--- title: "Tanzania (TZ) — Financial-Integrity Intelligence · Sentinel" canonical: https://sentinel.gi/jurisdictions/tanzania/ source_html: /jurisdictions/tanzania/index.html description: "Financial integrity intelligence for Tanzania (TZ): sanctions, beneficial ownership, enabler jurisdictions, conflict finance, digital assets and compliance technology — with sourced findings." generated_at: 2026-11-08T04:46:02Z content_sha256: f39d28977ab028ee1f2a857430ac69341a2d69d3d834d5d3e1aba108d6ccdfa3 generator: "fe-fleet/md-twin@1.0" --- # Tanzania (TZ) — Financial-Integrity Intelligence · Sentinel Not every instrument is backed by its official text yet. At least one law or rulebook covered here has no official source (tier 1) retrieved for it yet. No finding on this page is shown with confidence above “Probable” until stronger sources are retrieved. Financial Integrity Monitor # Tanzania TZ Domains covered 8 of 8 Sources 153 Role actions 8 Horizon <90d 0 Jurisdiction profile FATF status: Clean Tier: B Risk direction: Decreasing Enablement vs enforcement: Mixed AML/CFT governed by the Anti-Money Laundering Act 2006 (as amended 2022, Mainland) and AMLPOCA 2009 (Zanzibar), plus the Economic and Organized Crime Control Act 2022. More A National Multi-Disciplinary Committee chaired by the Bank of Tanzania coordinates AML/CFT policy; the FIU is the central reporting authority. Tanzania is an ESAAMLG member, was FATF grey-listed October 2022, and was formally delisted 13 June 2025 after a 2022-2025 action plan addressing supervision, ML/TF investigation capacity, confiscation and BO gaps. Key deficiencies - Risk-based AML/CFT supervision of FIs and DNFBPs remains uneven, particularly for bureaux de change, gold dealers and DNFBPs - Limited demonstrated capability to investigate, prosecute and confiscate proceeds of ML in line with risk profile - Comprehensive TF risk assessment and national CFT strategy only recently operationalised - Beneficial ownership information availability remains limited despite BRELA basic-ownership registration - FIU financial intelligence products remain underutilised by law enforcement and prosecutorial value chain Recent developments (18m) - February 2025: FATF made initial determination Tanzania substantially completed its action plan, warranting on-site verification - 13 June 2025: FATF formally removed Tanzania from the Jurisdictions Under Increased Monitoring (grey) list at the Joint FATF-MONEYVAL Plenary - 4 December 2025: European Commission adopted Delegated Regulation (EU) 2026/83 removing Tanzania from the EU list of high-risk third countries - UK HRTC status for Tanzania fell away automatically under the MLR 2024 mechanism tying Schedule-free HRTC status directly to live FATF lists - July 2025: FATF's Comprehensive Update on Terrorist Financing Risks cited Tanzania-linked financial networks supporting ISCAP in the DRC - 29 October 2025 general election followed by political unrest with reported cash and fuel shortages, straining the cash-dependent informal economy Brief ## Lead signal #### Lead Signal Tanzania's financial-integrity picture this cycle is dominated by a confirmed structural fact: the country remains off the FATF list of jurisdictions under increased monitoring, having exited on 13 June 2025 and having not been re-added at either the October 2025 or February 2026 plenaries. That durability over two subsequent plenary cycles is itself the signal, since a single clean plenary can be an artefact of timing while two in succession indicates the FATF has assessed the underlying reforms as holding. Set against that stability, two lower-confidence but directionally consistent developments point toward tightening elsewhere in the architecture: Tanzanian company-registry practice around beneficial ownership appears to be moving from passive collection toward active verification, and the central bank has signalled, but not yet published, a dedicated digital-asset supervisory framework. Read full brief #### Lead Signal Tanzania's financial-integrity picture this cycle is dominated by a confirmed structural fact: the country remains off the FATF list of jurisdictions under increased monitoring, having exited on 13 June 2025 and having not been re-added at either the October 2025 or February 2026 plenaries. That durability over two subsequent plenary cycles is itself the signal, since a single clean plenary can be an artefact of timing while two in succession indicates the FATF has assessed the underlying reforms as holding. Set against that stability, two lower-confidence but directionally consistent developments point toward tightening elsewhere in the architecture: Tanzanian company-registry practice around beneficial ownership appears to be moving from passive collection toward active verification, and the central bank has signalled, but not yet published, a dedicated digital-asset supervisory framework. A fourth, narrower item concerns sanctions-regime divergence rather than the domestic AML/CTF architecture: a senior Tanzania Police Force officer was made visa-ineligible for entry to the United States over alleged human-rights abuses, a State Department action distinct in kind from a Treasury asset-freeze designation, with no corresponding European Union or United Kingdom measure identified. Taken together, the cycle shows an AML/CTF regime in relatively settled, compliant standing, a beneficial-ownership apparatus in gradual tightening, a digital-asset space in a pre-regulatory holding pattern, and a sanctions picture characterised by autonomous unilateral action rather than coordinated multilateral listing. #### Other Developments Beneficial-ownership verification tightens at the registrar. Commentary describing the Companies (Forms) (Amendment) Rules 2026 indicates that Tanzania's Business Registrations and Licensing Agency has begun actively verifying beneficial-ownership declarations submitted at incorporation, rather than merely collecting them, with incorporation applications reportedly being rejected where declarations are incomplete or inconsistent. No primary registrar or gazette text was independently retrieved this cycle to confirm the rule's precise scope, so the finding rests on secondary commentary; it nonetheless describes a direction of travel consistent with closing a long-standing gap, since Tanzania still has no public register of ultimate beneficial owners. A central-bank digital-asset framework remains promised, not published. The Governor of the Bank of Tanzania stated in mid-July 2026 that a supervisory framework covering cryptocurrencies, stablecoins and virtual assets had completed a study phase and was being finalised, with consumer protection, AML/CFT and fraud prevention named as the guiding priorities. No instrument has been published, and the only concrete supervisory artefact remains a single-participant sandbox pilot for a shilling-pegged stablecoin that is explicitly not legal tender. The gap between stated intent and enacted instrument should be read as exactly that: an intention, not a regime. A unilateral US visa measure illustrates sanctions divergence rather than coordinated listing. In May 2026 the US Secretary of State designated a Senior Assistant Commissioner of the Tanzania Police Force under a human-rights-based visa-restriction authority, barring entry over alleged torture of detained activists. This is a State Department ineligibility action, not an OFAC asset-freeze designation, and no equivalent European Union or United Kingdom measure was located. The episode is a reminder that autonomous sanctions tools continue to diverge in trigger, scope and effect from the asset-freeze architecture that financial institutions typically screen against. #### Cross-Monitor Connections The beneficial-ownership tightening at the registrar level intersects directly with corporate-transparency themes tracked on the data-protection and world-payments sides insofar as the same registrar and compliance infrastructure increasingly touches digital onboarding flows; a stricter BO-verification posture raises the evidentiary bar for any payment or crypto entity seeking Tanzanian incorporation. The central bank's crypto-framework signal is the same underlying fact referenced on the World Payments Monitor's stablecoin and sandbox tracking and on the Crypto Monitor's licensing and stablecoin-regime modules; readers following those monitors will recognise the nTZS sandbox pilot as the common evidentiary anchor across all three views. The sanctions-divergence item has no coordinated EU/UK counterpart to cross-reference this cycle, which is itself consistent with the broader pattern of autonomous US human-rights listings proceeding independently of parallel Treasury or European designations. #### Outlook Absent a published instrument, the central bank's digital-asset framework should be tracked as a proposed-stage development with a wide uncertainty band around any 2027 implementation date; nothing in the current record supports treating it as imminent. The beneficial-ownership verification tightening, if sustained and eventually corroborated by primary registrar text, would be a genuine structural improvement worth escalating in confidence terms once a gazette or BRELA circular can be cited directly. Tanzania's grey-list exit appears durable through two plenaries, and the next scheduled ESAAMLG mutual evaluation is reportedly not expected before 2028, which gives the jurisdiction a multi-year window in which the structural record, rather than any single enforcement episode, will continue to be the more analytically significant story. Earlier periodic briefs (5) 25 Oct 2026 · fim-2026-10-25 #### Lead Signal Tanzania's financial-integrity picture is dominated by a confirmed structural fact: the country remains off the FATF list of jurisdictions under increased monitoring, having exited on 13 June 2025 and having not been re-added at either the October 2025 or February 2026 plenaries. That durability over two subsequent plenary cycles is itself the signal, since a single clean plenary can be an artefact of timing while two in succession indicates the FATF has assessed the underlying reforms as holding. Set against that stability, two lower-confidence but directionally consistent developments point toward tightening elsewhere in the architecture: Tanzanian company-registry practice around beneficial ownership appears to be moving from passive collection toward active verification, and the central bank has signalled, but not yet published, a dedicated digital-asset supervisory framework. A fourth, narrower item concerns sanctions-regime divergence rather than the domestic AML/CTF architecture: a senior Tanzania Police Force officer was made visa-ineligible for entry to the United States over alleged human-rights abuses, a State Department action distinct in kind from a Treasury asset-freeze designation, with no corresponding European Union or United Kingdom measure identified. Taken together, the cycle shows an AML/CTF regime in relatively settled, compliant standing, a beneficial-ownership apparatus in gradual tightening, a digital-asset space in a pre-regulatory holding pattern, and a sanctions picture characterised by autonomous unilateral action rather than coordinated multilateral listing. #### Other Developments Beneficial-ownership verification tightens at the registrar. Commentary describing the Companies (Forms) (Amendment) Rules 2026 indicates that Tanzania's Business Registrations and Licensing Agency has begun actively verifying beneficial-ownership declarations submitted at incorporation, rather than merely collecting them, with incorporation applications reportedly being rejected where declarations are incomplete or inconsistent. No primary registrar or gazette text was independently retrieved to confirm the rule's precise scope, so the finding rests on secondary commentary; it nonetheless describes a direction of travel consistent with closing a long-standing gap, since Tanzania still has no public register of ultimate beneficial owners. A central-bank digital-asset framework remains promised, not published. The Governor of the Bank of Tanzania stated in mid-July 2026 that a supervisory framework covering cryptocurrencies, stablecoins and virtual assets had completed a study phase and was being finalised, with consumer protection, AML/CFT and fraud prevention named as the guiding priorities. No instrument has been published, and the only concrete supervisory artefact remains a single-participant sandbox pilot for a shilling-pegged stablecoin that is explicitly not legal tender. The gap between stated intent and enacted instrument should be read as exactly that: an intention, not a regime. A unilateral US visa measure illustrates sanctions divergence rather than coordinated listing. In May 2026 the US Secretary of State designated a Senior Assistant Commissioner of the Tanzania Police Force under a human-rights-based visa-restriction authority, barring entry over alleged torture of detained activists. This is a State Department ineligibility action, not an OFAC asset-freeze designation, and no equivalent European Union or United Kingdom measure was located. The episode is a reminder that autonomous sanctions tools continue to diverge in trigger, scope and effect from the asset-freeze architecture that financial institutions typically screen against. #### Cross-Monitor Connections The beneficial-ownership tightening at the registrar level intersects directly with corporate-transparency themes tracked on the data-protection and world-payments sides insofar as the same registrar and compliance infrastructure increasingly touches digital onboarding flows; a stricter BO-verification posture raises the evidentiary bar for any payment or crypto entity seeking Tanzanian incorporation. The central bank's crypto-framework signal is the same underlying fact referenced on the World Payments Monitor's stablecoin and sandbox tracking and on the Crypto Monitor's licensing and stablecoin-regime modules; readers following those monitors will recognise the nTZS sandbox pilot as the common evidentiary anchor across all three views. The sanctions-divergence item has no coordinated EU/UK counterpart to cross-reference, which is itself consistent with the broader pattern of autonomous US human-rights listings proceeding independently of parallel Treasury or European designations. #### Outlook Absent a published instrument, the central bank's digital-asset framework should be tracked as a proposed-stage development with a wide uncertainty band around any 2027 implementation date; nothing in the current record supports treating it as imminent. The beneficial-ownership verification tightening, if sustained and eventually corroborated by primary registrar text, would be a genuine structural improvement worth escalating in confidence terms once a gazette or BRELA circular can be cited directly. Tanzania's grey-list exit appears durable through two plenaries, and the next scheduled ESAAMLG mutual evaluation is reportedly not expected before 2028, which gives the jurisdiction a multi-year window in which the structural record, rather than any single enforcement episode, will continue to be the more analytically significant story. 