Not every instrument is backed by its official text yet. At least one law or rulebook covered here has no official source (tier 1) retrieved for it yet. No finding on this page is shown with confidence above “Probable” until stronger sources are retrieved.

Financial Integrity Monitor

Uganda UG

Domains covered
8 of 8
Sources
157
Role actions
8
Horizon <90d
0
Jurisdiction profile
FATF status: Compliant Tier: B Risk direction: Stable Enablement vs enforcement: Mixed

Uganda's AML/CFT/CPF regime rests on the Anti-Money Laundering Act 2013 (amended 2017) and AML Regulations 2015, supervised by the Financial Intelligence Authority (FIA) and Bank of Uganda.

MoreUganda exited FATF increased monitoring in February 2024 and the EU high-risk third-country list in June 2025 after ESAAMLG-verified technical-compliance improvements, but structural exposure persists via gold/mineral transit, EACOP oil finance, and PEP corruption networks.

Key deficiencies
  • Customs and due-diligence gaps enabling DRC conflict-gold consolidation and re-export via Ugandan traders and refineries
  • Risk-based (rather than blanket) supervision of the NPO sector remains incomplete, per FATF's continuing ESAAMLG follow-up concern
  • Limited public transparency on ML investigation/prosecution and asset-recovery statistics, constraining independent verification of stated enforcement gains
  • Political contestation of anti-corruption enforcement narratives undermines credibility of PEP accountability measures
Recent developments (18m)
  • UN 1267 ISIL/Al-Qaida Sanctions Committee listed Ugandan national Abubakar Swalleh as an ISIL financial facilitator (16 June 2025)
  • European Commission delisted Uganda from the EU AML high-risk third-country list via Delegated Regulation (EU) 2025/1184 (10 June 2025)
  • ESAAMLG/FATF issued a further follow-up report analysing Uganda's progress against 2016 MER technical-compliance deficiencies (circa late 2025)
  • Continued political pressure for expanded US sanctions on President Museveni following his seventh-term inauguration (reported May 2026)
  • FATF's July 2025 Comprehensive Update on Terrorist Financing Risks lists Uganda among contributing jurisdictions amid regional ADF/ISIL financing concerns
Brief

Lead signal

Lead Signal

Uganda's AML/CTF architecture continued a pattern of incremental consolidation this cycle rather than structural disruption. The Financial Intelligence Authority issued Circular No. 13 on 14 February 2026, directing reporting entities to apply FATF Recommendation 19 measures for higher-risk countries, and a statutory instrument amending AML Schedule 2 was gazetted on 10 March 2026. Both developments are named and dated on FIA's own published feed, though the full instrument text for each was not independently retrieved this cycle, capping provision-level confidence at the probable tier rather than confirmed. Uganda remains off the FATF grey list, having exited at the February 2024 Paris plenary, and does not appear on FATF's June 2026 list of 22 jurisdictions under increased monitoring; the next mutual evaluation is scheduled for 2028.

Read full brief

Lead Signal

Uganda's AML/CTF architecture continued a pattern of incremental consolidation this cycle rather than structural disruption. The Financial Intelligence Authority issued Circular No. 13 on 14 February 2026, directing reporting entities to apply FATF Recommendation 19 measures for higher-risk countries, and a statutory instrument amending AML Schedule 2 was gazetted on 10 March 2026. Both developments are named and dated on FIA's own published feed, though the full instrument text for each was not independently retrieved this cycle, capping provision-level confidence at the probable tier rather than confirmed. Uganda remains off the FATF grey list, having exited at the February 2024 Paris plenary, and does not appear on FATF's June 2026 list of 22 jurisdictions under increased monitoring; the next mutual evaluation is scheduled for 2028.

A separate judicial development bears on the Authority's operational powers. Reporting on a ruling in Silver Kayondo v Bank of Uganda clarifies that FIA account-freeze directives require prompt post-freeze judicial sanction, though no prior notice to the account holder is required before the freeze itself. This due-process boundary was reported in trade press on 13 April 2026, relying on a single secondary summary of the judgment rather than the primary court text, which has not been independently retrieved.

Other Developments

Virtual-asset framework remains at the announcement stage. Bank of Uganda, together with the Financial Intelligence Authority and the Capital Markets Authority, has signalled a forthcoming six-pillar virtual-asset framework covering licensing, AML/CFT, custody, and cybersecurity, first announced in a Bank of Uganda Governor keynote on 25 November 2025. No draft legislation implementing this framework has been published as of this cycle, leaving Uganda's digital-asset sector without a dedicated supervisory regime despite the stated regulatory intent.

Regional crypto-laundering nexus flagged. A joint Cambodia-United States operation seized approximately seven million US dollars in cryptocurrency linked to Sinaloa-cartel laundering activity routed through Cambodian networks, reported in August 2026. This is a Tier-D watch-jurisdiction finding rather than a Uganda-specific development, but it illustrates the kind of cross-border typology that regional virtual-asset supervisory gaps can enable.

Cross-Monitor Connections

The absence of a finalised Ugandan virtual-asset licensing regime is a structural gap relevant to the world-payments monitor's tracking of Uganda's fintech and digital-money landscape; any future product launch in the virtual-asset space would need to navigate a six-pillar framework that currently exists only as an announced intention. The Silver Kayondo ruling on account-freeze due process is relevant to institutions' governance and legal functions handling FIA directives, and connects to broader questions of how enabler-jurisdiction account-freeze powers are judicially constrained across the region.

Outlook

The near-term question for Uganda's AML/CTF regime is whether the February and March 2026 instruments (Circular No. 13 and the AML Schedule 2 amendment) will be followed by primary-text publication that would allow confidence in their provisions to move from probable to confirmed. On the virtual-asset side, the test is whether the six-pillar framework announced in November 2025 progresses to draft legislation; until it does, Uganda's digital-asset sector remains in a supervisory gap relative to regional peers such as Kenya. Uganda's standing outside FATF's grey list and increased-monitoring list continues to hold ahead of the 2028 mutual evaluation, with no indication this cycle of a change to that status.

Earlier periodic briefs (3)
25 Oct 2026 · fim-2026-10-25

Lead Signal

Uganda's AML/CTF architecture continued a pattern of incremental consolidation rather than structural disruption. The Financial Intelligence Authority issued Circular No. 13 on 14 February 2026, directing reporting entities to apply FATF Recommendation 19 measures for higher-risk countries, and a statutory instrument amending AML Schedule 2 was gazetted on 10 March 2026. Both developments are named and dated on FIA's own published feed, though the full instrument text for each was not independently retrieved, capping provision-level confidence at the probable tier rather than confirmed. Uganda remains off the FATF grey list, having exited at the February 2024 Paris plenary, and does not appear on FATF's June 2026 list of 22 jurisdictions under increased monitoring; the next mutual evaluation is scheduled for 2028.

A separate judicial development bears on the Authority's operational powers. Reporting on a ruling in Silver Kayondo v Bank of Uganda clarifies that FIA account-freeze directives require prompt post-freeze judicial sanction, though no prior notice to the account holder is required before the freeze itself. This due-process boundary was reported in trade press on 13 April 2026, relying on a single secondary summary of the judgment rather than the primary court text, which has not been independently retrieved.

Other Developments

Virtual-asset framework remains at the announcement stage. Bank of Uganda, together with the Financial Intelligence Authority and the Capital Markets Authority, has signalled a forthcoming six-pillar virtual-asset framework covering licensing, AML/CFT, custody, and cybersecurity, first announced in a Bank of Uganda Governor keynote on 25 November 2025. No draft legislation implementing this framework has been published, leaving Uganda's digital-asset sector without a dedicated supervisory regime despite the stated regulatory intent.

Regional crypto-laundering nexus flagged. A joint Cambodia-United States operation seized approximately seven million US dollars in cryptocurrency linked to Sinaloa-cartel laundering activity routed through Cambodian networks, reported in August 2026. This is a Tier-D watch-jurisdiction finding rather than a Uganda-specific development, but it illustrates the kind of cross-border typology that regional virtual-asset supervisory gaps can enable.

Cross-Monitor Connections

The absence of a finalised Ugandan virtual-asset licensing regime is a structural gap relevant to the world-payments monitor's tracking of Uganda's fintech and digital-money landscape; any future product launch in the virtual-asset space would need to navigate a six-pillar framework that currently exists only as an announced intention. The Silver Kayondo ruling on account-freeze due process is relevant to institutions' governance and legal functions handling FIA directives, and connects to broader questions of how enabler-jurisdiction account-freeze powers are judicially constrained across the region.

Outlook

The near-term question for Uganda's AML/CTF regime is whether the February and March 2026 instruments (Circular No. 13 and the AML Schedule 2 amendment) will be followed by primary-text publication that would allow confidence in their provisions to move from probable to confirmed. On the virtual-asset side, the test is whether the six-pillar framework announced in November 2025 progresses to draft legislation; until it does, Uganda's digital-asset sector remains in a supervisory gap relative to regional peers such as Kenya. Uganda's standing outside FATF's grey list and increased-monitoring list continues to hold ahead of the 2028 mutual evaluation, with no indication of a change to that status.

4 Oct 2026 · fim-2026-10-04

Lead Signal

Uganda's virtual-asset ecosystem has produced its clearest quantification yet of an oversight gap that has existed largely in the abstract. The Financial Intelligence Authority's first national money-laundering and terrorist-financing risk assessment on virtual assets, completed in September 2025, found roughly $564 million in virtual-asset inflows and roughly $546 million in outflows between July 2020 and June 2024, with stablecoins the largest component and the great majority of this activity sitting outside regulatory oversight. This is not a new phenomenon; it is the first time it has been measured and named as a national risk by the country's own financial-intelligence body. That combination of scale and structural gap is the lead signal this cycle.

The assessment lands alongside two other developments that, together, describe a jurisdiction in transition rather than one standing still. The Bank of Uganda has announced a six-pillar virtual-asset regulatory framework, covering licensing and fit-and-proper standards, client-asset protection, AML/CFT controls including the Travel Rule, cybersecurity, market integrity and transparency, but this framework remains at the announced-pillars stage with no published draft bill. And Uganda's High Court has upheld a central-bank circular barring payment-system-licensed entities from converting cryptocurrency into official currency or mobile money, confirming a restriction that has been operative since April 2022 but had not previously been tested judicially.

