening in parallel: routine domestic supervisory enforcement continuing under the current Wwft framework, and a structural transition toward the EU's new AML architecture gathering pace underneath it. On the enforcement side, DNB fined trust office International Trust Services B.V. EUR29,700 on 24 November 2025 for failing to commission a required audit under the Wwft, covering the 2021 calendar year. This is ordinary supervisory enforcement of an existing governance obligation, not a systemic-risk finding, and it illustrates that the Wwft's audit-commissioning requirement remains an active area of DNB scrutiny for trust offices even as the broader legal architecture around it prepares to change.

The structural story is the more significant one. The Anti-Money Laundering Authority, established under the AMLA Regulation (Reg (EU) 2024/1620), has operated its General Board since 1 July 2025. The Netherlands is one of only two AMLA member states, alongside Germany, represented on that board by a single national authority rather than a multi-regulator delegation; DNB holds that seat. This is a notable governance-concentration fact: most member states apportion AMLA representation across multiple domestic supervisors reflecting their own sectoral split, while the Netherlands and Germany have each consolidated representation in one institution.

Looking forward, the Wwft itself is due to be replaced by the Implementation Act on the Prevention of Money Laundering and Terrorist Financing, the Iwt, as the Netherlands' vehicle for transposing the sixth Anti-Money Laundering Directive. This will operate alongside the directly-applicable AML Regulation, which does not require domestic transposition. AMLA is scheduled to begin direct supervision of selected high-risk cross-border entities from January 2028, at which point the current DNB/AFM dual-supervisor model, under which DNB supervises the majority of Wwft-obliged institutions while the AFM covers certain financial-market participants, will operate alongside a layer of EU-level direct supervision for the highest-risk entities.

Outlook

The Iwt's exact legislative timetable is not yet confirmed to a primary calendar; its progression from consultation toward enactment is the clearest near-term marker to watch, since it will fix the date on which the Wwft is formally superseded as NL's transposition vehicle. The longer-term marker is January 2028, when AMLA's direct-supervision powers activate and the Netherlands' unusual single-authority board representation will be tested against the practical demands of coordinating EU-level supervision through one national channel rather than several.

D8 Commercial Activity

no_change

FIU-Nederland reporting volumes and DNB payment-fraud statistics for 2025 are market facts, not commercial transactions; no qualifying M&A/investment/partnership event among NL financial-integrity market participants found within the 12-month window.

Regulatory horizon
Proposed2026-Q4 · ±half_year

UBO-register legitimate-interest access decree

Creates a closed system of categories of persons with legitimate interest eligible for UBO-register access; published 2 April 2026, not yet in force.
Source
Adopted2027 · ±year

AMLR / 6AMLD application date and AMLA direct supervision phase-in

Wwft is progressively displaced by a directly-applicable EU single rulebook (AMLR) with a wider obliged-entity population and a new supranational supervisor (AMLA).
European Commission / AMLA Source
Adopted10 Jul 2027 · ±year

AMLR direct effect in Netherlands

The EU AMLR becomes directly applicable, replacing most Wwft material rules as a single rulebook for reporting entities.
Source
Consultation2027-Q3 · ±multi_year

Implementatiewet ter voorkoming van witwassen en terrorismefinanciering (Iwt) — AMLD6 transposition, Wwft repeal

Wwft repeal; national AMLD6 transposition enters into force on an unconfirmed date within the EU package's July 2027 outer deadline.
Source
Proposed2030-Q1 · ±multi_year

FATF 5th-round mutual evaluation of the Netherlands

The Netherlands is scheduled for its next mutual evaluation round under the 2022 FATF Methodology.
Source
5 dated · 2 pending date · baseline fim-2026-07-08
Role action cards
MLRO

DNB fined an electronic-money institution for AML monitoring failures tied to reliance on downstream platform partners.

The Modulr Finance fine shows DNB will sanction ongoing-monitoring failures even where an obliged entity relies on intermediary partners, including crypto-asset service providers, to perform customer and transaction monitoring; outsourcing monitoring functions does not discharge the Wwft art. 3(2)(d) obligation.

1 evidence refs
Compliance

The Netherlands' AMLD6 transposition vehicle remains at consultation stage with no confirmed timetable.

Obliged entities continue to operate under the existing Wwft pending the Implementatiewet's eventual passage, while the EU AML Regulation already applies directly; compliance functions should track both tracks as parallel, not sequential, obligations.

2 evidence refs
Legal

AFM and DNB jointly identified a legal gap preventing native securities tokenisation under Dutch civil and securities law.

