D1 Sanctions
Sanctions is not yet covered for this jurisdiction in this report.
Wisconsin operates under the federal BSA/AML framework administered by FinCEN and OFAC; the Wisconsin Department of Financial Institutions (Division of Banking) licenses money transmitters under state statute.
Sanctions is not yet covered for this jurisdiction in this report.
Beneficial Ownership is not yet covered for this jurisdiction in this report.
Enabler Jurisdictions is not yet covered for this jurisdiction in this report.
Conflict Finance is not yet covered for this jurisdiction in this report.
Wisconsin's 2025 Wisconsin Act 226 (Wis. Stat. §217.12), in force since April 9, 2026, imposes a $1,000 daily transaction cap on virtual currency kiosk transactions together with mandatory fraud-warning disclosures, customer identification, live customer support, advance notice of kiosk locations to law enforcement, and a 30-day scam-victim refund obligation. Read through a digital-assets lens, this is architecture, not incident: the state has built a bespoke control layer around a single, well-documented typology, cash-to-crypto kiosk conversion, rather than responding to it through a single enforcement action. The statute stops short of a comprehensive virtual-asset-service-provider licensing regime; it neither licenses kiosk operators as full money transmitters nor exempts crypto-specific activities from the state's general Chapter 217 framework. It occupies a narrow, purpose-built middle ground.
That middle ground was not the only option on the table this cycle. A broader bill, AB471, would have exempted node operation, crypto-to-crypto exchange, blockchain software development, and mining or staking from Chapter 217 money-transmitter licensing; a rival bill, SB386, would have required kiosk operators to hold a full DFI money-transmitter license. Both failed on March 23, 2026. The bill that became law, the narrower AB968 (enacted as Act 226), grew out of a documented elder-fraud typology rather than a general crypto-industry policy push. For a digital-assets reading, the practical takeaway is that Wisconsin's licensing perimeter for crypto on- and off-ramp activity is unchanged this cycle: neither loosened by AB471's exemptions nor tightened by SB386's full-licensing requirement.
The kiosk-specific approach places Wisconsin within a broader national pattern of state-level responses to crypto-ATM-enabled fraud and laundering typologies, in which legislatures have generally favored targeted consumer-protection and transaction-limiting controls over comprehensive VASP licensing. This is worth flagging under the three-pillar lens: the visible legislative activity here is AML/CTF-adjacent and consumer-protection-oriented; no CTF- or CPF-specific finding accompanies it this cycle, and that absence is itself worth noting rather than passing over.
Watch for two things next cycle: whether Wisconsin's Department of Financial Institutions issues implementing guidance or begins an enforcement record under the newly operative §217.12 kiosk regime, and whether other states move toward Wisconsin's narrow, kiosk-specific control model rather than the fuller VASP-licensing or broad-exemption approaches that Wisconsin's own legislature considered and rejected this cycle. The failure of both AB471 and SB386 leaves open, rather than resolved, the question of how far Chapter 217 licensing should extend into other categories of digital-asset activity.
Compliance Technology & Active Defence is not yet covered for this jurisdiction in this report.
AML/CTF Regime is not yet covered for this jurisdiction in this report.
A new state-level control targets a documented cash-to-crypto laundering and elder-fraud conduit, adding a transaction-cap and CDD layer that did not previously exist for this activity class.
Compliance functions should note that neither AB471's exemption nor SB386's full-licensing approach became law; the operative control is the narrower Act 226 kiosk regime alone.
The legal scope of Chapter 217 as applied to node operation, crypto-to-crypto exchange, and mining or staking remains as it was; no new exemption or licensing obligation was created for those activities.
This is a state-level, sector-specific development rather than a systemic or reputational event; it signals continued legislative attention to crypto-kiosk fraud nationally.
Kiosk platforms operating in Wisconsin will need to implement transaction-cap enforcement, identity capture, and fraud-warning acknowledgment mechanics; the licensing status of node operation and staking infrastructure remains statutorily undefined.
Exposure concentration tied to unregulated crypto-kiosk cash flows should be reassessed downward for Wisconsin-based volume, though no comparable control exists yet for node operation, exchange, or staking activity.
Transaction-monitoring and screening workflows touching Wisconsin kiosk volume should reflect the new cap, identification, and refund-handling requirements effective April 9, 2026.
Audit trail expectations for kiosk operators now include fraud-warning acknowledgment records and 30-day refund-claim handling; control-testing scope should be updated accordingly.
Wisconsin's new virtual-currency-kiosk law imposes a $1,000 daily transaction cap and mandatory customer identification on kiosk operators.
Wisconsin's kiosk-specific statute takes effect while the broader crypto money-transmitter licensing perimeter remains unchanged following two failed bills.
Wisconsin's crypto money-transmitter licensing perimeter remains unchanged after two competing bills failed to pass this cycle.
Wisconsin enacted a targeted virtual-currency-kiosk consumer-protection and AML statute this cycle.
Wisconsin's kiosk transaction cap and identification requirements create a new technical compliance surface for kiosk operators.
A new kiosk-specific control narrows a documented crypto-ATM fraud and laundering typology in Wisconsin.
Kiosk operators in Wisconsin must now enforce a $1,000 daily cap, customer ID, and a 30-day refund process.
New documentary and refund-handling obligations apply to Wisconsin kiosk operators under Act 226.
Illustrative orientation only: as the AMLA Regulation (Reg (EU) 2024/1620) moves cross-border obliged entities toward direct or indirect EU-level supervision, alongside the directly applicable AMLR (Reg (EU) 2024/1624) and per-state transposition of the sixth AML Directive, the supervisory landscape for entities operating across multiple EU member states could shift from a purely national patchwork toward a hybrid model. This could, in principle, alter where evasion pressure concentrates, pushing it toward jurisdictions and entity types that remain outside AMLA's direct-supervision perimeter. This is architecture-over-incident framing under the intelligence register; it is not a prediction and not a statement of observed fact for any single jurisdiction, including US-WI, which sits outside the EU AML Package's direct perimeter.
Illustrative scenario for analytical orientation only. Not compliance advice, not a prediction, and not a statement of observed fact.
| Tracker | Status | Note |
|---|---|---|
| T1 · Russian Sanctions-Evasion Architecture | no_change | No material change found; not separately re-swept this cycle given JID-bound budget. |
| T2 · EU AML Package / AMLA | no_change | Not applicable to the US-WI bound JID this cycle. |
| T3 · FATF Grey List | watch | June 2026 FATF Plenary added Iraq and Bosnia and Herzegovina and removed Algeria and Namibia, bringing the list to 22 jurisdictions; sourced only via T4 aggregator, not fatf-gafi.org directly. |
| T4 · Beneficial-Ownership Register Status | no_change | No US-WI-specific beneficial-ownership development identified this cycle. |
| T5 · Crypto & Digital-Asset Integrity | material_change | Wisconsin's crypto-kiosk consumer-protection law, DFI/banking-lobby pushback against AB 471's staking carve-out, and the CFTC federal suit against Wisconsin over prediction-market classification together illustrate active US state-federal divergence on digital-asset regulatory perimeter. |
| T6 · Sanctions Regime Divergence | no_change | No EU/US/UK autonomous-listing divergence signal surfaced this cycle; not re-swept given JID-bound budget allocation. |