11 Oct 2026 · fim-2026-10-11 #### Lead Signal The principal development for Tanzania this cycle is commercial rather than regulatory: Gaming Innovation Group, through its subsidiary GiG Software Plc, completed a EUR 16.4 million acquisition of an 80 percent stake in African betting and gaming operator 888AFRICA, bringing a Tanzania-licensed betting operation under the ownership of a Malta-domiciled, listed group. The deal was announced on 28 September 2026 and completed on 11 October 2026, with 888AFRICA's operations spanning Tanzania, Angola and Mozambique. No AML or beneficial-ownership filing specific to this transaction, and no Gaming Board of Tanzania register confirmation of the underlying licence transfer, has been located. For an architecture-over-incident read, the significance lies less in the transaction value and more in what it represents structurally: a consolidation of licensed online betting ownership into a listed, cross-border corporate group, which changes the beneficial-ownership chain sitting above a Tanzania-licensed entity without yet showing a confirmed companion filing under Tanzania's beneficial-ownership regime. #### Other Developments Beneficial-ownership enforcement commentary continues without a dated action this window. Secondary commentary describes 2026 as a period of intensified enforcement by the Business Registrations and Licensing Agency under the Companies (Beneficial Ownership) Regulations, which set a 25 percent control threshold for disclosure. No new instrument or specific enforcement action dated within this cycle's window was located to substantiate the intensification beyond the standing commentary, so this is recorded as a continuing posture rather than a fresh event. Tanzania's FATF-delisted status remains the standing AML/CTF anchor. Tanzania was officially removed from the Financial Action Task Force grey list effective 13 June 2025, and no plenary action regarding Tanzania was found this cycle. This standing position frames the jurisdiction's baseline AML/CTF risk classification against which the current commercial and ownership developments should be read. #### Cross-Monitor Connections The GiG/888AFRICA acquisition sits at the intersection of commercial-activity tracking and the beneficial-ownership domain: a change in ultimate ownership of a licensed gambling operator is, in principle, a beneficial-ownership event under Tanzania's Companies (Beneficial Ownership) Regulations, even where no filing confirming that event has yet been located. This connects to gambling-sector licensing and commercial-activity tracking on the Advennt gambling-regulatory monitor, which covers the same transaction from a licensing and market-structure perspective. It also bears on Tanzania's standing AML/CTF posture, since consolidation of gambling-sector ownership into a listed group with cross-border operations in Angola and Mozambique is the kind of structural shift that beneficial-ownership and AML/CTF supervisors would, in a fuller record, expect to see cross-referenced against a group's wider sanctions and PEP screening obligations. #### Outlook The principal open item is whether a beneficial-ownership filing reflecting the change of control at 888AFRICA's Tanzania-licensed entity surfaces under the Companies (Beneficial Ownership) Regulations, and whether the Gaming Board of Tanzania's own licensee register is updated to reflect the ownership change. Absent either, the transaction remains confirmed only at the level of the commercial announcement and completion dates. Tanzania's FATF-delisted status is not expected to change absent a plenary action, and the BRELA enforcement-intensification narrative will bear watching for a dated, specific action that would move it from commentary to a confirmed development. 28 Sep 2026 · fim-2026-09-28 #### Lead Signal Tanzania's beneficial-ownership transparency regime widened materially this cycle. The Written Laws (Miscellaneous Amendments) Act, 2026, published 15 January 2026, amends the Companies Act (Cap. 212) to formalise nominee-shareholder and nominee-director concepts, requires companies to file and maintain nominee and beneficial-ownership records, and expressly brings designated non-financial businesses and professions into scope of beneficial-ownership information submission and access for AML/CTF purposes. This is a structural widening of the perimeter established by the Companies (Beneficial Ownership) Regulations, 2023, which had been made under section 22 of the Companies Act without the DNFBP-access dimension the 2026 amendment now adds. The finding is corroborated by two independent commentary sources but rests on secondary legal-commentary text rather than a retrieved primary gazette or BRELA filing this cycle, holding the confidence at Probable rather than Confirmed. #### Other Developments BOT nearing completion of a digital-asset oversight framework. The Bank of Tanzania Governor announced in July and August 2026 that the central bank has completed a digital-asset study and is finalising laws and regulations covering cryptocurrencies, stablecoins and virtual assets, following a stablecoin sandbox pilot approved in May 2026. No enacted VASP or AML licensing perimeter for digital assets exists yet in Tanzania, leaving unregulated crypto activity a standing, uncosted AML/CFT exposure gap even as the regulatory architecture to close that gap is actively under construction. #### Cross-Monitor Connections The beneficial-ownership expansion documented here connects to the world-payments monitor's tracking of Bank of Tanzania payment-system-provider licensing: any DNFBP or corporate structure now newly in scope for beneficial-ownership disclosure that also operates as a licensed payment-system provider faces a compounding compliance obligation across both regimes. Similarly, the digital-asset framework BOT is finalising connects directly to the crypto monitor's parallel tracking of the same sandbox pilot and forthcoming regulatory framework; the two monitors describe the same underlying BOT development through different lenses -- AML/CTF exposure here, market-structure and licensing detail there. #### Outlook Two confirmations would materially sharpen this picture: a retrieved gazette or BRELA primary text for the Written Laws (Miscellaneous Amendments) Act, 2026 would upgrade the beneficial-ownership finding from Probable to Confirmed, and a retrieved BOT circular or notice on the digital-asset framework would do the same for the crypto/digital-asset finding. Tanzania's removal from the FATF grey list, effective 13 June 2025, has held through the 2026 plenary cycles reviewed this run, providing continuity against which both the beneficial-ownership widening and the digital-asset framework build-out should be read as incremental strengthening rather than remedial catch-up. 5 Sep 2026 · fim-2026-08-05 #### Lead Signal The financial-integrity profile of Tanzania this cycle is bifurcated rather than uniformly directional. On the institutional-architecture side, the removal of the jurisdiction from the FATF grey list, effective 13 June 2025, has held through the February and June 2026 plenaries, and the Business Registrations and Licensing Agency (BRELA) of Tanzania is now enforcing beneficial-ownership and nominee disclosure more rigorously under the Written Laws (Miscellaneous Amendments) Act 2026 and the Companies (Forms)(Amendment) Rules 2026, having blocked renewal of 901 business licences and inspected 632 companies, of which 398, or 63 percent, submitted beneficial-ownership information. Read together, these are improving signals for the corporate-transparency and AML architecture that FATF membership rests on. Set against that improvement is a separate and non-AML development: in May 2026 the United States barred Faustine Jackson Mafwele, a Senior Assistant Commissioner in the Tanzania Police Force, from US entry under State Department human-rights authority rather than Treasury or OFAC financial-sanctions authority, over alleged torture and sexual assault of activists during the post-election crackdown in Tanzania. No corroborating European Union or United Kingdom designation was identified this cycle. This is consistent with the key-judgment framing for this cycle: an improving AML/CFT institutional trajectory sits alongside a fresh unilateral US human-rights sanction, producing a bifurcated risk profile, improving financial-crime architecture alongside elevated institutional-integrity risk outside the AML/CFT perimeter. No countering-proliferation-financing or Tanzania-specific counter-terrorist-financing finding surfaced this cycle; under the three-pillar framing this monitor applies, the absence of CTF/CPF signal is itself worth noting rather than treated as a null result. #### Other Developments Virtual-asset reversal by the Bank of Tanzania. The central bank has completed a digital-assets study, approved a stablecoin sandbox pilot in May 2026, and is finalizing a regulatory framework covering cryptocurrencies, stablecoins and virtual assets, reversing the 2017 and 2019 trading prohibitions. No implementation timeline has been published, which leaves the formal ban technically in force while supervised activity is being piloted underneath it, an enforcement gap worth tracking into subsequent cycles. Draft cybersecurity guidelines for the financial sector. The Bank of Tanzania issued draft Cybersecurity Guidelines for banks, payment service providers and financial service providers in March 2026, binding entities under the Banking and Financial Institutions Act and the National Payment Systems Act. Sourcing is a single Tier-4 legal-commentary account with no Bank of Tanzania primary text resolved this cycle, which caps confidence at Low pending corroboration. Enabler-jurisdiction dynamics beyond Tanzania. The National Bank Governor of Cambodia has warned of a possible third FATF grey-list placement tied to persistent casino- and scam-centre-linked money laundering, with authorities intensifying crackdowns. Separately, a June 2026 FinCEN supplemental alert on fiscal fuel-theft and tax-evasion trade-based money-laundering schemes tied to the Cartel de Jalisco Nueva Generacion network was paired with OFAC sanctions on two Mexican nationals and nine entities, and earlier OFAC action in April 2026 against Cartel del Noreste-linked casinos, following a proposed Section 311 special measure, extended enforcement into casino placement vehicles. Neither development is Tanzania-specific, but both illustrate enabler-jurisdiction and casino-sector typologies structurally comparable to dynamics regulators elsewhere are watching. #### Cross-Monitor Connections The Mafwele entry-ban designation sits outside the AML/CFT perimeter and is more naturally a state-capture and security-sector governance signal than a financial-integrity one; it merits routing to institutional-governance tracking of the security apparatus in Tanzania rather than treatment as a sanctions-evasion architecture finding. The virtual-asset framework reversal by the Bank of Tanzania has an adjacent payments-infrastructure dimension, since any licensed stablecoin or virtual-asset regime interacts directly with domestic payment-systems supervision; this is a signal worth surfacing to payments-focused tracking alongside the financial-integrity read given here. The Mexico casino-linked TBML enforcement expansion, meanwhile, is a reminder that casino and gaming-sector placement vehicles are an active enforcement target for US authorities, a typology-adjacent signal for any monitor tracking gaming-sector money flows. #### Outlook The key variable to watch is implementation timing: the virtual-asset framework of the Bank of Tanzania has no published date, and the gap between a nominally still-in-force cryptocurrency ban and active supervised piloting is a live regulatory-arbitrage window that will only close once a framework is formally adopted. On the beneficial-ownership track, continued BRELA enforcement intensity through subsequent cycles would further corroborate the improving trajectory established this cycle, while a slowdown would call the assessed confidence into question. The FATF status of Tanzania bears watching through the next plenary cycle, and any European Union or United Kingdom action mirroring the US entry-ban