The absence of a legal basis for token-only securities under the Burgerlijk Wetboek and Wet giraal effectenverkeer creates structuring risk for any transaction relying on native tokenisation; counsel should expect continued reliance on hybrid dual-registration arrangements pending any legislative fix.

1 evidence refs
Board

DNB's first public AML fine against an EMI signals continued supervisory rigour over payment-sector gatekeepers.

The €722,160 Modulr Finance fine is a reputational and precedent-setting signal for any institution with similar outsourced-monitoring arrangements; board-level oversight of third-party monitoring reliance is now a demonstrated supervisory focus area.

1 evidence refs
CTO

The AFM/DNB tokenisation report identifies a civil-law gap, not a technical or MiCA-licensing restriction, for native token-based securities infrastructure.

Technical architecture for tokenised securities in the Netherlands must continue to layer over conventional legal title via dual-registration arrangements; the gap is in private law, not in the crypto-licensing perimeter, so no change to CASP authorisation requirements follows from this finding.

1 evidence refs
Risk

Reliance on downstream intermediary partners, including crypto-asset service providers, for AML monitoring is a demonstrated supervisory exposure.

The Modulr Finance fine demonstrates that outsourced-monitoring arrangements concentrate risk at the point where an obliged entity fails to retain adequate oversight of a partner performing monitoring on its behalf; this is a model-risk and third-party-risk concentration point worth flagging in exposure reviews.

1 evidence refs
Operations

No material change for this persona this cycle.

No material change for this persona this cycle

Audit

The Modulr Finance fine identifies a documented monitoring-control failure spanning an 18-month period.

DNB's finding covers 1 January 2023 to 16 July 2024, a sustained period during which ongoing monitoring did not meet Wwft art. 3(2)(d) standards; audit scope for comparable payment-sector institutions relying on intermediary monitoring partners should consider whether equivalent control gaps exist.

1 evidence refs
Scenario sketches

AMLA direct-supervision transition and Dutch obliged-entity exposure

Illustrative only: as AMLA direct and indirect supervision of cross-border obliged entities phases in under the AMLA Regulation (Reg (EU) 2024/1620), alongside the directly-applicable AML Regulation (Reg 2024/1624) and per-state sixth directive transposition such as the Netherlands' still-consultation-stage Implementatiewet, a Dutch payment-sector gatekeeper combining national Wwft-era enforcement exposure (illustrated this cycle by the Modulr Finance fine) with eventual EU-level supervisory oversight could face a reshaped compliance landscape in which national and supranational supervisory expectations must be reconciled during the transition window. This is architecture-over-incident illustration, not a prediction of any specific future enforcement action.

Illustrative scenario for analytical orientation only. Not compliance advice, not a prediction, and not a statement of observed fact.

Standing trackers (T1–T6)
TrackerStatusNote
T1 · Sanctions Architecture and Evasionno_changeSanctiewet 1977 screening/freezing/reporting regime unchanged.
T2 · EU AML Package (AMLR/6AMLD/AMLA)no_change
T3 · Enabler Jurisdiction Dynamicsno_change
T4 · Conflict Finance Trackingno_change
T5 · Crypto / VASP Regulatory FrameworkstableMiCA CASP authorisation and TFR travel-rule obligations confirmed in force in NL.
T6 · Sanctions Regime Divergenceno_change
Registers

Enforcement actions

  • 31 Jan 2025
  • 31 Mar 2025
  • 2 May 2025
  • 23 Sep 2025
  • 31 Jan 2025
  • 31 Mar 2025
  • 6 Feb 2025
  • 2 May 2025
  • 26 Sep 2024
  • 6 Jul 2026
  • 5 Feb 2026
  • 25 Jun 2025
  • 22 Jun 2026
  • 24 Nov 2025
  • 30 Sep 2026
  • Trafigura and its former chief operating officer were convicted on bribery charges relating to payments to an Angolan official between 2009-2011, the first conviction of a senior commodity-trading executive for corruption; the Amsterdam-domiciled parent entity itself was also convicted for inadequate internal controls. 31 Jan 2025
  • Trafigura agreed to a civil settlement resolving Brazilian bribery-related cases dating to at least 2020, following a 2024 guilty plea to a decade of bribery in Brazil entered in a Miami federal court. 31 Mar 2025
  • AFM published a dedicated annex to its Wwft guidelines specifically for CASPs, embedding EBA-aligned expectations on customer due diligence, transaction monitoring, beneficial-ownership verification and suspicious-activity reporting into the same supervisory footing as the rest of the regulated financial sector. 2 May 2025
  • FATF adopted the 1st Enhanced Follow-Up Report on the Netherlands, re-rating Recommendation 15 (new technologies/VASPs) from Partially Compliant to Largely Compliant following technical-compliance improvements since the 2022 mutual evaluation. 23 Sep 2025