Other Developments

FATF standing confirmed. Uganda remains off the Financial Action Task Force's increased-monitoring list, having been removed in February 2024, with the June 2026 plenary listing continuing to exclude the country from that list. ESAAMLG follow-up rates Uganda Compliant or Largely Compliant on 25 of the FATF's 40 Recommendations, a stable baseline position rather than a change this cycle, though it is worth restating because it frames the jurisdiction's overall AML architecture as functioning credibly at the level the mutual-evaluation process measures.

Gambling-sector AML perimeter widened. The National Lotteries and Gaming Regulatory Board has tied casino licence renewal in the 2026 cycle to registration with the Financial Intelligence Authority as accountable persons, with an accompanying requirement to file annual AML/CFT compliance reports. This is a sector-specific tightening that extends the accountable-person perimeter into gambling, a sector that in many enabler-adjacent jurisdictions has historically sat outside effective AML supervision even where formally covered.

Judicial confirmation of the conversion prohibition. The High Court ruling in Silver Kayondo v Bank of Uganda confirms that BOU Circular NPSD 306, issued 29 April 2022, validly bars National Payment Systems-licensed entities from converting virtual assets into official currency or mobile money. The practical effect is that licensed payment rails in Uganda remain closed to direct crypto-to-fiat conversion, pushing volume toward channels the FIA's own risk assessment describes as largely unsupervised.

Cross-Monitor Connections

The scale of unsupervised virtual-asset flow quantified by the FIA assessment is directly relevant to payments-monitor analysis of Uganda's mobile-money and account-to-account rails, since the same underlying consumer base and cash-out points are implicated whether the transaction is framed as a payments-compliance matter or an AML-typology matter. The judicially confirmed conversion prohibition on payment-system-licensed entities is itself a payments-architecture fact with a financial-integrity reading: it closes one enforcement-adjacent channel while leaving the FIA-quantified unsupervised volume to move through channels the assessment did not fully characterise. The gambling-sector AML tightening likewise intersects with gambling-monitor coverage of the same 2026 licence-renewal cycle, where the accountable-person registration condition is a licensing fact as much as an AML fact.

Outlook

The near-term marker to watch is whether Bank of Uganda's six-pillar framework progresses from announced pillars to a published draft bill; the framework's own timeline points toward 2027, and the gap between neighbouring East African jurisdictions that have already enacted dedicated VASP statutes and Uganda's earlier-stage design process is a a structural feature the interpreter's gap assessment flags explicitly. Whether the FIA's full national risk-assessment document is published in a form that allows independent verification of the $564 million/$546 million flow estimates, currently known only through secondary press reporting, would materially strengthen or qualify the picture this cycle's lead signal presents. Absent enactment of the six-pillar framework, the structural gap the FIA has now quantified is likely to persist as a standing feature of Uganda's financial-integrity exposure rather than resolve on its own.

14 Sep 2026 · fim-2026-09-14

Lead Signal

Uganda's financial-integrity profile this cycle is defined by a widening divergence between a stable, FATF-validated traditional AML/CTF regime and a materially under-governed crypto sector where informal flows substantially outpace the licensing perimeter. Uganda was removed from the FATF grey list in February 2024 after completing its action plan, and remains absent from the 2026 list of jurisdictions under increased monitoring, a status confirmed directly by Uganda's Ministry of Finance, Planning and Economic Development and corroborated by press reporting of the FATF plenary statement. This stability in the traditional regime sits in sharp contrast to the virtual-asset space, where a Financial Intelligence Authority risk assessment reportedly found $564m in virtual-asset inflows and $546m in outflows between July 2020 and June 2024, even as Bank of Uganda bars licensed payment entities from converting cryptocurrency into official currency.

This bifurcation is the single most important structural fact for this cycle: Uganda has successfully built and maintained conventional AML/CTF architecture sufficient to satisfy FATF, while a parallel informal virtual-asset economy of material scale operates almost entirely outside any licensing perimeter, constrained only by a conversion ban that appears not to have suppressed underlying demand.

Other Developments

MER follow-up compliance picture. A 2024 mutual evaluation follow-up assessment reportedly found Uganda rated Compliant or Largely Compliant on 25 of the FATF's 40 Recommendations. This finding is sourced from a commercial compliance database at a lower evidentiary tier this cycle and has not been independently corroborated against a primary FATF or national publication, so it should be read as an indicative rather than fully confirmed compliance picture.

Sanctions list administration without autonomous listing. Uganda's Financial Intelligence Authority applies the OFAC-SDN List, UN Security Council Resolution 1267, and UN Security Council Resolution 1373 lists administratively, but maintains no autonomous sanctions list of its own. This reflects a common architecture among jurisdictions that rely on incorporation of externally maintained lists rather than independent designation authority.

Six-pillar VASP framework announced, not drafted. Bank of Uganda's Governor announced, in a BIS-hosted keynote delivered in November 2025 and published in February 2026, a forthcoming six-pillar VASP regulatory framework spanning licensing, client-asset protection, AML/CFT including the FATF Travel Rule, cybersecurity, market integrity, and transparency and data reporting. This remains at announcement stage only, with no draft legislation published as of this cycle.

Cross-Monitor Connections

The crypto monitor's own coverage of Uganda's conversion ban and VASP registration-only perimeter draws on largely the same underlying facts documented here; readers seeking the crypto-licensing-specific framing of the conversion ban and the announced six-pillar framework should consult that brief directly. The world-payments monitor's coverage of Bank of Uganda's parallel CBDC pilot development is a related but analytically distinct thread: the CBDC pilot is a sovereign payments-infrastructure initiative, whereas the informal virtual-asset flow finding documented here concerns private, unlicensed virtual-asset activity occurring despite the conversion ban.

Outlook

The central open question for coming cycles is whether the announced six-pillar VASP framework progresses to draft legislation, and if so, whether it closes the gap between the current AML-registration-only perimeter and a genuine licensing regime capable of bringing the substantial informal virtual-asset flows documented by FIA's risk assessment within regulatory visibility. Independent retrieval of that underlying FIA National ML/TF Risk Assessment on Virtual Assets, referenced only via secondary press coverage this cycle, would materially strengthen confidence in the scale finding and should be prioritised in subsequent research.

Domain intelligence (D1–D8)

D1 Sanctions

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Sanctions Architecture and Evasion

Uganda D1 file this cycle is defined by the completion of a list-status normalisation across three separate regimes, layered against two developments that reintroduce sanctions-architecture risk into a jurisdiction that had appeared to be exiting the high-risk bracket entirely. The Financial Action Task Force removed Uganda from increased monitoring on 23 February 2024, crediting completion of the 2020 action plan, and the United Kingdom removed Uganda from the Money Laundering Regulations Schedule 3ZA high-risk third country list in step with that decision, a near-automatic mirroring pattern consistent with the UK general approach to FATF grey-list movements. The EU parallel process under Article 9 of the fourth Anti-Money Laundering Directive moved on an entirely separate timeline: Uganda was not delisted from the EU high-risk third-country list until Delegated Regulation (EU) 2025/1184 took effect on 10 June 2025, roughly sixteen months after the FATF and UK removals. This gap is not evidence of a substantive risk disagreement between regimes; it reflects the EU delegated-act procedural cycle running independently of the FATF plenary calendar, a pacing divergence that should be expected to recur on any future re-listing.

Continue reading

Two developments this cycle complicate a reading of Uganda sanctions file as resolved. First, the UN Security Council 1267 ISIL/Al-Qaida Sanctions Committee listed Ugandan national Abubakar Swalleh, also known as Tom Kiyurige, on 16 June 2025, for acting since 2018 as a financial and logistical facilitator supporting ISIL recruitment across East and Southern Africa, a designation that subjects him to an asset freeze, travel ban and arms embargo, and that stands as an active terrorism-financing node distinct from, and additional to, Uganda now-normalised country-level list status. Second, the OFAC designation of the African Gold Refinery in Entebbe and its owner Alain Goetz, imposed 17 March 2022 under the DRC-related sanctions program, remains the primary enforcement anchor for the conflict-gold transit architecture running through Uganda; the refinery has since ceased operating under that designation, but the underlying consolidation-and-re-export channel it served has not been demonstrated to have closed.

A further, still-uncorroborated signal concerns the presidency itself. Reporting from 14 May 2026 describes Ugandan opposition figures, led by Robert Kyagulanyi, lobbying the US Congress and Senate for Magnitsky-style sanctions against President Museveni following his seventh-term inauguration. This is a single, early-stage political signal with no corroborating US Treasury or State Department action, but it is pattern-consistent with a broader sanctions-regime divergence: the UK April 2024 Global Anti-Corruption Sanctions on three Ugandan officials targeted individual politically-exposed persons rather than the presidency, and neither the UK nor the EU has signalled any intention to extend action to Museveni himself. Should the US lobbying translate into an actual designation, Uganda would present a case of individual-PEP and country-risk tracks moving independently across three separate sanctions regimes simultaneously.

Also within this cycle D1 signal, the United Kingdom own high-risk-country architecture has shifted structurally rather than in response to Uganda specifically: the Money Laundering and Terrorist Financing (Amendment) Regulations 2026 narrow the MLR Regulation 33 high-risk third-country definition to FATF call for action jurisdictions only, effective 30 June 2026, moving away from the broader increased monitoring trigger that previously applied. Uganda sits on neither list currently, so this change carries no immediate consequence for Ugandan counterparties, but it widens the structural gap between the UK narrower enhanced-due-diligence trigger and the EU broader Article 9 approach, a divergence with latent relevance should Uganda ever be re-flagged by FATF. The Allied Democratic Forces cross-border financing footprint, sustained despite joint Uganda-DRC military operations, sits alongside the Swalleh designation as a second active D1 signal that country-level delisting does not by itself extinguish the terrorism-financing exposure that runs through Uganda porous eastern border.

Outlook

The near-term D1 trajectory for Uganda is governed less by fresh instrument-level change than by whether the two live threads identified this cycle mature into concrete action. The UN 1267 listing of Abubakar Swalleh establishes an active facilitation node that regulated entities screening East African counterparties should treat as a standing reference point independent of Uganda's own list status. The US opposition lobbying push, if it develops into an actual Treasury or State designation against President Museveni, would create the clearest instance yet of the individual-sanctions and country-risk-list tracks moving on entirely separate calendars across the US, UK and EU regimes, a structural pattern this file has already demonstrated once via the EU sixteen-month delisting lag. Absent a genuinely new designation, the most likely near-term development remains procedural: continued EU list churn that does not re-add Uganda, and a UK regime increasingly narrowed to FATF call-for-action jurisdictions that leaves Uganda outside its scope for the foreseeable future.