designation would materially change the sanctions-regime-divergence read. 14 Jul 2026 · fim-2026-07-14 #### Lead Signal Tanzania jurisdiction-risk classification underwent a structural realignment across three independent listing regimes within a roughly eighteen-month window, converging on a single assessment of the anti-money-laundering and counter-terrorist-financing reform trajectory of the country. The Financial Action Task Force formally delisted Tanzania from its list of jurisdictions under increased monitoring on 13 June 2025, following completion of a 2022-2025 action plan addressing supervision, money-laundering and terrorist-financing investigation capacity, confiscation regimes and beneficial-ownership gaps. High-Risk Third Country status for Tanzania under United Kingdom money laundering regulations lapsed automatically the same day, a function of the Money Laundering Regulations 2024 amendment that ties Regulation 33(3)(a) status directly to the live lists maintained by FATF rather than requiring a separate statutory instrument. Removal of Tanzania from the fourth AML Directive Article 9 high-risk third country annex by the European Commission followed roughly six months later, on 4 December 2025, via Commission Delegated Regulation (EU) 2026/83 - illustrating a comparatively slower delegated-act adoption cycle at the EU relative to the automatic-tracking mechanism used by the United Kingdom, but arriving nonetheless at eventual cross-regime convergence. Read architecturally rather than as a single delisting event, this cascade is best characterised as mixed rather than unambiguously positive. The jurisdiction-risk-list machinery has genuinely improved its assessment of Tanzania, and the underlying reform programme - spanning supervision, confiscation, and investigation capacity - appears to have been substantively implemented. At the same time, structural gaps identified independently of the listing process persist largely undisturbed: beneficial-ownership verification remains thin, predicate-crime prosecutions in the wildlife-trafficking and gold sectors have not translated into parallel financial investigations, and a regional terrorist-financing nexus continues to transit Tanzanian financial channels. The delisting cascade therefore measures the closing of one class of gap - the FATF action-plan items - without yet measuring closure of several others. #### Other Developments Beneficial-ownership architecture remains unverified at the registry level. Tanzania has no dedicated beneficial-ownership register; the BRELA (Mainland) and BPRA (Zanzibar) company registries capture basic ownership data only. The Mutual Evaluation of the country found that financial institutions and designated non-financial businesses and professions are nominally required to obtain and maintain beneficial-ownership information, but that competent authorities lack timely, accurate access to it - a gap that enables nominee arrangements, unlimited private companies and trusts to obscure true control, with particular relevance given assessed politically-exposed-person and state-owned-enterprise corruption risk. Wildlife-trafficking predicate prosecutions proceed without parallel financial investigation. Chinese-led syndicates operating through Tanzania and Zanzibar have laundered ivory-trafficking proceeds via front businesses, and convictions for the underlying wildlife-crime predicate offences have repeatedly proceeded without any accompanying financial investigation - leaving proceeds, layering mechanisms and ultimate beneficiaries untraced. This sits alongside a broader pattern in which financial intelligence products of the Tanzania Financial Intelligence Unit remain underutilised across the law enforcement and prosecutorial chain, with investigators prioritising predicate-offence cases over dedicated money-laundering investigation. Artisanal gold-sector vulnerability compounds trade-based laundering exposure. A regional ESAAMLG gold study cited in the OFAC Africa Gold Advisory finds the artisanal and small-scale gold sector of Tanzania vulnerable to under- and over-invoicing, informal cross-border movement bypassing licensed bureaux de change, and cash-based settlement - compounding an already large informal economy and weak cross-border currency-declaration enforcement. Regional hawala and mobile-money networks pool funds supporting Islamic State Central Africa Province. United Nations Counter-Terrorism Committee Executive Directorate and FATF analysis identify financial cells spanning Somalia, Kenya, Uganda, Tanzania and South Africa that pool resources through mobile-money platforms, cash transfers and hawala-linked business laundering to support ISCAP operations in the Democratic Republic of Congo and northern Mozambique. Proximity of Tanzania to the Cabo Delgado insurgency and its porous southern border create a conduit for this cross-border fund pooling. Post-election unrest introduces episodic stress on the cash-dependent informal economy. The 29 October 2025 general election was followed by political unrest with reported cash and fuel shortages, layering an episodic stress factor onto the structural AML/CFT reform trajectory of Tanzania. The Bank of Tanzania continues phased central bank digital currency development absent a dedicated virtual-asset framework. Central bank CBDC development is cautious and risk-based, framed partly as a counter to informal cryptocurrency use, but no dedicated licensing or AML framework for virtual-asset service providers has been identified, leaving unregulated crypto activity as a monitoring gap. Government mining-sector growth ambitions intensify supervisory demand ahead of capacity expansion. Plans to grow the mining-sector contribution toward ten percent of GDP intensify exposure to gold-sector trade-based laundering, corruption and informal cross-border smuggling absent a commensurate expansion of risk-based AML supervisory capacity. Transhipment role of Dar es Salaam leaves an unconfirmed sourcing gap on Russian sanctions-evasion routing. No confirmed, sourced linkage has been identified between Tanzania and Russian sanctions-evasion transit corridors, dark-fleet insurance arrangements or intermediary financial structures, despite the function of Dar es Salaam as an Indian Ocean port hub handling approximately forty percent of transit trade for six landlocked neighbours. Absence of documented monitoring on this point should not be read as an absence of underlying risk. #### Cross-Monitor Connections The ISCAP financing nexus, in which mobile-money and hawala-linked networks spanning five East and Southern African jurisdictions pool resources for an armed group active in the Democratic Republic of Congo and northern Mozambique, is directly relevant to SCEM conflict-finance tracking, given the direct armed-conflict nexus of the funds involved. Separately, the artisanal gold-sector trade-based laundering vulnerability of Tanzania and its mining-sector GDP expansion horizon connect to ERM commodity-flow monitoring, since both the informal gold trade and the anticipated formal-sector growth trajectory shape extractive-resource integrity exposure that ERM tracks independently of the AML lens used here. Neither connection currently carries a confirmed operational case tying Tanzania to WDM-relevant state-capture dynamics or FCW-relevant information-operations financing, though the wildlife-trafficking front-business pattern and the unresolved Dar es Salaam sourcing gap on Russian sanctions-evasion routing both remain plausible future connective points warranting monitoring rather than present assertion. #### Outlook The near-term test of durability sits with the ESAAMLG follow-up review of post-delisting reform sustainment in Tanzania, expected on or after 1 October 2026; this review will indicate whether the supervisory, investigation-capacity and confiscation reforms that underpinned the FATF delisting were durable structural changes or delisting-motivated compliance that may not persist. The EU Article 9 delisting is now fully in force, removing the mandatory enhanced-vigilance trigger for Tanzania-linked transactions across EU obliged entities, though ordinary risk-based due diligence remains appropriate. Medium-term, the leading forward risk indicators are the unresolved beneficial-ownership verification gap and the mining-sector GDP expansion target, which raises extractive-sector AML supervisory demand at a pace that current resourcing has not yet matched. The crypto and CBDC trajectory of Tanzania bears watching as a structurally under-monitored channel: continued central bank digital currency development proceeds without a parallel virtual-asset licensing regime, a gap more likely to widen than close absent a dedicated supervisory initiative. Domain intelligence (D1–D8) #### Sanctions Architecture and Evasion Tanzania's sanctions-exposure picture this cycle is defined by a single, narrowly-scoped unilateral action rather than any coordinated multilateral listing activity. On 21-22 May 2026, the United States Secretary of State imposed a visa-ineligibility designation on Faustine Jackson Mafwele, a Senior Assistant Commissioner in the Tanzania Police Force, under a human-rights-based authority, barring his entry to the United States over alleged torture of detained activists. The analytical distinction worth preserving here is between this category of action and an OFAC Treasury asset-freeze designation: the former bars physical entry and carries no obligation on financial institutions to freeze or block assets, while the latter creates affirmative screening and blocking duties under US jurisdiction. Conflating the two risks overstating the financial-sector exposure created by this specific action, since no US financial institution has any new blocking obligation arising directly from a State Department visa restriction of this kind. Continue reading What makes the episode analytically interesting at the architecture level, rather than merely as an individual case, is the absence of any corresponding European Union or United Kingdom measure against the same individual. No EU or UK equivalent human-rights sanctions listing was identified touching this designation. This divergence is consistent with a broader pattern seen across multiple jurisdictions in which the United States' human-rights-focused visa authorities move independently of, and on a different evidentiary and procedural track from, EU Magnitsky-style or UK Global Human Rights sanctions regimes. For institutions conducting PEP and adverse-media screening on Tanzanian government and security-sector counterparties, the practical implication is that a clean result against EU or UK sanctions lists provides no assurance against the separate universe of US State Department ineligibility findings, and vice versa; genuinely comprehensive screening requires querying both architectures independently rather than treating one as a proxy for the other. Beyond this single development, the cycle surfaced no additional sanctions-architecture or evasion-typology findings specific to Tanzania: no new asset-freeze designations, no reported evasion-network findings, and no sanctioned-party corporate-structure findings touching Tanzanian entities were located. The absence of enforcement activity in this space should not be read as an absence of exposure; Tanzania's position within regional trade and transport corridors continues to warrant monitoring even where, as this cycle, no specific finding has emerged. #### Outlook Given the narrow, individual-level nature of this cycle's sole sanctions development, the near-term outlook for Tanzania's sanctions-architecture profile is one of continuity rather than escalation. There is no evidence in the current record of a broader US, EU or UK sanctions programme targeting Tanzanian state or security-sector institutions as such, and the May 2026 visa action should be read as an isolated human-rights accountability measure rather than the leading edge of a wider listing programme. Institutions with Tanzanian counterparty exposure, particularly in the public-sector and security-adjacent commercial space, may reasonably continue layered screening across both US and EU/UK sanctions and visa-restriction regimes as a matter of standing practice, without this cycle's finding on its own indicating a change in overall risk posture. Judgment: A formerly Tanzania-flagged crude oil tanker was re-flagged to Curacao in an Iran-related OFAC SDN update dated 5 October 2026, predating this window; carried as standing context only. Probable #### Beneficial Ownership and Corporate Transparency The durable structural backdrop against which any Tanzanian beneficial-ownership development must be read is the European Union's AML Package, which is now architecturally three distinct instruments rather than one: the directly-applicable AML Regulation (AMLR, Regulation (EU) 2024/1624), the sixth Anti-Money Laundering Directive (6AMLD), transposed individually by each EU Member State, and the AMLA Regulation (Regulation (EU) 2024/1620), which establishes the Anti-Money Laundering Authority and shifts supervision of higher-risk obliged entities from purely national competence toward a hybrid EU-level perimeter of direct and indirect AMLA supervision. Tanzania sits entirely outside this architecture; it is not an EEA member and is not subject to AMLR, 6AMLD transposition, or AMLA's direct or indirect supervisory perimeter. This cycle's interpreter output carried no AMLA horizon anchors specific to Tanzania, and the architecture is noted here as standing global context rather than as a Tanzania-specific development. Continue reading The directly relevant development for Tanzania this cycle sits instead at the level of domestic