Sanctions changes

  • 23 Oct 2025
  • 23 Apr 2026
  • 23 Oct 2025
  • 23 Apr 2026
  • 15 Jun 2026
  • 14 May 2026
  • 23 Apr 2026
  • 1 Apr 2026
  • 28 Apr 2025
  • EU 19th sanctions package against Russia introduced a phased LNG import ban, closed exemptions for Rosneft/Gazprom Neft transactions, added 117 shadow-fleet vessel listings (total 557) and imposed the EU's first-ever sanctions on crypto providers, targeting the Russian-state-linked A7A5 stablecoin ecosystem — all directly applicable in the Netherlands as an EU member state, including at Rotterdam port and via Dutch-domiciled trading/financial intermediaries. 23 Oct 2025
  • EU 20th sanctions package added 46 further shadow-fleet vessel listings (bringing the EU total to 632), delisted 11 vessels returning to compliance, introduced a mandatory 'no Russia' clause for EU sellers, a scrapping clause for shadow-fleet exit, and listed Murmansk, Tuapse and the Karimun Oil Terminal (Indonesia) as ports linked to shadow-fleet circumvention. 23 Apr 2026

Regulatory horizon (register)

  • UK ECCTA 2023 failure-to-prevent-fraud offence in force
  • AMLR / 6AMLD application date and AMLA direct supervision phase-in
  • UK ECCTA 2023 failure-to-prevent-fraud offence in force
  • Implementation Act on the Prevention of Money Laundering and Terrorist Financing (Iwt)
  • Implementatiewet ter voorkoming van witwassen en terrorismefinanciering (Iwt) — AMLD6 transposition, Wwft repeal
  • AMLD6 transposition bill (Iwt) targeting Wwft repeal
  • AMLR direct effect in Netherlands
  • UBO-register legitimate-interest access decree
  • FATF 5th-round mutual evaluation of the Netherlands
  • AML Regulation (AMLR, Reg (EU) 2024/1624) becomes directly applicable
  • MiCA transitional window for Dutch CASPs closes
  • AMLA direct/indirect supervisory perimeter selection affecting Dutch entities

