D1 Sanctions
Sanctions is not yet covered for this jurisdiction in this report.
Hawaii operates under the federal BSA/AML framework (FinCEN, OFAC) plus state money-transmitter licensing via the DCCA Division of Financial Institutions.
Sanctions is not yet covered for this jurisdiction in this report.
Beneficial Ownership is not yet covered for this jurisdiction in this report.
Enabler Jurisdictions is not yet covered for this jurisdiction in this report.
Conflict Finance is not yet covered for this jurisdiction in this report.
Hawaii presents an unusual case in the crypto/AML architecture: a state regulator has determined, rather than a legislature having enacted, that standalone digital-currency trading and transmission activity does not require a state money-transmitter license. The Hawaii Division of Financial Institutions issued this determination effective July 1, 2024, following the conclusion of the state's Digital Currency Innovation Lab, a multi-year regulatory sandbox program. Two independent Tier-1 Hawaii government sources corroborate the determination, giving it High confidence in this cycle's assessment. The practical consequence is that Hawaii-domiciled or Hawaii-serving crypto-asset operators conducting purely digital-asset activity now sit entirely within the federal AML/CFT perimeter, registered as money services businesses with FinCEN and subject to the Bank Secrecy Act, without any additional state-level AML/CDD licensing overlay of the kind still found in many peer states.
This is a structural enablement signal, in the architecture-over-incident sense: no enforcement action produced this outcome, and none is needed to sustain it, since the exemption is a standing regulator interpretation rather than a statute the legislature would need to repeal. That interpretive basis is also its principal vulnerability. Hawaii's 2026 legislature is separately considering SB2757, the Digital Asset Charters bill, which would create a new state chartering framework for digital-asset businesses. SB2757's legislative findings explicitly characterize the digital-asset industry as largely unregulated in the United States, a finding that, if the bill advances, would directly supersede the 2024 exemption by reintroducing a state authorization pathway specific to crypto firms. As introduced, SB2757 has not been enacted, and its assessed confidence reflects that it remains a proposed rather than settled framework.
Layered above this state-level picture is the federal GENIUS Act stablecoin rulemaking. On April 8, 2026, FinCEN and OFAC jointly proposed to implement the AML/CFT and sanctions provisions of the GENIUS Act for Permitted Payment Stablecoin Issuers, establishing a stand-alone Bank Secrecy Act framework at a new 31 CFR Part 1033. This is characterized as the first sanctions compliance program requirement imposed on a specific category of US person, and it applies with full force to any Hawaii-based or Hawaii-serving stablecoin issuer regardless of the state's otherwise permissive crypto-licensing posture. The comment period on this NPRM closed June 9, 2026, moving it toward a final rule. Read together, Hawaii's digital-asset financial-integrity profile this cycle is one of a narrow, regulator-driven state licensing gap sitting beneath an expanding and increasingly sanctions-specific federal compliance architecture, two layers moving in opposite directions, one loosening and one tightening, simultaneously.
The central question for the next cycle is sequencing: whether SB2757 advances through the Hawaii legislature before, after, or independently of the federal GENIUS Act stablecoin rule reaching finalization. If SB2757 passes, Hawaii's digital-asset AML architecture would shift from a federal-only default back toward a hybrid state-federal model. If the federal stablecoin NPRM finalizes first, Hawaii-serving stablecoin issuers would face a new sanctions compliance program requirement irrespective of the state legislative outcome. Both tracks warrant monitoring in parallel, since neither outcome is contingent on the other.
Compliance Technology & Active Defence is not yet covered for this jurisdiction in this report.
The federal AML/CTF regime applicable to US-HI saw two structural rulemaking developments this cycle, both flowing from FinCEN rather than any Hawaii-specific action. First, FinCEN issued a notice of proposed rulemaking that would fundamentally reform the requirements for financial institutions' AML/CFT programs, inserting counter-terrorist-financing terminology and effectiveness-based requirements into what has historically been an AML-only program rule under the Bank Secrecy Act. This is an architecture-level change: it does not respond to a single incident but rewrites the baseline expectation for how institutions design and evidence the adequacy of their compliance programs, a change that would apply uniformly to Hawaii-domiciled financial institutions as it would nationwide. Second, FinCEN proposed a whistleblower program that would operationalize financial incentives for reporting BSA, AML, and sanctions violations, with the comment period closing June 1, 2026. No FinCEN-administered monetary whistleblower channel for BSA or sanctions violations existed prior to this proposal, making it a new enforcement-support mechanism rather than an incremental adjustment to an existing one.
Separately, and at a global rather than jurisdictional level, the FATF's June 2026 Plenary updated its grey list, adding Iraq and Bosnia and Herzegovina and removing Algeria and Namibia, bringing the total under increased monitoring to twenty-two jurisdictions. No direct nexus between this update and US-HI has been identified this cycle; it is carried in this brief for fleet-wide completeness rather than as a Hawaii-specific finding. Notably, no US-HI-specific or US federal mutual-evaluation status has been established to primary-source standard this cycle, which remains an open evidentiary gap rather than a confirmed null finding.