company-registry practice. Commentary describing the Companies (Forms) (Amendment) Rules 2026 indicates that Tanzania's Business Registrations and Licensing Agency (BRELA) has moved from passively collecting beneficial-ownership declarations at incorporation toward actively verifying them, with incorporation applications increasingly being rejected where BO declarations are incomplete or internally inconsistent. This is reported by two independent secondary commentary sources that corroborate the same direction of travel, though no primary BRELA circular or Gazette notice was independently retrieved this cycle to confirm the rule's precise legal mechanics, scope, or enforcement thresholds. The underlying obligation traces to the Companies (Beneficial Ownership) Regulations, GN No. 478 of 2023, made under the broader Companies Act framework, meaning this cycle's development is best understood as a tightening of enforcement practice under an existing regulatory instrument rather than the introduction of a wholly new BO obligation. Tanzania continues to have no public register of ultimate beneficial owners accessible to third parties, which remains the more structurally significant transparency gap relative to peer jurisdictions that have moved toward publicly searchable UBO registers. A shift from passive collection to active verification at the point of incorporation is a meaningful operational improvement in data quality terms, but it does not by itself close that transparency gap, since verified data held only by the registrar for internal purposes does not provide the same screening utility to banks, DNFBPs, or civil-society actors that a public register would. #### Outlook If sustained, active BO verification at incorporation would represent a genuine structural improvement in the integrity of Tanzania's corporate registry data, and the claim would merit an upgrade in confidence once a primary BRELA circular or Gazette text can be directly cited. The more consequential open question for the medium term is whether Tanzania moves toward any form of public UBO register access, which remains unaddressed in the current record. Given Tanzania's position outside the EU AML Package architecture, any further tightening is likely to continue proceeding through domestic company-law and FIU-linked instruments rather than through alignment with the EU's AMLR/6AMLD/AMLA framework. Judgment: Tanzania's BO filing regime under the Companies (Beneficial Ownership) Regulations 2021 continues to operate via BRELA's portal without full public searchability; no new instrument found this cycle. Uncertain #### Enabler Jurisdictions and Professional Facilitators Tanzania functions this cycle as an enabler jurisdiction across two distinct financial-crime channels, compounded by a documented gap in the operational use of financial intelligence once it is produced. The first channel is the artisanal and small-scale gold sector, which a regional ESAAMLG gold study cited in the OFAC Africa Gold Advisory finds vulnerable to under- and over-invoicing, informal cross-border movement bypassing licensed bureaux de change, and cash-based settlement. This vulnerability is compounded by an already large informal economy and weak cross-border currency-declaration enforcement identified in the Tanzania Mutual Evaluation, creating conditions under which gold-sector trade-based laundering can proceed with limited friction from the formal financial system. Continue reading The second channel is historic rather than newly active: Chinese-led wildlife-trafficking syndicates have used front businesses, including sea-cucumber and garlic-snail traders, to conceal ivory within low-value trade goods moving through Tanzania and Zanzibar, enabled in part by customs and port bribery. What makes this an enabler-jurisdiction finding rather than a closed enforcement success is that convictions for the underlying wildlife-crime predicate offences have repeatedly proceeded without any accompanying financial investigation, leaving the proceeds, the layering mechanisms and the ultimate beneficiaries of the trafficking network untraced. The laundering architecture that made the trafficking financially viable has not, on the evidence reviewed, been disrupted by the predicate prosecutions themselves. Underlying both channels is a third, structural finding: financial intelligence products generated by the Tanzania Financial Intelligence Unit remain underutilised across the law enforcement and prosecutorial value chain. Investigators and prosecutors have tended to rely on other information sources and to prioritise predicate-offence investigation over dedicated money-laundering investigation, a pattern the Mutual Evaluation identifies as systemic rather than case-specific. This is the connective tissue between the gold-sector and wildlife-trafficking findings: both channels depend, in part, on the practical reality that even where a predicate crime is successfully prosecuted, the financial-investigation function that would trace, freeze and confiscate the associated proceeds is not consistently engaged. An episodic stress factor layers on top of this structural picture: the 29 October 2025 general election was followed by political unrest with reported cash and fuel shortages, a development relevant to the enabler-jurisdiction assessment insofar as cash-dependent informal-economy stress can further reduce the traceability of financial flows through formal banking channels during a period of disruption, even though this is better characterised as episodic strain than as a structural change to the enabler profile itself. The customer-typology exposure most directly implicated spans trade finance, money-service businesses and corporate structures used in both the gold and wildlife-trafficking channels, with red-flag indicators including under- and over-invoicing of shipments, informal cross-border movement of gold bypassing licensed bureaux de change, cash-based settlement, and the use of front businesses in low-value trade goods to conceal high-value contraband. #### Outlook Financial-investigation case data tied to wildlife-trafficking and gold-sector predicate prosecutions would be the clearest evidence that ESAAMLG follow-up reforms have begun producing parallel proceeds-tracing outcomes; none has been identified this cycle. Post-election financial-system stability reporting, expected as 2025 data becomes available, would clarify whether the cash and fuel shortages following the October 2025 election materially affected AML/CFT supervisory capacity or informal-economy risk exposure. Absent both, the enabler-jurisdiction profile of Tanzania across the gold and wildlife-trafficking channels should be treated as unchanged and structurally persistent notwithstanding the improved formal risk-list status secured this cycle. Judgment: No new enabler-jurisdiction finding for Tanzania was located this cycle. Uncertain #### Conflict Finance and Extractive-Industry Integrity Two distinct conflict-and-extractive-integrity findings define the Tanzania profile this cycle, alongside a forward-looking horizon item that connects both to a widening supervisory demand. The first finding concerns wildlife-trafficking proceeds: predicate convictions for wildlife crime connected to Chinese-led syndicates operating through Tanzania and Zanzibar have repeatedly proceeded without any parallel financial investigation, leaving the proceeds, the layering mechanisms and the ultimate financiers of an alleged transnational syndicate untraced. This is an extractive-and-illicit-resource integrity finding as much as a general enforcement one: the trafficking economy depends on sustained financial infrastructure - front businesses, customs and port bribery, and untraced proceeds - that individual predicate prosecutions have not disturbed. Continue reading The second finding sits more directly within the conflict-finance category proper: regional hawala and mobile-money financing networks spanning Somalia, Kenya, Uganda, Tanzania and South Africa pool resources to support Islamic State Central Africa Province operations in the Democratic Republic of Congo and northern Mozambique, according to United Nations Counter-Terrorism Committee Executive Directorate and FATF analysis. Proximity of Tanzania to the Cabo Delgado insurgency and its porous southern border create a conduit for this cross-border fund pooling, placing Tanzania within a documented armed-conflict financing nexus even though Tanzania itself is not a conflict-affected jurisdiction in the narrower sense. A forward-looking structural risk connects both findings to the extractive-industry integrity dimension of this domain: government plans to grow the mining-sector contribution toward ten percent of GDP intensify exposure to gold-sector trade-based laundering, corruption and informal cross-border smuggling, absent a commensurate expansion of risk-based AML supervisory capacity. This is a horizon item rather than a current-cycle enforcement finding, but it is directly relevant to conflict-and-extractive-industry integrity because formal-sector mining growth, layered onto an already-documented gold-sector laundering vulnerability and a financial-investigation gap that has left wildlife-trafficking proceeds untraced, creates conditions in which extractive-sector expansion could outpace the capacity of Tanzania supervisory institutions to monitor it. Taken together, these findings support the assessed judgment that enforcement action against predicate crimes in Tanzania has not yet translated into disruption of the underlying laundering architecture, a pattern consistent with the architecture-over-incident principle: an individual wildlife-trafficking conviction or a hawala-network interdiction is a data point, but the financial infrastructure enabling extraction, trafficking and armed-group financing across multiple predicate crimes is the more analytically significant object of assessment, and it appears substantially intact notwithstanding the FATF delisting cascade addressed elsewhere in this cycle. The customer-typology exposure attached to these findings spans trade finance and corporate structures for the wildlife-trafficking and gold channels, and money-service businesses and retail customers for the hawala and mobile-money-based ISCAP financing channel, with red-flag indicators including front businesses concealing high-value contraband within low-value trade goods, customs and port bribery enabling undocumented export, and cross-border pooling of funds via mobile-money platforms. Severity assessment for both the wildlife-trafficking and gold-sector schemes is preliminary and rated high given the scale of documented proceeds and the persistence of the underlying laundering architecture across multiple enforcement cycles, while the mining-sector expansion horizon item is assessed with an elevated severity candidate reflecting its status as a forward risk rather than a currently realised harm. #### Outlook The mining-sector GDP expansion target is expected to remain in force through the end of 2026 and is assessed as likely to worsen extractive-integrity risk unless matched by expanded supervisory capacity for gold dealers and designated non-financial businesses and professions in the sector. Financial-investigation case data tied to wildlife-trafficking prosecutions would be the clearest evidence of improvement in this domain; none has been identified this cycle. The regional ISCAP financing nexus should be monitored jointly with SCEM conflict-finance tracking given its cross-jurisdictional armed-conflict dimension, which extends beyond what a Tanzania-specific assessment alone can capture. Judgment: No conflict-finance finding for Tanzania was located this cycle. Uncertain #### Crypto, Digital Assets, and Financial Innovation Tanzania's digital-asset regulatory posture remains, as of this cycle, pre-regulatory: the Bank of Tanzania has signalled intent but has not published any licensing, registration, or supervisory instrument governing cryptocurrencies, stablecoins, or other virtual assets. Governor Emmanuel Tutuba stated on 13-14 July 2026 that the central bank had completed a study and was finalising laws and regulations covering these instrument classes, explicitly citing consumer protection, AML/CFT and fraud prevention as the priorities shaping the forthcoming framework. This is a direct, multiply-reported quoted statement from the central bank's own leadership, which gives it reasonable standing as evidence of policy direction even though no legal text accompanies it, and the development sits at the proposed stage of the regulatory lifecycle rather than the enacted one. Continue reading The only concrete supervisory artefact currently in existence is a sandbox pilot: the Bank of Tanzania approved NEDA Labs' nTZS, a Tanzanian-shilling-pegged stablecoin built on a layer-2 blockchain and required to remain fully backed 1:1 by shilling-denominated reserves, for participation in its fintech regulatory sandbox beginning in May 2026. The instrument is explicitly not legal tender, and its backing requirement is a condition of sandbox participation for a single named participant rather than a generally-applicable statutory reserve requirement. Reading this pilot correctly matters for an AML/CTF audience: it demonstrates that the central bank has operational tools to engage with a digital-asset issuer on a supervised basis, but it does not establish a licensing regime, a token-classification framework, or AML/CFT-specific controls applicable to the wider market of crypto-asset activity occurring outside the sandbox. That gap between a single supervised pilot and an unregulated broader market is the central AML/CTF-relevant fact for this module. Outside