Active schemes

  • [HIGH] Netherlands as physical infrastructure host for Russian/DPRK-linked crypto laundering
  • Netherlands as domicile hub for global commodity-trading corporate structures
  • Dutch BV conduit/mailbox companies with no real presence
  • Trust offices and corporate lawyers as under-supervised gatekeepers
Sources
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  80. Frequently Asked Questions
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  86. Netherlands - Reform Support - European Commission
  87. "Black and grey" lists
  88. US Treasury Takes Coordinated Actions Against Illicit Russian Virtual Currency Exchanges and Cybercrime Facilitators PM2BTC and Cryptex | TRM Labs
  89. OFAC Sanctions Tracker: How Sanctions Impact Crypto Crime - Chainalysis
  90. Netherlands
  91. OFAC Designates Russian Exchange Cryptex, FinCEN names PM2BTC - Chainalysis
  92. The Netherlands' progress in strengthening measures to tackle money laundering and terrorist financing
  93. EU sanctions against Russia: questions and answers - Consilium
  94. FATF Report highlights major gaps in global response to Proliferation Financing and Sanctions Evasion
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  96. RUSSIA-RELATED ILLICIT FINANCE AND SANCTIONS FIU WORKING GROUP STATEMENT OF INTENT | FinCEN.gov
  97. Enforcement Release - Office of Foreign Assets Control
  98. The TOP Takeover: Tornado Cash’s Latest Chapter | TRM Labs
  99. (TORN) Dutch Arrest Man Suspected of Being Involved in Tornado Cash - Bloomberg
  100. Tornado Cash Co-Founder Found Guilty But Avoids Worst Counts - Bloomberg
  101. 1 (BILLINGCODE: 4810-02-P) DEPARTMENT OF THE TREASURY
  102. Understanding Tornado Cash, Its Sanctions Implications, and Key Compliance Questions - Chainalysis
  103. Dutch Authorities Make Arrests in Crypto Money Laundering Probes | OCCRP
  104. Tornado Cash Token Tumbles After Developer Arrest
  105. OFAC sanctions Tornado Cash developer Roman Semenov
  106. OFAC Sanctions Tornado Cash Founder Roman Semenov
  107. Tornado Cash Co-Founders Charged for Money Laundering | OCCRP
  108. FAQ: The EU Ruling on Ownership Transparency and What It Means for Journalists | OCCRP
  109. Frequently Asked Questions | FinCEN.gov
  110. European e-Justice Portal - Beneficial Ownership Registers – search for beneficial ownership information
  111. Treasury Department won’t enforce beneficial ownership rule under the Corporate Transparency Act - ICIJ
  112. Guidance on Beneficial Ownership of Legal Persons
  113. Beneficial Ownership Information Reporting | FinCEN.gov
  114. Beneficial Ownership Data is Critical in the Fight Against Corruption | OCCRP
  115. Beneficial Ownership Information Reporting Rule Fact Sheet | FinCEN.gov
  116. Fact Sheet: Beneficial Ownership Information Access and Safeguards Final Rule | FinCEN.gov
  117. FinCEN Removes Beneficial Ownership Reporting Requirements for U.S. Companies and U.S. Persons, Sets New Deadlines for Foreign Companies | FinCEN.gov
  118. Largest Norwegian Bank Faces Fine For Anti-Money Laundering Failures | OCCRP
  119. Global Crypto Policy Review Outlook 2025/26 Report | TRM Labs
  120. FATF publishes new Guidance on Financial Inclusion and Anti-Money Laundering and Terrorist Financing Measures
  121. ABN Amro in Dutch Central Bank Crosshairs Over Pay Restrictions - Bloomberg
  122. Executive Summary Key Findings
  123. De Nederlandsche Bank (DNB) | EU Digital Finance Platform
  124. Fatf-gafi
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  138. Russia’s war of aggression against Ukraine: EU agrees 17th package of sanctions - Consilium
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  149. Jail Sentence For Trafigura Powerbroker Shows Bribery Crackdown - Bloomberg
  150. Trafigura Appeals Swiss Conviction Over Bribery Controls - Bloomberg
  151. Trafigura Agrees to Pay $76 Million in Brazil Bribery Cases - Bloomberg