Judgment: No Uganda-specific sanctions-architecture development this cycle. Uncertain
Cumulative analysis

Sanctions Architecture and Evasion — Cumulative Analysis

Across the cycles observed to date, Uganda's D1 posture has moved from a country actively under increased FATF monitoring to one that has exited three separate high-risk-list regimes while simultaneously accumulating fresh, unrelated sanctions signal. The foundational sequence is now well established: FATF removed Uganda from increased monitoring on 23 February 2024 after completion of its 2020 action plan; the UK mirrored that removal from its Money Laundering Regulations Schedule 3ZA list in step; and the EU followed only via Delegated Regulation (EU) 2025/1184, effective 10 June 2025, roughly sixteen months later. This EU lag has proven to be a durable structural feature of the file rather than a one-off anomaly, and the interpretive judgment carried forward across cycles is that it reflects institutional-pacing divergence between the EU delegated-act cycle and the FATF plenary calendar rather than a substantive disagreement about Uganda's risk profile — a pattern that should recur on any future re-listing scenario.

Layered onto this list-status consolidation is a persistent enforcement dimension that country-level delisting does not resolve. The OFAC designation of the African Gold Refinery in Entebbe and owner Alain Goetz, imposed 17 March 2022 under the DRC-related sanctions program, remains the anchor enforcement action evidencing the conflict-gold transit architecture running through Uganda; although the refinery has since ceased operating under that designation, the consolidation-and-re-export channel it served has not been shown to have closed. The UK Global Anti-Corruption Sanctions imposed 30 April 2024 on three Ugandan officials over diversion of iron-sheet aid remain in force and constitute the UK first such designation against Uganda, though domestic parliamentary framing attributing the sanctions to unrelated legislation may be blunting their deterrent value. Most recently, the UN Security Council 1267 Committee's 16 June 2025 listing of Abubakar Swalleh as an ISIL financial and logistical facilitator active since 2018 introduces a live terrorism-financing node into the file, entirely independent of Uganda's now-resolved country-level status, alongside continuing evidence that the UN-listed Allied Democratic Forces has expanded its cross-border footprint despite joint Uganda-DRC military operations.

The emergent thread with the greatest potential to reshape this file going forward is political rather than technical: opposition lobbying, reported 14 May 2026 and led by Robert Kyagulanyi, for US Magnitsky-style sanctions against President Museveni following his seventh-term inauguration. This remains an early-stage, single-sourced signal uncorroborated by any US Treasury or State Department action, but it is the clearest illustration to date of a broader structural pattern this cumulative file has tracked since the UK April 2024 PEP designations: individual-sanctions tracks and country-level AML risk-listing tracks move independently across the US, UK and EU, and there is no assurance that action against individual officials extends, or will extend, to the head of state. The UK's own narrowing of its MLR Regulation 33 high-risk-country trigger to FATF call-for-action jurisdictions only, effective 30 June 2026, adds a further structural layer of divergence between UK and EU enhanced-due-diligence architecture that, while not currently material to Uganda, would matter immediately if Uganda were ever re-flagged.

Outlook

Reading across cycles, Uganda D1 trajectory should be understood as bifurcated: a largely closed list-status track running alongside an open-ended enforcement and individual-sanctions track that shows no sign of resolution. The Swalleh designation and the ADF cross-border footprint both indicate that terrorism-financing exposure through Uganda persists structurally regardless of country-level list movements, and should be treated by regulated entities as a standing screening consideration independent of Uganda's FATF or EU status. Whether the US opposition lobbying push matures into an actual designation against President Museveni is the single most consequential open question in this file; if it does, Uganda would become a live case study in three-way sanctions-regime divergence, with the US pursuing an individual head-of-state designation, the UK confined so far to sub-presidential PEPs, and the EU having already normalised the country risk-list position entirely.

domain_sub_briefs · D1 · Cumulative analysis

D2 Beneficial Ownership

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Beneficial Ownership

Uganda carried no distinct beneficial-ownership development this cycle; the applicable signal for D2 this period is structural and global rather than jurisdiction-specific. The EU AML Package continues to take shape as the structural backdrop against which beneficial-ownership and corporate-transparency developments worldwide are now read. The package comprises three distinct instruments: the AML Regulation (AMLR, Regulation (EU) 2024/1624), which applies directly across Member States; the sixth AML Directive (6AMLD), transposed individually by each Member State; and the AMLA Regulation (Regulation (EU) 2024/1620), establishing the Anti-Money Laundering Authority. Within this architecture, the Anti-Money Laundering Authority published its first three final draft Regulatory Technical Standards on 1 October 2026, including customer due diligence standards under AMLR Article 28(1). This is a probable-confidence finding resting on secondary reporting rather than AMLA's own primary publication, which was not independently retrieved this cycle.

Continue reading

The AMLA direct and indirect supervision perimeter is shifting beneficial-ownership and corporate-transparency supervision from a purely national model toward a hybrid EU-level regime, with cross-border obliged entities increasingly falling under AMLA's own supervisory reach rather than that of national authorities alone. This is a durable structural fact rather than a single-cycle development, and it forms the backdrop against which any future Uganda-specific beneficial-ownership finding would need to be read, given Uganda's position outside the EU AML Package's direct perimeter. No Uganda-specific corporate-transparency or beneficial-ownership-register development was identified in the available evidence this cycle.

Outlook

The near-term development to watch is whether AMLA's newly published draft RTS move from draft to adopted status, and whether further drafts addressing beneficial-ownership register interoperability follow. For Uganda specifically, no beneficial-ownership-register development is in train based on the evidence available this cycle; any future finding would need to be assessed against Uganda's standing Anti-Money Laundering Act framework rather than against the EU architecture, which remains contextual background rather than directly applicable.

Judgment: No new Uganda BO-registry development located this cycle. Uncertain
Cumulative analysis

Beneficial Ownership and Corporate Transparency — Cumulative Analysis

Uganda's beneficial-ownership and corporate-transparency file has, across the cycles observed, been shaped almost entirely by its own domestic registry architecture and FATF/ESAAMLG peer-review process rather than by any EU instrument, since Uganda sits outside the European Union and its AML Package transposition scope as a non-EEA third country. The central evidentiary thread has been the Uganda Registration Services Bureau company registry: FATF credited Uganda, at its February 2024 delisting, with resolving a prior deficiency in competent-authority access to beneficial-ownership information, but no independent, ICIJ-style public-searchability or data-quality verification of that registry has surfaced in the evidence base through this cycle, leaving a persistent gap between the FATF-credited improvement and external corroboration of it. The credibility of that 2024 finding now rests on continuing ESAAMLG scrutiny: a further follow-up report issued around December 2025 keeps Uganda in enhanced follow-up specifically to confirm sustained beneficial-ownership access and progress toward risk-based, rather than blanket, supervision of non-profit organisations, both of which were named conditions of the 2024 delisting. Reading across cycles, this follow-up mechanism functions as the primary check on whether Uganda's gains were durable institutional change or a condition satisfied narrowly to secure delisting.

Globally, the EU AML Package sets the structural direction for beneficial-ownership and corporate-transparency regulation and merits standing acknowledgment as backdrop even though it is not the primary subject matter for a jurisdiction with Uganda's regulatory perimeter. The Package consists of three distinct instruments: the directly-applicable AML Regulation (AMLR, Regulation (EU) 2024/1624), which applies uniformly across EU member states from 2027 without national transposition; the sixth Anti-Money Laundering Directive (6AMLD), transposed individually by each member state into domestic law; and the AMLA Regulation (Regulation (EU) 2024/1620), establishing the Anti-Money Laundering Authority and shifting supervision of the highest-risk cross-border obliged entities from purely national competent authorities toward a hybrid EU-level regime of direct AMLA supervision for a defined pool of high-risk groups alongside continued indirect national oversight of the remainder. Uganda's only structural point of contact with this architecture across the cycles tracked has been its position on the EU Article 9 AMLD4 high-risk third-country list, from which it was delisted via Delegated Regulation (EU) 2025/1184 effective 10 June 2025 — itself lagging the FATF and UK country-risk delistings by roughly sixteen months, a pacing divergence that recurs as a structural feature of this file rather than a one-off event.

The durable analytical takeaway carried forward across cycles is that Uganda's BO-transparency progress must be assessed on its own domestic evidentiary terms — FATF delisting conditions, ESAAMLG follow-up reporting cadence, and URSB registry functionality — since AMLA's evolving supervisory perimeter has no direct jurisdiction over Ugandan entities or Ugandan competent authorities, and will not acquire any absent a change in Uganda's own EU list status.

Outlook

The next ESAAMLG follow-up report, expected around mid-2027, remains the single clearest forward marker across this cumulative file: it will determine whether Uganda's NPO sector has moved toward genuinely risk-based supervision and whether beneficial-ownership access for competent authorities has been sustained beyond the point of delisting. Independent verification of URSB register data quality continues to be the file's most persistent open evidentiary gap, unresolved across every cycle tracked to date. On the EU side, AMLA's continuing build-out toward full AMLR application from 2027 will keep refining the EU's own high-risk-list methodology, but absent a fresh FATF or ESAAMLG adverse finding, Uganda's re-entry onto that list appears unlikely in the near to medium term.

domain_sub_briefs · D2 · Cumulative analysis
Periodic updates (1)
25 Oct 2026 · fim-2026-10-25

Beneficial Ownership

Uganda carried no distinct beneficial-ownership development; the applicable signal for D2 this period is structural and global rather than jurisdiction-specific. The EU AML Package continues to take shape as the structural backdrop against which beneficial-ownership and corporate-transparency developments worldwide are now read. The package comprises three distinct instruments: the AML Regulation (AMLR, Regulation (EU) 2024/1624), which applies directly across Member States; the sixth AML Directive (6AMLD), transposed individually by each Member State; and the AMLA Regulation (Regulation (EU) 2024/1620), establishing the Anti-Money Laundering Authority. Within this architecture, the Anti-Money Laundering Authority published its first three final draft Regulatory Technical Standards on 1 October 2026, including customer due diligence standards under AMLR Article 28(1). This is a probable-confidence finding resting on secondary reporting rather than AMLA's own primary publication, which was not independently retrieved.

The AMLA direct and indirect supervision perimeter is shifting beneficial-ownership and corporate-transparency supervision from a purely national model toward a hybrid EU-level regime, with cross-border obliged entities increasingly falling under AMLA's own supervisory reach rather than that of national authorities alone. This is a durable structural fact rather than a single-cycle development, and it forms the backdrop against which any future Uganda-specific beneficial-ownership finding would need to be read, given Uganda's position outside the EU AML Package's direct perimeter. No Uganda-specific corporate-transparency or beneficial-ownership-register development was identified in the available evidence.