the nTZS pilot, there is no reported licensing, registration, or AML/CFT obligation specifically applicable to crypto-asset exchanges, wallet providers, or other virtual-asset service providers operating in or serving Tanzania. For firms assessing counterparty or correspondent exposure to Tanzanian crypto-asset activity, this means the general AML/CTF regime under the Anti-Money Laundering Act, Cap. 423, continues to apply by virtue of Tanzania's broad reporting-entity obligations, but no crypto-specific controls, travel-rule equivalent, or VASP registration requirement has yet been enacted to supplement it. #### Outlook The Bank of Tanzania's own stated priorities for the forthcoming framework, consumer protection, AML/CFT and fraud prevention, indicate that when a crypto-specific instrument is eventually published it is likely to incorporate AML/CFT obligations directly rather than leaving VASPs to rely solely on the general AML Act. No draft text exists yet, however, and the current evidentiary basis supports only a wide-band expectation of implementation, plausibly in 2027, rather than any near-term date. Until a published instrument exists, the nTZS sandbox pilot should continue to be read as a controlled, single-participant pilot rather than as evidence of a functioning or imminent general crypto-asset regulatory regime. Judgment: The Bank of Tanzania's virtual-asset/stablecoin regulatory concept, submitted to the Ministry of Finance mid-2026, remains at the same pre-legislative stage; no new publication found this cycle. Probable #### Compliance Technology and Active Defence No material RegTech, artificial-intelligence or machine-learning transaction-monitoring, or supervisory-technology development has been identified for Tanzania this cycle. The domain tracker for this jurisdiction records a watch status with no-change trajectory, and no developments were logged against it in the underlying research for this baseline. This is a genuine absence-of-signal finding rather than an omission: Tanzania compliance-technology posture was not a focus area within the FATF action plan that drove the delisting cascade addressed elsewhere in this cycle, and none of the sources reviewed this cycle described a RegTech procurement, supervisory-technology initiative, or transaction-monitoring modernisation programme specific to Tanzania. Continue reading Honesty over coverage is the operative principle for this domain: rather than inferring a compliance-technology posture from adjacent findings, such as the documented underutilisation of Financial Intelligence Unit products by law enforcement, this brief records the absence of direct evidence and flags the domain as limited-signal for this cycle. This is distinct from the beneficial-ownership and enabler-jurisdiction domains, where structural gaps are well documented even absent this-cycle developments; for compliance technology, the absence extends to the underlying evidentiary base itself, meaning no assessment beyond the watch-status classification carried in the standing domain tracker can be responsibly offered at this time. #### Outlook Future cycles should watch for any published Financial Intelligence Unit technology-modernisation initiative, given the documented gap in operational use of financial intelligence across the law enforcement value chain, since a compliance-technology upgrade paired with an operational-use gap would itself be an analytically significant combination worth tracking. Absent such a development, this domain should be expected to remain quiet in the near term. Judgment: No RegTech/compliance-technology development specific to Tanzania was located this cycle. Uncertain Removed from FATF grey list (13 June 2025); status sustained through 19 June 2026 and 13 February 2026 plenary outcomes. Continue reading Disputed: FATF's own page (13 Jun 2025) confirms exit; a T3 source alleges Oct 2025 re-listing unconfirmed by a Feb 2026 compilation. Judgment: Tanzania's FIU, established under the Anti-Money Laundering Act Cap. 423 of 2006, continues as the designated reporting authority; Tanzania remains off the FATF increased-monitoring list since 13 June 2025. Probable #### Commercial Activity Gaming Innovation Group, acting through GiG Software Plc, completed the acquisition of an 80 percent stake in African betting and gaming operator 888AFRICA for EUR 16.4 million on 11 October 2026, following a share purchase agreement announced on 28 September 2026. 888AFRICA's operations include a Tanzania-licensed betting business alongside positions in Angola and Mozambique, and the acquiring group is Malta-domiciled and listed. This is the dominant discrete commercial event for Tanzania this cycle: a specific, dated transaction with disclosed consideration, completion date, and named parties, rather than a structural market-trend observation. As a commercial event, it is distinct from a sanctions, beneficial-ownership instrument, or AML/CTF regulatory action, but it has direct bearing on the beneficial-ownership chain sitting above a licensed Tanzanian gambling entity. Continue reading No AML-specific filing or beneficial-ownership disclosure tied to this specific transaction has been located this cycle, and no Gaming Board of Tanzania primary-source register update confirming a change-of-control or licence-transfer filing for the underlying Tanzanian entity has been located. This is recorded as an evidentiary gap rather than as a finding that no such filing exists: the absence reflects what was and was not located within the research window, not a confirmed non-filing. Readers should treat the beneficial-ownership and licence-transfer status of the Tanzanian entity under its new ownership structure as unconfirmed pending a primary-source update from either BRELA's beneficial-ownership register or the Gaming Board of Tanzania's licensee register. The commercial logic attributed to the transaction, as stated by GiG, centres on developing 888AFRICA's existing operations and expanding into additional African markets. This framing is consistent with a consolidation play in licensed online betting ownership across multiple African jurisdictions rather than a single-market acquisition, which is relevant context for assessing the durability of the Tanzanian licensed entity's ownership structure going forward. #### Outlook The principal item to watch is whether a beneficial-ownership filing under the Companies (Beneficial Ownership) Regulations, or a change-of-control update on the Gaming Board of Tanzania's licensee register, surfaces to confirm the transaction's effect on the Tanzania-licensed entity specifically. Until either surfaces, the transaction is confirmed only at the level of the commercial announcement, consideration amount, and completion date reported in trade press. No further discrete commercial event for Tanzania within the payments or gambling sectors was located this cycle. Judgment: No financial-integrity-market commercial event for Tanzania was located this cycle. Uncertain Regulatory horizon Proposed 2027-Q1 · ±year ### Bank of Tanzania cryptocurrency/stablecoin/virtual-asset regulatory framework A dedicated digital-asset supervisory regime covering cryptocurrencies, stablecoins and virtual assets is being drafted per public central-bank statements, though no draft text has been published. [Source](https://bitcoinke.io/2026/07/bank-of-tanzania-finalising-crypto-regulations/) Proposed 2027-Q1 · ±year ### Bank of Tanzania virtual-asset/stablecoin regulatory framework A concept covering cryptocurrencies, stablecoins and virtual assets, with AML and consumer-protection as stated priorities, has been submitted to the Ministry of Finance for drafting into law. [Bank of Tanzania / Ministry of Finance Source](https://www.thecitizen.co.tz/tanzania/business/bot-completes-regulatory-concept-framework-for-crypto-regulation-5540320) In Force Pending 2027-Q1 · ±year ### Next ESAAMLG/FATF follow-up review of Tanzania's AML/CFT effectiveness post grey-list exit Continued monitoring of sustained effectiveness of the AMLA amendments supporting the 2025 exit. [ESAAMLG / FATF Source](https://dailynews.co.tz/tanzania-reaps-gains-after-fatf-grey-list-exit/) 3 dated · 3 pending date · baseline financial-integrity-2026-07-05 Role action cards MLRO ### Tanzania remains off the FATF monitoring list through a second consecutive plenary, while BO-verification practice reportedly tightens at the company registrar. The sustained grey-list exit supports continued standard due diligence rather than enhanced measures on Tanzania-nexus relationships under FATF-status-driven triggers. The reported tightening in BO verification at incorporation may, if confirmed, improve the reliability of registry-sourced beneficial-ownership data used in onboarding. 2 evidence refs Compliance ### A central-bank statement signals a forthcoming crypto/stablecoin supervisory framework, but no instrument has been published. Policy teams tracking Tanzania crypto exposure should treat the framework as proposed-stage only; no new licensing or AML/CFT obligation for crypto-asset activity currently exists beyond the general AML Act. 1 evidence refs Legal ### A US visa-ineligibility designation against a Tanzanian police official has no EU or UK counterpart. Legal teams assessing sanctions-nexus exposure on Tanzanian government counterparties should note this is a State Department entry-ban action, not an OFAC asset-freeze designation, and should not assume parallel EU/UK listing exists. 1 evidence refs Board ### Tanzania's sustained FATF grey-list exit is a durable structural positive, offset by a still-unregulated digital-asset sector. The board-level read is one of improving overall standing on the AML/CTF dimension, tempered by an open regulatory gap in digital assets that leaves exposure in that sector without a published supervisory framework. 2 evidence refs CTO ### A single-participant stablecoin sandbox pilot remains the only operative Tanzanian digital-asset supervisory artefact. Technical teams evaluating Tanzania as a market for stablecoin or crypto infrastructure should note that the nTZS pilot operates under sandbox-specific reserve conditions, not a generally-applicable statutory framework, and that the central bank has not yet published licensing criteria for market entrants generally. 1 evidence refs Risk ### Beneficial-ownership verification tightening at the registrar is reported but not yet corroborated by primary source text. Risk functions should treat the BRELA verification-tightening finding as directionally probable but hold off upgrading internal risk scoring on Tanzanian corporate structures until primary registrar or Gazette text is retrieved. 1 evidence refs Audit ### The 24-hour STR deadline under s.18(1) of the Anti-Money Laundering Act remains the confirmed standing control audited against. Internal audit scope for Tanzania-nexus reporting entities continues to rest on a confirmed, primary-sourced statutory STR deadline; no change to this control was identified this cycle. 1 evidence refs Scenario sketches ### AMLA transition reshaping cross-border obliged-entity supervision Illustrative only: as AMLA assumes direct supervision of a cohort of higher-risk cross-border obliged entities under the AMLA Regulation, alongside the directly-applicable AMLR and per-state 6AMLD transposition, evasion structures that previously relied on inconsistent national supervisory intensity across EU Member States could face a more harmonised supervisory lens. A structure routing through an enabler jurisdiction outside this perimeter, such as Tanzania, would remain unaffected by the EU-level shift itself, but could see increased scrutiny at the point where EU-based correspondent or counterparty entities now fall under AMLA's harmonised supervisory standard. This is an illustrative structural sketch, not an observed development in Tanzania this cycle. Illustrative scenario for analytical orientation only. Not compliance advice, not a prediction, and not a statement of observed fact. Standing trackers (T1–T6) Tracker Status Note T1 · Russian Sanctions-Evasion Architecture no_change No new UN Panel of Experts, OFAC or OFSI action involving Tanzania found this cycle; a 5 October 2026 OFAC update re-flagging a formerly TZ-flagged tanker predates the window. T2 · EU AML Package / AMLA no_change Not applicable; Tanzania is not an EEA/UK jurisdiction. T3 · FATF Grey List no_change Tanzania remains delisted from FATF increased monitoring since 13 June 2025; no plenary action this cycle. T4 · Beneficial-Ownership Register Status no_change BO filing continues under the Companies (Beneficial Ownership) Regulations 2021 via BRELA; register not fully publicly searchable. T5 · Crypto & Digital-Asset Integrity no_change BoT's virtual-asset regulatory concept remains at pre-legislative stage, submitted to Ministry of Finance mid-2026. T6 · Sanctions Regime Divergence no_change No new US/EU/UK autonomous listing specific to Tanzania found this cycle. Registers ### Enforcement actions - 21 Feb 2025 - 13 Jun 2025 - 4 Dec 2025 - 13 Jun 2025 - 21 May 2026 - 30 Jun 2026 - At its February 2025 Plenary, the FATF made the initial determination that Tanzania had substantially completed its 2022 action plan and warranted an on-site assessment to verify reforms were being implemented and sustained. 21 Feb 2025 - The FATF formally removed Tanzania (with Croatia and Mali) from the Jurisdictions Under Increased Monitoring list after confirming sustained implementation of its AML/CFT action plan since October 2022. 13 Jun 2025 - The European Commission adopted Delegated Regulation (EU) 2026/83 amending Delegated Regulation (EU) 2016/1675 to remove Tanzania (with Burkina Faso, Mali, Mozambique, Nigeria and South Africa) from the EU list of high-risk third countries under Article 9 of the fourth AML Directive. 