  152. Trafigura and Ex-COO Convicted of Bribery by Swiss Court - Bloomberg
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  157. Trafigura Defends Its Controls During Time It Was Paying Bribes
  158. Trafigura’s Bribery Case Puts Commodity Trading Culture on Trial in Switzerland
  159. Sanctions: Iranians Flock to Crypto; Int'l Actions Target Russia - Chainalysis
  160. What is a crypto mixer?
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  162. Tornado Cash Founders Storm, Semenov Charged by US in Money Laundering Scheme
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  164. Jurisdictions under Increased Monitoring - 13 February 2026
  165. High-risk and other monitored jurisdictions
  166. High-Risk Jurisdictions subject to a Call for Action - 13 February 2026
  167. Countries / Jurisdictions
  168. High-Risk Jurisdictions subject to a Call for Action - 19 June 2026
  169. FATF changes its grey listing criteria to further focus on risk
  170. Jurisdictions under Increased Monitoring - 24 October 2025
  171. FIOD (Netherlands) | OCCRP
  172. Police Arrest 90 Alleged Mafia Members in Europe and Latin America | OCCRP
  173. Asset Seizure and Cryptocurrency - Chainalysis
  174. Crypto Mixers and AML Compliance - Chainalysis
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  185. The Netherlands' measures to combat money laundering and terrorist financing
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  187. Antitrust: Commission sends Statement of Objections to Deutsche Bank and Rabobank over Euro-denominated bonds trading cartel case
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  198. OCCRP
Coverage gaps
fim-int-2026-07-07-G001: The WODC National Risk Assessment 2…
fim-int-2026-07-07-G001: The WODC National Risk Assessment 2023 could not be verbatim-cited this cycle; challenger evidence suggests alternate accessible repository paths exist and should be re-pulled at the next cycle. [resolved]
fim-int-2026-07-07-G002: The specific FATF Recommendation re…
fim-int-2026-07-07-G002: The specific FATF Recommendation remaining Partially Compliant in the Netherlands' September 2025 follow-up report is not identified in Research and would clarify the residual BO/DNFBP risk surface. [resolved]
fim-int-2026-07-07-G003: Whether successor hosting infrastru…
fim-int-2026-07-07-G003: Whether successor hosting infrastructure has emerged following the September 2024 Cryptex/PM2BTC disruption is not established this cycle. [resolved]
fim-int-2026-07-07-G004: The Netherlands' 6AMLD transpositio…
fim-int-2026-07-07-G004: The Netherlands' 6AMLD transposition status, vehicle, and deadline are not established in Research this cycle. [resolved]
fim-int-2026-07-07-G005: Precise corporate-hierarchy detail …
fim-int-2026-07-07-G005: Precise corporate-hierarchy detail distinguishing the Singapore-based Trafigura Group parent from the Amsterdam-domiciled Trafigura Beheer B.V. subsidiary in the Swiss and Brazilian convictions requires clarification for accurate enabler-jurisdiction attribution. [resolved]
fim-int-2026-07-13-G001: No standalone Colombia-specific enf…
fim-int-2026-07-13-G001: No standalone Colombia-specific enforcement action identified this cycle; peso-broker mechanics only surfaced as contextual material within a Mexico-focused FinCEN advisory. [resolved]
fim-int-2026-07-13-G002: Sub-Saharan Africa/Central Asia/Pac…
fim-int-2026-07-13-G002: Sub-Saharan Africa/Central Asia/Pacific extractive-industry conflict-finance vector remains under-covered this cycle (D4). [resolved]
fim-int-2026-07-13-G003: No Tier-1/2 primary EU Official Jou…
fim-int-2026-07-13-G003: No Tier-1/2 primary EU Official Journal citation retrieved for AMLR/AMLD6/AMLA NL transposition detail; capped at Assessed confidence pending primary-source retrieval. [resolved]
fim-int-2026-07-13-G004: SR 26-2 primary Federal Reserve/FDI…