Outlook

The near-term development to watch is whether AMLA's newly published draft RTS move from draft to adopted status, and whether further drafts addressing beneficial-ownership register interoperability follow. For Uganda specifically, no beneficial-ownership-register development is in train based on the evidence available; any future finding would need to be assessed against Uganda's standing Anti-Money Laundering Act framework rather than against the EU architecture, which remains contextual background rather than directly applicable.

D3 Enabler Jurisdictions

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Enabler Jurisdictions and Professional Facilitators

Judgment: No Uganda enabler-jurisdiction development this cycle. Uncertain
Standing baseline position

Investigative reporting (30 Sep 2026) documents limited suspicious-transaction reporting from lawyers, accountants, real-estate agents and TCSPs despite their formal AML Act accountable-person designation, per GFI commentary.

D4 Conflict Finance

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Uganda continues to function as a reported downstream gold-export conduit amid OFAC's June 2026 sanctions on the Rwanda-linked M23 conflict-mineral network; no Ugandan entity designated this cycle.

Judgment: No Uganda conflict-finance development this cycle. Uncertain

D5 Crypto / Digital Assets / Financial Innovation

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Crypto / Digital Assets / Financial Innovation

Uganda's virtual-asset regulatory posture remains at the announcement stage. Bank of Uganda, jointly with the Financial Intelligence Authority and the Capital Markets Authority, signalled a forthcoming six-pillar framework covering virtual-asset licensing, AML/CFT, custody, and cybersecurity in a Bank of Uganda Governor keynote delivered 25 November 2025. As of this cycle, no draft legislation implementing that framework has been published, leaving Uganda's digital-asset sector without a dedicated supervisory regime notwithstanding the stated regulatory intent. This is a probable-confidence finding sourced to Bank of Uganda's own published material, though the forward-looking nature of the announcement means no legislative text yet exists to assess against.

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This gap is read against a regional backdrop in which virtual-asset channels are demonstrably exploitable for large-scale illicit finance: a joint Cambodia-United States operation reported in August 2026 seized approximately seven million US dollars in cryptocurrency linked to Sinaloa-cartel laundering activity routed through Cambodian networks. While this is a Cambodia-specific finding and not a Uganda event, it is the kind of typology that a persistent supervisory gap for virtual-asset activity can leave unaddressed, and it sharpens the significance of Uganda's own framework remaining at the pre-legislative stage. Uganda's crypto-asset regulatory posture, assessed against regional peers such as Kenya which have moved further on virtual-asset supervision, leaves a comparative AML/CTF gap for virtual-asset activity specifically.

Outlook

The key development to watch is whether Uganda's six-pillar virtual-asset framework progresses from announcement to draft legislation. Until a legislative text is published, Uganda's digital-asset sector sits outside any dedicated AML/CFT, custody, or cybersecurity supervisory architecture, a gap that the Cambodia nexus finding illustrates is not merely theoretical for the region. No timeline for draft legislation has been identified in the evidence available this cycle.

Judgment: Six-pillar virtual-asset framework remains announced but undrafted; VASPs remain AML-accountable persons under the 2020 amendment. Probable
Cumulative analysis

Crypto, Digital Assets, and Financial Innovation

Uganda's virtual-asset sector presents a stark enablement gap: substantial informal flows persist despite a formal conversion ban and the absence of any licensing perimeter. According to a Financial Intelligence Authority risk assessment reported via press coverage, Ugandans moved $564m in virtual-asset inflows and $546m in outflows between July 2020 and June 2024. This scale of activity occurred even as Bank of Uganda's Directive NPSD 306, issued 29 April 2022, bars entities licensed under the National Payment Systems Act from converting cryptocurrency into official currency or mobile money, a directive subsequently upheld by Uganda's High Court in 2023. The persistence of large informal flows alongside an enforced conversion ban is itself an analytically significant finding: it demonstrates that prohibition without a corresponding licensing and monitoring perimeter does not eliminate underlying demand, it merely displaces it outside the visibility of the formal financial system.

Against this backdrop, Bank of Uganda's Governor used a BIS-hosted keynote address in November 2025, published in February 2026, to announce a forthcoming six-pillar VASP regulatory framework. The six pillars as announced are licensing and fit-and-proper standards, client-asset protection, AML/CFT compliance including the FATF Travel Rule, cybersecurity, market integrity, and transparency and data reporting. This is a Tier 1 source confirming the announcement itself, though the framework remains at announcement stage only, with no draft legislation published as of this cycle. If enacted broadly as described, the framework would represent a substantial architectural shift from the current AML-registration-only perimeter toward a genuine licensing and supervisory regime, and would be the first Ugandan instrument to introduce a FATF Travel Rule mechanism for virtual-asset transfers.

The control-gap signal here is structurally significant under a three-pillar analytical lens: the AML dimension is partially addressed through FIA's accountable-person registration requirement for VASPs, but the absence of any licensing regime means CTF and CPF risk in the virtual-asset space is effectively unmonitored beyond whatever visibility FIA's registration perimeter provides. The scale of informal flows identified in the FIA risk assessment, if accurate, indicates this gap is material rather than marginal.

Outlook

The determinative question for the coming cycle is whether the announced six-pillar framework advances from keynote rhetoric to draft legislative text, and whether independent retrieval of the underlying FIA National ML/TF Risk Assessment on Virtual Assets becomes possible, which would allow the informal-flow scale finding to be corroborated beyond a single secondary press source. Until either development occurs, Uganda's virtual-asset sector should be read as a jurisdiction where formal prohibition and substantial informal activity coexist, with the licensing vacuum as the structural feature explaining that coexistence.

domain_sub_briefs · D5 · Cumulative analysis
Standing baseline position

Uganda's informal virtual-asset economy carries an estimated $564m in inflows and $546m in outflows (Jul 2020-Jun 2024) despite a judicially-confirmed crypto-fiat conversion ban and no licensed VASPs; a six-pillar regulatory framework has been announced but not drafted.

Periodic updates (2)
25 Oct 2026 · fim-2026-10-25

Crypto / Digital Assets / Financial Innovation

Uganda's virtual-asset regulatory posture remains at the announcement stage. Bank of Uganda, jointly with the Financial Intelligence Authority and the Capital Markets Authority, signalled a forthcoming six-pillar framework covering virtual-asset licensing, AML/CFT, custody, and cybersecurity in a Bank of Uganda Governor keynote delivered 25 November 2025. No draft legislation implementing that framework has been published, leaving Uganda's digital-asset sector without a dedicated supervisory regime notwithstanding the stated regulatory intent. This is a probable-confidence finding sourced to Bank of Uganda's own published material, though the forward-looking nature of the announcement means no legislative text yet exists to assess against.

This gap is read against a regional backdrop in which virtual-asset channels are demonstrably exploitable for large-scale illicit finance: a joint Cambodia-United States operation reported in August 2026 seized approximately seven million US dollars in cryptocurrency linked to Sinaloa-cartel laundering activity routed through Cambodian networks. While this is a Cambodia-specific finding and not a Uganda event, it is the kind of typology that a persistent supervisory gap for virtual-asset activity can leave unaddressed, and it sharpens the significance of Uganda's own framework remaining at the pre-legislative stage. Uganda's crypto-asset regulatory posture, assessed against regional peers such as Kenya which have moved further on virtual-asset supervision, leaves a comparative AML/CTF gap for virtual-asset activity specifically.

Outlook

The key development to watch is whether Uganda's six-pillar virtual-asset framework progresses from announcement to draft legislation. Until a legislative text is published, Uganda's digital-asset sector sits outside any dedicated AML/CFT, custody, or cybersecurity supervisory architecture, a gap that the Cambodia nexus finding illustrates is not merely theoretical for the region. No timeline for draft legislation has been identified in the evidence available.

4 Oct 2026 · fim-2026-10-04

Crypto, Digital Assets, and Financial Innovation

Globally, virtual-asset regulatory architecture is moving toward frameworks combining licensing, client-asset protection and Travel-Rule AML controls; in Uganda, the directly relevant development is the Financial Intelligence Authority's first national ML/TF risk assessment on virtual assets, completed in September 2025, which found roughly $564 million in virtual-asset inflows and roughly $546 million in outflows between July 2020 and June 2024. Stablecoins were the largest single component of this flow, and the assessment characterises the great majority of this activity as sitting largely outside regulatory oversight. This is the first time Uganda's own financial-intelligence apparatus has quantified and formally named virtual-asset flow as a national money-laundering and terrorist-financing risk, rather than treating it as an informally understood phenomenon.

The Bank of Uganda has responded by announcing a six-pillar virtual-asset regulatory framework: licensing and fit-and-proper requirements, client-asset protection, AML/CFT controls including the Travel Rule, cybersecurity standards, market-integrity provisions and transparency obligations. This framework remains at the announced-pillars stage, with no published draft bill as of this cycle, and the expected timeline for a more concrete instrument points toward 2027. The gap between this design-stage position and the position of regional peers, several of which have already enacted dedicated virtual-asset service provider statutes, is a structural feature of Uganda's current exposure rather than a one-off delay.

A separate but related development this cycle is judicial: Uganda's High Court upheld Bank of Uganda Circular NPSD 306 (issued 29 April 2022) in Silver Kayondo v Bank of Uganda, confirming that entities licensed under the National Payment Systems Act may not convert virtual assets into official currency or mobile money. This ruling closes off judicial uncertainty about whether the circular's restriction was validly imposed, and it means that, for as long as no comprehensive VASP framework exists, licensed payment rails in Uganda remain formally closed to direct crypto-to-fiat conversion. The effect is that whatever volume the FIA's assessment measured moved through channels other than regulated payment-system operators, a detail with direct bearing on how any future six-pillar framework would need to address the cash-out point specifically.

Taken together, these three facts describe a jurisdiction where the scale of the digital-asset risk has now been measured, the direction of regulatory travel has been announced, but the substantive licensing and supervisory apparatus to address the measured risk is not yet in force. The size of the gap between measurement and regulation is itself the D5 finding for this cycle.

Outlook

The primary marker to watch is whether the six-pillar framework progresses beyond announced pillars into a published draft bill, given the multi-year uncertainty band the regulatory horizon currently carries. A second marker is whether the FIA's full national risk-assessment document becomes independently available, since this cycle's flow figures rest on secondary press reporting of the assessment rather than the primary document itself. Until a licensing framework exists, the structural gap the assessment identified is likely to persist as the defining D5 fact for Uganda.