4 Dec 2025 - Under the MLR 2024 amendment, UK High-Risk Third Country status is defined by direct reference to the FATF's live 'Increased Monitoring' and 'Call for Action' lists rather than a standalone statutory schedule; Tanzania's removal fell away automatically upon the FATF's 13 June 2025 delisting, without a separate UK statutory instrument being required. 13 Jun 2025 ### Sanctions changes - 4 Dec 2025 - 13 Jun 2025 - 30 Jun 2026 - 21 May 2026 - Commission Delegated Regulation (EU) 2026/83 of 4 December 2025 removed Tanzania from the EU's list of high-risk third countries under the fourth AML Directive, six months after Tanzania's FATF grey-list delisting. 4 Dec 2025 - Tanzania's status as a UK Money Laundering Regulations High-Risk Third Country lapsed automatically upon the FATF's 13 June 2025 delisting, since the MLR 2024 amendment ties Regulation 33(3)(a) HRTC status directly to the FATF's live lists rather than a separately-updated Schedule 3ZA. 13 Jun 2025 ### Regulatory horizon (register) - HM Treasury NRA refresh / EU Commission SNRA refresh - Written Laws (Miscellaneous Amendments) Act, 2026 — BO/nominee-disclosure expansion - Bank of Tanzania virtual-asset/stablecoin regulatory framework - Next ESAAMLG/FATF follow-up review of Tanzania's AML/CFT effectiveness post grey-list exit - Bank of Tanzania cryptocurrency/stablecoin/virtual-asset regulatory framework - Bank of Tanzania virtual-assets/stablecoin regulatory framework - Continued ESAAMLG post-delisting follow-up on Tanzania reforms - EU HRTC delisting entry into force for Tanzania-linked EDD - Phased, risk-based CBDC rollout continues amid crypto caution - Mining-sector GDP expansion raises extractive-integrity supervisory demand ### Active schemes - Tanzania and Zanzibar serve as historic ivory-smuggling nodes for Chinese-led syndicates using front businesses to conceal tusks in low-value goods, with customs and port bribery enabling export. Predicate wildlife-crime convictions repeatedly proceed without parallel financial investigation. - Tanzania artisanal and small-scale gold sector functions as a channel through which criminal actors manipulate the gold trade for money laundering, corruption facilitation and cross-border smuggling into regional and international markets. - Financial networks and cells spanning Somalia, Kenya, Uganda, Tanzania and South Africa pool resources via mobile money platforms, cash transfers and hawala-linked business laundering to support Islamic State Central Africa Province operations in the Democratic Republic of Congo and northern Mozambique. - Company and legal-arrangement registration in Tanzania runs through BRELA and BPRA, both capturing only basic ownership data rather than verified beneficial ownership, enabling nominee arrangements, unlimited private companies and trusts to obscure true control. Sources - [Tanzania FIU](https://www.fiu.go.tz/news/tanzania-has-been-removed-from-the-fatf-grey-list) - [Washington Post](https://www.washingtonpost.com/world/2026/05/22/tanzania-us-sanctions-human-rights/2d80452e-55af-11f1-9c40-7a0a12d9e745_story.html) - [Global Advisory Experts](https://globaladvisoryexperts.com/companies-rules-tanzania/) - [Crypto Briefing](https://cryptobriefing.com/tanzania-central-bank-crypto-regulatory-framework/) - [Victory Attorneys (TZ)](https://victoryattorneys.co.tz/2026/04/27/draft-cybersecurity-guidelines-for-banks-psp-financial-service-providers-2026-by-bot/) - [SiGMA News](https://sigma.world/news/cambodia-anti-gambling-drive-fatf-grey-list/) - [FinCEN](https://www.fincen.gov/news/news-releases/fincen-issues-supplemental-alert-fuel-smuggling-and-tax-evasion-schemes-southern) - [Illicit Edge](https://illicitedge.com/chinese-money-laundering-networks-serving-mexico-based-drug-cartels/) - [FATF](https://www.fatf-gafi.org/en/countries/detail/Tanzania.html) - [Bloomberg](https://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2026-05-22/us-sanctions-tanzanian-police-chief-over-alleged-rights-abuses) - [The Respondents (TZ)](https://www.therespondents.co.tz/2026/05/brela-drives-stronger-business.html) - [The Citizen (TZ)](https://www.thecitizen.co.tz/tanzania/business/bot-awaits-government-directive-on-digital-currency-after-completion-of-study-5201592) - [Financial Intelligence Unit Tanzania](https://www.fiu.go.tz/news/tanzania-has-been-removed-from-the-fatf-grey-list) - [Rive & Co.](https://www.rive.co.tz/tanzania-tables-changes-to-various-laws-through-the-written-laws-miscellaneous-amendments-act-2026/) - [FB Attorneys](https://fbattorneys.co.tz/beneficial-ownership-in-tanzania/) - [Mondaq](https://www.mondaq.com/finance-and-banking/896866/the-ban-on-cryptocurrency-in-tanzania) - [Bank of Tanzania](https://www.bot.go.tz/PaymentSystem/regulations) - [https://www.fiu.go.tz/news/tanzania-has-been-removed-from-the-fatf-grey-list](https://www.fiu.go.tz/news/tanzania-has-been-removed-from-the-fatf-grey-list) - [https://www.fatf-gafi.org/en/publications/High-risk-and-other-monitored-jurisdictions/increased-monitoring-june-2025.html](https://www.fatf-gafi.org/en/publications/High-risk-and-other-monitored-jurisdictions/increased-monitoring-june-2025.html) - [https://sanctionslawyers.net/blog-en/fatf-grey-list-countries-2026/](https://sanctionslawyers.net/blog-en/fatf-grey-list-countries-2026/) - [https://civicadvisoryhub.org/resources/topic-hubs/fatf-grey-list](https://civicadvisoryhub.org/resources/topic-hubs/fatf-grey-list) - [https://tanzlii.org/akn/tz/act/2006/12/eng@2019-11-30/source](https://tanzlii.org/akn/tz/act/2006/12/eng@2019-11-30/source) - [https://www.fiu.go.tz/uploads/documents/en-1748525741-G.N%20NO.%20853E-THE%20ANTI-MONEY%20LAUNDERING%20(AMENDMENT)%20REGULATIONS,%20%20November%202023.pdf](https://www.fiu.go.tz/uploads/documents/en-1748525741-G.N%20NO.%20853E-THE%20ANTI-MONEY%20LAUNDERING%20(AMENDMENT)%20REGULATIONS,%20%20November%202023.pdf) - [https://www.fiu.go.tz/uploads/documents/en-1712237226-Guidelines%20on%20Targeted%20Financial%20Sanctions%20revised.pdf](https://www.fiu.go.tz/uploads/documents/en-1712237226-Guidelines%20on%20Targeted%20Financial%20Sanctions%20revised.pdf) - [https://www.fiu.go.tz/uploads/documents/en-1712566361-POTARegulations2022.pdf](https://www.fiu.go.tz/uploads/documents/en-1712566361-POTARegulations2022.pdf) - [https://www.dentons.com/en/insights/alerts/2025/march/21/tanzania-beneficial-ownership-reporting-deadline-looms](https://www.dentons.com/en/insights/alerts/2025/march/21/tanzania-beneficial-ownership-reporting-deadline-looms) - [https://www.businessdataguide.com/blog/jurisdictions/tanzania-company-search-guide](https://www.businessdataguide.com/blog/jurisdictions/tanzania-company-search-guide) - [https://www.thecitizen.co.tz/tanzania/business/bot-completes-regulatory-concept-framework-for-crypto-regulation-5540320](https://www.thecitizen.co.tz/tanzania/business/bot-completes-regulatory-concept-framework-for-crypto-regulation-5540320) - [https://bitcoinke.io/2026/05/tanzania-approves-first-stablecoin-sandbox-pilot/](https://bitcoinke.io/2026/05/tanzania-approves-first-stablecoin-sandbox-pilot/) - [https://www.bot.go.tz/Adverts/PressRelease/sw/2020031307240424208.pdf](https://www.bot.go.tz/Adverts/PressRelease/sw/2020031307240424208.pdf) - [https://dailynews.co.tz/tanzania-reaps-gains-after-fatf-grey-list-exit/](https://dailynews.co.tz/tanzania-reaps-gains-after-fatf-grey-list-exit/) - [https://blog.voveid.com/aml-compliance-in-tanzania-2025-guide-for-fintechs-and-regulated-businesses/](https://blog.voveid.com/aml-compliance-in-tanzania-2025-guide-for-fintechs-and-regulated-businesses/) - [https://sigma.world/news/gig-completes-over-e16m-deal-for-888africa/](https://sigma.world/news/gig-completes-over-e16m-deal-for-888africa/) - [https://globallawexperts.com/beneficial-ownership-tanzania/](https://globallawexperts.com/beneficial-ownership-tanzania/) - [https://avcpartners.co.tz/regulations-for-beneficial-ownership-in-tanzania/](https://avcpartners.co.tz/regulations-for-beneficial-ownership-in-tanzania/) - [https://www.fatf-gafi.org/en/publications/Fatfgeneral/outcomes-FATF-plenary-october-2025.html](https://www.fatf-gafi.org/en/publications/Fatfgeneral/outcomes-FATF-plenary-october-2025.html) - [https://www.washingtonpost.com/world/2026/05/22/tanzania-us-sanctions-human-rights/2d80452e-55af-11f1-9c40-7a0a12d9e745_story.html](https://www.washingtonpost.com/world/2026/05/22/tanzania-us-sanctions-human-rights/2d80452e-55af-11f1-9c40-7a0a12d9e745_story.html) - [https://globaladvisoryexperts.com/companies-rules-tanzania/](https://globaladvisoryexperts.com/companies-rules-tanzania/) - [https://bitcoinke.io/2026/07/bank-of-tanzania-finalising-crypto-regulations/](https://bitcoinke.io/2026/07/bank-of-tanzania-finalising-crypto-regulations/) - [https://www.fiu.go.tz/welcome](https://www.fiu.go.tz/welcome) - [https://www.fiu.go.tz/](https://www.fiu.go.tz/) - [https://ofac.treasury.gov/recent-actions/20261005](https://ofac.treasury.gov/recent-actions/20261005) - ["Black and grey" lists](https://www.fatf-gafi.org/en/countries/black-and-grey-lists.html) - [Tanzania](https://www.fatf-gafi.org/en/countries/detail/Tanzania.html) - [Jurisdictions under Increased Monitoring - 13 June 2025](https://www.fatf-gafi.org/en/publications/High-risk-and-other-monitored-jurisdictions/increased-monitoring-june-2025.html) - [FATF changes its grey listing criteria to further focus on risk](https://www.fatf-gafi.org/en/publications/Fatfgeneral/FATF-grey-listing-criteria.html) - [Jurisdictions under Increased Monitoring - 19 June 2026](https://www.fatf-gafi.org/en/publications/High-risk-and-other-monitored-jurisdictions/increased-monitoring-june-2026.html) - [Kenya](https://www.fatf-gafi.org/en/countries/detail/Kenya.html) - [Mutual Evaluation of Tanzania](https://www.fatf-gafi.org/en/countries/s-t/tanzania/documents/mutualevaluationoftanzania.html) - [Jurisdictions under Increased Monitoring - 23 February 2024](https://www.fatf-gafi.org/en/publications/High-risk-and-other-monitored-jurisdictions/Increased-monitoring-february-2024.html) - [Jurisdictions under Increased Monitoring - 13 February 2026](https://www.fatf-gafi.org/en/publications/High-risk-and-other-monitored-jurisdictions/increased-monitoring-february-2026.html) - [Jurisdictions under Increased Monitoring - 21 February 2025](https://www.fatf-gafi.org/en/publications/High-risk-and-other-monitored-jurisdictions/increased-monitoring-february-2025.html) - [Unlocking the Fight against Financial Crimes: UNODC Empowers Tanzanian Law Enforcement Agencies to Counter Money Laundering and Terrorism Financing](https://www.unodc.org/easternafrica/en/Stories/unlocking-the-fight-against-financial-crimes_-unodc-empowers-tanzanian-law-enforcement-agencies-to-counter-money-laundering-and-terrorism-financing.html) - [Financial Action Task Force Identifies Jurisdictions with Anti-Money Laundering, Countering the Financing of Terrorism, and Counter-Proliferation Finance Deficiencies | FinCEN.gov](https://www.fincen.gov/news/news-releases/financial-action-task-force-identifies-jurisdictions-anti-money-laundering-3) - [The Egmont Group of Financial Intelligence Units | FinCEN.gov](https://www.fincen.gov/resources/international/egmont-group-financial-intelligence-units) - [Tanzania's measures to combat money laundering and terrorist financing](https://www.fatf-gafi.org/en/publications/Mutualevaluations/Mer-tanzania-2021.html) - [Tanzania's progress in strengthening measures to tackle money laundering and terrorist financing](https://www.fatf-gafi.org/en/publications/Mutualevaluations/FUR-Tanzania-2023.html) - [The FATF Recommendations](https://www.fatf-gafi.org/en/publications/Fatfrecommendations/Fatf-recommendations.html) - [Financial Action Task Force Identifies Jurisdictions with Anti-Money Laundering and Combating the Financing of Terrorism and Counter-Proliferation Deficiencies | FinCEN.gov](https://www.fincen.gov/index.php/news/news-releases/financial-action-task-force-identifies-jurisdictions-anti-money-laundering-and-3) - [Anti-Money Laundering and Terrorist Financing Directive 4 - Finance](https://finance.ec.europa.eu/regulation-and-supervision/financial-services-legislation/implementing-and-delegated-acts/anti-money-laundering-and-terrorist-financing-directive-4_en) - [Africa Gold Advisory](https://ofac.treasury.gov/system/files/2023-06/africa_gold_advisory_06272023.pdf) - [Sanctions Programs and Country Information | Office of Foreign Assets Control](https://ofac.treasury.gov/sanctions-programs-and-country-information) - [Home | Office of Foreign Assets Control](https://ofac.treasury.gov/) - [OFAC Related Press Releases | Office of Foreign Assets Control](https://ofac.treasury.gov/press-releases) - [Counter Narcotics Trafficking Sanctions | Office of Foreign Assets Control](https://ofac.treasury.gov/sanctions-programs-and-country-information/counter-narcotics-trafficking-sanctions) - [Civil Penalties and Enforcement Information | Office of Foreign Assets Control](https://ofac.treasury.gov/civil-penalties-and-enforcement-information) - [United States Department of the Treasury Financial Crimes Enforcement Network - Home | FinCEN.gov](https://www.fincen.gov/) - [Anti-money laundering and counter-terrorist financing measures](https://www.fatf-gafi.org/content/dam/fatf-gafi/fsrb-mer/ESAAMLG-Mutual-Evaluation-Report-Tanzania-June-2021.pdf) - [What We Do | FinCEN.gov](https://www.fincen.gov/about-fincen/what-we-do) - [INTERNATIONAL STANDARDS ON COMBATING MONEY LAUNDERING AND THE FINANCING OF](https://www.fatf-gafi.org/content/dam/fatf-gafi/recommendations/FATF%20Recommendations%202012.pdf.coredownload.inline.pdf) - [International Narcotics Control Strategy Report Volume II Money