fim-int-2026-07-13-G004: SR 26-2 primary Federal Reserve/FDIC/OCC text not directly retrieved this cycle; reliance on secondary vendor commentary caps confidence at Assessed. [resolved]
fim-int-2026-08-20-G001: Tier D jurisdictions (KH/LA/MX/CO) …
fim-int-2026-08-20-G001: Tier D jurisdictions (KH/LA/MX/CO) cross-reference to NL was not actively searched this cycle; run was NL-JID-bound. [resolved]
fim-int-2026-08-20-G002: D1, D3, D4, D5, D6 NL-specific find…
fim-int-2026-08-20-G002: D1, D3, D4, D5, D6 NL-specific findings were thin or absent this cycle; no distinct material beyond standing frameworks was located. [resolved]
fim-int-2026-09-05-G001 ({'scheme': 'financial_integrity', '…
fim-int-2026-09-05-G001 ({'scheme': 'financial_integrity', 'value': 'D2'}): No T1 legislative text for AMLR obliged-entity scope expansion or Wwft Article 1f was independently retrieved this cycle; both rest on T3 law-firm sourcing. [resolved]
fim-int-2026-09-05-G002 ({'scheme': 'financial_integrity', '…
fim-int-2026-09-05-G002 ({'scheme': 'financial_integrity', 'value': 'D6'}): No NL-specific AI/ML transaction-monitoring supervisory guidance was located this cycle, leaving the D6 compliance-technology posture gap unresolved. [resolved]
fim-int-2026-09-05-G003: Tier D jurisdictions (KH, LA, MX, C…
fim-int-2026-09-05-G003: Tier D jurisdictions (KH, LA, MX, CO) were not searched this cycle; this is a run-scope constraint, not a finding of quiet conditions there. [resolved]
fim-int-2026-09-28-G001 ({'scheme': 'financial_integrity', '…
fim-int-2026-09-28-G001 ({'scheme': 'financial_integrity', 'value': 'D1'}): D1 (Sanctions Architecture) had no NL-specific finding identified this cycle within the pooled research budget. [resolved]
fim-int-2026-09-28-G002 ({'scheme': 'financial_integrity', '…
fim-int-2026-09-28-G002 ({'scheme': 'financial_integrity', 'value': 'D2'}): D2 (Beneficial Ownership) had no NL-specific UBO-register development identified this cycle within the pooled research budget. [resolved]
fim-int-2026-09-28-G003 ({'scheme': 'financial_integrity', '…
fim-int-2026-09-28-G003 ({'scheme': 'financial_integrity', 'value': 'D3'}): D3 (Enabler Jurisdictions) had no NL-specific finding identified this cycle within the pooled research budget. [resolved]
fim-int-2026-09-28-G004 ({'scheme': 'financial_integrity', '…
fim-int-2026-09-28-G004 ({'scheme': 'financial_integrity', 'value': 'D4'}): D4 (Conflict Finance) had no NL-specific finding identified this cycle within the pooled research budget. [resolved]
fim-int-2026-09-28-G005 ({'scheme': 'financial_integrity', '…
fim-int-2026-09-28-G005 ({'scheme': 'financial_integrity', 'value': 'D7'}): Exact stage and confirmed transposition timeline for the Iwt (AMLD6 transposition vehicle) is not established to a primary legislative calendar this cycle. [resolved]
fim-int-2026-10-04-G001 ({'scheme': 'financial_integrity', '…
fim-int-2026-10-04-G001 ({'scheme': 'financial_integrity', 'value': 'D1'}): No NL-specific D1 (sanctions), D3 (enabler jurisdiction) or D6 (compliance technology) development was located this cycle; coverage for these domains is thin. [resolved]
fim-int-2026-10-04-G002: No Tier D jurisdiction search (KH/L…
fim-int-2026-10-04-G002: No Tier D jurisdiction search (KH/LA/MX/CO) was run this cycle within the shared pooled budget; absence of findings is a coverage gap, not a confirmed no-material-change result. [resolved]
fim-int-2026-10-04-G003 ({'scheme': 'financial_integrity', '…
fim-int-2026-10-04-G003 ({'scheme': 'financial_integrity', 'value': 'D2'}): The Raad van State advisory document itself (W06.26.00123/III) was not directly retrieved this cycle; the finding rests on T3 secondary reporting only. [resolved]
fim-int-2026-10-11-G001: D1-D7 domain updates for NL within …
fim-int-2026-10-11-G001: D1-D7 domain updates for NL within the 2026-10-04 to 2026-10-11 periodic window were not located; this is logged as a coverage gap given NL's chained/delta-only research posture against EEA. [resolved]