D6 Compliance Technology & Active Defence

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Judgment: No Uganda-specific RegTech/compliance-technology development this cycle. Uncertain

D7 AML/CTF Regime

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AML/CTF Regime

Uganda's AML/CTF architecture moved incrementally this cycle through targeted circular issuance and schedule amendment rather than through wholesale reform, consistent with a post-grey-list-exit consolidation phase. The Financial Intelligence Authority issued Circular No. 13 on 14 February 2026, directing reporting entities to apply FATF Recommendation 19 measures concerning higher-risk countries. A statutory instrument amending AML Schedule 2 followed, gazetted 10 March 2026. Both instruments are named and dated on FIA's own published feed; the full instrument text for each was not independently retrieved this cycle, which caps provision-level confidence at the probable tier rather than confirmed for both developments.

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A judicial development this cycle bears directly on the Authority's operational powers. Reporting on a ruling in Silver Kayondo v Bank of Uganda indicates that FIA account-freeze directives require prompt post-freeze judicial sanction, though no prior notice to the account holder is required before the freeze itself takes effect. This finding relies on a single secondary law-firm summary of the judgment; the primary court text was not independently retrieved this cycle, and confidence is accordingly probable rather than confirmed.

Uganda's standing FATF status is unchanged and confirmed: the jurisdiction remains off the FATF grey list, having exited at the February 2024 Paris plenary, and does not appear on FATF's June 2026 list of 22 jurisdictions subject to increased monitoring. The next mutual evaluation is scheduled for 2028. This combination of incremental instrument issuance, a clarified judicial due-process boundary on account freezes, and a stable grey-list-exit position characterises Uganda's AML/CTF regime this cycle as one of consolidation rather than disruption.

Outlook

The principal matter to watch is whether primary-text publication of Circular No. 13 and the AML Schedule 2 amendment becomes available, which would allow confidence in both instruments' specific provisions to move from probable to confirmed. On the judicial side, whether further case law tests or extends the account-freeze due-process boundary established in Silver Kayondo v Bank of Uganda is a live question for the Authority's operational powers. Ahead of the 2028 mutual evaluation, no indication has surfaced this cycle of any change to Uganda's stable position outside both the FATF grey list and the increased-monitoring list.

Judgment: Standing AML/CTF regime (AML Act 2013 as amended, FIA supervision) unchanged; FIA pursues funding ahead of 2028 mutual evaluation. Probable
Cumulative analysis

AML/CTF Regime

Uganda's traditional AML/CTF regime presents a stable and FATF-validated posture this cycle. Uganda was removed from the FATF grey list in February 2024 after completing a structured action plan addressing identified deficiencies, and Uganda's own Ministry of Finance, Planning and Economic Development confirms that the country successfully completed reforms for combating money laundering, countering terrorism financing, and proliferation financing in line with international standards. This Tier 1 confirmation is corroborated by press reporting of the relevant FATF plenary statement, which recorded Uganda's removal from the list of jurisdictions under increased monitoring alongside Barbados, Gibraltar, and the United Arab Emirates. Uganda remains absent from the 2026 grey list, indicating the delisting has held stable through at least two years of subsequent monitoring cycles.

A 2024 mutual evaluation follow-up assessment is reported, via a commercial compliance database at a lower evidentiary tier, to have found Uganda rated Compliant or Largely Compliant on 25 of the FATF's 40 Recommendations. This figure has not been independently corroborated against a primary FATF or national publication this cycle and should be treated as indicative pending stronger sourcing, though it is broadly consistent with the confirmed grey-list exit.

On sanctions administration, Uganda's Financial Intelligence Authority applies the OFAC-SDN List, UN Security Council Resolution 1267, and UN Security Council Resolution 1373 lists on an administrative basis, but maintains no autonomous sanctions list of its own. This is a common architectural choice among jurisdictions that rely on incorporation of externally maintained designations rather than independent listing authority, and it should be read as a structural feature of Uganda's sanctions-implementation architecture rather than a gap in itself.

Weighed against this traditional-regime stability is the crypto-sector enablement gap documented separately under Crypto, Digital Assets, and Financial Innovation: Uganda's AML/CTF success in the conventional financial sector has not yet extended to bringing the virtual-asset sector's substantial informal flows within a comparable supervisory perimeter.

Outlook

Uganda's grey-list exit is likely to remain stable absent a material new deficiency finding, and the near-term AML/CTF story for Uganda is less about the traditional regime, which appears settled, than about whether the announced six-pillar VASP framework closes the parallel gap in the virtual-asset space. Independent corroboration of the reported MER follow-up compliance figures at a primary-source level would strengthen confidence in the overall compliance picture for the coming cycle.

domain_sub_briefs · D7 · Cumulative analysis
Standing baseline position

Uganda exited the FATF grey list in February 2024; remains off the 2026 list; MER follow-up reports Compliant/Largely Compliant on 25 of 40 FATF Recommendations.

Periodic updates (2)
25 Oct 2026 · fim-2026-10-25

AML/CTF Regime

Uganda's AML/CTF architecture moved incrementally through targeted circular issuance and schedule amendment rather than through wholesale reform, consistent with a post-grey-list-exit consolidation phase. The Financial Intelligence Authority issued Circular No. 13 on 14 February 2026, directing reporting entities to apply FATF Recommendation 19 measures concerning higher-risk countries. A statutory instrument amending AML Schedule 2 followed, gazetted 10 March 2026. Both instruments are named and dated on FIA's own published feed; the full instrument text for each was not independently retrieved, which caps provision-level confidence at the probable tier rather than confirmed for both developments.

A judicial development bears directly on the Authority's operational powers. Reporting on a ruling in Silver Kayondo v Bank of Uganda indicates that FIA account-freeze directives require prompt post-freeze judicial sanction, though no prior notice to the account holder is required before the freeze itself takes effect. This finding relies on a single secondary law-firm summary of the judgment; the primary court text was not independently retrieved, and confidence is accordingly probable rather than confirmed.

Uganda's standing FATF status is unchanged and confirmed: the jurisdiction remains off the FATF grey list, having exited at the February 2024 Paris plenary, and does not appear on FATF's June 2026 list of 22 jurisdictions subject to increased monitoring. The next mutual evaluation is scheduled for 2028. This combination of incremental instrument issuance, a clarified judicial due-process boundary on account freezes, and a stable grey-list-exit position characterises Uganda's AML/CTF regime this cycle as one of consolidation rather than disruption.

Outlook

The principal matter to watch is whether primary-text publication of Circular No. 13 and the AML Schedule 2 amendment becomes available, which would allow confidence in both instruments' specific provisions to move from probable to confirmed. On the judicial side, whether further case law tests or extends the account-freeze due-process boundary established in Silver Kayondo v Bank of Uganda is a live question for the Authority's operational powers. Ahead of the 2028 mutual evaluation, no indication has surfaced of any change to Uganda's stable position outside both the FATF grey list and the increased-monitoring list.

4 Oct 2026 · fim-2026-10-04

AML/CTF Regime

Globally, AML/CTF architecture is increasingly organised around FATF-tiered monitoring status and sector-by-sector accountable-person perimeters; in Uganda, this cycle's directly relevant development is confirmation that the country remains off the FATF increased-monitoring list, having been removed in February 2024, with the June 2026 plenary listing continuing to exclude Uganda from that list. ESAAMLG's follow-up mutual-evaluation process rates Uganda Compliant or Largely Compliant on 25 of the FATF's 40 Recommendations, a standing baseline position that frames the country's overall AML architecture as functioning at a level the FATF process itself regards as adequate, even as sector-specific gaps persist elsewhere in the regime.

The more immediately consequential D7 development this cycle is sectoral rather than status-level: the National Lotteries and Gaming Regulatory Board has, as a condition of the 2026 casino licence-renewal cycle, required casinos to register as accountable persons with the Financial Intelligence Authority and to submit annual AML/CFT compliance reports. This closes a supervisory gap in a sector, gambling, that in many jurisdictions sits formally within AML coverage but has historically received limited effective supervision in practice. Tying the registration requirement to the licence-renewal process itself gives the obligation direct regulatory teeth: a casino that fails to register or report risks its licensing status, not merely a standalone AML penalty.

This sectoral tightening should be read against the standing FATF/ESAAMLG baseline rather than as a signal of broader deterioration. Uganda's overall AML architecture is stable and rated adequately by the mutual-evaluation process; what has moved this cycle is the extension of accountable-person obligations into a previously under-supervised sector, which represents an incremental strengthening of coverage rather than a response to an identified deficiency in the existing framework.

Outlook

The standing FATF/ESAAMLG position is not expected to change materially before the next onsite or plenary cycle, anticipated in 2028 or 2029. The more immediate marker to watch is implementation: whether casino operators actually complete FIA accountable-person registration and file the required annual compliance reports within the 2026 renewal cycle, and whether the Financial Intelligence Authority publishes any compliance data on gambling-sector registration uptake in subsequent cycles.

D8 Commercial Activity

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Judgment: No commercial transactions in the financial-integrity vendor/services space touching Uganda this cycle. Uncertain
Regulatory horizon
Proposed2027 · ±multi_year

Bank of Uganda six-pillar VASP regulatory framework

A licensing/fit-and-proper regime, client-asset protection rules, AML/CFT compliance including FATF Travel Rule, cybersecurity, market-integrity and transparency/data-reporting pillars are proposed but not yet drafted into legislation.
Proposed2027 · ±year

Bank of Uganda six-pillar virtual-asset regulatory framework

A licensing/fit-and-proper, AML/CFT, cybersecurity, market-integrity and transparency framework for virtual assets was announced; no draft bill text located.
Proposed2027 · ±multi_year

Uganda six-pillar virtual-asset regulatory framework

In Force Pending2028 · ±multi_year

Uganda's next FATF Mutual Evaluation (following 2024 grey-list exit)

A re-assessment of Uganda's AML/CFT/CPF framework against FATF's 40 Recommendations under an effectiveness-weighted methodology.
5 dated · 2 pending date · baseline financial-integrity-2026-07-05
Role action cards
MLRO

FIA issued Circular No. 13 on FATF Recommendation 19 and amended AML Schedule 2 this period.

Reporting entities subject to Ugandan AML obligations should be aware that FIA has formally circularised enhanced due diligence expectations for higher-risk countries and amended the AML Schedule 2 list; the underlying instrument text has not been independently confirmed, so provision-level detail remains probable rather than confirmed.