Taken together, the AML/CTF architecture governing US-HI this cycle is being reshaped almost entirely at the federal layer, through the BSA program-modernization NPRM and the whistleblower NPRM, with no genuine subnational divergence identified beyond the crypto money-transmission licensing gap tracked separately under the crypto and digital-assets domain. The absence of state-specific AML/CTF rulemaking in Hawaii this cycle is itself consistent with the state's broader pattern of relying on federal frameworks rather than layering additional state requirements.
Both FinCEN NPRMs are past their comment-period close and moving toward potential finalization; either would materially change the compliance-program and enforcement-exposure baseline for financial institutions operating in or through Hawaii. The next cycle should also look for progress toward closing the US federal mutual-evaluation gap noted in this cycle's evidence, and for any indication that Hawaii's legislature intends to layer state-specific AML requirements onto the federal baseline, which nothing in this cycle's evidence currently suggests is under consideration.
Any Hawaii-domiciled or Hawaii-serving stablecoin issuer would face a new stand-alone BSA and sanctions compliance program requirement under 31 CFR Part 1033 if finalized, and the separate program-modernization NPRM would insert CFT and effectiveness-based expectations into existing AML program design nationwide.
The policy-gap and jurisdictional-change picture for Hawaii-nexus crypto and financial firms is active on three fronts at once: a non-statutory state exemption, a pending state charter bill, and two federal rulemakings that would apply irrespective of the state outcome.
This is a novel liability and enforcement-trajectory exposure for stablecoin-issuer clients, distinct from generic BSA obligations, and its interaction with Hawaii's otherwise permissive state crypto-licensing posture should be assessed independently.
This is a structural, reputational-relevant fact for any board overseeing Hawaii-nexus digital-asset exposure: the current favorable posture rests on regulator interpretation, not statute, and SB2757 is a live legislative track that could change it.
Technical architecture decisions for stablecoin issuance or Hawaii-facing crypto products should anticipate the 31 CFR Part 1033 sanctions-screening framework and should not assume the current state licensing gap is a durable design assumption given SB2757's pendency.
Exposure-concentration models for Hawaii-facing crypto and stablecoin activity should reflect both the loosening state posture and the tightening federal program-modernization and sanctions-screening trajectory, since the two do not move together.
Transaction-screening workflows for any Hawaii-nexus stablecoin issuance activity should anticipate the proposed 31 CFR Part 1033 framework, which introduces a sanctions compliance program requirement not previously codified for this category of US person.
Control-testing scope for AML program adequacy should anticipate a shift from legacy AML-only checklist testing toward effectiveness-based evidentiary standards if this NPRM is finalized.
FinCEN advances a stablecoin AML/sanctions NPRM and a broader AML/CFT program-modernization NPRM, both applicable to Hawaii-nexus institutions.
Hawaii's crypto money-transmission exemption persists via regulator determination while SB2757 and two federal NPRMs advance in parallel.
The GENIUS Act stablecoin NPRM introduces the first sanctions compliance program requirement for a specific category of US person.
Hawaii's state-level AML supervisory perimeter for crypto activity is narrower than in many peer states, with a pending bill that could reverse it.
Federal stablecoin AML/sanctions rulemaking and Hawaii's crypto licensing gap both bear directly on digital-asset infrastructure design.
Two opposing regulatory vectors, state-level crypto enablement and federal-level AML/CFT tightening, are active simultaneously for Hawaii-nexus exposure.
A new stand-alone sanctions screening obligation is proposed for permitted payment stablecoin issuers.
FinCEN's proposed AML/CFT program reform would insert effectiveness-based requirements into existing program design.
Illustrative orientation only: as the EU AML Package matures, direct and indirect AMLA supervision of cross-border obliged entities under the AMLA Regulation (Reg (EU) 2024/1620), alongside the directly applicable AMLR (Reg (EU) 2024/1624) and per-Member-State transposition of the sixth AML Directive, could gradually shift the center of gravity in EU AML supervision from purely national authorities toward a hybrid EU-level regime. This is a structural, architecture-level illustration of how a supervisory perimeter could evolve, not an observed development in any single jurisdiction this cycle, and it has no confirmed nexus to US-HI.
Illustrative scenario for analytical orientation only. Not compliance advice, not a prediction, and not a statement of observed fact.
| Tracker | Status | Note |
|---|---|---|
| T1 · Russian Sanctions-Evasion Architecture | stable | No material US-HI-nexus finding this cycle. |
| T2 · EU AML Package / AMLA | no_change | Not applicable to US-HI (non-EEA jurisdiction); tracked for fleet completeness only. |
| T3 · FATF Grey List | material_change | June 2026 FATF Plenary added Iraq and Bosnia and Herzegovina, removed Algeria and Namibia, bringing the list to 22 jurisdictions; no direct US-HI nexus. |
| T4 · Beneficial-Ownership Register Status | stable | No US-HI-specific CTA variance or state BO-registry development identified this cycle. |
| T5 · Crypto & Digital-Asset Integrity | material_change | Federal GENIUS Act AML/sanctions NPRM for stablecoin issuers advances while Hawaii's state crypto exemption remains in force and SB2757 proposes a new state charter regime. |
| T6 · Sanctions Regime Divergence | stable | No US-HI-specific sanctions-divergence signal identified this cycle. |