Laundering](https://syntheticdrugs.unodc.org/uploads/syntheticdrugs/res/library/cybercrime_html/US_International_Narcotics_Control_Strategy_Report_Money_Laundering.pdf) - ['Next-Generation' FIU.net - Finance - European Commission](https://finance.ec.europa.eu/news/next-generation-fiunet-2025-02-04_en) - [Tanzania: Two Tons of Ivory Seized in Controversial Operation | OCCRP](https://www.occrp.org/en/news/tanzania-two-tons-of-ivory-seized-in-controversial-operation) - [Report: Chinese Criminal Groups Running “World’s Largest Hub” for Ivory Trafficking](https://occrp.org/en/27-ccwatch/cc-watch-briefs/6675-report-chinese-criminal-groups-running-world-s-largest-hub-for-ivory-trafficking) - [Tanzania: Queen of Poaching Trade Sentenced to 15 Years | OCCRP](https://www.occrp.org/en/news/tanzania-queen-of-poaching-trade-sentenced-to-15-years) - [Report: Chinese Criminal Groups Running “World’s Largest Hub” for Ivory Trafficking](https://www.occrp.org/en/component/content/article?id=6675:report-chinese-criminal-groups-running-world-s-largest-hub-for-ivory-trafficking) - [Report: Chinese Criminal Groups Running “World’s Largest Hub” for Ivory Trafficking | OCCRP](https://www.occrp.org/en/news/report-chinese-criminal-groups-running-worlds-largest-hub-for-ivory-trafficking) - [INTERPOL Seized Smuggled Ivory, Rhino Horns, Pangolin and Tiger Parts | OCCRP](https://www.occrp.org/en/news/interpol-seized-smuggled-ivory-rhino-horns-pangolin-and-tiger-parts) - [Report: To End Illegal Wildlife Trafficking, Follow The Money | OCCRP](https://www.occrp.org/en/daily/15126-report-to-end-illegal-wildlife-trafficking-follow-the-money) - [Organized Crime and Corruption Reporting Project | OCCRP](https://www.occrp.org/en) - [Tanzania: Two Tons of Ivory Seized in Controversial Operation](https://www.occrp.org/en/daily/2201-tanzania-two-tons-of-ivory-seized-in-controversial-operation) - [Worldwide Operation Across 133 Countries Targets Wildlife and Forest Crime](https://www.occrp.org/en/daily/18303-worldwide-operation-across-133-countries-targets-wildlife-and-forest-crime) - [2025 Crypto Regulatory Round-Up](https://www.chainalysis.com/blog/2025-crypto-regulatory-round-up/) - [2025 Crypto Adoption and Stablecoin Usage Report | TRM Labs](https://www.trmlabs.com/reports-and-whitepapers/2025-crypto-adoption-and-stablecoin-usage-report) - [Elliptic's 2026 regulatory and policy outlook: 5 crypto trends to expect in 2026](https://www.elliptic.co/blog/regulatory-and-policy-crypto-trends-to-except-in-2026) - [(BTC) Wary of Crypto, Tanzania Shifts Closer to Own Digital Currency - Bloomberg](https://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2022-05-09/wary-of-crypto-tanzania-shifts-closer-to-own-digital-currency) - [Elliptic's 2026 regulatory and policy outlook: a global pivot toward innovation](https://www.elliptic.co/blog/elliptics-2026-regulatory-and-policy-outlook-global-pivot-to-innovation) - [Elliptic's 2026 regulatory and policy outlook: US sets the pace](https://www.elliptic.co/blog/elliptics-2026-regulatory-and-policy-outlook-us-sets-the-pace) - [Tanzanian Central Bank Plans Own Digital Currency, Following Nigeria’s eNaira - Bloomberg](https://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2021-11-26/fomo-drives-tanzanian-central-bank-to-plan-own-digital-currency) - [Mobile Money & Digital Financial Services](https://unstats.un.org/unsd/classifications/Workshops/AddisAbaba2026/Session3-Deck7_WorkshopAddis_Section_L_Mobile_money.pdf) - [Digital Currencies: Tanzania Central Bank Currency Launch - Bloomberg](https://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2023-01-14/tanzania-plans-cautious-central-bank-digital-currency-launch) - [CAC/COSP/IRG/2019/CRP.5 24 May 2019 English only V.19-03713 (E) *1903713*](https://www.unodc.org/documents/treaties/UNCAC/WorkingGroups/ImplementationReviewGroup/27-29May2019/V1903713e.pdf) - [Strengthening Tanzania’s Anti-Corruption Action (STACA) Programme](https://assets.publishing.service.gov.uk/media/5a751085ed915d60d3b90d64/Strengthening-Tanzania-Anti-Corruption-Action-Programme.pdf) - [UNTOC Review Mechanism Self-assessment questionnaires submitted](https://www.unodc.org/documents/organized-crime/reviewmechanism/Countries/Tanzania/Tanzania_SAQ.pdf) - [PREVENTION AND COMBATING OF CORRUPTION BUREAU THE UNITED REPUBLIC OF TANZANIA](https://track.unodc.org/uploads/documents/UNCAC/WorkingGroups/ImplementationReviewGroup/17-21February2025/presentations/IRG16_panel_1_Tanzania.pdf) - [Tanzania](https://www.unodc.org/documents/corruption/WG-Prevention/Art_13_Participation_of_society/Tanzania.pdf) - [United Nations Convention against Corruption Self-assessment Name:](https://www.unodc.org/documents/treaties/UNCAC/SA-Report/Tanzania_UNCAC_self-assessment.pdf) - [Tanzanian Journalist Charged with Economic Crimes](https://www.occrp.org/en/27-ccwatch/cc-watch-briefs/10414-tanzanian-journalist-charged-with-economic-crimes) - [Mid-term review of IMPACT - 'Improving accountability through ...](https://international-partnerships.ec.europa.eu/document/download/3d725c5c-d98a-4feb-b4e6-3be15a351417_en?filename=evaluation-report-2021-m-2951-tanzania-redacted_en.pdf) - [CASEBOOK ON Money Laundering and Proceeds of Crime](https://www.unodc.org/documents/southernafrica/Publications/TransnationalOrganisedCrime/case_book_final_17032021.pdf) - [Comprehensive Update on Terrorist Financing Risks FATF REPORT July 2025](https://www.fatf-gafi.org/content/dam/fatf-gafi/publications/Comprehensive-Update-on-Terrorist-Financing-Risks-2025.pdf.coredownload.inline.pdf) - [CTED Trends Tracker Evolving Trends in the Financing of Foreign Terrorist](https://www.un.org/securitycouncil/ctc/sites/www.un.org.securitycouncil.ctc/files/cted_trends_tracker_evolving_trends_in_the_financing_of_foreign_terrorist_fighters_activity_2014_-_2024.pdf) - [FATF report highlights evolving terrorist financing risks and warns of gaps in global understanding of the threats](https://www.fatf-gafi.org/en/publications/Methodsandtrends/comprehensive-update-terrorist-financing-risks-2025.html) - [The role of Hawala and other similar service providers in money laundering and terrorist financing](https://www.fatf-gafi.org/en/publications/Methodsandtrends/Role-hawalas-in-ml-tf.html) - [Terrorism - Tanzania travel advice - GOV.UK](https://www.gov.uk/foreign-travel-advice/tanzania/terrorism) - [FATF REPORT Emerging Terrorist Financing Risks October 2015](https://www.fatf-gafi.org/content/dam/fatf-gafi/reports/Emerging-Terrorist-Financing-Risks.pdf.coredownload.pdf) - [Safety and security - Tanzania travel advice - GOV.UK](https://www.gov.uk/foreign-travel-advice/tanzania/safety-and-security) - [Terrorist Financing in West Africa](https://www.fatf-gafi.org/en/publications/Methodsandtrends/Tf-west-africa.html) - [FinCEN Advisory, FIN-2025-A001, April 1, 2025](https://www.fincen.gov/system/files/advisory/2025-04-01/FinCEN-Advisory-ISIS-508C.pdf) - [IP Country Fiche - TANZANIA - Intellectual Property Helpdesk](https://intellectual-property-helpdesk.ec.europa.eu/system/files/2021-11/07_Tanzania_final.pdf) - [Frequently Asked Questions | FinCEN.gov](https://www.fincen.gov/boi-faqs) - [Overseas business risk: Tanzania - GOV.UK](https://www.gov.uk/government/publications/overseas-business-risk-for-tanzania/overseas-business-risk-tanzania) - [Beneficial Ownership Reporting Outreach and Education Toolkit | FinCEN.gov](https://www.fincen.gov/boi/toolkit) - [U.S. Beneficial Ownership Information Registry Now Accepting Reports | FinCEN.gov](https://www.fincen.gov/news/news-releases/us-beneficial-ownership-information-registry-now-accepting-reports) - [Beneficial Ownership Information Report (BOIR) - BOI E-FILING](https://boiefiling.fincen.gov/fileboir) - [Financial Crimes Enforcement Network U.S. Department of the Treasury](https://www.fincen.gov/system/files/shared/BOI_Small_Compliance_Guide.v1.1-FINAL.pdf) - [Beneficial Ownership Information Reporting | FinCEN.gov](https://www.fincen.gov/boi) - [Guidance on Beneficial Ownership and Transparency of Legal Arrangements](https://www.fatf-gafi.org/en/publications/Fatfrecommendations/Guidance-Beneficial-Ownership-Transparency-Legal-Arrangements.html) - [Quick Reference | FinCEN.gov](https://www.fincen.gov/boi/quick-reference) - [Jurisdictions under Increased Monitoring - 21 February 2025](https://www.fatf-gafi.org/content/fatf-gafi/en/publications/High-risk-and-other-monitored-jurisdictions/increased-monitoring-february-2025.html) - [FATF GUIDANCE Money Laundering National Risk Assessment Guidance November 2024](https://www.fatf-gafi.org/content/dam/fatf-gafi/reports/Money-Laundering-National-Risk-Assessment-Guidance-2024.pdf.coredownload.inline.pdf) - [News](https://www.fatf-gafi.org/en/the-fatf/news.html) - [Money Laundering National Risk Assessment Guidance](https://www.fatf-gafi.org/en/publications/Methodsandtrends/Money-Laundering-National-Risk-Assessment-Guidance.html) - [Money laundering and terrorist financing risks](https://www.fatf-gafi.org/en/publications/Methodsandtrends/Ml-tf-risks.html) - [FATF GUIDANCE Money Laundering National Risk Assessment Guidance](https://www.fatf-gafi.org/content/dam/fatf-gafi/publications/Money%20Laundering%20National%20Risk%20Assessment%20Guidance.pdf.coredownload.inline.pdf) - [Money Laundering Advisory Notice: High Risk Third Countries - GOV.UK](https://www.gov.uk/government/publications/money-laundering-advisory-notice-high-risk-third-countries--2) - [Money Laundering Advisory Notice: June 2026 - GOV.UK](https://www.gov.uk/government/publications/money-laundering-advisory-notice-high-risk-third-countries--2/money-laundering-advisory-notice-high-risk-third-countries--2) - [ECSH31555 - Schedule 3ZA - High-Risk Third Countries - HMRC internal manual - GOV.UK](https://www.gov.uk/hmrc-internal-manuals/economic-crime-supervision-handbook/ecsh31555) - [HM Treasury Advisory Notice: High Risk Third Countries - GOV.UK](https://www.gov.uk/government/publications/money-laundering-advisory-notice-high-risk-third-countries--2/hm-treasury-advisory-notice-high-risk-third-countries) - [ECSH64830 - Schedule 3ZA - High-Risk Third Countries - HMRC internal manual - GOV.UK](https://www.gov.uk/hmrc-internal-manuals/economic-crime-supervision-handbook/ecsh64830) - [High-risk third countries](https://www.gamblingcommission.gov.uk/licensees-and-businesses/notice/high-risk-third-countries) - [European Commission updates list of high-risk countries to strengthen international fight against financial crime - Finance](https://finance.ec.europa.eu/news/european-commission-updates-list-high-risk-countries-strengthen-international-fight-against-2025-12-04_en) - [The Money Laundering and Terrorist Financing (High-Risk ...](https://www.legislation.gov.uk/uksi/2023/704/pdfs/uksiem_20230704_en_001.pdf) - [ECSH33336 - High-risk third countries - HMRC internal manual - GOV.UK](https://www.gov.uk/hmrc-internal-manuals/economic-crime-supervision-handbook/ecsh33336) - [OFSI Consolidated List Search](https://sanctionssearchapp.ofsi.hmtreasury.gov.uk/) - [Anti-money laundering and counter-terrorist financing measures Tanzania](https://www.fatf-gafi.org/content/dam/fatf-gafi/fsrb-fur/ESAAMLG-Tanzania-FUR-2022.pdf.coredownload.inline.pdf) - [Enforcement Actions | FinCEN.gov](https://www.fincen.gov/news/enforcement-actions) - [Survey of the Costs of AML/CFT Compliance | FinCEN.gov](https://www.fincen.gov/survey-costs-amlcft-compliance) - [Eastern and Southern Africa Anti-Money Laundering Group (ESAAMLG)](https://www.fatf-gafi.org/en/countries/global-network/eastern-and-southern-africa-anti-money-laundering-group--esaamlg.html) - [Tanzania's progress in strengthening measures to tackle money laundering and terrorist financing](https://www.fatf-gafi.org/en/publications/Mutualevaluations/Tanzania-fur-2023.html) - [FATF contributes to AML/CFT discussions in Eastern and Southern Africa](https://www.fatf-gafi.org/en/publications/Fatfgeneral/Fatfcontributestoamlcftdiscussionsineasternandsouthernafrica.html) - [Mutual Evaluation of Tanzania](https://www.fatf-gafi.org/en/publications/Mutualevaluations/Mutualevaluationoftanzania.html) - [FATF / ESAAMLG](https://www.fatf-gafi.org/content/dam/fatf-gafi/fsrb-mer/ESAAMLG-Mutual-Evaluation-Report-Tanzania-June-2021.pdf) - [Financial Action Task Force](https://www.fatf-gafi.org/en/publications/High-risk-and-other-monitored-jurisdictions/increased-monitoring-june-2025.html) - [FinCEN, US Department of the Treasury](https://www.fincen.gov/news/news-releases/financial-action-task-force-identifies-jurisdictions-anti-money-laundering-3) - [European Commission](https://finance.ec.europa.eu/news/european-commission-updates-list-high-risk-countries-strengthen-international-fight-against-2025-12-04_en) - [UK Gambling Commission / HM Treasury](https://www.gamblingcommission.gov.uk/licensees-and-businesses/notice/high-risk-third-countries) - [OCCRP / Global Initiative Against Transnational Organized Crime (GI-TOC)](https://www.occrp.org/en/daily/15126-report-to-end-illegal-wildlife-trafficking-follow-the-money) - [OFAC, US Department of the Treasury](https://ofac.treasury.gov/system/files/2023-06/africa_gold_advisory_06272023.pdf) - [UN Security Council CTED](https://www.un.org/securitycouncil/ctc/sites/www.un.org.securitycouncil.ctc/files/cted_trends_tracker_evolving_trends_in_the_financing_of_foreign_terrorist_fighters_activity_2014_-_2024.pdf) - [UK Foreign, Commonwealth & Development Office](https://www.gov.uk/foreign-travel-advice/tanzania/terrorism) - [Financial Action Task Force](https://www.fatf-gafi.org/content/dam/fatf-gafi/publications/Comprehensive-Update-on-Terrorist-Financing-Risks-2025.pdf.coredownload.inline.pdf) - [Bloomberg](https://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2023-01-14/tanzania-plans-cautious-central-bank-digital-currency-launch) Coverage gaps fim-int-2026-07-05-G001: Direct evidence of correspondent-ba… fim-int-2026-07-05-G001: Direct