2 evidence refs
Compliance

FIA issued Circular No. 13 and an AML Schedule 2 amendment; Uganda's FATF-clean status continues unchanged.

Compliance functions overseeing Ugandan obligations should track these two instruments for eventual primary-text confirmation, and can continue to rely on Uganda's confirmed status outside both the FATF grey list and the June 2026 increased-monitoring list ahead of the 2028 mutual evaluation.

3 evidence refs
Legal

A Ugandan High Court ruling clarified judicial-sanction requirements for FIA account-freeze directives.

Reporting on Silver Kayondo v Bank of Uganda indicates FIA account freezes require prompt post-freeze judicial sanction without a prior-notice requirement; legal counsel advising on FIA directive challenges should note this due-process boundary, though it rests on a single secondary summary rather than the primary judgment text.

1 evidence refs
Board

Uganda's AML/CTF regime is consolidating incrementally, with a persistent virtual-asset supervisory gap.

The Board should note that Uganda's AML/CTF framework is maturing in a stable, post-grey-list-exit manner rather than undergoing disruptive reform, while its virtual-asset sector remains at the pre-legislative announcement stage, a gap relevant to any institution with Uganda-linked digital-asset exposure.

4 evidence refs
CTO

Uganda's six-pillar virtual-asset framework remains announced but not drafted; a regional crypto-cartel laundering nexus was reported.

Technology leadership supporting virtual-asset products with Uganda exposure should note that no licensing, custody, or cybersecurity regime yet exists in draft legislative form, and that a Cambodia-US operation seized cryptocurrency linked to cartel laundering via Cambodian networks, illustrating a regional typology relevant to digital-asset infrastructure risk assessment.

2 evidence refs
Risk

Uganda's virtual-asset supervisory gap persists alongside a regional crypto-laundering nexus finding.

Risk functions should weight Uganda-linked virtual-asset exposure against the continued absence of a dedicated licensing/AML-CFT/custody/cybersecurity regime, informed by the Cambodia cartel-laundering nexus as an illustration of what unaddressed virtual-asset supervisory gaps can enable regionally.

2 evidence refs
Operations

No material change for this persona this cycle.

No material change for this persona this cycle

Audit

FIA's Circular No. 13 and AML Schedule 2 amendment lack independently retrieved primary text this period.

Audit functions should note that both newly issued instruments rest on FIA's own feed description rather than independently verified primary-source text, which caps the confidence basis for any control-testing scope built against their specific provisions at the probable tier.

2 evidence refs
Scenario sketches

AMLA direct-supervision transition and cross-border obliged entities

Illustrative scenario: as the Anti-Money Laundering Authority moves from standing-up its Regulatory Technical Standards toward exercising direct and indirect supervision of cross-border obliged entities under the AMLA Regulation, alongside the directly-applicable AML Regulation and per-state sixth AML Directive transposition, the supervisory landscape for pan-European financial groups could shift materially from a purely national model toward a hybrid EU-level one. This could, illustratively, alter where evasion typologies cluster, as entities historically supervised at purely national level adjust to a layered EU/national supervisory structure. This is illustrative orientation only, not an observed development or a prediction of how AMLA's supervisory perimeter will in fact be exercised.

Illustrative scenario for analytical orientation only. Not compliance advice, not a prediction, and not a statement of observed fact.

Standing trackers (T1–T6)
TrackerStatusNote
T1 · Russian Sanctions-Evasion Architectureno_change
T2 · EU AML Package / AMLAno_change
T3 · FATF Grey Listno_change
T4 · Beneficial-Ownership Register Statusno_change
T5 · Crypto & Digital-Asset Integritywatch
T6 · Sanctions Regime Divergenceno_change
Registers

Enforcement actions

  • 16 Jun 2025
  • 30 Apr 2024
  • 1 Dec 2025
  • 13 Apr 2026
  • The Committee added Ugandan national Abubakar Swalleh to the ISIL/Al-Qaida Sanctions List, subjecting him to asset freeze, travel ban and arms embargo for acting since 2018 as an ISIL financial and logistical facilitator supporting recruitment in East and Southern Africa. 16 Jun 2025
  • The UK imposed its first Global Anti-Corruption Sanctions on Uganda-linked individuals, designating the Speaker of Parliament and two former Karamoja-affairs ministers charged with corruption at Uganda's Anti-Corruption Court over diversion of iron-sheet aid intended for Uganda's poorest region. 30 Apr 2024
  • ESAAMLG issued a further follow-up report analysing Uganda's continued progress addressing technical-compliance deficiencies identified in its 2016 mutual evaluation, maintaining Uganda in enhanced follow-up while it embeds beneficial-ownership access and risk-based DNFBP supervision reforms. 1 Dec 2025

Sanctions changes

  • 10 Jun 2025
  • 30 Apr 2024
  • 25 Jun 2026
  • The European Commission adopted Delegated Regulation (EU) 2025/1184, removing Uganda (alongside Barbados, Gibraltar, Jamaica, Panama, Philippines, Senegal and UAE) from the EU's Article 9 AMLD4 list of high-risk third countries with AML/CFT strategic deficiencies, aligning the EU list with Uganda's February 2024 FATF delisting. 10 Jun 2025
  • HM Treasury laid the Money Laundering and Terrorist Financing (Amendment) Regulations 2026, narrowing the UK MLR Regulation 33 definition of 'high-risk third country' to jurisdictions on the FATF 'call for action' list only, rather than also automatically including the broader 'increased monitoring' list — a materially narrower EDD trigger than the EU's Article 9 approach. 30 Jun 2026

Regulatory horizon (register)

  • UK Economic Crime and Corporate Transparency Act 2023 — failure-to-prevent-fraud offence
  • Bank of Uganda six-pillar VASP regulatory framework
  • Uganda's next FATF Mutual Evaluation (following 2024 grey-list exit)
  • ESAAMLG follow-up technical review of Uganda's AML/CFT compliance
  • Bank of Uganda six-pillar virtual-asset regulatory framework
  • Uganda six-pillar virtual-asset regulatory framework
  • UK MLR amendment narrows high-risk third country EDD trigger
  • UK Anti-Money Laundering and Asset Recovery Strategy publication
  • Uganda's next ESAAMLG follow-up on NPO supervision and BO access