fim-int-2026-10-11-G002: Tier D jurisdiction check (KH/LA/MX…
fim-int-2026-10-11-G002: Tier D jurisdiction check (KH/LA/MX/CO) was not actively re-swept this cycle within the shared research budget. [resolved]
fim-int-2026-10-11-G003 ({'scheme': 'financial_integrity', '…
fim-int-2026-10-11-G003 ({'scheme': 'financial_integrity', 'value': 'D8'}): No T1 regulatory filing was retrieved confirming closing conditions or competition/financial-sector approval status for the Adyen Orb/Talon.One or Mollie/GoCardless transactions. [resolved]
fim-int-2026-10-18-G001: Tier D jurisdictions (KH, LA, MX, C…
fim-int-2026-10-18-G001: Tier D jurisdictions (KH, LA, MX, CO) were not actively searched this cycle; the pooled union search budget was allocated primarily to NL across five consumers, which crowded out the mandatory Tier D sweep. [open]
fim-int-2026-10-18-G002 ({'scheme': 'financial_integrity', '…
fim-int-2026-10-18-G002 ({'scheme': 'financial_integrity', 'value': 'D7'}): October 2026 FATF plenary outcomes were not available as of this cycle's cut-off (2026-10-18); current grey-list status carried forward from June 2026 plenary. [open]
fim-int-2026-10-18-G003: FR-1260 producer-need lenses for ga…
fim-int-2026-10-18-G003: FR-1260 producer-need lenses for gambling_operator, payment_company and crypto_asset_operator were not researched this cycle for NL. [open]
fim-int-2026-11-02-G001: Conflict-minerals/extractive-indust…
fim-int-2026-11-02-G001: Conflict-minerals/extractive-industry transparency (D4) and counter-proliferation-specific risk assessment were not reached within research budget for this jurisdiction. [open]
fim-int-2026-11-02-G002: Nominee/bearer-share disclosure (D2…
fim-int-2026-11-02-G002: Nominee/bearer-share disclosure (D2) and unexplained-wealth-order mechanics were not located within budget. [open]
fim-int-2026-11-04-G001: Conflict-minerals/extractive transp…
fim-int-2026-11-04-G001: Conflict-minerals/extractive transparency (CF1) obligations for NL were not reached within research budget this cycle. [open]
fim-int-2026-11-04-G002: Counter-proliferation-specific risk…
fim-int-2026-11-04-G002: Counter-proliferation-specific risk assessment (CPF1) obligations for NL were not reached within research budget this cycle. [open]
fim-int-2026-11-04-G003: Nominee/bearer-share disclosure rul…
fim-int-2026-11-04-G003: Nominee/bearer-share disclosure rules (BO2) were not reached within research budget this cycle. [open]
fim-int-2026-11-04-G004: No official aggregate obliged-entit…
fim-int-2026-11-04-G004: No official aggregate obliged-entity population count or frozen-asset total was located for NL within research budget this cycle. [open]
FIM-GAP-001 (D2): FATF's 2022 mutual evaluation and 2025 fol…
FIM-GAP-001 (D2): FATF's 2022 mutual evaluation and 2025 follow-up continue to flag that the Netherlands has not fully closed gaps around preventing misuse of legal persons and ensuring adequate, accurate and current beneficial-ownership information, including a beneficial-ownership definition that historically failed to capture persons with ultimate effective control over legal arrangements.
FIM-GAP-002 (D3): FATF assessors found the frequency, scope …
FIM-GAP-002 (D3): FATF assessors found the frequency, scope and intensity of AML/CFT supervision and monitoring for DNFBPs (including trust offices and corporate lawyers) insufficiently robust relative to identified risk, with legal ambiguities around preventive-measure obligations for corporate lawyers left unresolved.
FIM-GAP-003 (D2): The seed-designated authoritative NRA sour…
FIM-GAP-003 (D2): The seed-designated authoritative NRA source (WODC — Dutch National Risk Assessment on Money Laundering 2023) returned a 403 response on automated fetch attempt during this baseline run, consistent with the seed's own bot-block hint, preventing verbatim citation of its content in this baseline.