evidence of correspondent-banking or shipping-insurance linkages between Dar es Salaam port trade flows and Russian sanctions-evasion corridors would clarify whether the T1 tracker sourcing gap reflects genuine absence of risk or under-monitoring. [resolved] fim-int-2026-07-05-G002: A dedicated Tanzania beneficial-own… fim-int-2026-07-05-G002: A dedicated Tanzania beneficial-ownership register audit or BRELA/BPRA digitisation timeline would resolve uncertainty on whether Recommendation 24 and 25 gaps are closing. [resolved] fim-int-2026-07-05-G003: Financial-investigation case data t… fim-int-2026-07-05-G003: Financial-investigation case data tied to wildlife-trafficking and gold-sector predicate prosecutions would confirm whether ESAAMLG follow-up reforms have begun producing parallel proceeds-tracing outcomes. [resolved] fim-int-2026-07-05-G004: A published Bank of Tanzania VASP l… fim-int-2026-07-05-G004: A published Bank of Tanzania VASP licensing consultation or framework would clarify the crypto and CBDC regulatory horizon practical AML implications. [resolved] fim-int-2026-07-05-G005: Post-election financial-system stab… fim-int-2026-07-05-G005: Post-election financial-system stability reporting from late 2025 would clarify whether cash and fuel shortages materially affected AML/CFT supervisory capacity or informal-economy risk exposure. [resolved] fim-int-2026-07-14-G001: No independent T1 Gazette or BoT ci… fim-int-2026-07-14-G001: No independent T1 Gazette or BoT circular corroborates the digital-payment-proof mandate for land/asset transfers beyond the single T3 news report. [resolved] fim-int-2026-07-14-G002: D3 (enabler jurisdictions), D4 (con… fim-int-2026-07-14-G002: D3 (enabler jurisdictions), D4 (conflict finance) and D5 (crypto, TZ-specific) domains returned thin TZ-specific material this cycle. [resolved] fim-int-2026-07-14-G003: No Colombia-specific narco-finance … fim-int-2026-07-14-G003: No Colombia-specific narco-finance or FATF-trajectory signal was found despite mandatory Tier-D sweep. [resolved] fim-int-2026-08-05-G001: No TZ-specific enabler-jurisdiction… fim-int-2026-08-05-G001: No TZ-specific enabler-jurisdiction/professional-facilitator finding distinct from BO enforcement was located this cycle. [resolved] fim-int-2026-08-05-G002: No conflict-finance finding specifi… fim-int-2026-08-05-G002: No conflict-finance finding specific to Tanzania was located this cycle. [resolved] fim-int-2026-08-05-G003: Yemen/Houthi UN Panel of Experts / … fim-int-2026-08-05-G003: Yemen/Houthi UN Panel of Experts / OFAC / OFSI designation channel check yielded no material change this cycle. [resolved] fim-int-2026-08-05-G004: No OFAC/Treasury primary URL was lo… fim-int-2026-08-05-G004: No OFAC/Treasury primary URL was located for the Mafwele designation; sourcing capped at Tier 3. [resolved] fim-int-2026-08-05-G005: Tier-D sweep did not resolve findin… fim-int-2026-08-05-G005: Tier-D sweep did not resolve findings for Laos (LA) or Colombia (CO) this cycle. [resolved] fim-int-2026-09-28-G001 ({'scheme': 'financial_integrity', '… fim-int-2026-09-28-G001 ({'scheme': 'financial_integrity', 'value': 'D2'}): No T1 gazette or BRELA primary text was retrieved for the Written Laws (Miscellaneous Amendments) Act, 2026; would upgrade the BO-expansion finding from Probable to Confirmed. [resolved] fim-int-2026-09-28-G002 ({'scheme': 'financial_integrity', '… fim-int-2026-09-28-G002 ({'scheme': 'financial_integrity', 'value': 'D5'}): No T1 BOT circular or press release text was retrieved on the digital-asset/stablecoin framework; sourcing rests entirely on T3/T4 commentary. [resolved] fim-int-2026-09-28-G003: D1 (Sanctions), D3 (Enabler Jurisdi… fim-int-2026-09-28-G003: D1 (Sanctions), D3 (Enabler Jurisdictions), D4 (Conflict Finance) and D6 (Compliance Technology) were not researched to adequate depth for TZ this cycle due to search-budget allocation; this is a coverage gap, not a finding of no movement. [resolved] fim-int-2026-09-28-G004: Tier D (KH/LA/MX/CO) jurisdictions … fim-int-2026-09-28-G004: Tier D (KH/LA/MX/CO) jurisdictions were not actively searched this cycle; pooled union web_search budget was allocated to the bound jurisdiction. [resolved] fim-int-2026-10-04-G001 ({'scheme': 'financial_integrity', '… fim-int-2026-10-04-G001 ({'scheme': 'financial_integrity', 'value': 'D7'}): No T1 FATF statement for any plenary session after June 2025 naming Tanzania was retrieved; the Oct 2025 re-listing claim from a lower-tier source remains unverified. [resolved] fim-int-2026-10-04-G002 ({'scheme': 'financial_integrity', '… fim-int-2026-10-04-G002 ({'scheme': 'financial_integrity', 'value': 'D3'}): No D3 enabler-jurisdiction findings for Tanzania were located this cycle. [resolved] fim-int-2026-10-04-G003 ({'scheme': 'financial_integrity', '… fim-int-2026-10-04-G003 ({'scheme': 'financial_integrity', 'value': 'D4'}): No D4 conflict-finance findings for Tanzania were located this cycle. [resolved] fim-int-2026-10-04-G004 ({'scheme': 'financial_integrity', '… fim-int-2026-10-04-G004 ({'scheme': 'financial_integrity', 'value': 'D6'}): No Tanzania-specific AI/ML transaction-monitoring supervisory guidance (D6) was located against which to benchmark industry practice. [resolved] fim-int-2026-10-04-G005: The current (2026) EU high-risk-thi… fim-int-2026-10-04-G005: The current (2026) EU high-risk-third-country list was not retrieved to confirm whether Tanzania's 2022 listing persists. [resolved] fim-int-2026-10-11-G001 ({'scheme': 'financial_integrity', '… fim-int-2026-10-11-G001 ({'scheme': 'financial_integrity', 'value': 'D1'}): D1 sanctions finding for Tanzania not located this cycle; coverage gap rather than confirmed no-change. [resolved] fim-int-2026-10-11-G002 ({'scheme': 'financial_integrity', '… fim-int-2026-10-11-G002 ({'scheme': 'financial_integrity', 'value': 'D3'}): D3 enabler-jurisdiction finding for Tanzania not located this cycle. [resolved] fim-int-2026-10-11-G003 ({'scheme': 'financial_integrity', '… fim-int-2026-10-11-G003 ({'scheme': 'financial_integrity', 'value': 'D4'}): D4 conflict-finance finding for Tanzania not located this cycle. [resolved] fim-int-2026-10-11-G004: Tier-D jurisdictions (KH, LA, MX, C… fim-int-2026-10-11-G004: Tier-D jurisdictions (KH, LA, MX, CO) were not actively researched this cycle because the pooled research budget was directed at Tanzania. [resolved] fim-int-2026-10-11-G005 ({'scheme': 'financial_integrity', '… fim-int-2026-10-11-G005 ({'scheme': 'financial_integrity', 'value': 'D8'}): No AML/BO filing specific to the GiG/888AFRICA transaction, and no GBT register confirmation of the Tanzania licence transfer, was located this cycle. [resolved] fim-int-2026-10-18-G001 ({'scheme': 'financial_integrity', '… fim-int-2026-10-18-G001 ({'scheme': 'financial_integrity', 'value': 'D3'}): D3 Enabler Jurisdictions returned no findings for Tanzania this cycle. [open] fim-int-2026-10-18-G002: Tier D watch jurisdictions (Cambodi… fim-int-2026-10-18-G002: Tier D watch jurisdictions (Cambodia, Laos, Mexico, Colombia) were not actively re-searched this cycle owing to pooled search-budget allocation to Tanzania-specific modules. [open] fim-int-2026-10-18-G003 ({'scheme': 'financial_integrity', '… fim-int-2026-10-18-G003 ({'scheme': 'financial_integrity', 'value': 'D7'}): Cash/EFT reporting-threshold figures under the AML (Electronic Funds Transfer and Cash Transaction Reporting) Regulations, 2019 are Disputed across secondary sources pending retrieval of the current consolidated regulation text. [open] fim-int-2026-10-25-G001: FIM-native Tier-D watch (KH/LA/MX/C… fim-int-2026-10-25-G001: FIM-native Tier-D watch (KH/LA/MX/CO) was not actively researched this cycle due to the union single-JID lock scoping this run to Tanzania only. [open] fim-int-2026-10-25-G002 ({'scheme': 'financial_integrity', '… fim-int-2026-10-25-G002 ({'scheme': 'financial_integrity', 'value': 'D6'}): No new UN/OFAC/OFSI Tanzania-specific sanctions or enforcement action within the 2026-10-18 to 2026-10-25 window was located; D3, D4 and D6 remain thinly covered this cycle. [open] FIM-GAP-001 (D3): Tanzania's FIU produces financial intellig… FIM-GAP-001 (D3): Tanzania's FIU produces financial intelligence reports that remain underutilised across the ML/TF investigation and prosecution value chain, with law enforcement relying on other sources of information and prioritising predicate-offence investigation over dedicated ML investigation. FIM-GAP-002 (D4): Wildlife-trafficking prosecutions in Tanza… FIM-GAP-002 (D4): Wildlife-trafficking prosecutions in Tanzania and the wider East African region have repeatedly proceeded without parallel financial investigations, meaning courts convict on predicate wildlife-crime charges while never tracing, freezing or confiscating laundering proceeds or upstream financiers. FIM-GAP-003 (D2): Despite BRELA/BPRA basic company-ownership… FIM-GAP-003 (D2): Despite BRELA/BPRA basic company-ownership registration, Tanzania's Mutual Evaluation identified limited availability of verified beneficial ownership information for legal persons and arrangements, undermining competent authorities' timely access to true ownership data. FIM-GAP-004 (D1): No confirmed, sourced evidence was identif… FIM-GAP-004 (D1): No confirmed, sourced evidence was identified in this baseline directly linking Tanzania to Russian sanctions-evasion transit corridors, dark-fleet activity, or intermediary financial structures (Tracker T1). This absence is noted as a sourcing gap rather than a confirmed clean bill, given Tanzania's role as an Indian Ocean port hub for six landlocked neighbours. ## Evidence #### Confidence-tiered claims Tanzania removed from the FATF list of Jurisdictions under Increased Monitoring effective 13 June 2025; a lower-tier source alleges an October 2025 re-listing not corroborated by a February 2026 compilation. [[Source 1]](#sec-sources) Disputed · 1 source Reporting persons must report a suspicious transaction to the FIU within 24 hours of forming the suspicion (s.17(1)). [[Source 1]](#sec-sources) Probable · 1 source CDD trigger for occasional transactions reset to USD 15,000 equivalent; supervisory review cycle changed from annual to every three years. [[Source 1]](#sec-sources) Probable · 1 source Reporting persons must freeze, without delay, funds of UN-designated persons/entities; domestic designation routed through the Minister of Home Affairs or the UN Ombudsperson/Focal Point. [[Source 1]](#sec-sources) Probable · 1 source 25% UBO threshold filing regime in force via BRELA; register not publicly searchable as of 2026; non-filers blocked from registrar transactions; 30-day change-filing requirement with TZS 5-10 million fines. [[Source 1]](#sec-sources) Probable · 1 source BOT completed a virtual-asset sector assessment and submitted a regulatory concept covering cryptocurrencies, stablecoins and virtual assets to the Ministry of Finance for drafting into law; no implementation timeline given. [[Source 1]](#sec-sources) Probable · 1 source BOT approved a three-month phased sandbox pilot (May 2026) requiring nTZS to remain fully 1:1 backed by TZS-denominated reserves with all customer settlement in local currency. [[Source 1]](#sec-sources) Probable · 1 source EUR 16.4m for 80% stake, completed 2026-10-11 [[Source 1]](#sec-sources) Probable · 1 source Effective 13 June 2025 [[Source 1]](#sec-sources) Probable · 1 source 2026 marks a period of intensified enforcement; 25% control threshold under Companies (Beneficial Ownership) Regulations [[Source 1]](#sec-sources) Uncertain · 1 source US Secretary of State imposed a visa-ineligibility designation under a human-rights authority on 21-22 May 2026, barring US entry over alleged torture of detained activists. [[Source 1]](#sec-sources) Probable · 1 source BRELA moved from passive BO data collection to active verification, with incorporation applications increasingly rejected for incomplete or inconsistent beneficial-ownership declarations. [[Source 1]](#sec-sources) Probable · 1 source BoT Governor Emmanuel Tutuba stated (13-14 July 2026) that a crypto/stablecoin/virtual-asset supervisory framework is being finalised, citing consumer protection, AML/CFT and fraud-prevention priorities; no published instrument exists yet. [[Source 1]](#sec-sources) Probable · 1 source Section 18(1) requires reporting persons to file a suspicious transaction report with the FIU within 24 hours of forming suspicion. [[Source 1]](#sec-sources) Probable · 1 source Tanzania exited the FATF increased-monitoring list on 13 June 2025 and was not re-added at the October 2025 or February 2026 plenaries. [[Source 1]](#sec-sources) Probable · 1 source removed from FATF increased monitoring list [[Source 1]](#sec-sources) Probable · 1 source Anti Money Laundering Act, Cap. 423 of 2006 [[Source 1]](#sec-sources) Probable · 1 source regulatory concept for cryptocurrencies, stablecoins and virtual assets submitted to Ministry of Finance mid-2026, no draft law published [[Source 1]](#sec-sources) Probable · 1 source bo.brela.go.tz, formal filing destination for UBO declarations under the Companies (Beneficial Ownership) Regulations 2021 [[Source 1]](#sec-sources) Uncertain · 1 source re-flagged from Tanzania to Curacao within an Iran-related OFAC SDN designation, dated 5 October 2026 [[Source 1]](#sec-sources) Probable · 1 source Not on FATF grey or black list as of the 28-30 October 2026 Plenary publication. [[Source 1]](#sec-sources) Probable · 1 source BoT holds statutory authority under National Payment Systems Act 2015 s.53 over payment-service-provider agent security; press reporting documents continuing TCRA/BoT enforcement activity against SIM-registration fraud feeding mobile-money agent fraud, an AML-adjacent enabling vector. [[Source 1]](#sec-sources) Probable · 1 source