Active schemes

  • [HIGH] DRC conflict-gold consolidation and re-export via Uganda
  • EACOP oil-pipeline financing amid civic-space suppression
  • [HIGH] ISIL/ADF East African financial-facilitation network
Sources
  1. https://www.fatf-gafi.org/en/publications/High-risk-and-other-monitored-jurisdictions/increased-monitoring-june-2026.html
  2. https://bou.or.ug/
  3. https://www.mmaks.co.ug/articles/2026/04/13/uganda-high-court-clarifies-limits-financial-intelligence-authoritys-account
  4. https://www.monitor.co.ug/uganda/news/national/financial-intelligence-authority-boss-speaks-out-on-closed-ngos-5424270
  5. https://www.bis.org/review/r260210a.htm
  6. https://www.monitor.co.ug/uganda/business/markets/how-govt-s-crypto-ban-created-a-shs4-trillion-illegal-market-5467028
  7. https://www.finance.go.ug/media-center/news-and-updates/uganda-financial-action-task-force-fatf-grey-list
  8. https://www.monitor.co.ug/uganda/news/national/what-removal-of-uganda-from-fatf-grey-list-means-4539260
  9. https://www.fia.go.ug/sites/default/files/Anti-Money%20Laundering%20(Amendment)%20Regulations,%202023.pdf
  10. https://www.knowyourcountry.com/country-reports/uganda/
  11. https://ezine.eversheds-sutherland.com/global-sanctions-guide/uganda
  12. The Independent (Uganda)
  13. Financial Intelligence Authority (Uganda)
  14. Financial Intelligence Authority (Uganda)
  15. Financial Intelligence Authority (Uganda)
  16. FATF
  17. PwC Uganda
  18. Ministry of Finance, Planning and Economic Development, Uganda
  19. US Federal Register / OFAC
  20. Financial Intelligence Authority (Uganda)
  21. MMAKS Advocates
  22. RegWatch
  23. Border Report (AP)
  24. FATF
  25. U.S. Department of the Treasury (OFAC)
  26. Africanews
  27. Eversheds Sutherland
  28. The EastAfrican
  29. Focus Gaming News Africa
  30. https://www.theeastafrican.co.ke/tea/business-tech/uganda-seeks-funds-to-boost-anti-money-laundering-fight-5390684
  31. https://www.pwc.com/ug/en/assets/pdf/uganda-off-financial-grey-list.pdf
  32. https://fia.go.ug/
  33. "Black and grey" lists
  34. Uganda
  35. Jurisdictions under Increased Monitoring - 19 June 2026
  36. FATF changes its grey listing criteria to further focus on risk
  37. Jurisdictions under Increased Monitoring - 13 February 2026
  38. Jurisdictions under Increased Monitoring - 23 June 2023
  39. Jurisdictions under Increased Monitoring - 23 February 2024
  40. High-risk and other monitored jurisdictions
  41. Jurisdictions under Increased Monitoring - 13 June 2025
  42. Jurisdictions under Increased Monitoring - 24 October 2025
  43. National strategy for combating money laundering and the financing of terrorism and proliferation
  44. Uganda's measures to combat money laundering and terrorist financing
  45. Eastern and Southern Africa Anti-Money Laundering Group (ESAAMLG)
  46. Uganda's progress in strengthening measures to tackle money laundering and terrorist financing
  47. News
  48. 1 Anti-money laundering and counter-terrorist financing measures Uganda
  49. Financial Action Task Force Identifies Jurisdictions with Anti-Money Laundering, Combating the Financing of Terrorism, and Counter-Proliferation Deficiencies | FinCEN.gov
  50. Anti-Money Laundering and Terrorist Financing Directive 4 - Finance
  51. Anti-money laundering and countering the financing of terrorism at international level - Finance
  52. Conflict gold sold on international markets despite sector clean up says new UN report | Global Witness
  53. Global Witness raises question about new DRC gold refinery | Global Witness
  54. Africa Gold Advisory
  55. SECURITY COUNCIL CONDEMNS ILLEGAL EXPLOITATION OF DEMOCRATIC REPUBLIC OF CONGO’S NATURAL RESOURCES | UN Meetings Coverage and Press Releases
  56. River of Gold | Global Witness
  57. Global minerals, arms smuggling networks fuel DR Congo conflict – UN report | UN News
  58. Report: $4 Billion in African Conflict Gold Floods World Markets | OCCRP
  59. Illegal Gold Smuggling Choking Legitimate Markets in the DRC | OCCRP
  60. New investigation suggests EU trader Traxys buys conflict minerals from DRC | Global Witness
  61. United Nations S/2024/969 Security Council Distr.: General 27 December 2024
  62. Sanctions Programs and Country Information | Office of Foreign Assets Control
  63. Sanctions List Updates
  64. Where is OFAC's Country List? What countries do I need to worry about in terms of U.S. sanctions? | Office of Foreign Assets Control
  65. Recent Actions | Office of Foreign Assets Control
  66. Democratic Republic of the Congo-Related Designations | Office of Foreign Assets Control
  67. Frequently Asked Questions | Office of Foreign Assets Control
  68. U.S. Launches New Strike Force to Combat $10 Billion Scam Industry
  69. Crypto Ransomware 2025: 35.82% YoY Decrease in Ransomware Payments
  70. Sanctions: Iranians Flock to Crypto; Int'l Actions Target Russia - Chainalysis
  71. 2025 Crypto Crime Trends from Chainalysis
  72. International Co-operation on Money Laundering Detection, Investigation, and
  73. Uganda
  74. Anti-money laundering and counter-terrorist financing measures The Cooperative
  75. TotalEnergies implicated in repression of East Africa defenders | Global Witness
  76. French giant TotalEnergies implicated in intimidation of communities affected by controversial oil pipeline | Global Witness
  77. Global Witness condemns escalating arrests of climate campaigners in Uganda | Global Witness
  78. Search | Global Witness
  79. Concern grows for Tanzanian communities opposing TotalEnergies’ oil pipeline | Global Witness
  80. UK sanctions corrupt politicians in Uganda who stole from vulnerable communities - GOV.UK
  81. TotalEnergies implicated in intimidation of communities | Global Witness
  82. Uganda Sees China Oil Pipeline Loans Agreed by April as Timeline Slips
  83. Uganda Parliament Says UK Sanctioned Speaker Anita Among Over Anti-LGBTQ Law - Bloomberg
  84. DFID's Anti-Corruption Strategy for Uganda
  85. Uganda: overview of corruption and anti-corruption - GOV.UK
  86. Ugandan Police Arrest Protesters Calling for End to Corruption - Bloomberg
  87. Ugandan Women Stage Naked Protest Against Corruption | OCCRP
  88. Opposition Seeks US Sanctions for Uganda’s Seventh-Term Leader - Bloomberg
  89. Search | Global Witness
  90. Overseas business risk: Uganda - GOV.UK
  91. Dismantling corruption and advocating for women and children in Uganda - Commonwealth Scholarship Commission in the UK
  92. 2026 Crypto Crime Report: Scams
  93. Crypto and Human Trafficking: 2026 Crypto Crime Report
  94. 2026 Crypto Crime Report – Illicit Crypto Trends & Typologies | TRM Labs
  95. The 2026 Crypto Crime Report - Chainalysis
  96. U.S. Crackdown on Southeast Asian Crypto Scam Centers
  97. Crypto scam
  98. African Authorities Bust Cybercrime Networks | OCCRP
  99. 2026 Crypto Crime Report Introduction - Chainalysis
  100. The State of Crypto Scams 2025: Keeping our industry safe with blockchain analytics
  101. Global Magnitsky Sanctions | Office of Foreign Assets Control
  102. Global Magnitsky Designations | Office of Foreign Assets Control
  103. Global Magnitsky Designation | Office of Foreign Assets Control
  104. Counter Terrorism Designations; Issuance of General License; Publication of Amended Global Magnitsky Sanctions Regulations | Office of Foreign Assets Control
  105. Global Magnitsky Designations Removals | Office of Foreign Assets Control
  106. Magnitsky Sanctions | Office of Foreign Assets Control
  107. Global Magnitsky Designation Update | Office of Foreign Assets Control
  108. Publication of Global Magnitsky Sanctions Regulations
  109. Global Magnitsky Designations; Counter Terrorism and Iran-related Designations and Designation Update; Publication of Legal Payments Rule | Office of Foreign Assets Control
  110. UGANDA - Intellectual Property Helpdesk
  111. Frequently Asked Questions | FinCEN.gov
  112. BENEFICIAL OWNERSHIP OF LEGAL PERSONS MARCH 2023 MARCH 2023
  113. Beneficial Ownership Regulations and Company Registries in Southeast Asia
  114. Beneficial Ownership Information Reporting | FinCEN.gov
  115. Strategy guidance note on beneficial ownership registries
  116. FinCEN Removes Beneficial Ownership Reporting Requirements for U.S. Companies and U.S. Persons, Sets New Deadlines for Foreign Companies | FinCEN.gov
  117. Guidance on Beneficial Ownership of Legal Persons
  118. Quick Reference | FinCEN.gov
  119. U.S. Beneficial Ownership Information Registry Now Accepting Reports | FinCEN.gov
  120. Security Council ISIL (Da’esh) and Al-Qaida Sanctions Committee Adds One Entry to Its Sanctions List | Meetings Coverage and Press Releases
  121. un security council - s/2025/482 - UNDOCS - the United Nations
  122. Comprehensive Update on Terrorist Financing Risks FATF REPORT July 2025
  123. S/2025/71 - UNDOCS - the United Nations
  124. Sanctions List Materials | Security Council
  125. Uganda | Security Council
  126. resolution 2776 - UNDOCS - the United Nations
  127. ALLIED DEMOCRATIC FORCES (ADF) | Security Council
  128. Reports of Security Council subsidiary bodies | Security Council - Counter-Terrorism Committee (CTC)
  129. Security Council ISIL (Da’esh) and Al-Qaida Sanctions Committee Amends One Entry to Its Sanctions List | UN Meetings Coverage and Press Releases
  130. The FATF Recommendations
  131. FATF publishes new Guidance on Financial Inclusion and Anti-Money Laundering and Terrorist Financing Measures
  132. Financial Inclusion and Anti-Money Laundering and Terrorist Financing Measures
  133. Public Consultation on AML/CFT and Financial Inclusion - Updated FATF Guidance on AML/CFT Measures and Financial Inclusion
  134. Key Changes in FinCEN’s Proposed Rule to Refocus AML/CFT Programs on
  135. FATF updates Standards and consults on guidance to better promote financial inclusion
  136. Money Laundering Advisory Notice: High Risk Third Countries - GOV.UK
  137. Money Laundering Advisory Notice: June 2026 - GOV.UK
  138. Commission updates list of high-risk countries to strengthen international fight against financial crime - Finance
  139. High-risk third countries
  140. The Money Laundering and Terrorist Financing (High-Risk ...
  141. HM Treasury publish updated list of high risk third jurisdictions
  142. The draft Money Laundering and Terrorist Financing (Amendment and Miscellaneous Provision) Regulations 2025 - Policy note - GOV.UK
  143. 2023 No. 1306 FINANCIAL SERVICES The Money ...
  144. FATF releases detailed guidance to help practitioners recover criminal assets
  145. UK Anti-Corruption Strategy 2025 (accessible) - GOV.UK
  146. UNODC Corruption and Financial Crime Branch
  147. UNCAC Chapter V: Asset Recovery
  148. Financial Action Task Force
  149. ESAAMLG / FATF
  150. United Nations Security Council
  151. European Commission
  152. UK Foreign, Commonwealth & Development Office
  153. US Department of the Treasury, OFAC
  154. OCCRP / The Sentry
  155. Global Witness
  156. Bloomberg
  157. HM Treasury
Coverage gaps
fim-int-2026-07-07-G001: Ugandan customs authorities' gold i…
fim-int-2026-07-07-G001: Ugandan customs authorities' gold import/export due-diligence records are not independently accessible, preventing verification of the scale of conflict-gold consolidation beyond aggregate export-value statistics. [resolved]
fim-int-2026-07-07-G002: Uganda's NPO-sector risk assessment…
fim-int-2026-07-07-G002: Uganda's NPO-sector risk assessment methodology has not been independently published, limiting verification of progress toward FATF's risk-based supervision condition. [resolved]
fim-int-2026-07-07-G003: No independent, non-governmental so…
fim-int-2026-07-07-G003: No independent, non-governmental source corroborates or disputes the Ugandan Parliament's characterisation of UK sanctions on the Speaker as politically motivated, leaving the credibility question unresolved. [resolved]
fim-int-2026-07-07-G004: Uganda's Financial Intelligence Aut…
fim-int-2026-07-07-G004: Uganda's Financial Intelligence Authority has not published granular, dated ML investigation, prosecution, conviction, or asset-recovery statistics that would allow independent verification of FATF's stated enforcement-improvement finding. [resolved]
fim-int-2026-07-14-G001: No primary High Court judgment text…
fim-int-2026-07-14-G001: No primary High Court judgment text was retrieved for the FIA account-freezing ruling; sourced only via a single Tier-3 law-firm summary, capping confidence at Assessed. [resolved]
fim-int-2026-07-14-G002: FIA's underlying September 2025 Nat…
fim-int-2026-07-14-G002: FIA's underlying September 2025 National ML/TF Risk Assessment on Virtual Assets report was not directly retrieved this cycle; findings are sourced via secondary press quotation of the primary report. [resolved]
fim-int-2026-07-14-G003: Tier D jurisdictions (Cambodia, Lao…
fim-int-2026-07-14-G003: Tier D jurisdictions (Cambodia, Laos, Mexico, Colombia) were not researched this cycle as the pass was jurisdiction-locked to Uganda; D1 and D4 domains remain thinly covered. [resolved]
fim-int-2026-07-14-G004: No independent second source corrob…
fim-int-2026-07-14-G004: No independent second source corroborates the report of FIA-ordered NGO account closures ahead of the 2026 elections; confidence capped at Assessed pending corroboration. [resolved]
fim-int-2026-08-04-G001: No Tier 1/2 primary URSB statement …
fim-int-2026-08-04-G001: No Tier 1/2 primary URSB statement confirming beneficial-ownership register non-publication status. [resolved]
fim-int-2026-08-04-G002: Uganda's direct conflict-finance ne…
fim-int-2026-08-04-G002: Uganda's direct conflict-finance nexus is thin; no Uganda-domiciled OFAC/EU designation located this cycle, only an incidental Kampala-born individual in a DRC/Rwanda designation round. [resolved]
fim-int-2026-08-04-G003: No primary NLGRB PDF located confir…
fim-int-2026-08-04-G003: No primary NLGRB PDF located confirming the full scope of the 3 March 2026 casino AML compliance session. [resolved]
fim-int-2026-08-04-G004: Tier D (KH/LA/MX/CO) mandatory chec…
fim-int-2026-08-04-G004: Tier D (KH/LA/MX/CO) mandatory checks were not actively re-searched this UG-bound dispatch pass. [resolved]
fim-int-2026-09-14-G001 ({'scheme': 'financial_integrity', '…
fim-int-2026-09-14-G001 ({'scheme': 'financial_integrity', 'value': 'D2'}): D2 Beneficial Ownership registry status for Uganda not substantiated at any tier this cycle. [resolved]
fim-int-2026-09-14-G002 ({'scheme': 'financial_integrity', '…
fim-int-2026-09-14-G002 ({'scheme': 'financial_integrity', 'value': 'D3'}): D3 Enabler Jurisdictions and D4 Conflict Finance domains could not be populated for Uganda this cycle pending primary-source escalation. [resolved]
fim-int-2026-09-14-G003 ({'scheme': 'financial_integrity', '…
fim-int-2026-09-14-G003 ({'scheme': 'financial_integrity', 'value': 'D5'}): FIA's National ML/TF Risk Assessment on Virtual Assets (Sept 2025) not independently retrieved; only secondary press coverage available this cycle. [resolved]
fim-int-2026-10-04-G001 ({'scheme': 'financial_integrity', '…
fim-int-2026-10-04-G001 ({'scheme': 'financial_integrity', 'value': 'D3'}): No T1 FIA statistics on DNFBP suspicious-transaction-report volumes were located to substantiate or quantify the enabler-sector reporting gap flagged by The Independent (Uganda). [resolved]
fim-int-2026-10-04-G002 ({'scheme': 'financial_integrity', '…
fim-int-2026-10-04-G002 ({'scheme': 'financial_integrity', 'value': 'D2'}): No Uganda-specific beneficial-ownership register milestone was identified this cycle; D2 coverage remains thin. [resolved]
fim-int-2026-10-04-G003 ({'scheme': 'financial_integrity', '…
fim-int-2026-10-04-G003 ({'scheme': 'financial_integrity', 'value': 'D5'}): No Uganda-specific conflict-finance, compliance-technology, or crypto/digital-asset development beyond the standing six-pillar/CBDC background was identified this cycle. [resolved]
fim-int-2026-10-11-G001 ({'scheme': 'financial_integrity', '…
fim-int-2026-10-11-G001 ({'scheme': 'financial_integrity', 'value': 'D7'}): Primary instrument text for FIA Circular No.13 and the March 2026 AML Schedule 2 amendment was not independently retrieved; provision-level confidence capped at Probable. [resolved]
fim-int-2026-10-11-G002 ({'scheme': 'financial_integrity', '…
fim-int-2026-10-11-G002 ({'scheme': 'financial_integrity', 'value': 'D7'}): No primary court judgment text retrieved for Silver Kayondo v Bank of Uganda; relies on single T3 law-firm summary. [resolved]
fim-int-2026-10-11-G003 ({'scheme': 'financial_integrity', '…
fim-int-2026-10-11-G003 ({'scheme': 'financial_integrity', 'value': 'D2'}): D2, D3, D4 and D6 domains carried thin or no coverage for Uganda this cycle within the available search budget. [resolved]
fim-int-2026-10-18-G001 ({'scheme': 'financial_integrity', '…
fim-int-2026-10-18-G001 ({'scheme': 'financial_integrity', 'value': 'D7'}): No primary FIA, Bank of Uganda AML circular, or ESAAMLG mutual-evaluation-follow-up document was independently retrieved this cycle; findings rest on T1 OFAC designation plus T2/T3 secondary reporting. [open]
fim-int-2026-10-18-G002 ({'scheme': 'financial_integrity', '…
fim-int-2026-10-18-G002 ({'scheme': 'financial_integrity', 'value': 'D5'}): No draft bill text or published statutory instrument exists for Bank of Uganda's six-pillar virtual-asset framework; cannot assess implementation timeline with confidence beyond Speculative. [open]
fim-int-2026-10-25-G001: No Uganda-specific beneficial-owner…
fim-int-2026-10-25-G001: No Uganda-specific beneficial-ownership registry development was located this cycle; standing BO-registry status is uncertain. [open]
fim-int-2026-10-25-G002: No Uganda-specific enabler-jurisdic…
fim-int-2026-10-25-G002: No Uganda-specific enabler-jurisdiction, conflict-finance, or compliance-technology development was located this cycle. [open]
FIM-GAP-001 (D4): Ugandan customs authorities have repeatedl…
FIM-GAP-001 (D4): Ugandan customs authorities have repeatedly been found not to complete due diligence on gold import/export documentation, or to ignore suspect documentation, allowing declared gold export volumes to vastly exceed plausible domestic production and enabling DRC conflict-gold to enter formal Ugandan export channels.
FIM-GAP-002 (D3): FATF's February 2024 statement urged Ugand…
FIM-GAP-002 (D3): FATF's February 2024 statement urged Uganda to move toward genuinely risk-based NPO supervision rather than classifying all NPOs as obliged entities, a deficiency that had persisted since at least the 2016 mutual evaluation.
FIM-GAP-003 (D2): Uganda's Parliament publicly characterised…
FIM-GAP-003 (D2): Uganda's Parliament publicly characterised the UK's 2024 corruption sanctions on the Speaker and two former ministers as retaliation for Uganda's anti-LGBTQ legislation rather than a genuine accountability measure, illustrating contested domestic narratives around PEP sanctions that can blunt their deterrent and reputational effect.
FIM-GAP-004 (D3): Uganda's Financial Intelligence Authority …
FIM-GAP-004 (D3): Uganda's Financial Intelligence Authority does not appear to publish granular, regularly updated public statistics on money-laundering investigations, prosecutions, convictions or asset-recovery outcomes, limiting independent verification of FATF's 2024 finding that Uganda demonstrated 'an increase in ML investigations and prosecutions'.