Evidence

Confidence-tiered claims

Adyen (Amsterdam-headquartered, Euronext-listed) agreed to acquire Talon.One (Berlin, ~EUR750m) and Orb (US, $335m), both slated to close 1 July 2026 subject to regulatory approval. [Source 1]
Probable · 1 source
Mollie (Amsterdam-founded payments firm) completed its acquisition of UK-based GoCardless on 1 September 2026 (reported deal value c. $1.1bn), combining card/local-payment and bank-payment capability across 38 countries. [Source 1]
Probable · 1 source
Mollie committed EUR350m over five years to expansion outside its home NL and UK markets, upon reaching full EEA (30-country) operational coverage on 18 June 2026. [Source 1]
Probable · 1 source
Council of State advisory (17 Aug 2026) concluded the Iwt must be amended before filing with the Tweede Kamer, citing risk-based-approach, non-discrimination and data-protection gaps. [Source 1]
Probable · 1 source
Absolute prohibition on cash payments of EUR 3,000 or more for sale/purchase of goods, effective 1 January 2026, replacing prior EUR 10,000 CDD threshold for traders of goods. [Source 1]
Probable · 1 source
The new AML/CFT framework (AMLR) will become directly applicable in NL on 10 July 2027, per DNB and AFM published guidance. [Source 1]
Probable · 1 source
DNB, AFM, the Dienst Financieel-Economische Integriteit, Bureau Financieel Toezicht, the deken and the Kansspelautoriteit are designated supervisors under the Iwt. [Source 1]
Probable · 1 source
Remains in legislative preparation to replace the Wwft as NL's AMLD6 transposition vehicle; Council of State's 17 August 2026 advisory opinion (flagging risk-based-supervision, discrimination and data-protection gaps) is the most recent substantive marker, now outside this week's window. [Source 1]
Probable · 1 source
DNB imposed a €722,160 administrative fine on Modulr Finance B.V. on 30 September 2026 for serious shortcomings in ongoing monitoring of customers and transactions (1 Jan 2023-16 Jul 2024), breaching Wwft art. 3(2)(d); third-party reporting indicates reliance on intermediary partners including crypto-asset service providers for monitoring the firm should have performed itself. [Source 1]
Probable · 1 source
The Netherlands' AMLD6 transposition vehicle (Iwt), which will repeal the Wwft, remains at the consultation stage opened 4 July 2025; no material progression toward enactment identified this cycle and the parliamentary timetable is unconfirmed. [Source 1]
Probable · 1 source
AFM and DNB jointly published an exploratory report (12 October 2026) finding Dutch property law (Burgerlijk Wetboek, Wet giraal effectenverkeer) provides no basis for securities issued, held and transferred exclusively as tokens, warning of migration risk without timely legal clarification, and recommending a joint follow-up process with government and market participants. [Source 1]
Probable · 1 source
DNB is designated supervisor for (intermediary) payment service providers under the Transfer of Funds Regulation, and AFM for (intermediary) crypto-asset service providers; CASPs falling under the TFR are brought within scope of the Sanctiewet 1977. [Source 1]
Probable · 1 source
Financial institutions, crypto-asset service providers and trust offices must screen for sanctions matches, freeze funds without delay on a confirmed hit and notify DNB/AFM without delay; new Russia-related freezes must be reported within 2 weeks; banks, trust offices and crypto providers must report every 3 months even if nothing is frozen. [Source 1]
Probable · 1 source
DNB and AFM jointly supervise compliance with the Sanctiewet 1977 for the financial sector under the Regeling toezicht Sanctiewet 1977, established 1 October 2005, screening against the EU asset-freezing list, National Terrorism List and UN sanctions list. [Source 1]
Probable · 1 source
A UBO is a natural person holding more than 25% of shares, voting rights or economic interest in a legal entity, verified by the obliged institution independently of the UBO register; absent such a person, senior managing officials are registered as pseudo-UBOs. [Source 1]
Probable · 1 source
Since 1 October 2024, Wwft-obliged institutions must report discrepancies between the KVK UBO register and the UBO(s) the institution itself identified to the Chamber of Commerce; absence of any UBO registration is not treated as a discrepancy. [Source 1]
Probable · 1 source
Enhanced due diligence is mandatory for higher ML/TF-risk relationships, clients established in EU-designated high-risk third countries, or PEP clients/UBOs, requiring senior-management approval and source-of-wealth checks; PEP status retained for at least 12 months after leaving the prominent function. [Source 1]
Probable · 1 source
It is prohibited for anyone seated in the Netherlands to provide trust services professionally without a DNB licence, and for anyone seated in another Member State to provide trust services into the Netherlands without one; five categories of trust service are designated and DNB keeps a public register. [Source 1]
Probable · 1 source
Six Wwft supervisors are designated by activity, not legal form: DNB (banks, trust offices, crypto-asset services), AFM (investment firms/funds, CASPs, life-insurance intermediaries), BFT (notaries, accountants, tax advisers), NOvA (lawyers), Bureau Toezicht Wwft (estate agents, high-value goods dealers), and Kansspelautoriteit (casinos). [Source 1]
Probable · 1 source
AFM is the Dutch competent authority for CASP authorisation and conduct under MiCA Title V; DNB supervises ART/EMT issuers prudentially. Professional provision of crypto-asset services requires AFM authorisation. [Source 1]
Probable · 1 source
This Act amends the Wft and Wet op de economische delicten to implement MiCA, designating AFM and DNB as competent authorities and attaching economic-offence penalties for breaches of MiCA-related Wft provisions. [Source 1]
Probable · 1 source
The pre-MiCA AML-only DNB registration regime for crypto-exchange and custodial-wallet providers (former Wwft Chapter 3A) was repealed effective 4 February 2025; CASPs become ordinary obliged entities under the new MiCA-aligned regime. [Source 1]
Probable · 1 source
CASPs must ensure every crypto-asset transfer is accompanied by required originator and beneficiary information, with no de minimis threshold (unlike the EUR 1,000 threshold for ordinary fund transfers). [Source 1]
Probable · 1 source
For transfers to or from a self-hosted address exceeding EUR 1,000, the CASP must take adequate measures to assess whether the address is owned or controlled by its own customer using suitable technical means. [Source 1]
Probable · 1 source
fine_8500000_EUR_ABN_AMRO_Wwft [Source 1]
Probable · 1 source
fine_20000000_EUR_de_Volksbank_Wwft_Wft [Source 1]
Probable · 1 source
fine_2656250_EUR_CCV_Wwft [Source 1]
Probable · 1 source
fine_2600000_EUR_bunq_Wwft [Source 1]
Probable · 1 source
10_compliant_29_largely_compliant_1_partially_compliant_regular_follow_up [Source 1]
Probable · 1 source
bill_published_by_raad_van_state_2026-08-17_repeals_wwft [Source 1]
Probable · 1 source
2027-07-10 [Source 1]
Probable · 1 source
in_force_2024-12-30_designates_dnb_afm_crypto_travel_rule_supervisors [Source 1]
Probable · 1 source
fine_3325000_EUR_Wwft_art30_unregistered_operation [Source 1]
Probable · 1 source
internal_reporting_channel_required_financial_sector_regardless_of_size_since_2023-02-18 [Source 1]
Probable · 1 source
3055362_reports_2025 [Source 1]
Probable · 1 source
35_enforcement_actions_2025_EUR_38500000_fines [Source 1]
Probable · 1 source