Evidence

Confidence-tiered claims

limited suspicious-transaction reporting despite formal accountable-person designation [Source 1]
Probable · 1 source
FIA is Uganda's designated FIU under the Anti-Money Laundering Act, Cap 118 [Source 1]
Probable · 1 source
Section 9 of the AML Act mandates suspicious-transaction reporting by accountable persons [Source 1]
Probable · 1 source
off the FATF grey list since February 2024 exit; next mutual evaluation expected 2028 [Source 1]
Probable · 1 source
Regulation 45(1) requires annual compliance reports from accountable persons [Source 1]
Probable · 1 source
Circular No.13 on FATF Recommendation 19 (measures for higher-risk countries), 14 February 2026 [Source 1]
Probable · 1 source
AML Schedule 2 amended by statutory instrument gazetted 10 March 2026 [Source 1]
Probable · 1 source
FIA account-freeze directives require prompt post-freeze judicial sanction though no prior notice is required (Silver Kayondo v Bank of Uganda, Misc. Cause No. 109 of 2022, judgment 24 April 2023 reported 13 April 2026) [Source 1]
Probable · 1 source
Off FATF grey list since February 2024 Paris plenary; not on FATF June 2026 list of 22 increased-monitoring jurisdictions [Source 1]
Probable · 1 source
Six-pillar virtual-asset licensing/AML-CFT/custody/cybersecurity framework announced by BOU Governor keynote (25 Nov 2025); no draft legislation published as of this cycle [Source 1]
Probable · 1 source
First three final draft Regulatory Technical Standards, including CDD standards under AMLR Art.28(1), published 1 October 2026 [Source 1]
Probable · 1 source
Cambodia-US joint operation seized approximately $7M in cryptocurrency linked to Sinaloa-cartel laundering via Cambodian networks [Source 1]
Probable · 1 source
Remains on FATF June 2026 increased-monitoring list; follow-up report dated 22 May 2026 [Source 1]
Probable · 1 source
Uganda reported as a downstream export/refining conduit for conflict gold smuggled from DRC's Ituri province, amid OFAC's June 2026 sanctions on Rwanda-linked mining/refining network; no Ugandan entity designated. [Source 1]
Probable · 1 source
OFAC designated Gasabo Gold Refinery LTD and three Rwandan mining companies on 25 June 2026 for smuggling conflict minerals from eastern DRC to Rwanda. [Source 1]
Probable · 1 source
Casinos must register as accountable persons with the Financial Intelligence Authority and submit annual AML/CFT compliance reports under NLGRB's 2026 licence-renewal notice, restating a standing DNFBP obligation. [Source 1]
Probable · 1 source
Uganda was removed from the FATF grey list in February 2024; ESAAMLG follow-up technical review on 11 identified reporting-area weaknesses scheduled for 2028. [Source 1]
Probable · 1 source
Bank of Uganda announced a six-pillar virtual-asset regulatory framework (licensing, client-asset protection, AML/CFT including Travel Rule, cybersecurity, market integrity, transparency) in a November 2025 keynote; no draft legislation located. [Source 1]
Uncertain · 1 source
FIA seeking approximately UGX4.5 billion in additional funding to address 11 of 40 FATF compliance areas flagged as deficient ahead of the 2028 FATF/ESAAMLG mutual evaluation. [Source 1]
Probable · 1 source
Removed from the FATF grey list in February 2024; next full mutual evaluation scheduled for 2028. [Source 1]
Probable · 1 source
VASPs are designated as 'accountable persons' under the Anti-Money Laundering (Amendment) Act, 2020, supervised by the Financial Intelligence Authority (FIA). [Source 1]
Probable · 1 source
Six-pillar virtual-asset regulatory framework (licensing, client-asset protection, AML/CFT including Travel Rule, cybersecurity, market integrity, transparency) announced by Governor 25 November 2025 keynote; no draft legislation published as of this cycle. [Source 1]
Probable · 1 source
VASPs are registered as accountable persons under the AML Act 2013 as amended, supervised by the FIA for AML/CFT purposes (a registration perimeter, not a licensing regime). [Source 1]
Probable · 1 source
Reporting Institutions are required under the Anti-Money Laundering Act to register with the Financial Intelligence Authority. [Source 1]
Probable · 1 source
Beneficial-ownership disclosure is administered via the Companies (Amendment) Act 2022 and the 2023 Beneficial Owners Regulations; commentary this year continues to flag BO/AML compliance as a 2026 enforcement priority, but no concrete amending instrument or enforcement action was located this cycle. [Source 1]
Probable · 1 source